Truong Dinh
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| Trương Định | |
|---|---|
 Trương Định, 19th century Vietnamese anti-colonial military commander |
|
| Alternate name(s): | Trương Công Định |
| Date of birth: | 1820 |
| Place of birth: | Binh Son, Quang Ngai, Vietnam |
| Date of death: | August 19, 1864 |
| Place of death: | Bien Hoa, Vietnam |
| Major organizations: | Nguyen Dynasty |
| Religion: | Confucianism |
| Footnotes: | Refused an appointment to a mandarin post in An Giang |
Trương Định, sometimes known as Trương Công Định or Trương Đăng Định (1820–August 19, 1864) was a mandarin of the Nguyen Dynasty of Vietnam under Emperor Tu Duc. He is best known for his defiance of the emperor in leading a rebel army in southern Vietnam. This came after the Treaty of Saigon of 1862 saw Tu Duc cede three southern provinces to become the French colony of Cochinchina. Dinh refused to recognise the treaty and fought on, until he committed suicide to avoid capture when his men were surrounded. Dinh's actions in disregarding the treaty caused much debate among historians, Vietnamese and French officials alike. The success of Dinh in his continued insurgency led French officials to claim that Tu Duc was secretly assisting Dinh and thereby violating the treaty, a pretext the French used to seize a further three provinces in 1867. Vietnamese records dispute this, contending that Tu Duc repeatedly appealed to Dinh to surrender without success, hoping that Vietnamese cooperation with the French authorities would allow them to buy back the ceded territory.
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[edit] Early years
Dinh was born in the district of Binh Son in Quang Ngai prefect in Quang Nam in central Vietnam.[1] The son of a military mandarin named Truong Cam, Dinh went south along with his father when he was posted to Gia Dinh as the provincial commander. Dinh enjoyed a local reputation for his martial skills and knowledge of the military classics. He married the daughter of a wealthy resident of Tan An in nearby Dinh Tuong province, where he moved after his father's unexpected death. It was likely that he would have moved back to central Vietnam if he was not married at the time.[2][3]
Dinh took advantage of his improved socio-economic status to recruit a group of impoverished people whom he organized for clearing land and founding a don dien (military plantation). This occurred after Emperor Tu Duc's order in 1854 to grant General Nguyen Tri Phuong permission to organise southern levies in this manner. In return for his services, Dinh was awarded the rank of deputy regimental commander from the mandarin authorities. His success in these activities were attributed to an organizational sense as well as to a genuine concern for the welfare of those under his protection, ensuring that they had enough to eat and something to wear. It was estimated that he had around one thousand tenants and peasants armed with spars and swords, trained and on call as necessary. As a local notable who was respected for his leadership abilities and military ability, Dinh naturally assumed a leading role in the partisan movement that arose in response to the Emperor's appeals for the populace to resist European military aggression.[4][3]
[edit] French invasion in 1859
In 1859, a French and Spanish assault on the imperial citadel at Gia Dinh quickly saw it captured in February 1859, and the citadel's commander committed suicide. The leaderless and defeated imperial troops fled in disarray.[3] The attacks were ordered by French Emperor Napoleon III. The French expedition had long been advocated by French diplomats, naval officers, merchants and missionaries. The missionaries want French administration to facilitate their work in converting Vietnamese to Catholicism while military and business figures saw commercial gains in Vietnam. Napoleon's aims were primarily imperial, strategic and commercial, but he found it convenient to cloak in the reasoning of "freedom of religion".[5][6][7][8] The monarchy of the Nguyen Dynasty was Confucian in nature and has restricted the activity of missionaries. The belief system of Christianity was incompatible with the Confucian belief the monarch was the "son of heaven".[5]
In response, Dinh organized his local levies into a guerrilla force that initially numbered 500 men and operated out of Thuan Kieu. In 1861, Dinh moved his men to Tan Hoa sub prefecture, where he incorporated soldiers from the defeated imperial army into his ranks.[3] With the help of officers from the imperial army, Dinh began to stockpile foodstuffs, manufacture weapons, and recruit forces from populace. His forces grew to 1,000 men, and they began to inflict substantial damage on the European troops, largely because of the insurgent' intimate knowledge of the terrain, skill in guerrilla tactics, and support from the local villagers. Learning of Dinh's role in support of the Nguyen Dynasty's call for popular resistance, Tu Duc promoted him to the rank of lieutenant colonel for Gia Dinh. Later in 1861, imperial regulars were defeated by the Europeans at Bien Hoa, and the commanding Vietnamese officers were ordered by the imperial authorities of Hue to meet with Dinh at Tan Hoa to develop a plan for retaking Bien Hoa. As a result, the number of troops under Dinh's direct authority grew to approximately 6,000. Early in 1862, the Nguyen court granted Dinh command of all the southern nghia quan (righteous soldiers), Hue’s term for the partisans. His base of operations by this time was Go Thuong, in Tan Hoa sub prefecture, from which he led raids on enemy forces.[9] Friction developed between the regular army and Dinh’s partisans as to whether to stage aggressive sorties from Tan Hoa, or to simply engage in military buildup.[10]
