Two-level game theory
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Two-level game theory is a political model of international conflict resolution between liberal democracies derived from game theory and originally introduced in 1988 by Robert Putnam.[1]
The model views international negotiations between liberal democracies as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the intra-national level (eg. domestic) and the international level (eg. between governments). Over domestic negotiations, the executive absorbs the concern of societal actors and builds coalitions with them; at the international level, the executive tries to implement these concerns without committing to anything that will have deleterious effects at home. Win-sets occur when the concerns of actors at both levels overlap, a condition under which an international agreement is likely.
[edit] References
- ^ Robert D. Putnam. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." International Organization. 42(Summer 1988):427-460.
|
||||||||||||||||||||
