User:Trident13/HCopp

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Harley F. Copp Ford GT

Contents 1 Ford Continental 2 Ford UK and Brentwood 2.1 Cosworth DFV 3 Ford Pinto 3.1 Safety problems 4 Input 4.1 Input1 4.2 Input2 4.3 Input2 4.4 Input2 5 References

[edit] Ford Continental

In fall 1952, Ford set-up the revived Lincoln Continental as a seperate division to produce what became the Continental Mark II. The idea was to create a superior up-market brand to compete with GM's Cadillac and Chrysler's DeSoto. Outside design teams were engaged to come up with a suitable design for the all-new Continental, but Ford chose the one from their own Special Products Division: John Reinhart was chief stylist; Gordon Buehrig was the chief body engineer assisted by Robert McGuffey Thomas; and Copp was chief engineer.^[1]

The new Continental's were hand built and used a Lincoln V8 mated to a three speed automatic transmission. The MkII Continental went on sale for a staggering $10,000, priced to be exclusive but, as it turned out, also priced out of the market. The MkIII of 1959 was much cheaper, at a more respectable $6,000, but to help reduce the price Ford had chosen to rely heavily on the Lincoln parts bin. It was difficult to differentiate the two, and soon the Continental marque was re-absorbed by Lincoln.^[2]

[edit] Ford UK and Brentwood

After the launch of the 1958 Continental and engineering for the 1960 Lincoln Continental, Copp left to set-up a special vehicles engineering department in Europe. Ford had chosen Brentwood, Essex in England for the site, and Copp became Vice President Engineering, Ford of Britain.^[3]

In 1961, the first project Copp became involved in was project "Panda", which became the Mk IV Zephyr/Zodiac range. As the car used the new V-series engines, the then traditional long bonnet concept created a problem until Copp required that the car was both larger and had more internal space, and came up with the idea of placing the spare wheel ahead of the radiator on an angle.^[4]

  began in mid-1961 under the code-name “Panda”. The decision to use the new V-engine range created a problem for the designers because the short power unit naturally only needed a short engine compartment. 

Since the concept of European large cars called for a long bonnet, this gave unacceptable proportions until it was decided to house the spare wheel at an angle under the bonnet ahead of the radiator. Ford Britain’s new American director of engineering Harley Copp decreed that the new car should be larger than its predecessor, and the new car was therefore entirely different from the Mk III.

Of similar dimensions to the American Ford Fairlane, the Mk IV was launched on April 20, 1966, with V4 2 litre and V6 2.5 litre engines in the Zephyr and V6 3 litre in the Zodiac. Neat “bow-back” styling made the capacious boot look deceptively short, but the large expanse of bonnet was unkindly likened to the landing deck of an aircraft carrier by some journalists!

 Copp had also insisted on independent rear suspension but the chosen design had many of the failings of swing axle suspension when the car was lightly laden. Coupled with the five turns lock-to-lock of the steering, this gave rise to alarming “tuck-under” of the outer rear wheel when cornering with the back seats empty.
 The Mk IV range used the new Ford C4 automatic transmission or a new manual four-speed gearbox (which could be specified with a Laycock LH overdrive).

the

Ford Cortina Mk3 ^[5]

[edit] Cosworth DFV

As Vice President Engineering, Ford of Britain, Copp over saw the development of the Ford GT40 by Lola. However, his key input was on the Ford Cosworth DFV.

Colin Chapman's Lotus cars had until that point relied on power from fast revving Coventry Climax engines, but with the change in Formula One regulations to three litre capacity from 1966, Coventry Climax decided for business reasons not to develop a large capacity engine. Chapman had approach the fledgling Cosworth group, with Keith Duckworth commenting that he could produce a competitive three litre engine, given a development budget of £100,000.^[6]

Chapman approach Ford and also David Brown of Aston Martin, each without initial success. Chapman's friend and Ford Great Britain's PR director Walter Hayes arranged diner for Chapman with Copp.^[7] Hayes and Copp developed a business plan, which was backed by Ford UK's new chairman Stanley Gillen, and approved by Ford's Detroit head office as a two part plan - stage one would produce a four-cylinder twin-cam engine for Formula Two; by May 1967, stage two would produce a V-8 Formula One unit. In return, Chapman agreed to engineer "specials" for Ford, the first of which was 1963's Lotus Cortina.^[8]