Dinh's nghia quan quickly earned the respect of the French naval officers whom they fought. Leopold Pallu de la Barriere, who defended the posts at Go Cong against Dinh's attacks, was surprised by their ferocity. De la Barriere had expected the Vietnamese to live submissively under any ruler that would allow them to sow their crops, unaware of their nationalist feelings.[9] He wrote
The attack on Go Cong by a group of armed, skillfully led men surprised everyone. We thought that the Annamites were still submerged in fear, that the masses were enslaved, cowardly, the dregs of empire ... incapable of any act of resistance.[9]
He went on to recognize the popular nature of the partisans' efforts by stating that the "centre of resistance was everywhere, infinitely subdivided" and considered every peasant to be a center of resistance.[9]
[edit] Continued guerrilla campaign
On June 5, 1862, Dinh broke with the Nguyen army after the court’s plenipotentiary Phan Than Gian and another official Lam Huy Diep signed the Treaty of Saigon which ceded the three southern provinces of Gia Dinh, Dinh Tuong and Bien Hoa to become the French colony of Cochinchina.[10] This was accompanied by financial compensation, religious concessions to missionaries and commercial opportunities to European merchants. In military terms, the withdrawal of the Nguyen army deprived the resistance of the logistical support that only a regular army could provide. It also permitted the French colonialists to concentrate their efforts against a single antagonist. Politically, the treaty provided, for those Vietnamese who needed one, a legal basis to collaborate with the French in the territories ceded to them by Hue. The colonial forces subsequently found it easier to recruit militia and administrative personnel among Vietnamese who had been too afraid or ashamed to openly serve the French before the 1862 treaty.[11]
The Hue court ordered Truong Dinh to disband his forces and accept a high position in An Giang Province. Dinh’s followers and lieutenants pressed him to remain, for fear that they faced extermination at the hands of the French. Claiming that his followers would not allow him to leave, Dinh took the chance and refused his appointment to An Giang,[10] instead adopting the title of Bình Tây Sát Tà Đại Tướng, meaning Western Pacifying Antiheresy General. He continued his guerrilla attacks of French patrols and those Vietnamese who helped the colonial forces. Among the populace, the epithet "Phan-Lâm mái quốc; Triều đình khi dân" (Phan [Thanh Gian] and Lam [Duy Hiep] sell out the country; the court doesn’t care for the people).[10] From his stronghold at Go Cong, Dinh appealed to all Vietnamese in the occupied south to rise against the occupation regime, an appeal which was strongly received. In the words of naval artillery officer Henri de Poyen, by December 1862, "the insurrection had broken out and was rapidly spreading throughout the colony". French commanders were convinced that Dinh remained in secret contact with Due and was privately supported by Tu Duc. The French charged that he had in his possession a seal of office from Hue.[11]
Dinh was regarded as having a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of his armed resistance, in contrast with many of his scholar-gentry colleagues who lacked a military training. Dinh hoped to wear down the French over an extended period, exploiting the constant outbreak of malaria among the Europeans which at least partly compensated the inferior weaponry of his forces. He also attempted to maintain a parallel administration to that imposed on the districts by the French admirals. These objectives required a high degree of regional coordination, something that was impossible without the support of the imperial bureaucracy.[12]
[edit] Death
In late February, Admiral Bonard had accumulated sufficient reinforcements to attack and seize Dinh’s main strongholds in the Tan Hoa and Go Cong areas, with the partisans suffering heavy casualties and being forced to retreat in disarray. Dinh reorganised his troops and procured more firearms from the local Chinese in order to resume his guerrilla harassment campaign. He also attempted to widen his support base by distributing leaflets as far as regional centres of Saigon and My Tho calling on nghia quan of other provinces to join the common struggles. By this time the French were able to keep him and the remaining resistance leaders constantly on the move, aided by a growing network of local informants. In 1863 a famine broke out, and resistance forces were increasingly unable to find food for their sustenance. With the court in Hue providing no practical support, the French gradually wore down the partisans. Dinh retreated into the marshes of Bien Hoa, where he attempted to reorganize his forces. On August 19, 1864, with his remaining guerrillas facing serious supply problems and suffering from hunger, Dinh was betrayed by a former follower and ambushed by French forces. Wounded and facing imminent capture, Dinh committed suicide. His son Truong Quyen, at the time only twenty years old, attempted with modest success to carry on his father’s struggle. A new base was set up in Tay Ninh. It allowed more room for tactical manoeuvring but still depended on supplies being carried in from Tan Hoa to the south.[12] His son was later also killed and in 1874, long after the insurgency in the south had been crushed, Tu Duc granted a month allowance in grain and cash to Dinh’s widow Le Thi Thuong, who had returned to her native village in Quang Ngai which was at the time still in independent Vietnamese territory.[12]
[edit] Defiance of Hue?
