Talk:Vagueness

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Consider Lewis' example of a cloud Is this supposed to be David Lewis? His paper is merely referred to as "(1988)"; shouldn't this be in the References section (likewise for Evans's paper)? Best, Andrei Schtoltz 13:29, 3 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Case for a merger?

There are four articles in Wikipedia dealing with essentially one and the same philosophical topic: Imprecise language, Paradox of the heap, Vagueness and Continuum fallacy. (Sorites paradox redirects to Paradox of the heap.) I have done a little editing of the Vagueness page, but really I think all four pages should be merged, or that at very least, they be rationalised to two pages, one a longer one on the philosophical problem of vagueness, and the other a quick summary of the sorites paradox with a link to the vagueness page for a more in-depth discussion. What do people think? Matt 9 Nov. 2005

Imprecise language isn't necessarily the same as vagueness. Imprecision could also be about ambiguity, which is (at least conventionally) a different subject. Lucidish 01:48, 9 November 2005 (UTC)
Ambiguity should certainly be distinguished from vagueness, and Ambiguity should continue to have a separate page. Whether the word "imprecision" encompasses just vagueness, or both vagueness and ambiguity, is a debatable (and not particularly interesting) question. What matters is there are two distinct phenomena, vagueness and ambiguity. Now, the current Imprecise language page talks as if imprecise language just is vagueness, and consists of larger cocks of football players of the sorites paradox, which already has its own page (Paradox of the heap, to which Sorites paradox redirects). (The sorites of course arises from vagueness rather than from ambiguity.) I suggest, then, that the following solution would both reduce the superfluity of pages, and take into account your point about ambiguity possibly being one kind of imprecision. I suggest that the Imprecise language page be turned into a page which contains simply the following message: "See Vagueness or Ambiguity." It seems to me that the Vagueness page does a better job at discussing vagueness than the current Imprecise language page does, and the Ambiguity page certainly does a better job at discussing ambiguity than Imprecise language currently does (the latter doesn't discuss it at all). By changing Imprecise language to a thing that merely provides a links to each of these two pages, and leaving it at that, no-one will be tempted to duplicate at Imprecise language the content already on either of those pages. And this would also take into account your opinion that "imprecise language" encompasses two distinct phenomena. Matt 10 Nov. 2005
I don't mind turning "imprecise language" into a disambiguation page (though the irony is striking). If there are any other semantic-logical fallacies, they could be listed under that page as well. IE, "equivocation".
Not sure this is just "opinion". Pretty clear that's what the words mean. Lucidish 00:01, 10 November 2005 (UTC)
"Precise", to my mind, suggests "the opposite of vague". It suggests "sharp boundaries". But I do not have a very strong view on the matter, and in fact, the change which I have just suggested (turning "imprecise language" into the suggested disambiguation page) is one which makes Wikipedia come to reflect your own view, that "imprecise language" encompasses "ambiguity". It currently does not reflect that view at all. If I was wondering what "imprecise language" was, at the moment, and went to look it up on Wikipedia, I would come away with the impression that it is vague, sorites-prone language. Matt 10 Nov. 2005
On further thought, I do not think the page I am suggesting Imprecise language become should be entitled "disambiguation page". "Ambiguity" is not one of two distinct meanings of "imprecise language". Rather, if you are right about the meaning of "imprecise language", ambiguity is one of two or more types of imprecise language. Therefore, my proposal is that the imprecise language page should look something like this:
"Imprecise language
Language might be said to imprecise because it exhibits one or more of the following features: vagueness; ambiguity. Please see the individual pages on vagueness and ambiguity for an in-depth discussion."
I had originally thought that imprecise language could redirect straight to vagueness. But I am willing to take into account the possibility that the word "imprecise" might be used to describe a statement or word that is ambiguous. Therefore I propose the above page. Matt (now Matt9090). 10 Nov. 2005
I should clarify. A "disambiguation page" is a technical term used by Wikipedia. It means a page that links to other, related pages. Exactly like your suggestion. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disambiguation_page
OK then. Matt9090 11 Nov. 2005

