Walter David Alexander Lentaigne

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Lieutenant General Walter David Alexander Lentaigne, CB, CBE, DSO, (1899-1955) British Indian Army. Sometimes called "Joe" Lentaigne.

Walter Lentaigne was an officer in the British Indian Army. He fought in the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. During the second world war he commanded a battalion during the 1942 Burma Campaign and was after given command of 63rd Indian Brigade. In 1943, he was personally selected by General Wavell the British commander in India to form and command a Long Range Pentration Brigade known as the 111th Indian Infantry Brigade. In 1944 he was appointed commander of the Chindit Force and led the force until it was disbanded in 1945. He then led the Indian Army's jungle training programs as commander of the 39th Indian Infantry Division. He served in the postwar Indian Army and rose finally to the rank of Lieutenant General.

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[edit] Career Highlights

  • 1899 Born
  • 1918 Joined 4th Prince of Wales's Own Gurkha Rifles
  • 1919 Third Anglo-Afghan War
  • 1919-1924 Served in Waziristan, North West Frontier
  • 1925-1929 Garrison and Depot duty, Bakloh, India
  • 1930-1934 Served in Tirah, North West Frontier
  • 1935-1936 Attended British Army Staff College, Camberley
  • 1936-1939 Waziristan, North West Frontier
  • World War II
    • 1938-1941 Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General at General Headquarters(GHQ) India
    • 1941-1942 Instructor at the Indian Army Staff College, Quetta
    • 1942 Commanding Officer 1st Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles. Took part in the`retreat from Burma, into India
    • 1943 Temporarily commanded Indian 63rd Infantry Brigade in Imphal, India. Subsequently raised Indian 111 Infantry Brigade, a Long Range Penetration formation.
    • 1944 Led 111 Brigade in Operation Thursday, the second Chindit operation. On 24th March 1944 succeeded to command of Special Force / 3rd Indian Infantry Division, on the death of Major General Orde Wingate in an air crash. Commanded the Chindits until it they were disbanded early in 1945.
  • 1945 General Officer Commanding Indian 39th Infantry Division
  • 1946 Attended Imperial Defence College
  • 1947 Director of Military Operations and Deputy Quartermaster General at GHQ India
  • 1948-1955 Commandant of the Indian Army Staff College, Wellington.
  • 1955 Retired as Lieut-General and died soon afterwards

[edit] Lentaigne and the Chindits

Lentaigne was an outsider in the Chindit organization. He was appointed by General Wavell in the spring of 1943 during the first Chindit operation to raise 111th Indian Brigade as a second Chindit Brigade. Because Wingate was operations, he was unable to influence the choice. Wingate's dislike of Indian Army officers and in particular officers of Gurkha battalions also worked against Lentaigne. He objected to the appointment after he learned of it but was unable to do anything about.

On Wingate's death, Lentaigne took over command of the Chindit organization. He was the seniormost officer in the Chindits and also had the most command experience. General Slim described the problems involved in replacing Wingate within the Chindits: 'To step into Wingate's place would be no easy task. His successor had to be someone known to the men of Special Force, one who had shared their hardships and in whose skill and in whose skill and courage they could trust'.

Amongst his rivals for the position including Mike Calvert and Derek Tulloch there was criticism of this decision. They alleged that Lentaigne was the Chindit leader least in tune with Wingate's methods and tactics. They also pointed out that he had commanded 111 Indian Brigade in the field for only a few weeks. After the war, certain of his rivals used the comments of his Brigade Major John Masters with regard to Lentaigne's age out of context to attack him.

Lentaigne had been a distinguished battalion commander who had fought during the 1942 Burma campaign. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities lacking Staff College qualifications or significant time in command of even a battalion sized formation. Additionally, there was no clear successor to Wingate even among his closest followers. Each of them thought that they would have been (or were) Wingate's obvious successor. Field Marshal Lord Slim wrote in his memoirs of the Burma War, Defeat into Victory, that after Wingate's death, at least three officers went to him, and told him, separately and confidentially, that Wingate had designated each of them as the Divisional Commander, in the event of his death.

Much of the criticism of Lentaigne's conduct in the 1944 operations revolves around orders he was given by higher commanders, especially the irascible Limey-hating General 'Joe' Stilwell. Many of his critics fault him for carrying out orders which they personally considered contrary to Wingate's plan and strategy. He is also blamed for the eventual disbandment of the Chindits in early 1945. A critical appreciation of the Chindit operations demonstrates the fact that the whole enterprise was so infused with the undoubtedly magnetic personality of Orde Wingate, that only Orde Wingate could have stood up to someone like Stilwell, who, in the manner of most professional infantrymen, disliked all 'special' forces. Stilwell similarly played a major negative role in demoralising the Marauders, who were effectively fighting the Japanese, alongside the Chinese forces in northern Burma. After Wingate's death, it was left to Slim to visit Stilwell and Lentaigne, whom he found sulking in their respective tents, and to bring about a reconciliation that resulted in the withdrawal of 111 Infantry Brigade, which had nearly been decimated by then.

[edit] Postwar Career

In his book, Red Coats to Olive Green Colonel V Longer has listed Lentaigne as one of the handful of British General Officers to be offered attachement to, and service in, the post-Independence Indian Army. Among the others were General Sir Rob Lockhart, Lt-Gen Sir Dudley Russell, and Maj-Gen H Williams, who, as Engineer-in-Chief, was the last to retire, late in 1955.

Brigadier John P Dalvi, famous for his precise criticism, in his book, 'Himalayan Blunder' of the reasons that led to the defeat of the Indian Army in 1962 at the hands of the Chinese, wrote of how as a young officer he attended the Staff College at Wellington, and was critical of Joe Lentaigne's abrupt interruption of a senior government official's speech at a conference, asking him if the government felt secure on India's north-eastern from any possibility of a Chinese attack.

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