Talk:Verificationism

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Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines verificationism this way:

"verificationism. Any view which embraces some version of the verification principle. Verificationists characterize the meaning of a proposition, or the conditions required for a proposition to have meaning, in terms of the difference its truth makes to the senses, the conditions under which it is verified (or falsified) by empirical test."

Contents 1 Wittgenstein 2 Title 3 Cut material on Wittgenstein's PLA 4 Popper? 5 Criticisms?

[edit] Wittgenstein

A verificationist? Who says? Certainly he does not describe himself as such. Banno 21:26, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

No, Wittgenstein would not. But (1) what the logical positivists interpreted as early Wittgenstein's verificationism was extremely important to the development of the logical positivist's verificationism, and (2) many have seen Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument as a form of verificationism. - Atfyfe 04:04, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

I've never seen a link between private language and verificationism - ther is, for instance, no mention of verificationism in the main article linked to from here. I'd be interested in some references. It would appear, prima faci, to be contrary to meaning as use. The section ought be removed if no verifiable source can be found. Banno 09:39, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

What is the problem with having a private name for a sensation except that there is no imaginable circumstance where I use the name incorrectly. That is, I can say "I see blarg now, now, not now, now again, now, but not now" and there is no way even for myself to verify my claim. Anyway, the connection was pointed out to me in C.J. Misak's (1995) Verificationism. 53-55; 133. Apparently, it is also brought up in Peacocke (1992) A Study of Concepts. p. 222 - Atfyfe 12:27, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

You also could not tell that you were using the word incorrectly. Sounds quite a stretch to me. But if someone re-writes the section so it says something like "C.J. Misak's (1995) Verificationism. 53-55; 133, claims that Wittgenstein is a verificationist" I would drop the objection. Banno 12:38, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

Done. - Atfyfe 12:42, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

No, not done. What you have provided is an iteration of part of the private language argument(is it a direct quote? if so it should be in a block quote) which does not mention verificationism. It is not sufficient to support the claim that the private language argument "happens to be an example of later Wittgenstein's verificationism." Indeed, on thinking about it, I am unhappy with the source: secondary, or better, tertiary sources would be preferred in this case. See No original research: Primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. Re-inserting disputation. Banno 20:57, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

It's a book on the history of verificationism! Why else would Wittgenstein's PLA appear in the book? I'm not an idiot, I just didn't think any of the explicit passages where the author calls Wittgenstein a verificationist were relevant to the article. I wasn't trying to support the claim that Wittgenstien was a verificationist with that direct quote (for that you can check the book I referenced), instead I was trying to give an idea of what Wittgenstein's PLA was in the article.

Furthermore, the suggestion that I am violating the "No original research" policy is absurd. I am not the one making the claim that Wittgenstein was a verificationist, I am citing a respected academic work on the history of the very topic of the article (i.e. verificationism). I've provided you with the source, but I'll go ahead and do your work for you. Anyway, I don't have my physical copy of the book with me, but luckily amazon.com lets me read portions of the book. Here is a passage where Misak explicitly uses the term "verificationist" and "Wittgenstein" in the same sentence:

Wittgenstein's verificationism, however, survives the loss of its initial rationale. In his later view of meaning, both Wittgenstein (at times) and many of his interpreters see a different argument for a verificationist criterion. It is worth examinging this position carefully, as sustained arguments for verificationism are rare. (Misak 1995:52)

I'll leave it to you to remove your disputation. - Atfyfe 00:29, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

The issue is discussed by Kenny in Wittgenstein. The verificationist views found in Bermerkungen are pretty much rejected by the time of the Investigations, and the mature PLA:

As we have seen, a crucial part is played in the private-language argument by Wittgenstein's advice 'Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.' This advice has a verificationist ring, and some philosophers have thought that the private-language argument depends, in the last analysis, on verificationist premises. But Wittgenstein's advice is not meant to be followed by the question 'How would you ever find out?' but by the question 'What possible difference would it make?' The private-language argument does indeed depend on premises carried forward from Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy; but they are not peculiar to the verificationist period of the 1930s but date back to the time of the picture theory of the proposition in the 1910s