The actions of Dinh in the wake of the Treaty of Saigon which surrendered southern Vietnam away to be the French colony of Cochinchina has long been a bone of contention. The French long claimed that Hue was surrepticiously supporting Dinh in contravention of the treaty, while Hue publicly claimed that Dinh’s actions in resisting the French would be counterproductive in the attempt to maintain Vietnamese sovereignty.[13]
After the signing of the Treaty of Saigon, the Hue court attempted to regain what it had lost by the sword through diplomacy. Vietnamese negotiators sought a reversal of the territorial concession which they considered to be the most humiliating clause of the treaty. In 1864, the Vietnamese proposed extensive financial, economic, and political concessions in exchange for the return of the three provinces. Despite France's refusal, Tu Duc continued to hope that Vietnamese compliance with the terms would convince France to return three souther provinces. In the words of Gian, Vietnam's full cooperation with the 1862 Treaty's commercial and religious articles was necessary to keep the possibility of a territorial retrocession alive. The French officers in Saigon, which was made the capital of Cochinchina frequently charged that the Nguyen court violated the treaty by quietly supporting continued resistance and took this as a pretext to seize the other three provinces in southern Vietnam in 1867: Vinh Long, Ha Tien and An Giang. The court records of the Nguyen dynasty in Hue, the Dai Nam Thuc Luc or Veritable Records of the Great South dispute this, saying that they attempted to prevent illegal guerrilla activity such as that of Dinh.[14]
In one edict, Dinh claimed that his struggle was endorsed by Tu Duc in an attempt to garner more support among the populace. This fuelled French claims that the guerrillas were periodic traveling between French territory and Nguyen territory to get supplies from the provincial officials court, rather than simply supplies given by the general populace.
The French officers never produced concrete proof of Hue's support for the southern partisans such as Dinh or of the connivance of Vietnamese officials in the sovereign provinces bordering French-occupied territory. This lack of evidence did not prevent them from continually asserting and finally acting upon these premises. Vice-Admiral Bonard, governor of French Cochin China from 1861 until 1863, said the following of the relationship between Dinh and the Nguyen court:
There is no disguising the fact that the peace stipulated by the Treaty [of 1862] has never been faithfully executed by the Hue court. Seeing that it could not withstand a conventional war, the Annamite government organized, openly before the peace, clandestinely and underhandedly afterward, a permanent insurrection in Cochin China.... Quan Dinh [Mandarin Dinh], head of the insurrection at Go Cong, although publicly disavowed by the viceroy of Vinh Long Phan Thanh Gian, who has called on him several times to withdraw so that the peace treaty can be implemented, has absolutely refused to do so. He is thus apparently in a state of rebellion, but the Hue government, which has publicly given him orders that he has disobeyed, supports him clandestinely and supplies him with arms, munitions, and seals.[15]
French historians sympathetic to the colonial activities reiterated the admirals’ assertions about the contacts between Hue and the southern partisans. De Poyen wrote that the southern insurgency "was ceaselessly excited and supported by emissaries from Hue, hwo travelled throughout the country."[15] Milton Osborne, while accepting that evidence was circumstantial, asserted that French charges were probably legitimate:[15]
The scale of the risings in December 1862 certainly suggests an organized concerted effort, backed by Hue. This judgment, however, is based on inference, not on certain fact. After the failure of the 1862 risings, Hue had little active part in the repeated risings in the South.... Noninvolvement in practical ways did not mean the end of interest, and there seems some reason to accept the French allegations that the sporadic risings against their control of Cochinchina received the clandestine approval of Hue for many years.[15]
