U.S Plan of Campaign for 1815

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The U.S. Plan of Campaign for 1815 was forestalled by the signing of the Treaty of Ghent which brought an end to the War of 1812.

After two years of the war, the Burning of Washington drove Secretary of War John Armstrong, Jr. from office. He was replaced by James Monroe. Monroe and Major General Jacob Brown conferred in Washington from February 6 to February 11, 1815. Both men appeared to have similar ideas, although Monroe had already expressed them when he was temporarily Secretary of War at the end of 1812.

In essence, the plan was to concentrate all the regular units of the U.S. Army in the north, at a point on the Saint Lawrence River, where they would bar the river to British boat traffic. The most probable location for this concentration would be Ogdensburg, to which crude roads ran from Plattsburgh, on Lake Champlain and Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario.

Had the Americans succeeded in cutting the Saint Lawrence, all British posts west of the Saint Lawrence would ultimately starve and wither.

A letter from Monroe to Brown, dated February 10 and confirming the instructions to Brown, read in part:

"Having had much personal communication with you, relative to the operations of the next campaign, there remains little to be said in this letter, more than to give a general outline of the preparatory measures which it is necessary to adopt, to give effect to the plan which it is intended to pursue.

"The great object to be attained, is to carry the war into Canada, and to break the British power there, to the utmost practicable extent. After making due allowance for the number of British forces, for the difficulties attending the passage of the Saint Lawrence, and the immature state of our preparations, I think that we may enter Canada, and gain a decided superiority this next campaign. To what extent it may be carried, is uncertain, as it will depend upon many circumstances, of which we can form no estimate at this time. It seems probable, however, that if we secure the landing of a great force, and beat them completely in the field at any point between Kingston and Montreal, or wherever we may select, we shal be able to drive them into Quebec ...

"It is believed that the British commander cannot bring into the field, between the points above mentioned, an army of more than 20,000 regular troops, and 10,000 militia; and that to do this, he must weaken his posts above and below these points. I am satisfied, that this is an [sic] high estimate of the British force now there. If we can form an army of 40,000 men, to bear on that district of the country, of which 15,000 are regular troops, and the residue volunteers organized as regular troops, and militia, we must beat their main army.

"At every other point above Kingston, our superiority may be whatever we choose to make it; and altho' it will [not] consist principally, or in any considerable force of regular troops, it will be of a character to press the enemy, interrupt his supplies, fight and demolish him. ...

"If we succeed in the invasion of Canada, we take the war from our seaboards at once. It is only by making a defensive war there [i.e. on the northern frontier] that we enable the enemy to detach troops here."

[edit] Comments

Comments on this plan must of course remain speculation, but one or two points are worth considering:

• On the favourable side, the American leadership in 1815 would be far better than in late 1813, when the last American attempt to concentrate their forces for a campaign on the Saint Lawrence had failed ingloriously. Also, the regular U.S. Army units were by now well-trained and experienced.
• On the negative side, the United States was undoubtedly war-weary, and it is unlikely that volunteers from the militia (or even regulars) could be mustered in the numbers Monroe proposed; or perhaps that sufficient transport, munitions and supplies for the force could be obtained.
• The experience of the previous years' campaigns throws doubt on Monroe's assertions that forces consisting predominantly of militia could maintain pressure on British positions west of the Saint Lawrence. Indeed, Monroe may well have been risking nasty local reverses.
• Monroe may also have underestimated the possible numbers of British regulars that Brown might have to face. He could not possibly have forecast Napoleon Bonaparte's return to power in France which would cause the urgent withdrawal of two thirds of the British troops in Canada, although this occurred only after the Treaty of Ghent was signed.

[edit] Aftermath of the War

On the British side, the threat was taken very seriously. The Lieutenant-Governor for Upper Canada, Major General Frederick Philipse Robinson wrote to the British Secretary of State, Lord Bathurst,

"Had the War continued, it was the intention of the American Government to have interrupted our Transport Communication by the St. Lawrence to the Lower Province in the event of which an attempt at inland conveyance must have been made, or we must have endeavoured to dislodge the Enemy from the South Shore of the River by transferring the seat of War thither. The American General Brown, thinking secrecy no longer necessary, explained to me all that had been in contemplation for the ensuing Campaign, which in my opinion would have answered their expectations."

This alarming scenario, together with complaints made during the war by Sir George Prevost, Commander-in-Chief in Canada, about the inadequacy of the Saint Lawrence as a transport route, spurred the British Government to develop the Rideau River as an alternate route to Kingston. This work was not completed until 1832, at vast expense.

The Americans also proceeded with the construction of all-weather military roads from Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburgh, but these were soon made obsolete by commercially-developed canals and railroads.

Given the near parity in troop numbers which Monroe appeared to expect, it seems possible that had the war continued, a conflict similar to, but larger in scale and hence even bloodier than the Battle of Lundy's Lane, would have been fought near Ogdensburg or Prescott.

[edit] Sources

The Defended Border, ed. Morris Zaslow, Macmillan of Canada, ISBN 0-7705-1242-9 (article by C.P. Stacey, originally published in the American Historical Review, vol. 46)