United States v. Shipp
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United States v. Shipp (203 U.S. 563)[1] was a ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States with regard to events surrounding a lynching in Tennessee. It is the only criminal trial of the Supreme Court in its history.
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[edit] Background
Ed Johnson, a black man, had been convicted in Hamilton County, Tennessee of the rape of a white woman on February 11, 1906 and sentenced to death. On March 3, 1906, Johnson filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated. Specifically, he alleged that all blacks had been systematically excluded from both the grand jury considering the original indictment against him and the trial jury considering his case. He further argued that he had been substantively denied the right to counsel, as his lawyer had been too intimidated by the threats of mob violence to file motions for a change of venue, a continuance, or a new trial, all of which could be reasonably expected under the circumstances, meaning that he (Johnson) was, in effect, about to be deprived of his life without due process.
Johnson's petition was initially denied on March 10, 1906, and he was remanded to the custody of Hamilton County Sheriff Joseph F. Shipp, with the stipulation that Johnson be given 10 days to file further appeals.[2] His appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed by Justice Harlan on March 17, and subsequently by the entire court on March 19. However, despite being advised of this ruling by telegram on that date, and the case and the ruling being given full coverage by Chattanooga's evening newspapers that day, the case purported that Shipp and his chief jailer nonetheless allowed a mob to enter the Hamilton County jail and lynch Johnson on the city's Walnut Street Bridge.
The court felt that this action constituted contempt of court in that Sheriff Shipp, fully knowledgeable of the court's ruling, nonetheless chose willfully to ignore his duties to protect a prisoner in his care.
[edit] Argument
Shipp's actions resulted in his prosecution by the United States Department of Justice. Included as defendants were his chief jailer and such members of the lynch mob as could be reasonably identified. When the case came to the Supreme Court, the government was represented by both United States Solicitor General Henry Hoyt and Attorney General William H. Moody. Shipp's attorneys argued that the Supreme Court was not competent to hear the case, as it was now a party to the case in that it was involved in the action as a plaintiff rather than as a court.
[edit] Holding
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Harlan, the court held that it was not a party in any sense that would create a conflict of interest, in that members of the court were not affected by Shipp's actions in any way in their persons (Shipp's actions were not a threat to the justices personally but only to their ruling and hence to the authority of the court) and thus they were not "interested parties" in any sense which would affect their competence with regard to the case. The prosecution of Shipp was allowed to proceed.
[edit] Impact
Observers have concluded that this is about as close as to conducting an actual criminal trial itself. It also again reiterated the principal that the Supreme Court could always intervene in state capital cases where there was a question of the violation of the right to due process contained in the United States constitution.
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ U.S. v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165 (1906). See also "U.S. v. Shipp," 214 U.S. 386, 29 S.Ct. 637 (1909).
- ^ http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/newsejback.htmlhttp://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/newsejback.html ]