[edit] Improvements of the "imprecise language" page

I don't see how the second and third sentences of your second paragraph are supposed to be mutually exclusive. Lucidish 16:09, 10 November 2005 (UTC)
Pembroke welsh corgis and cardigan welsh corgis are two types of welsh corgi. But suppose I have one of each. If I say, "I have two welsh corgis", I have not said anything ambiguous. That is because: It is not the case that (the term) "pembroke welsh corgi" and (the term) "cardigan welsh corgi" are two distinct senses or meanings of (the term) "welsh corgi". Similarly, (the term) "giraffe" is not one of multiple distinct senses of (the term) "animal" - even though giraffes are types of animal. It is not the case that (the term) "animal" has multiple distinct meanings or senses, one for each type of animal. Matt9090 11 Nov. 2005
That which is a different type from another thing, is a different meaning from it. In your example, "pembroke welsh corgi" and "cardigan welsh corgi" are both different types and different meanings. Whether or not the genus of those two species, when uttered, is ambiguous / vague, depends on speaker and interpretive goals, as far as I'm concerned. Lucidish 23:38, 11 November 2005 (UTC)
Sure, "Pembroke welsh corgi" ("PWC") has a meaning which is distinct from the meaning of "cardigan welsh corgi" ("CWC") (which is just to say that "PWC" is not synonymous with "CWC"); and PWCs are types of WC; and CWCs are types of WC. However, this does not entail that "WC" is ever ambiguous as between "PWC" and "CWC". In contrast "bank" is ambiguous as between "riverbank" and "moneybank", because "bank" sometimes (i.e. in some contexts of utterance) means "riverbank" and sometimes means "money-bank". You might say that riverbanks and money-banks are (in a manner of speaking) two "types" of bank (sort of). But even if you said this, it would still not follow that having types X & Y entails being ambiguous as between "X" and "Y". Are there contexts in which an utterance of "Welsh Corgi" just means "Pembroke Welsh Corgi"? Well, even if there were, it still is not the case that, just because X is is a type of Z and Y is a type of Z, "Z" is, or ever is, ambiguous as between "X" and "Y". This is shown by the example of "animal", "giraffe" etc. There is no context in which an utterance of "animal" just means "aardvark", even though aardvarks are types of animal. Consider another example. Odd positive integers and even positive integers are two types of positive integer. However there is no context in which the (a competent utterance of) "positive integer" just means "odd positive integer", and there is no context in which "positive integer" just means "even positive integer". Therefore, even though odd positive integers and even positive integers are two different types of positive integer, it is not the case that "positive integer" is ambiguous as between "odd positive integer" and "even positive integer".
Now consider the word "imprecise". Let's grant that vague language and ambiguous language are two distinct types of imprecise language. This does not automatically entail that (the term) "imprecise language" is ambiguous as between "vague language" and "ambiguous language". It could be that vague language is one type of imprecise language, in the same way that odd positive integers are one type of positive integer.
The above explains why the term "disambiguation page" seems to me to be a misnomer, when applied to a page entitled "Z" which serves to redirect users to pages entitled "X" and "Y", where X and Y are two distinct types of Z, but "Z" is not ambiguous (or at least not ambiguous as between "X" and "Y") - and so is literally in no need of disambiguation between "X" and "Y".
Now, I'm not sure that the phrase "imprecise language" is, properly speaking, ambiguous as between "vague language" and "ambiguous language". If it is ambiguous as between anything, then it is as between these two senses: (1) a broad sense "imprecise-1 language", such that vague language and ambiguous language are two distinct types of imprecise-1 language; and (2) a narrow sense "imprecise-2 language", synonymous with "vague language", such that ambiguous language is not a type of imprecise-2 language. But you argued earlier that the meaning of "imprecise language" was 'pretty clear', and you seemed to be saying that that meaning is meaning (1). I am willing to go along with that. It seems to me it would be handy to have a word with just meaning (1), and I am willing to treat "imprecise language" as such a word (and if you are right it is such a word already, and perhaps indeed it is). But in that case, the label "disambiguation page" would be a misnomer for the resulting page. However...
if it is common practice at Wikipedia to label pages entitled "Z" "disambiguation pages" even where "Z" is not ambiguous, then I am willing to go along with this for the sake of eliminating the superfluous content now at the Imprecise language page. I would prefer, if possible, to reform the practice, if it is a practice, of using the word "disambiguation" is this too broad way. But I do not propose to prioritise this rather daunting task over the more easily achievable task of getting rid of the superfluous content at the Imprecise language page. Regards Matt9090 12 Nov. 2005
Certainly, these are all things to be sensitive to when the example warrants it. I agree that it does seem outrageous, in your example, if a person were to use the word "animal" and by the use of that word mean "corgi".
But I think the case of "imprecision" is quite a bit different. While I think it's agreed that, by the relevant sense, the meaning of the word "imprecision" includes both vagueness and ambiguity, it does not seem to be an error to use the term in one way or the other exclusively. And speaker's meaning is still a sort of meaning.
The reason for that is that the two concepts overlap to such a significant extent that, effectively, equivocation between the two is manageable. That is to say, what can be looked at as an issue of vagueness, can also be looked at as an issue of ambiguity; and vice-versa. Indeed (for example), the supervaluationists talk about vagueness as ambiguity writ large.
So, when you say "Let's grant that vague language and ambiguous language are two distinct types of imprecise language", I find it very hard to agree. First of all, because I don't believe that "vagueness" or "ambiguity" have anything to do with the words themselves at all - they have to do with conversation goals! Second, if I were forced to characterize the difference in terms of language itself, I would say that the two are indistinct types. Lucidish 23:46, 12 November 2005 (UTC)


