Talk:Viktor Suvorov/Archive1

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Actually, his first book was Aquarium, not Icebreaker. Gene s 14:28, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Almost agreed. See my changes, including biblio. Mikkalai 18:57, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Well, from technical point of view, his books are mixture from lies and half-lies, sometimes amusing, sometimes embarassing. From aesthetic point of view, this man is just a small-time rat, cheating on his previous masters. Cheers, Dmitry

In fact, there are some essentialy problems with this writer:

1) In contradiction with facts, told in `Liberator`, there is doubt, was the author taken a part in so called `Praga Spring`, the riot in 1968.

2)In contradiction with facts, told in `Aquarium`, there is doubt, has he ever served in Spetsnaz (Special Task Force); another book (`How Rezun betrayed the Aquarium`) by Alexander Kadetov, former GRU officer too, claims both these facts to be false; I haven't found any other (independent!) affirmation or denial of that.

3) Further, there are some problems with the description of tank manoeuvre during the playwar: guys who served in Soviet tank forces too, assure the commander of tank squad does not command tanks in such way, as Rezun describes it in `Aquarium`.

4) And, finally, it should be noticed, that all `historical` books by Rezun is written in supervision of British intelligence service, and, possibly, demonstrates a correspondent opinion.

--195.2.101.102 17:18, 22 Dec 2004 (UTC)Best regards, Mārrutku Jums

Much more criticism may be found on internet. The article does write aboout criticism, but it is not the place to debunk each and every lie/error/misconception in his books. Although I agree, that the article is poor. Mikkalai 17:49, 22 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Actually, his first book was “The Liberators”, published in 1981. I know this, first because I bought a copy, and second, because I have copies of it and “Aquarium” on my desk right now, and they have their publication dates inside. Also, the correct pseudonym is VIKTOR with a K, not VICTOR with a C. I may move this page accordingly. (Alex Swanson, 9 Jan 2005)

In what language? It Russian it is called "The Liberator". If you have the books on your table, why don't you enter their ISBN numbers into the article? As or the dates, please keep in mind that the order of writing does not match the order of publishing. So the term "his first book" is ambiguous. Not to say that some of them were known through "Samizdat". Mikkalai 22:45, 9 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Sorry, forgot to write: the first written book was "Рассказы освободителя" ("The tales of the Liberator"). I don't know how it was named in translations. Mikkalai 23:08, 9 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Confirmed: Suvorov says so himself. Mikkalai 01:28, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I’m working in English, partly because his books were first published in English, in the UK, and partly because this article is in English and therefore intended for English speakers. Of course it’s possible that some were published by samizdat in the USSR, in a different order, but I don’t believe this likely; it’s difficult to see how or why this should be, especially since they appear to me to be aimed at a Western audience.

I've read them in several languages (excerpts), and I can assure you they are aimed at Russian speakers. What is more, translators appear to cut away some details and jokes (probably in their opinion the Western readers wouldn't understand). Mikkalai 01:28, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

As for "it’s difficult to see", I fully understand you. It is difficult to believe in many things that happened in the USSR. Mikkalai 01:28, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Also, please keep in mind that his last five (soon will be six) books were never published translated, primarily because they said some things extremely inconvenient and embarrassing for "Western audience". Mikkalai 01:28, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Are they all listed in this article's bibliography? The last five are sounding particularly interesting. —Michael Z. 02:54, 2005 Jan 10 (UTC)

I haven’t added an ISBN number for “The Liberators” because they differ between publications. Anyone who really cares can very easily find out on Amazon anyway. Since I have US and UK copies of “Aquarium”, however, I have given both in a short description I’ve added. The ISBN number for my (American) copy of “The Liberators” is 0-393-01759-1. (AS 10 Jan 2005 00:50 UTC)

The reason to provide ISBN is that wikipedia ISBN tool assists the search in a huge number of other sources, including libraries. Just try to click, e.g., at an ISBN link in the article you've just created: Aquarium (Suvorov). Mikkalai 01:28, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Thank you! This is the first time I’ve contributed to Wikipedia, and I didn’t realise the ISBNs were so important. I will add in the other ISBNs I have, when I enter summaries for those books (“The Liberators”, “Spetsnaz”, and “Inside the Soviet Army”). I also enjoy the style of writing in English translation; it combines a personal element with a distinctive tinge which I’ve encountered in other translations from Russian. (AS, 10 Jan 2005 01:20 UTC)