Revealed by Hayes in a PR launch in Detroit at the end of 1965, the Ford Cosworth DFV won its first race - the Dutch Grand Prix on 4 June 1967, in a Lotus 49 driven by Jim Clark. Graham Hill was in the team was at the specific request of Ford and Hayes, who wanted to be sure that a strong driving cadre would be seated ahead of their engines.^[9]

Initially, the agreement between Ford, Cosworth and Lotus was binding on all parties, and Ford as the funder had no plans to sell or hire the DFV to any other teams. However, it occurred to Hayes that there was no competition - the Ferrari was underpowered; the BRM complex and too heavy; the unreliable Maserati; Brabham was powered by the Oldsmobile-derived V8 Repco ; the overweight Honda; while Dan Gurney's Eagle Weslake was beautiful, powerful and sleek, but often unreliable.^[10] Hayes concluded that Ford's name could become tarnished, and that they should agree to use the unit in other teams, and hence potentially dominate Formula One. Chapman, on the back of the pairs long friendship agreed,^[11] and Hayes could release the DFV initially to revival French team Matra, headed by Ken Tyrrell with Jackie Stewart as a driver.

Still the most successful Grand Prix engine ever, sixteen years later it was still taking the chequered flag - a DFV-powered Tyrrell Racing car won the 1983 Detroit Grand Prix, the engine's 155th race victory: with the Ford logo branded on the side of every one.

At the start of the DFV project, Hayes told Henry Ford II that he thought the DFV engine was "fairly likely" to win a World Championship.^[12] In 1997 a group of people gathered at Donington Park to commemorate the DFV's 30th anniversary. Jackie Stewart said a few words, making comments on an engine which had made him as well as Graham Hill, Jochen Rindt, Emerson Fittipaldi, James Hunt, Mario Andretti, Alan Jones, Nelson Piquet and Keke Rosberg. It had also brought championships to teams: Lotus, Matra, Tyrrell, McLaren and WilliamsF1; and won races for Hesketh, March, Penske, Shadow and Wolf.^[13]

[edit] Ford Pinto

Typically, manufacturers strongly resist disclosing the decision-making process regarding the level of safety their products should achieve. During litigation, however, documents may surface or former employees may come forward to testify, revealing how a manufacturer balances consumer safety against corporate profits in determining whether to redesign a defective product, remove it from the market or recall it. This "cost/benefit" process was first brought to public attention in the Ford Pinto fuel tank case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company.(14)

According to evidence in Grimshaw, Ford's crash tests revealed that several design defects in the Pinto's fuel tank and rear structure exposed consumers to serious injury or death in a 20-30 mile per hour collision.(15) In April 1971, some time before the 1972 Pinto was placed on the market, Ford Vice President of Car Engineering, Harold MacDonald, chaired a product review meeting to discuss a report that had been prepared by Ford engineers. This report recommended deferring from 1974 to 1976 the incorporation into all Ford cars, including the Pinto, of either a shock absorbent "flak suit" to protect the fuel tank at a cost of $4 per car, or a nylon bladder within the tank at a cost of $5.25 to $8 per car.(16) This deferral would allow Ford to realize a savings of $10.9 million.(17) Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash testing program, testified that Ford's management knew that the gas tank created a significant risk of death or injury from fire but decided to go forward with the Pinto anyway, knowing that these "fixes" were feasible at nominal cost.(18)

As Justice Tamara concluded in the majority opinion, Ford "engage[d] in cost-benefit analyses which balanced life and limb against corporate savings and profits."(19) In June of 1978, the automaker finally recalled all 1.4 million 1971 through 1976 Pintos for fuel system modification,(20) after it was required to do so by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). By the time of the recall, however, Pinto fuel-fed fires had killed at least 27 people and injured many others.(21)