That's on p.195. I'm not accusing you of original research, but rather questioning the suitability of a wording in the article that declares Wittgenstein a verificationist. As Kenny shows here, it's not that simple. Banno 10:24, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

Would you be willing to go along with my re-write? [1] Banno 20:32, 1 August 2007 (UTC)

This looks good. I like that we have two different angles on the PLA represented. I changed the wording a bit. I am not sure if Kennedy is representative of the collective opinion of all those closer to Wittgenstein. - Atfyfe 21:31, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Title

Shouldn't this page be either Verification theory of meaning or Verificationism? Banno 21:51, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

I would stay away from "Verification theory of meaning" since not all the forms of verificationism discussed here are theories of meaning (e.g. Popper). However, moving it to Verificationism might be good. - Atfyfe 04:02, 24 July 2007 (UTC)

Done. Banno 20:37, 1 August 2007 (UTC)

Verifiability theory of meaning redirects to this page, so it might be wise to at least state something about it in the introduction, or otherwise clarify the difference between it and the other terms, for instance, the possibly more generalized nature of the term, if it is decided that this is the case in common usage. Mmortal03 (talk) 12:48, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Cut material on Wittgenstein's PLA

"However, Private Language by its nature is a pseudo concept. the concept and definition of 'language' is the fact that it isnt private."

Well, that is exactly what Wittgenstein's PLA is supposed to show. So I am not sure what the "however" is doing here. Secondly, not everyone would agree that there cannot be a private language.

"A private language is not open to be verified or falsified, therefore making it meaningless."

Okay.

"Language as Ayer suggests is talking about sense data. this sense data is only labeled via ostensive verification and agreed publicly and a definition by more than one person. Therefore the idea of a language that is private only to one person is both a contradiction and a self-refutation."

I am not sure why Ayer was brought into this section out-of-the-blue and I am not sure if relying on the contentious issue of "sense-data" is the right way to give exposition to Wittgenstein's PLA.

- Atfyfe 07:11, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Popper?

I don't know much about this all, but isn't Popper a falsificationist? 89.27.19.182 (talk) 03:09, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Yes. Although he might have been part of the "Vienna circle" when he was young, he soon decided he was not wild about verificationism and then promoted falsification instead. Why?--Filll (talk) 05:29, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Well, obviously because he's listed as a "notable verificationist" which would seem to me a mischaracterization; yes, the article makes note of the (unsourced) fact that Popper is often lumped together with verificationist, but I don't know if that qualifies as criteria to include him in that category here as well. 89.27.19.182 (talk) 00:34, 3 March 2008 (UTC)

The difference between Popper and the other verificationists is minimal. Both rule out "untestable" propositions as illegitimate (whether you cash out "untestable" as not verifiable, not falsifiable, or not both). Compare these philosophers to those who do think untestable propositions are perfectly legitimate. The terminology is unfortunate since "verificationism" implies that these philosophers mean "not verifiable" by "not testable", but that is just how the terminology evolved. Here is a good standard for if someone is a verificationist: Do they rule out the "The universe uniformly doubled in size ten minutes ago" as an illegitimate hypothesis? - Atfyfe (talk) 04:02, 3 March 2008 (UTC)

Ok, I see that and if it's a matter of (unfortunate) terminology then so be it. Still, if I've understood correctly, Popper explicitly didn't rule out metaphysical statements as meaningless or not belonging to science, only that they be rejected if the testable (in this case, falsifiable) statements they are dependent on are rejected too. Thus, according to Popper, we can have statements about "space-time" or "electrons" or "aether", but if the hypotheses that apply these notions fail, the metaphysical notions must go as well. Well, go figure, I'm not in a position to really argue this anyway. 89.27.19.182 (talk) 18:00, 3 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Criticisms?

Could someone add a section discussing the historical criticisms of verificationist thought? Mmortal03 (talk) 12:36, 11 March 2008 (UTC)