Also, I'd like to say that while I don't believe everything what Suvorov wrote, I enjoy his unique style of writing (in Russian). Besides, he mentions many facts which are not widely known to general public, and starting from them (not necessarily believing how Suvorov interprets them), one can find many other surprises. As a scientist, I appreciate his nontraditional approach. Even if he is mistaken (or deliberately misleading), it is always useful to shatter dogmas once in a while (even if with the purpose to reconfirm them). Mikkalai 01:34, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I agree with your verdict on Suvorov. However, I will also say that as a British Territorial Army soldier during the 1980’s his books were extremely valuable in teaching me about Soviet society in general, and the Soviet Army in particular; and on the (rare) occasions when I’ve been able to cross-check anything, Suvorov has always checked out. (AS, 10 Jan 2005 01:20 UTC)

Have moved page as mentioned above (Alex Swanson 01:16, 25 Jan 2005 (UTC))

1 Ethnicity of Suvorov
2 Aquarium
3 Flying Tanks
4 Arguments for and against Suvorov's theory

Ethnicity of Suvorov

Mikkalai, why do you belive his ethnicity should be mentionned? Why is it noteworthy? What does it explain? In what way will it help the reader understand the person, his acts and his ideas? Besides, Suvorov writes "Я [...] наполовину русский, наполовину украинец" (http://www.suvorov.com/articles/i001.htm). Yes, I know the rule, and it is as arbitrary as tho opposite one. And it means nothing but tribalist games.

Some think this is a tribalist game, other think it is a matter of tradition and pride. Are you saying nations don't matter any more? As for "should", it is a non-trivial fact, and there is no justification of fact deletion. Mikkalai 00:00, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC)

You say it is a non-trivial fact. But I asked you why do you believe it is an important, that is a non-trivial, fact in this context, and you didn't answer. As for specifying the ethnicity being a matter of tradition and pride, I simply note that Suvorov himself did not specify his ethnicity in the biography on its home page. I wonder if it is not because he has other accomplishments of which to be proud.--195.141.66.158 16:00, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC) (Alex)

Ethnicity is traditionally considered an important information about a person. Wikipedia is not the place to question its importance, as well as importance of other pieces of info about a person. (E.g. IMO it is not at all important that Suvorov was born on April 20. I doubt if more than 100 persons of several milliard of Earth population celebrate his birthday). This has nothing to do whether I or you think it is important or not, and I will not discuss the issue further. I suggest you to ask question at Talk:Ethnicity why some think it is important. Also, I think the answer will be an important improvement of the Ethnicity article.Mikkalai 21:07, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC)

I observe that you evade my invitation to rationaly justify your point of view and that you invoke "tradition" as your only argument. Until and unless you come with some rational arguments, or at least show that it is Wikipedia's tradition to specify the ethnic origin in similar cases, I will remove the disputed sequence. --212.41.69.75 22:08, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC) (Alex)

If you will persist in deleting true and correct information for the sole reason you think it is unimportant, this will be treated as vandalism, and you will be blocked from editing. Mikkalai 23:21, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC)

As for wikipedia tradition, the best example is Jews. Tell them about "tribalist games". Mikkalai 01:13, 5 Feb 2005 (UTC)

I've read carefuly the article on Jews and cold find no connection with the subject of our dispute. What was your point? And yes, please start the procedure to block me from editing. But meanwhile you'll have to cool down and come up with some rational arguments in favour of your position - until now you have presented none. You couldn't even justify your own argument from tradition. You have no case - yet. --212.41.69.75 10:11, 5 Feb 2005 (UTC) (Alex)

While this comment comes a bit too late, I believe it's still relevant. So, Alex, the info on Suvorov's ethnicity is absolutely relevant because it explains why Suvorov includes autobiographical references to mid-lands of Ukraine and historical references to the peasant war (Makhno vs Red Army) of twenties in his books, why he is so pathetic about Kiev, as well as hints on possible additional personal motives that had eventually made him hate the Soviet regime. --ashapochka 00:03, 5 November 2005 (UTC)