Vietnamese documentation challenges the French assertions. The Vietnamese imperial records, written communications between Gian and Dinh, and the account of the southern insurgency written by a resistance figure named Nguyen Thong (1827–94) support the view that Dinh's guerrillas operated independently of Hue and in violation of its orders. The imperial records hold that Tu Duc immediately ordered the insurgents to disband immediately fearing that it would harm his chances of successfully negotiating a peaceful retrocession of territory. The records hold that Tu Duc ordered his officials to disallow the insurgents from returning to independent Vietnamese land and to arrest those who did. The messengers who travelled from Hue into the south were intended to discourage the insurgents, rather than encourage them.[16]
In the specific case of Dinh, the Vietnamese documents record the failed attempts of Gian to persuade him to lay down his arms and accept and administrative post in An Giang and that his position as head of the resistance was granted by his followers rather than Hue.[17]
Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Saigon, the court directed Gian to send a letter to Dinh, ordering him to end his resistance in accordance with the terms of the treaty. Gian's letter and Dinh's rebuff show the Tu Duc's insistence that the treaty be adhered to and the insurgent chief's staunch refusal to do so. Gian's letter argued that since the court had ordered a cessation of hostilities, further resistance was both illegal and futile. Gian wrote:[17]
Since the court has signed the peace treaty, you should cease hostilities and not violate the king's orders.... At present, the court's regular forces have all been withdrawn, and the mandarins commanding troops hiding in the mountains and forests have all disbanded their forces. If you alone are to lead your soldiers to the attack, can you be certain of victory? If you retreat, can you defend yourself? Certainly not![17]
In his reply to Gian, Dinh demonstrated his awareness of the illegality of his insurgency and the southerners' obligation to obey their emperor. The insurgent mandarin nevertheless refused to abandon his supporters and their common fight for a return to the status quo antebellum, vowing to disobey royal orders:[17]
The people of the three provinces, wanting to return to their former status, designated me as their leader. Therefore, we cannot take any course but our present one.... If Your Excellency still maintains that the agreements with the invaders must be preserved, then we will oppose the court's commands, and ... there can be no more peace or truce between us and Your Excellency.[17]
Explicit in Gian's criticism and Dinh's rebuttal is a mutual comprehension that Emperor Tu Duc, in hoping to "preserve agreements with the invaders", opposed continued armed struggle against the French occupation of the south. Vietnamese records show that when Dinh refused to obey the court's orders, he was stripped of his position and titles.[18]
Truong Dinh has refused to return to the exercise of his office, and he is accordingly removed from that function with loss of honorific titles.[18]
This view is supplemented by an account of the southern insurgency authored by Nguyen Thong, a former mandarin and resistance figure who fought alongside Dinh in the occupied provinces and corresponded with many of the other guerrilla leaders. According to Thong, Dinh's continued resistance after the signing of the treaty resulted from local initiatives contrary to Hue's explicit orders. When imperial edicts in 1862 directed the partisans to end hostilities, Dinh's supporters implored him to refuse:[18]
Our people forced the Westerners to retreat many times, and now that the court has made peace with them, they will surely kill us.... Since the court has settled with them, who will support us? Let us unite to strike back at them, to take for ourselves a piece of land on which we can fight for our lives.[18]
According to the accounts of Nguyen Thong, Dinh was persuaded by these arguments and began to organise the material and human resources required for his non imperial anti-French movement. Although he was fully aware that he was defying Tu Duc, Dinh sent an appeal "to all the righteous men, encouraging them in the name of loyalty to the court to rise and destroy the invaders." Thong goes on to assert that the imperial edicts that Dinh used, which were cited by French officers for subsequent aggression – were fake. Dinh had falsified these to make propaganda among the people to rally support.[18]
It remained possible that a faction of hawks in the Nguyen court at Hue had covertly funnelled support to Dinh’s rebels. According to Mark McLeod, it is unclear whether hawkish mandarins were assisting Dinh’s southern insurgents in contravention of Tu Duc’s wishes.[19]
[edit] Disrespect of the mandate of heaven?