An even more damaging cost/benefit analysis was excluded from evidence in Grimshaw. In that internal memorandum, captioned "Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires," Ford valued a human life at $200,000, a burn injury at $67,000 and an incinerated car at $700. The automaker then calculated that proposed government regulations aimed at preventing fuel-fed fires in roll-over crashes would benefit society by $49.5 million. This figure was then compared with the cost of Ford's complying with the proposed regulations -- $11 per car or a total cost of $137 million.(22) See Exhibit 2. ^[14]

[edit] Safety problems

Through early production of the model, it became a focus of a major scandal when it was alleged that the car's design allowed its fuel tank to be easily damaged in the event of a rear-end collision which sometimes resulted in deadly fires and explosions. Critics argued that the vehicle's lack of a true rear bumper as well as any reinforcing structure between the rear panel and the tank, meant that in certain collisions, the tank would be thrust forward into the differential, which had a number of protruding bolts that could puncture the tank. This, and the fact that the doors could potentially jam during an accident (due to poor reinforcing) made the car a potential deathtrap.

Ford was aware of this design flaw but allegedly refused to pay what was characterized as the minimal expense of a redesign. Instead, it was argued, Ford decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits for resulting deaths. Mother Jones magazine obtained the cost-benefit analysis that it said Ford had used to compare the cost of an $11 repair against the cost of paying off potential law suits, in what became known as the Ford Pinto Memo. The characterization of Ford's design decision as gross disregard for human lives in favor of profits led to major lawsuits, criminal charges, and a costly recall of all affected Pintos. While Ford was acquitted of criminal charges, it lost several million dollars and gained a reputation for manufacturing "the barbecue that seats four."^{[citation needed]}

The most famous Ford Pinto product liability case resulted in a judicial opinion that is a staple of remedies courses in American law schools. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (4th Dist. 1981) [1], the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District reviewed Ford's conduct, and upheld compensatory damages of $2.5 million and punitive damages of $3.5 million against Ford. It also upheld the judge's reduction of the punitive damages from the jury's original verdict of $125 million. Of the two plaintiffs, one was killed in the collision that caused her Pinto to explode, and her passenger, 13-year old Richard Grimshaw, was badly burned and scarred for life.

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Background of Ford Pinto Case

Ford’s benefit-cost analysis. In 1993, Ford engineer Harley Copp of Ford Motor Company (General Motor) did a benefit-cost analysis when it planed to develop a subcompact car into market. The calculation formula was based on this assumption: in U.S each year there were 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, and 2,100 burned vehicles. For a fatality the society would cost any direct and indirect fee $200,725, the cost of each injury and each vehicle was $67,000 and $700. If Ford Company improved Pintos’ fuel-tank system, it would benefit the society total $49.5 million each year. However, the improvement would take total $137.5 million cost to Ford Company that related to $11 per car each year. After balancing its benefit and cost, Ford president Lee Iacocca decided to sale 11 million cars and 1.5 million light trucks to consumers without improving fuel-tank system. From 1971 to 1978, about 700 to 2,500 persons died in Pinto fires. According to the testimony of Harley Copp, 95% of deaths would have survived if Ford had had changed the location of the fuel-tank. In 1977, “Pinto Madness” (Mark Dowie, September/October 1977) revealed above benefit-cost analysis method secreted used by Ford and simultaneously discovered that Ford Motor Company preferred to save $11 per car to save customers’ lives from Ford Pinto’s exploding. It aroused public wrath, people hated that Ford would like money but not pity customers’ lives. Ford Pinto’s rear-end crashes tests and the NHTSA standard. By the late 60’s in Detroit, Lee Iacocca , who was the president of Ford Motor Company (General Motor), decided to design a car named Pinto with uncompromising limitation that the weight was less than 2,000 ounce and the cost was not more than $2,000. However, during the design and production, the defective design problem of fuel-tank was found by the crash tests. The rear-end crashes tests proved that over 25 miles per hour, the fuel-tank was always ruptured and the crumpled frame jammed the doors and stopped passengers escaping from inside to outside. Among the eleven tests, Ford failed eight standard design tests. The three cars that had some kind of fuel-tank modification were passed the tests. It was necessary to change and strengthen the design. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had responsibility to the traffic test and management. The NHTSA standard was that all automobiles must be able to endure a fixed-barrier impact of 20 miles per hour without fuel loss. When Ford did its benefit-cost analysis, it also used NHTSA and other statistical studies. For to be permitted to design and produce the Pintos, Ford lobbied the industry associates and the NHTSA with its results of benefit-cost analysis to delay publishing regulation of the twenty miles per hour crash standard. At the same time more than forty European and Japanese automobiles in the Pinto price and weight range had safer fuel-tank position. The NHTSA’s standard was delayed 9 years until 1977 it was published. Ford was obliged to recall its 1971-1976 Pintos for fuel-tank modification and do a rupture-proof fuel-tank. Ford Pintos’ accidents and trials. From 1971 to 1978, about 50 lawsuits were related to Pintos’ rear-end accident. Ford always denied that the Pinto was unsafe compared with other cars of its type and price range. Over the years, U.S. courts repeatedly helped Ford to keep the secrecy of Ford benefit-cost analysis out of public view. In May 1972, Lily Gray and his 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw were burned injuries in a 1972 Pinto. When they were struck by another car they were traveling by the speed of 30 miles per hour. The impact ignited a fire, Lily Gray was killed, and Richard Grimshaw was burned with devastation injuries. The Jury awarded the Gray family $560,000 and Grimshaw $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The jury awarded Ford $125 million in punitive damages, this was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million. In February 1993, a drunk driver struck 17-year-old Shannon Moseley’s truck in the side, which resulted in the death of Moseley. In this accident, a fire was caused by the Ford truck’s defective fuel-tank design. A former safety engineer, Ronald E. Elwell, after he had testified in more than 15 previous cases that the Pintos were safe, he gave jury a real evidence that Ford had seen for years that the Pinto’s design was defective and had not corrected the problem. An Atlanta jury blamed Ford and awarded $4.2 million in actual damages and $101 million in punitive damages to Moseley’s parents.^[15]