As a British observer, I'd say that in general you ought to err on the side of giving extra information. In this case, we're always aware that foreigners, especially Americans, tend to confuse "English" with "British". Even British commentators, who ought to know better, have routinely used "Russian" in the past where they really meant, and should have said, "Soviet". I think it's worth making nationality clear in any biographical information relating to the Soviet Union. Alex Swanson 23:24, 5 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Aquarium

I just finished reading Aquarium and found it a very interesting and enjoyable read. I will probably try to locate other books he has written. Suvorov's writing appears honest to me in the way that he reveals much of himself. I think he longed to be rebelious inside the cold war, totalitarian state. Suvorov seems to both revel in, yet despise tradition. When he enjoys tradition I think it is because sometimes tradition represents a currency to him; when he was promoted he had EARNED the right to observe certain traditions. Those traditions did not have to be shared by all his Soviet comrades. He exposes a darker side of himself with his growing anxieties. He fears the crematorium. Wouldn't we all. His agency sounds like a corporate sales department, though. One could almost imagine a special "Recruiter of the Month" parking slot in front of the office. I wonder how much motivation the crematorium would provide for a Fortune 500 company's sales force? I think the old Viktor Suvorov competed in the same way that any of us do; we compete on the playing field upon which we have been deposited. I would like to know, however, what transgressions he committed that increased his anxiety. I think he has not been forthcoming about something. Was it something that came out in the interrogation of the First Deputy following the initiation of evacuation? How was it that his flat was not under surveillance in the hours before his four AM escape? I found Aquarium alongside several similiar books(including one by KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko, also published by Macmillen Press)on a table inside a local resale shop. I wonder if I should try to find out who in my neighborhood is so interested in retired Soviet Spies. LOL. Bryan

Aquarium is a good place to start because of its biographical nature. It's been many years since I've read it so I'm not sure I remember what the "initiation of evacuation" was about. The Liberators also is somewhat biographical too. Inside the Soviet Army, while some may think is outdated, once understanding what the GRU is, and how it operates, still is very relevent. Also, it gives an extremely excellent look at how the politics of the Politburo operated. Inside Soviet Military Intelligence is still a very relevent work, being that GRU is still in existence, whereas KGB & CPSU bit the dust with the collapse of the USSR. The later more controversial works all deal with earlier periods of Soviet history, mostly before Suvorov's time.

As to being "forthcoming", it may be in the nature of the work. Perhaps dirty hands or something. You have to remember (and he says so in his books), that while he is intensely proud of his work and the organization he served—GRU, he is still under a death sentence for treason, and that from a state that nolonger exists (USSR). Truelly a modern oddity. One thing that comes through all his works is, his intense hatred of communism for what it did to his beloved country. nobs 05:27, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

I have removed the following: "Some of the schemes he proposes appear unlikely in face of evidence; for example, he claims that Red Army bolstered million trained paratroopers, but USSR didn't possess aerial transport capacity to carry more than few thousand: or his suggestion that young Komsomol pilots with only a glider training would fly a sophisticated warplane like Su-2 in combat." As a matter of recorded fact, the USSR during the Cold War had 8 Paratroop divisions at its disposal, but transport for only two; so the principle of an excess of one over the other is already established. Also, the Luftwaffe used gliders for pilot training during the 1930's, and the RAF in 1940 routinely put new Spitfire pilots into combat with only a few hours' training on those machines. No doubt these issues could be argued, but the nuances of such arguments would be lost on many people who read this article, and it is wrong to present it in a one-sided fashion. Alex Swanson 00:07, 12 November 2005 (UTC)