In light of Dinh's disobedience of the court contrary to the direct commands of Tu Duc's, his justification for his rebellion is discussed against the backdrop of the Confucian expectation for him to defer to the "mandate of heaven". Since Dinh himself left no explicit or definitive statement for his rationale for disobeying the Emperor, scholars who have recognized or suspected Dinh's disobedience have been forced to speculate, sometimes using their ideological beliefs to fill holes in the historical record.[19]
Truong Buu Lam, a Western-trained Vietnamese scholar, assumes Dinh's disobedience as a given and explains this by asserting that the insurgents held a distinction between the reigning monarch Tu Duc, and the monarchy as an idealised institution.[19]
After the Hue court signed the Treaty of Saigon, a moral dilemma developed since the partisans could neither accept the loss of their country nor claim that their cause was righteous if they acted in violation of the court's orders. They therefore drew a careful distinction between the person of an individual king and the moral principle of loyalty to the monarchy.... The monarchy was therefore an idealized institution not tarnished by any accidental deviation from the ideal.[20]
The historian David Marr agreed with Lam, noting that "the distinction quite rightly pointed out by Professor Truong Buu Lam was in all probability bred of immediate adverse conditions and not the product of a long tradition."[20][10] Modern Vietnamese historians of the Communist regime go further and assert that Dinh’s justification for continued resistance after the Treaty of 1862 was based on an implicit rejection of the monarchy in general. These historians base this on their assertion that the Confucian virtue of monarchical loyalty was unconditional and absolute in 19th century Vietnam. In the words of the editors of the Institute of Historical Study's journal, Nghien cuu lich su (Historical Studies), "Loyalty to the king was the people's duty, and to satisfy the obligation of monarchical loyalty, the court's orders had to be followed...."[21] In the view of the Marxist authors, Dinh solved the conflict between the requirements of monarchical loyalty and his intention to continuing the resistance against French occupation by surmounting the constraints of Confucian morality. Dinh justified his struggle, they assert, by rejecting Tu Duc's authority in the name of a higher loyalty to the land and people of Vietnam. As the Institute of Historical Study's Nguyen Cong Binh states, "Relying on the people, Truong Dinh placed the country above the king, thus safeguarding his feelings of loyalty to the country".[21] These arguments are consistent with the Marxist ideology and criticism of the Nguyen dynasty as a "reactionary, feudal regime". The communist party historians have long criticized the Nguyen dynasty and their roots in the Nguyen lords for the division with the country in the centuries long struggle with the Trinh lords of the north and then the subsequent use of French aid of Pigneau de Behaine to claim power by removing the Tay Son Dynasty. It further accords with Hanoi’s ideological line of portraying anti-colonial, anti-French fighters of the 19th century as the ancestors of the Vietnamese Communist Party.[21]
The above postulated explanations of Dinh's behaviour are seen as plausible, given the tumultuous historical events in which he participated and the lack of conclusive documentary evidence. However, explanations of Dinh's motivation that assert his rejection of the Tu Duc's authority encounter the problem that Dinh and his supporters initially asserted their loyalty to the monarch and justified their struggle in his name, and continued to do so after the Treaty of 1862. These declarations show no sign of rejecting Tu Duc's authority nor any reference to an idealized monarch more deserving of the Heavenly Mandate than Tu Duc. Conversely, many of these proclamations are characterized by an intense feeling of loyalty to the reigning monarch himself. Characters written on a board that French forces found floating down a river near Dinh's stronghold in Go Cong asserted:[22]
Gratitude ties us to our king. We will avenge the insults he has received [from the French], or we will die for him.[22]
One of Dinh's proclamations to his followers read:[22]
The Emperor does not recognize us, but it is indeed our duty to carry on our struggle.... The Emperor calls us rebels, but in the depth of his heart he cannot help but praise our loyalty. When the day of victory arrives, not only will the Emperor forgive us, he will furthermore grant us all kinds of awards.[22]