[edit] Input2

Chapter 12. Whistle Blowing The Ford Pinto Case In the late 1960s American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports. Lee Iacocca, then CEO of the Ford Motor Company, wanted a 1971 model to meet the competition. He reportedly ordered that Ford produce a car for 1971 that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and that would be priced at less than $2,000. That meant that the car had to be designed and produced in 25 months rather than the usual 43 months for a new car line. The resulting car was the Pinto.[1] Because of the accelerated production schedule, the Pinto was not tested for rear-end impact until after it was produced. There was no National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rear-end impact standard at the time. Ford engineers knew that testing for rear-end impact is a standard safety procedure. The car was tested after production, and it failed the test, meaning that it fell below the state of the art for cars of that size. The design of the car placed the fuel tank such that if the car was hit from the rear at a speed above 20 miles per hour, it would be punctured by a bolt from the bumper and could possibly burst into flame. Ford did a study and determined that if a baffle (estimated at costing between $6.65 and $11) were placed between the bumper and the gas tank, the Pinto would be comparable to other cars of its class with respect to the danger of fire from rear-end impact. A company cost-benefit analysis that weighed the cost of adding the baffle against the estimated cost of suits resulting from "excess" accidental deaths and injuries indicated that it would cost the company less not to insert the baffle than to insert it. For whatever reason, the company did not change the design from 1971 to 1978. Nor did the company offer its customers the option of purchasing the baffle.

[Page 299] Between 1976 and 1977 alone, Pintos suffered thirteen fiery rear-end collisions, which was more than double the number for comparable-size cars. As it turned out, suits brought against Ford and the amount it had to pay (estimated at more than $50 million) far exceeded what it saved ($20.9 million) by not correcting the defect—not to mention the cost of bad publicity.

Nonetheless, despite reports of fires in the Pinto, the car sold well through 1978, when it was finally recalled to have the baffle inserted. When the State of Oregon, because of safety concerns, sold its fleet of Pintos at public auction, the cars went for as much as $1,800 each. Obviously, buyers discounted the danger, weighing it against the cost of what was considered adequate transportation at a good price.

