United States v. Williams

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For articles on other court decisions under this name, see United States v. Williams (disambiguation).
United States v. Williams
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 30, 2007
Decided May 19, 2008
Full case name: United States v. Michael Williams
Citations: U.S.
Prior history: Defendant convicted and sentenced, No. 04–20299, (S.D. Fla., Aug. 20, 2004); rev'd, 444 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006)
Holding
Federal statute prohibiting the pandering of child pornography was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Court membership
Chief Justice: John Glover Roberts, Jr.
Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito
Case opinions
Majority by: Scalia
Joined by: Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito
Concurrence by: Stevens
Joined by: Breyer
Dissent by: Souter
Joined by: Ginsburg
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I; 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (PROTECT Act of 2003)

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. ___ (2008) was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a federal statute prohibiting the "pandering" of child pornography[1] (offering or requesting to transfer, sell, deliver, or trade the items) did not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, even if a person charged under the code did not in fact possess child pornography which to trade.

The Court overturned a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the statute was facially void for overbreadth and vagueness, having reasoned that there is no First Amendment protection for offers to engage in illegal transactions[2] and that banning "the collateral speech that introduces such material into the child-pornography distribution network" does not in fact criminalise a "substantial amount of protected speech."

Contents

[edit] Important Notes/Dicta

The Court further stated that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) would not be construed to punish the solicitation or offering of "virtual" (computer generated/animated) child pornography, thus comporting with the holding of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).

The Court assured a worried nation that "But an offer to provide or request to receive virtual child pornography is not prohibited by the statute. A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means 'a protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed,' post, at 13. Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever." (emphasis supplied) Williams at 17.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)
  2. ^ see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)

[edit] External links

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