Template:Voting system criteria
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Majority | Monotone | Consistency & Participation | Condorcet | Condorcet loser | IIA | Clone independence | Reversal symmetry | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Approval | Ambiguous | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Ambiguous[1] | Yes |
Borda count | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No (teaming) | Yes |
IRV | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | Yes[2] | No |
Kemeny-Young | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | |
Minimax | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No (vote-splitting) | No |
Plurality | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No (vote-splitting) | |
Range voting | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Ranked Pairs | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No (see local IIA note) |
Yes | |
Runoff voting | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No (vote-splitting) | |
Schulze | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No (see local IIA note) |
Yes | Yes |
[edit] Notes
- ^ The original independence of clones criterion applied only to ranked voting methods. (T. Nicolaus Tideman, "Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules", Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 4, No. 3 (1987), pp. 185–206.) There is some disagreement about how to extend it to unranked methods, and this disagreement affects whether approval and range voting are considered independent of clones.
- ^ Provided a tie-breaker method is used that provides for the elimination of only one of the tied candidates.