They are not 'nuances', they demonstrate how blatantly out of touch Suvorov is in many issues, especially in aerial and armoured warfare. Yes, many air forces used gliders in basic training. However, no air force sent its pilot in combat with mere youth aviation club glider training, without any navigational or weapons training, as Suvorov claims these "mass produced 'Ivanov' attack planes" would be used. You can bet those relatively inexperienced Spitfire pilots nevertheless had dozens or hundreds of hours in Miles Masters and Magisters. As for the paratroopers, disparity you mention is of rather smaller magnitude compared to that during WW2 - especially as during Cold War, Soviets had massive fleet of Aeroflot in their disposal. Of course this totally ignores what those Suvorov's "trained paratroopers" were: in reality, the number comes from parachute jumping club membership, which indeed was over a million. However, anyone should realize that learning a basics of parachute jumping from a jump tower in your teens does NOT make you an airborne commando. Examples of this kind in Suvorov's texts abound. He is a master of hyperbole and does good job impressing those who have only rudimentary knowledge of military matters, but anyone with even a basic knowledge will quickly shoot him down. --Mikoyan21 01:55, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

Both the Russian and Soviet armies are, I'm afraid, notorious for sending soldiers into combat with minimal training. As for "anyone with even a basic knowledge" rejecting his ideas, if you read the article you will discover that Suvorov was used as a consultant for a book authored by John Hackett, who I suspect was in a rather better position to judge his expertise than you are (if this is not so please feel free to explain why). On those occasions when I personally have been in a position to check what Suvorov says he has always been correct. However, the main point is that this argument is not as black-and-white as this entry suggests, and to present a genuinely impartial discussion of it would take up a disproportionate amount of space. Alex Swanson 05:38, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

Again, you don't quite understand the magnitude here - its not that Suvorov's minimally trained pilots would perform poorly in combat: its that they wouldn't get plane off the ground. Go ask any real pilot. It's not a matter of opinion. And of course, mere notion of 'minimally trained soldiers' is directly opposite of Suvorov's thesis of invincible Soviet military machine. As for Hackett, he used Suvorov as a consultant about contemporary Red Army at the time when he was one of the very few in West who had inside knowledge about that subject. When it comes to World War 2 history, Suvorov has no more (less, I'd say) credibility than David Irving. I have really hard time thinking of any Eastern Front historian who takes him seriously. And no, its not a matter of interpretation, his errors are gross and numerous. For example, he claims that German artillery was obsolete because their model number was "1918". He claims that Mannerheim Line was stronger than Maginot Line. He claims that I-16 had "three times more firepower than any other fighter". He doesn't know that Pe-2 was originally designed as an interceptor. Etcetera. I know that I don't sound like NPOV, but it is really hard to give NPOV about something so totally erraneus, much like its difficult to give a "neutral" view about Apollo moon landing hoax conspiracy. All the arguments against Suvorov's thesis are just too numerous to be listed here. You might want to google soc.history.war.world-war-ii for "Suvorov". His arguments are totally ripped apart there. --Mikoyan21 09:03, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

I wonder here if you really understand how the USSR worked. It doesn't in the least matter whether the paratroop or glider training was sufficient or not - although here in the UK amateurs routinely do take parachute jumps after only a few hours training, just for fun. What matters in a totalitarian state is whether ignorant politicians can be hoodwinked by career-minded functionaries, and this is not the same thing at all! But if you do feel that external sites have good info on the flaws in Suvorov's theses, why not put links to them in the "External Links" section at the bottom? That way, those who are interested can get a better idea of the pros and cons. Alex Swanson 22:20, 29 November 2005 (UTC)

Again, you miss the point by a mile. It is not that the training of Suvorov's mythical paratrooper forces was inadequate - there was no training. Suvorov's "million paratroopers" were mostly teenagers, not all even became soldiers, some later became pilots, many were girls. Being a paratrooper is not same as being a parachute jumper, which indeed is not all that difficult. Paratrooper is first and foremost a soldier, and it is the soldier training, not the parachuting training, which is the relevant part here. Except, apparently, in Suvorov's mind. In his logic, your local sailplane club is actually a clandestine RAF fighter pilot training centre.