I think that using “imprecise” just to mean “ambiguous” would be an unconventional way of using “imprecise”; though not as unconventional as using “animal” to mean “giraffe”. I admit that the overlap between these concepts makes it less clear cut than what is going on with "animal" etc..
Recall your original suggestion:
"Imprecise language isn't necessarily the same as vagueness. Imprecision could also be about ambiguity, which is (at least conventionally) a different subject. Lucidish 01:48, 9 November 2005 (UTC)."
I (mis)took this to be an assertion that ambiguity and vagueness are two different, i.e. distinct subjects, i.e. distinct types of imprecise language. But I see now that you would qualify this statement - perhaps in something like the following way.
Perhaps you would say that it depends on how you are using the word "vagueness". I would agree with that. Though I would add that some ways of using words are more unconventional than others, and the more unconventional one’s use of words is, the more liable one is to be misunderstood by others.
Wrt “vagueness” and “ambiguity”, I think there is a narrow sense of "vague", viz. "sorites-proneness"; and the concept of sorites-proneness is distinct from the concept of ambiguity. Analytic philosophers of language writing about (what they call) vagueness seem to have this narrow sense in mind, and seem to use the word "precise" as expressing the opposite of this narrow sense (i.e. "non-vague") - or that is my impression - even if some supervaluationists think vagueness is really a type of ambiguity. But I think there is also a broader sense of the word "vague" - which arguably has for its opposite the word "imprecise" in its broader sense - in which broad sense I might be asked to "be less vague" as a way of asking me to disambiguate between two distinct meanings, e.g. "bank"/"bank". Matt9090 15 Nov. 2005
I think we pretty much agree. The difference between two equally applicable senses of a word is a genuine ambiguity which is not vague. But other kinds of ambiguity, where the line between the two related meanings isn't especially crisp, overlap substantially with vagueness.
The question of the hour is, if vagueness and ambiguity can be considered their own concepts, then what about equivocation and amphiboly? Lucidish 00:14, 15 November 2005 (UTC)
I think the concept of equivocation is subtly different to that of ambiguity. Equivocation to me connotes deliberate ambiguity. If someone makes an unintentionally ambiguous utterance - i.e. while intending only one particular meaning, but not realising that their utterance might be interpreted in multiple ways - I would tend not to think of that as equivocation.
I can't say I've used the word 'amphiboly' too often. The Oxford Shorter E.D. def. gives the impression that it could be used to denote either ambiguity or equivocation. Matt9090 17 Nov. 2005
I like that distinction you made wrt "equivocation". If we can find a citation for that, preferably from a logic text, then it's worth putting in the "imprecise language" page. My logic text uses it in a slightly different way, describing it as "accidental or deliberate" confusion of meanings of a word or phrase in the context of an argument. The difference, it seems, is that equivocation happens within an argument, while imprecise language can be used up and beyond that.
Amphiboly is a technical term in logic to describe premises in a syllogism that are left implicit (as implicatures). For example, if I say to you:
I would never ride in an expensive cars.
Therefore, I'm not going to ride in your stupid Porsche.
This is an example of an amphiboly because a key premise ("Porsches are expensive cars") is left unsaid. I'm just wondering if / how that relates to equivocation, and whether or not it's a matter of language being imprecise. It's a bit more like the speaker is being uncooperative, somehow.
I'm still unsure whether or not an unclear conclusion is itself an amphiboly.
A few other technical terms worth throwing in:
a) Ambiguity wrt accent. When you italicize a certain word in such a way that it totally changes the meaning of the phrase.
b) Fallacies of composition and division, which is sort of complicated, having to do with (I think) being ambiguous wrt the scope of quantifiers. Lucidish 20:51, 19 November 2005 (UTC)
Good work on the Imprecise language page.
Are you sure about 'amphiboly' though? I thought when you leave some premisses implicit that is called an enthymeme (alternatively, an elliptical argument). My Shorter OED defines amphiboly as 'see amphibology ', which it in turn defines as '1 An ambiguity; a quibble... 2. Ambiguous wording; equivocation.' I know technical uses of words might not always appear in the dictionary; but I am just wondering whether 'amphiboly' really is the technical term for implicit-premissed argument. Cf. the Shorter OED's definition of 'enthymeme': '1 Logic. A syllogism in which one premiss is not explicitly stated. 2 Rhet. An argument based on merely probable grounds.' Matt 22 Nov. 2005
Thanks.. I'm quite positive that "amphiboly", when used in the sense of an informal fallacy of ambiguity, is used by at least some people to describe the phenomena we're talking about (Copi and Cohen, "Introduction to Logic", 11th edition). In this sense it seems to be a synonym with ethymeme arising from a slightly different tradition. Maybe the difference (if any) is the emphasis on it being a fallacy. Lucidish 05:13, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] History

It would be good to have a section on the history of the problem. E.g. if memory serves, Aristotle discussed the problem of vagueness, giving the example of a sea anemone as a vague case for the distinction between animal and plant since it has (acc. to Aristotle) some of the properties of animals (sense perception) but not others (motility). I would think there are plenty of other authors who made contributions between then and the contemporary (or nearly so) authors discussed in the current article.Crust 17:35, 28 December 2005 (UTC) --203.187.196.100 15:55, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] On Language

This article is rather well written, but it does not read like an encyclopedia entry. I suggest that the entry be re-worded and avoid the use of first-person pronouns. ---eniarrol- 16:25, 9 October 2007 (UTC)