Ford's actions with respect to the Pinto have been widely criticized. Harley Copp, a former Ford executive and engineer, was critical of the Pinto from the start. He left the company and voiced his criticism, which was taken up by Ralph Nader and others.[2]

Of course, the Ford engineers were not instructed to make an unsafe car, nor did Ford management set out to do so. That the Pinto was arguably below the state of the art may have been a result of the accelerated production schedule. That the defect was not corrected after the initial production year was the result of a business decision.

Was anyone at Ford at fault? Did anyone at Ford have an obligation to make known to the public the facts that Ford knew but did not make public? If so, who? Why?

[1] For sources and more details on the Pinto, see Richard T. De George, "Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: The Pinto Case," Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 1, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1–14; Lee P. Strobel, Reckless Homicide? Ford's Pinto Trial (South Bend, Ind.: And Books, 1980); and Mark Dowie, "Pinto Madness," Mother Jones, September/October 1977, pp. 24–28.

[2] Among the many articles that have appeared, one of the earliest and most incendiary was Mark Dowie, "Pinto Madness," Mother Jones (2), 1977, pp. 18–32. For a defense of Ford and an explanation of the decisions made, see Matthew T. Lee and M. David Ermann, "Pinto 'Madness' as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis," Social Problems 46 (1), 1999, pp. 30–47.

Blowing the Whistle We have seen that corporations have a moral obligation not to harm. This obligation falls on the corporation as such, and internally it falls primarily on those who manage the corporation. Yet other members of the corporation—for instance, engineers and assembly-line workers—are not morally allowed to take part in any immoral activity. Hence, they may not morally take part in any activity that they know will cause harm, including producing products that they know will cause harm. Do they further have a moral obligation to prevent harm, if they are able to do so?

[Page 300] As a general rule, people have a moral obligation to prevent serious harm to others if they are able to do so and can do so with little cost to themselves. As the cost increases, the obligation decreases. If we can save another's life only at the expense of our own life, we are not morally obliged to do so, and giving up our life for another is usually considered an act of heroic virtue. What is the obligation as an employee to prevent his or her company from harming others? The question is a complicated one and leads us to a consideration of what has become known as whistle blowing.[3]

[3] Some general works dealing with whistle blowing are Myron Peretz Glazer, Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001); Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing: When It Works—And Why (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Gerald Vinten (ed.), Whistleblowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizenship? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees (New York: Lexington Books, 1992). Ancorr Web: Anti-Corruption Ring Online has a useful bibliography on whistle blowing at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/Corruption/prev_whistle.htm#references.^[16]

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Last year, Trial magazine, a publication of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, featured an article entitled "Important Civil Trials of the Millennium." The article presented a select group of ten cases from the past millennium, which it cited as milestones in the development of the civil justice system. Included in them was Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981).

 In May of 1972, a new Ford Pinto hatchback unexpectedly stalled on Interstate15, erupting into flames when it was rear ended by another car. Mrs. Lilly Gray, the driver of the Pinto, suffered fatal burns and 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw suffered severe and permanently disfiguring burns over 90% of his body. Grimshaw and the heirs to Mrs. Gray sued Ford Motor Company, alleging that design defects in the Pinto made the car's fuel system extremely vulnerable to compromise or rupture in a rear-end collision, and that the passengers would be seriously injured or killed as a result of post-collision fires fed by escaping gasoline.

 Richard Grimshaw was represented by bar members and local attorneys, Mark P. Robinson, Jr. and the late Arthur Hews. Byron Rabin of Rose, Klein & Marias represented the heirs of Mrs. Gray. What appeared at first to be an ordinary product liability case, began with little fanfare or attention in the media. However, the six-month trial was filled with startling revelations about the inner-workings and thought processes within one of the world's largest companies, and how the bottom line can sometimes be placed ahead of safety and human life.

 One of the principal witnesses called by the Plaintiffs was Harley Copp, a former Ford engineering executive, who was fired just before Robinson was scheduled to take his deposition. Acting on a tip from a Ford employee moonlighting as a Detroit cab driver, Copp was tracked down and testified that he was forced to take an early retirement because he spoke out on matters of safety. Mr. Copp further testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the fuel tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low impact speeds.