I did put an external link there, as you adviced. It shows utterly what kind of gross errors and insanities Suvorov makes up. --Mikoyan21 14:39, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Flying Tanks

Surely deserve an article to themselves. Does anyone have more information on them? Bastie 04:47, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

Arguments for and against Suvorov's theory

There is a vital section I didn't find on the article page: special section of arguments for/ against. I suggest that we put forward some main points the way it is done here [[1]] for instance.Constanz 10:05, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

I suggest no such section is made until a comprehensive list of pro/con arguments can be listed. As of now, none of the arguments listed hold water - well-known military co-operation does not really "suggest" anything, Molotov-Ribbentrob -pact had number of implications and Suvorov's interpretation is only one, and rather poorly supported: and finally removal of fortifications - not true! It is true that Stalin line was being dismantled, but only because Soviet border had moved and according to then-Soviet doctrine, the line had become useless. Equipment removed from Stalin line was to be moved to the Molotov Line. Of course, if Soviets did not sacrifice any thought for defending themselves against Germany (as Suvorov claims), then why those lines were being built in the first place? --Mikoyan21 16:38, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

I suggest maintaining arguments for section, arguments seem speculative for only anti-Suvorov people like you; others, including skeptics have the right to have their own opinion. I suggest keeping it, and it is your job to develop section called arguments against. If you just remove sth you don't believe in... well, it looks as you're afraid of open and fair argument. And as for completeness -- nothing is (and needn't to be!) complete in Wikipedia, everything should be improved all the time. If you find arguments here proofless then discussion page is the proper place for unmasking them (as you've already endeavoured). So let's re-establish pro and con section immediately. I and other pro-Suvorovites shall point out pros, you and your comrades cons. Constanz 17:42, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

By the way, are you Mikoyan one of those people who still claim that Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a means for preserving peace? That Soviet Union began preparing German troops in the 1920s so that the Germans could later invade the Soviets? Do you suggest that if a defence line suddenly appears to be too far in the main land (due to the irrelevant fact that a peace-loving country has extended its borders) then a vast effort has to be put in demolishing the defences immediately, as it were a really crucial problem and as if the new lines could be established overnight? I'm inclined to think that it's your argumentation that does not hold water, even tiny drop of it.Constanz 17:56, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Let me associate myself with Constanz analysis. As this article has been presented from the beginning, it reads something like this, "Critics of Suvorov's theory point out he is a kook and a crackpot, and none of his arguments hold water". Never mind the fact much of Suvorov's information comes from archival work while at the military academy, whose doors have now been slammed shut. Suvorov ought to be able to articulate his ideas somewhat in this article. nobs 18:20, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

The arguments listed in the page are completely POV. If you people want to list pro-Suvorov arguments, at least try to gather some which make vaguely sense. If I start listing every debunk on the page, the article gets ridiculously long. Wikipedia article is not a discussion forum and not intended to be such. It is better to have discussions here. One problem with the Suvorov theory is that his books are evaluated by people who really do not understand the context. The Soviet doctrine at the time was that long, WW1 style defensive war was untenable. A major conflict would have several weeks (maybe month) long preparation phase during which both opponents made probing attacks and maneuver their main armies. After that, main forces are committed. Soviets believed that if Germany attacked, main battles would be fought relatively near border. This is why a defensive line 300km behind the border was considered useless. If war ever got that far, it was already lost. As for Molotov-Ribbentrob pact, it is well documented that Stalin wanted to make an anti-German alliance with France and Britain. Since Allied would not agree, he went for the next best thing. Whether Stalin was going to attack Germany is not material - the main argument is whether he was going to attack in 1941, and evidence is that he was not, neither he was capable of it. Important aspect in interpreting Suvorov's work is that he is a fierce patriot, and wants to prove how Russians are best at everything. It was only a fluke they had such massive debacles against Germany in 1941 - all Stalins fault! Similarly, surviving German generals would always blame Hitler from every loss.--Mikoyan21 23:33, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Agreed, let's discuss the arguments here. Firstly, we have the Molotov Ribbentrop pact here. Now, you basically claim that this pact was signed by Soviets in order to preserve peace!

You claim that Stalin wanted to make anti-German alliance... Well, why wasn't it signed then? Were the Western powers against it? Why? As far as I know they accepted almost all of Stalin's terms, the French even accepted the Soviet military occupation of the Baltic states. Only 'somehow' the neighbouring countries of Soviet Union didn't accept Soviet's military presence.

Sometimes it is claimed by your fellow thinkers that the reason Soviets rejected Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was that Poland refused Soviet military presence in their territory (i.e Soviet occupation). But what does it prove? That Poland had to be eliminated (in collaboration with Hitler!)?

