Universal prescriptivism

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R. M. Hare

Universal prescriptivism, often simply called prescriptivism, is a meta-ethical theory about the semantic content of moral statements. It holds that moral statements function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable — whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts obtain. Since the concept was introduced by philosopher R. M. Hare in his 1952 book The Language of Morals, it has been compared to emotivism and to the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant.^[1]^[2]

For example, take the moral proposition "Killing is wrong". According to an emotivist, such a statement merely expresses an attitude of the speaker. It only means something like "Boo on killing!" However, according to prescriptivism, the statement "Killing is wrong" means something more like "Don't kill". What it expresses is not primarily an emotion, it is an imperative. A value-judgment might also have descriptive and emotive meanings, but these are not its primary meaning.

Hare would allow utilitarian considerations to enter into such a formulation, but he would not base the formula or his ethical theory solely on a principle of utility. Hare believed that all of our ethical propositions ought to conform with logic.

Peter Singer has expressed sympathy with Hare's position,^[3] though he is more strictly representative of the preference utilitarian school.

[edit] Notes

^ Brandt, Theory, 221: "[The Language of Morals] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"
^ Brandt, Theory, 224: "Hare's [universalizability] proposal is reminiscent of Kant's view that an act is morally permissible if and only if the maxim in terms of which the agent thinks of it could possibly serve as a universal rule of conduct, and if the agent is prepared to accept it as such."
^ Singer, Peter, Practical ethics, second edition 1993, Preface

[edit] References

Brandt, Richard (1959). "Noncognitivism: The Job of Ethical Sentences Is Not to State Facts", Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. LCCN 59-075.