 According to OCBA member Mark Robinson, "Several documents introduced into evidence at trial showed that despite management's knowledge that the Pinto's fuel system could be made safe at a cost of $4 to $8 per car, Ford decided to defer corrective measures to save money and enhance profits. One key document which came to light as a result of the Grimshaw case was the infamous "Grush-Saunby" memo, a Ford interoffice memorandum from the early '70s, discussing the costs versus the benefits of meeting proposed federal motor vehicle safety standards."

 Although Judge Leonard Goldstein did not allow the memo into evidence, he did permit Mr. Copp to testify that Ford "had put a value of $200,000 on a human life, and that even though inexpensive alternative design 'fixes' were available for use in the Pinto, management based its design decision on the cost savings which would inure from delaying or omitting corrective measures."

 The jury's verdict was front-page news nationwide: $128 million. Up until that time the largest verdict in America was approximately $20 million in a personal injury action involving punitive damages against an airplane manufacturer. The Fourth District Court of Appeal had this to say in a concise yet profound comment on corporate irresponsibility: "Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collision. There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted 'conscious disregard' of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public." Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757,813 (1981).

 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration pressured Ford into recalling the Pinto and conducting modifications. The Pinto verdict was a wake-up call for not only Ford Motor Company, but for manufacturers and businesses all over the world. The specter of substantial punitive damages awards for reckless business decisions, which endanger the public, caused businesses to reassess their responsibility to the public. No longer could large corporations put profits over safety. The shock wave set off by the Grimshaw verdict in Orange County still reverberates today. Much like the phrase, "we don't want another Vietnam" is often heard in political decision-making, the phrase "we don't want another Pinto" has found its way into the corporate lexicon.[17]

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2. Junk Car Museum > Bad Cars > Ford Pinto > Ford Pinto Legal Case www.junkcarmuseum.4t.com/badcarbios/fordpinto/lega - [Cached] Published on: 12/18/2003 Last Visited: 9/2/2005

[*777] Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash testing program, testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low rear impact speeds creating a significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that "fixes" were feasible at nominal cost. ... Mr. Kennedy, who succeeded Mr. Copp as the engineer in charge of Ford's crash testing program, admitted that the test results had been forwarded up the chain of command to his superiors. ... Finally, Mr. Copp testified to conversations in late 1968 or early 1969 with the chief assistant research engineer in charge of cost-weight evaluation of the Pinto, and to a later conversation with the chief chassis engineer who was then in charge of crash testing the early prototype. ... The Testimony of Harley Copp