Such expressions of monarchical loyalty may be dismissed by skeptics as resulting from political expediency and the desire to mobilize support for continued resistance by appealing to the widely accepted Confucian value of monarchical loyalty. This is the explanation suggested by the Marxist authors: "On the one hand, Truong Dinh opposed Tu Duc's order to lay down his arms; on the other hand, he exploited Tu Duc's name in order to call upon the people to rise and fight the French." McLeod argued that the best explanation for Dinh's continued insurgency can be explained in the fact that the prevailing Confucian concept of monarchical loyalty was a much more flexible one than is generally recognized. He questioned the requirement for absolute and unconditional obedience, arguing that the Confucian tradition provides justification for a loyal official to disagree with and refuse to obey his sovereign without thereby calling the sovereign's authority into question. This is termed a tránh thần, meaning a minister (thần) who is willing to dispute (tránh) his sovereign's orders in order to prevent the ruler from committing an unrighteous or unwise act, even if this meant incurring the ruler's wrath. The minister who would allow the ruler to commit such a mistake rather than risk upsetting him was regarded as a sycophant, a petty man more interested in personal advancement than the ruler's ultimate benefit. The truly devoted official was thus required in certain circumstances to remonstrate with and even to disobey his sovereign to show the highest form of devotion to that monarch. Thus, according to McLeod, Dinh's disobedience did not ipso facto constitute a rejection of the Tu Duc's authority.[22]
Dinh believed that the Tu Duc would eventually realize his error and reward the loyal servants who had risked their lives to protect him from the consequences of his decision to yield to European arms. It is likely that Gian and the Tu Duc Emperor saw Dinh's continued resistance in this way. In their confrontation after the signing of the Saigon Treaty, Gian did not accuse Dinh of being a rebel. He rather credited him with excessive devotion to the emperor, which while admirable in principle, was in practice causing difficulties for the current strategy of appeasing France. "Monarchical loyalty is a noble quality", Gian had told the recalcitrant guerrilla leader,[23] but
It must have a limit. One cannot exceed this limit and still be faithful and pious. Too much is just as bad as not enough; when a snake begins to have legs, it is no longer a snake...[23]
Tu Duc also apparently viewed Dinh's continued resistance as a manifestation, albeit inconvenient, of monarchical loyalty. While the southern insurgents eventually provided French officers with a pretext for further aggression and thus hindered Tu Duc's plans for negotiated territorial retrocession, he consistently refrained from applying the terminology of rebellion to the resistance. Despite their disobedience, Tu Duc never accused them of rebelling against royal authority; he rather continued to refer to them as "righteous recruits" motivated by "indignation" at the actions of the Westerners.[23]
Nguyen Dinh Chieu, the leading poet of the southern struggle, did not portray Dinh as a rebel opposed to the Hue court. In an elegy to fallen insurgents, Chieu asserted that the resistance continued its struggle after the treaty was signed "because their hearts would not heed the Son of Heaven's edict". Chieu strongly supported the partisans's efforts in continuing their attempt to expel the French from southern Vietnam, a cause he considered righteous, yet his reference to Tu Duc as the "Son of Heaven" indicates that the legitimacy of the Emperor was not called into question. [24]
[edit] Notes
- ^ At the time, Quang Ngai was a part of Quang Nam.
- ^ Marr, pp. 30–31.
- ^ a b c d McLeod, p. 91.
- ^ Marr, p. 31.
- ^ a b McLeod, p. 88.
- ^ Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam:A history. Penguin Books, pp. 84–88. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ^ Hall, D. G. E. [1955] (1981). A History of South-east Asia. London: Macmillan, p. 647. ISBN 0-333-24163-0.
- ^ Cady, John F. [1964] (1976). South East Asia: Its historical development. New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 414–416. OCLC 15002777.
- ^ a b c d McLeod, p. 92.
- ^ a b c d e Marr, p. 32.
- ^ a b McLeod, p. 93.
- ^ a b c Marr, p. 34.
- ^ McLeod, pp. 89–90.
- ^ McLeod, p. 90.
- ^ a b c d McLeod, p. 94.
- ^ McLeod, p. 95.
- ^ a b c d e McLeod, p. 96.
- ^ a b c d e McLeod, p. 97.
- ^ a b c McLeod, p. 98.
- ^ a b McLeod, p. 99.
- ^ a b c McLeod, p. 100.
- ^ a b c d e McLeod, p. 101.
- ^ a b c McLeod, p. 103.
- ^ McLeod, p. 104.
[edit] References
- Marr, David G. (1970). Vietnamese anticolonialism, 1885–1925. Berkeley: University of California. ISBN 0-520-01813-3.
- McLeod, Mark (March 1993). "Truong Dinh and Vietnamese anti-colonialism, 1859–64: a reappraisal.". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 24 (1): pp. 88–106.