If Molotov-Ribbentrop pact hadn't been concluded the Germans would have had to face war with Western powers and hostile neighbour USSR after conquering Poland. Why did the Soviets need this pact if not for annexing neighbouring countries and consequently eliminating possible cordon sanitaire between USSR and Germany?

According to you, USSR was a weak country unprepared for war, its so-called Great Leader had only most dovish intentions... And then suddenly Stalin concludes this treaty and eliminates USSR's natural defence -- so-called sanitary cordon-- so that awfully well-armed Germany could better attack USSR????

It is by firm belief that the Germans hesitated before attacking Poland as it was clear that there wouldn't be any Munich teraties any more. USSR offered a pact that ensured Germany wouldn't have to face war on two fronts. And it is fact pure and simple that MRP was signed August 23 1939 (do you admit that there were secret protocols according to which peace-loving Soviet Union annexed 3 Baltic States, half of Poland, parts of Romania etc therefore liquidating sanitary cordon?), the WW II began a week later! Peaceful intentions indeed! Constanz 09:18, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

1. Molotov-Ribbentrob pact was to provide short-term security for Soviet Union - which it did. Surely it was better for Soviet point of view to grab potential buffer zones, instead of letting Germans conquer them all. Remember, Stalin was afraid that Western Powers and Germany would gang up and attack Soviet Union. This was not such a remote prospect at the time - many important people in the West wanted to do just that.

2. Why Western Powers didn't want to ally with Soviet Union? Because USSR was a pariah state, and considered somewhat weak militarily. Many people at the time thought that communists were a bigger threat than Nazis and any such treaty would have been hugely unpopular. Besides, Poland (quite understandably) did not want any Soviet "help".

This is not idle speculation, unlike your claims. It's all in the books. Read it up and stop making fantasies. And please stop making trollish straw man arguments about "dovish and peaceful Stalin". That is not the point. The point is whether Stalin was going to invade Germany in 1941, and evidence is he was not. --Mikoyan21 16:17, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

Let me state, Mikoyan appears knowledgeable on the subject (perhaps moreso than myself in regards to Soviet military doctrine, etc.) so I would like to engage in this discussion. Mikoyan, can you address the question of Soviet tank production from 1934 onwards. Suvorov says they were building 22 per day. By contrast the United States only had 400 total in its arsenal in 1939. And the whole question Suvorov lays out that peasants and children were literally starved so military budget could be fed. All this fits with the doctrine of Socialism in One Country, and Workers World Revolution, and in fact predates the rise of fascism & German rearmament. So it's a matter of viewing the question & policy apart from Germany and international affairs, i.e. Soviet internal policy and budgetary priorities. nobs 18:06, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

It is well known that at 1939, USSR had as much tanks as rest of the world combined. This is not a secret (USA, by contrast, had weaker army than for example Portugal). However, mere presence of large force as such is not a proof of invasion intent, let alone invasion intent on some given day. USA has vastly more tanks than Canada, but does anyone take this as a proof they are about to invade Canada? Remember that Stalin and much of the Communist apparatus was paranoid about foreign invasion. There were many of such war scares in the '20s, when USSR was weak. Suvorov, of course, fails to mention that in June 22, 1941, some 20% of Soviet tank force was immobile, and 60% had various degrees of shortcomings or malfunctions. This type of lack of connection between paper numbers and reality is abundant in Suvorov's work. --Mikoyan21 18:45, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

OK, here's the part of the testimony of General Jodl, 5-6 June 1946 at Nuremberg; some of the documents Jodl places in evidence provide part of a paper trail for us to follow on the German side. Here's some of the context:

"Q. Now, when did you first hear of the Fuehrer's fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?

A. For the first time, on 29th July, 1940, on the Berghof, near Berchtesgaden.

Q. In what connection?

A. The Fuehrer detained me alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Roumania before the winter, and that the Roumanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our conduct of the war, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not concentrate our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose any such Russian intention with strong forces. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false." [2] nobs 19:30, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

I'll add a more convincing paragraph from the same source:

Q. Then, in your opinion, the Fuehrer waged a preventive war. Did later events prove that this was a military necessity?

A. It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we established later on was the certainty of an enormous Russian military preparation opposite our borders. I will dispense with details. But I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise, on the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.