Mr. Harley Copp, a former Ford engineering executive, was plaintiffs' principal witness on the subject of defects in the design, placement, and protection of the Pinto's gas tank and on Ford management's [*780] decision to place the car on the market with knowledge of the defects. ... Plaintiffs' counsel met Mr. Copp for the first time on January 18, 1977, and learned of his potential availability [**24] as a witness. ... That the first contact between plaintiffs' attorneys and Mr. Copp occurred on January 18, 1977, was confirmed by Mr. Copp's testimony [*783] [**25] and was and is unchallenged by Ford. ... There was indication that Ford's counsel knew as early as June 1977 that Mr. Copp might be a witness for plaintiffs. [***366] That Ford's oral motion was for the disclosure of any former "disgruntled" Ford employee who might be called as plaintiffs' witness and that Ford's motion was made only after and in apparent response to one made by plaintiffs for the disclosure of a possible Ford witness suggest that Ford knew the identity of the witness. n6 ... Turning to Ford's motions to depose Mr. Copp before he continued with his direct testimony, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's rulings. The right to conduct discovery "within 30 days before trial" is within the sound discretion of the trial court and in exercising its discretion the court is required to take into consideration the necessity and reasons for such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking such discovery and his reasons for not having completed [*785] his discovery prior to 30 days before trial, whether permitting such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial on the [**30] day set or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar or result in prejudice to any party, and any other matter relevant to the request. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 222; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. ... The court ruled that evidence of the circumstances under which Mr. Copp left Ford was admissible because it bore upon his credibility and was necessary to enable the jury to understand and evaluate his testimony. ... Ford maintains that the evidence was inadmissible on direct examination because the [**31] witness' credibility had not yet been challenged and that Ford was prejudiced by the erroneous ruling because it was compelled to cross-examine Mr. Copp concerning the reasons for his termination, in turn enabling plaintiffs to introduce prejudicial rehabilitation testimony not otherwise admissible. ... Ford's argument that firing Mr. Copp in 1976 for speaking out on safety does not reasonably tend to show that Ford disregarded safety in designing the Pinto some five years earlier lacks merit. ... Ford complains that since Mr. Copp was permitted to testify to the circumstances surrounding his termination, Ford was compelled to cross-examine him to show that the reason for his dismissal was unexplained absences from work and unsatisfactory [**36] work performance; that if the court had not permitted Mr. Copp to give his version of the reason for termination, Ford would have had little or no reason to examine him about his retirement and plaintiffs would not have been able to adduce rehabilitation testimony highly prejudicial to Ford. ... Ford complains that since Mr. Copp was permitted to testify to the circumstances surrounding his termination, Ford was compelled to cross-examine him to show that the reason for his dismissal was unexplained absences from work and unsatisfactory [**36] work performance; that if the court had not permitted Mr. Copp to give his version of the reason for termination, Ford would have had little or no reason to examine him about his retirement and plaintiffs would not have been able to adduce rehabilitation testimony highly prejudicial to Ford. ... The record discloses that Mr. Copp testified only briefly concerning the circumstances of his early retirement from Ford but that on cross-examination [*788] Ford engaged in extensive questioning to show that the reason for his termination was not his safety views but unsatisfactory work and absenteeism. ... Ford argues that but for the court's erroneous initial ruling and its consequent cross-examination on the reason for Mr. Copp's retirement, the damaging [**37] rehabilitation evidence would not have come in. Since we find no error in the court's initial ruling and since Ford has not advanced any independent reason why the rehabilitating evidence should have been excluded, Ford's complaint concerning the prejudicial nature of that evidence must be rejected. ... 537, 552 P.2d 97].) Mr. Copp was not permitted to testify concerning [**40] the details of the hearsay matters on which he relied in forming his opinion. ... In addition, most of the matters to which Mr. Copp referred were within his personal knowledge and experience. When Mr. Copp was permitted to testify to the matters on which he based his opinion that the bladder within a tank was feasible, the judge gave the jury a proper limiting instruction at Ford's request. ... Finally, in no instance was Mr. Copp permitted to read the reports or documents to which he referred or relate their contents in specific detail. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error in the cited instances where the expert was permitted to testify to the matters he considered in forming his opinions. ... Mr. Copp testified, however, that the information in the study could be applied equally to the Pinto. ... The [***373] matter first came up during redirect-examination of Mr. Copp. ... Mr. Copp's testimony concerning the emission control matter tended to rebut Ford's evidence that Mr. Copp was fired for absenteeism and unsatisfactory performance. ... The court denied the motion, noting that the reference to the document prepared by Mr. Copp but which had not been received in evidence was innocuous and that the reference to deaths as well as injuries was proper under the evidence. ... It refers to Mr. Hews' statement that Mr. Copp testified that Ford engaged in cost-benefit analyses and that there was "plenty of documentation for it." ... Ford argues that the documentation referred to by Mr. Copp -- the "Grush-Saunby Report" -- was excluded from evidence so that the statement was improper. ... Furthermore, Mr. Copp was permitted to testify that Ford did in fact engage in cost-benefit analyses which balanced life and limb against corporate savings and profits. ... Ford contends those two individuals did not occupy managerial positions because Mr. Copp testified that they admitted awareness of the defects but told him they were powerless to change the rear-end design of the Pinto. ^[18]

3. Free-CliffNotes.com - Crime www.free-cliffnotes.com/data/ea/lfm98.shtml - [Cached] Published on: 10/28/2003 Last Visited: 11/5/2003

Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash testing program, testified that the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture at low rear impact speeds creating a significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that fixes were feasible at nominal cost. He testified that management's decision was based on the cost savings, which would inure from omitting the fixes.^[19]

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