Q. As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?

A. I recall approximately that there were about twenty airfields located in Eastern Poland and that in the meantime these had been increased to more than a hundred.

Q. Quite briefly, under these conditions, what would have been the result of Russia's having forestalled us?

A. I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the operations behind the front, but I will only state briefly that we were never strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometres we needed 300 divisions at least, and we never had them. If we had waited until the invasion and a Russian attack had caught us in a pincer movement simultaneously, we would certainly have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, namely, that we were threatened by this attack, then - from a military point of view - the preventive attack was also justified. The political situation was presented to us soldiers in this light. As a result, we based our military work on this premise. Constanz

Yes...so? Hey, you forgot to mention that Soviets also wanted to resolve 'Finnish issue' once and for all. What's the relevance of this? --Mikoyan21 12:24, 21 November 2005 (UTC)

Firstly, about the importance of reading books. I would recommend you some loyal Soviet Russian sources: N.Kuznetsov Nakanune (Moskva, 1966). Here are the memoirs of an admiral of the Soviet Navy, a close person to Stalin, a member of Bureau of Central Comitte by the time Zhukov was only candidate. Kuznetsov writes:

'It's out of the question -- it's not only that I.V.Stalin refused to exclude the possibility of a war against Hitler, on the contrary: he regarded it inevitable. Stalin carried out wide and thorough preparations for the war, proceeding from dates determined by himself. Hitler only crushed his calculations.'

Could it be said even more clearly? It would be worth seeing Soviet military journal VIZ (number 4, 1984) as well, where it is said again, that German Army did nothing but forestalled Soviets. Constanz 16:01, 21 November 2005 (UTC)

And about your complains about my constant use of phrases such as 'dovish Stalin'. Well, the Cold War was a proof for every thinking human being in the West that Communism was definitely as agressive an ideology as Nazism. Nobody denies that Soviet Union was an agressive state during the reign of Nikita Khruschev (the initator of the 'Thaw'), during the long era of Brezhnev (initator of so-called Peaceful co-existence). Even in 1980s, led by sickly or senile Andropov and Chernenko, Soviet Union was still regarded as a great danger.

For me its incomprehensible how one may still keep performing phrases à la 'No, Stalin didn't want to attack, No, all he wanted was to defend his country (only outside his own territory!)' All the other leaders (who ruled during the era of 'nuclear balance') were seen as possible agressors. 'But Stalin didn't!' it's still claimed. Although he had the world's biggest military, although he had made his country starve only in order to build up mighty military forces!. He would have been a sort of Soviet dove indeed if he didn't want to use the possibility to intervene in 'imperialist conflict' and 'liberate the working class'! Constanz

What I'd like to do is go back to that above source, and review the testimony prior to the above quotations, and list the intelligence documents cited that Jodl presented in evidence and were accepted by the tribunal. This gives a picture on the German side of how they interpreted the intelligence reports. nobs 19:02, 21 November 2005 (UTC)

Again Constanz, you are missing the whole point. The point is not that whether Stalin was aggressive, as he unquestionably was (though, he was not a gambler like Hitler, but rather cautious opportunist). The point is not whether Stalin viewed the war with Germany unevitable, which he certainly did (and was by no means alone with that opinion).

The point is whether Stalin was going to invade Germany in 1941. He was not. All the evidence, real or frivolous, of Stalin's non-peaceful nature, are completely irrelevant to that hypothesis. --Mikoyan21 17:08, 24 November 2005 (UTC)

Very well, we have at least agreed on two points:

1. Stalin had agressive intentions and believed in agression against his neighbours

2. Stalin 'had carried out wide and thorough preparations for the war' (Kuznetsov)

But you seem to have missed the point yourself: when admiral Kuznetsov talks in his book Nakanune (the title of which means 'Evening before', or in this context 'On the eve of war') about Soviet strategy of war (i.e 'to beat the enemy in its own country', to attack first), and Stalin's calculations, Kuznetsov does not talk about some indefinite future dates, be it 1942, 1943, or 1944. He claims that Stalin was ready to crush his enemy in 1941. (If you can refer to the opposite according to op cit, then you might do it here). Kuznetsov tells us the same as army general S.Ivanov puts it (in 1974): the German fascist leadership managed to prevent us by two weeks.

You have been repeating all the time that there's plenty of proof to claim that Stalin was not ready in 1941. Well, that's what you claim and of course you may refer to hundreds of sources.

But I on the other hand may refer to many sources as well, and Soviet sources among them. Right now, I'd like to point to an article from Soviet journal 'Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizhn', an article titled 'The Tank Philosophy', which was aimed at crushing some myths (but of course wasn't intended to show that SU had planned to attack Germany). It contains some valuable facts and figures actually proving Suvorov's statements.

You see, what I claim is that you can't just take for granted that this claim is absolutely proved -- there remains plenty of material against it. Constanz 14:25, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

1. Has anyone ever claimed any different?

2. Of course he had. He was not total idiot. By the way, Britain, Poland and France had also 'carried out wide and thorough preparations for the war'.

I explained Soviet war doctrine before. Soviet defensive doctrine centered around massive counter-offensive. Deployment of Soviet forces in June 1941 is consistent with this doctrine. It is not consistent with invasion theory: Soviet forces in Western Military Districts were 50% weaker than Axis forces facing them. You do not plan to invade when outnumbered 2 to 1, do you?

According to BBC news report from 22nd June, 1941 [3] it was the German side that was 'vastly outnumbered'. Here you are: 'Germany is thought to have committed a massive force of more than three million men, supported by more than 3,000 tanks, 7,000 guns and nearly 3,000 aircraft.

They are nonetheless vastly outnumbered by the Red Army which has about nine million men under arms with another 500,000 in reserve.' I feel tempted to ask you the same question: you do not plan do invade if you are outnumbered 3 to 1, do you?Constanz 07:24, 27 November 2005 (UTC)

There are mountains of evidence about Soviet lack of preparedness to war. Their dismal combat performance in 1941 is prime evidence. Suvorov claims that it was only because of surprise and being unprepared for defensive war, but this claim does not hold up to logic and evidence. You also might want to check out, for example, David Glantzs' book 'Stumbling Colossus' which addresses weaknesses of Soviet forces in June 1941. Glantz is supported by Ericsson, and Overy, and just about every credible scholar of Eastern Front.

Suvorov brings out Soviet offensive warplan dated May 1941 as a proof about their invasion intents. However, that plan was drawn up as pre-emptive attack because Soviets had noticed German troop concentration (which, at that point, was up to 100 divisions) and were worried about it. This, of course, is completely contrary what Suvorov claims about surprise and lack of knowledge. At any rate, Stalin did not approve any such designs. It is unclear whether it was even presented to Stalin. Hey, by the way, if Soviets were going to invade, why they were building defensive line at their border? Why they invested so much to anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns and high-altitude interceptors? Why they planned to discontinue T-34 production in 1941 and replace it with a new model? Let me explain Suvorov logic to you: if your army has 'assault rifles', it obviously means that you want to 'assault' something; and you would only want to assault something, if you are about to invade! This kind of 'brilliant' logic is splintered all around Suvorov's books. And then some wonder why serious historians don't take him seriously. --Mikoyan21 11:26, 26 November 2005 (UTC)

Your numbers are wrong, sorry to say. At June 22, 1941, total size of armed forces of Soviet Union (including Navy, Air Force and NKVD) was 5.5 million men. By contrast, total size of Heer, SS, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe was....7.2 million men. But of course that is all irrelevant. What matters is how many men you have at front. Germany committed 3.4 million men on Barbarossa. Other Axis powers (mostly Romania and Finland) committed additional 700 000 men. In Soviet side, three Western Military Districts had around 2.8 million men. So you see which side had superiority at front when war began. After the attack, Stalin announced mobilization of further 5 million or so men, but anyone (except apparently Suvorov) realizes that it takes time to arm, train and deploy these forces. --Mikoyan21 14:27, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

June 21, 1941. Soviet-German front

	Red Army	German Army (inc allies)	Relation
Divisions	190	166	1.1 : 1
Personnel	3,289,851	4,306,800	1 : 1.3
Artillery	59,787	42,601	1.4 : 1
Tanks and offensive guns	15,687	4171	3.8 : 1
Aircraft	10,743	4846	2.2 : 1