Talk:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||
| Mathematics rating: | B Class | Mid Priority | Field: History of mathematics | ||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
This article is within the scope of the WikiProject Philosophy, which collaborates on articles related to philosophy. To participate, you can edit this article or visit the project page for more details. | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Start | This article has been rated as Start-Class on the quality scale. | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| High | This article has been rated as high-importance on the importance scale. | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
This article is within the scope of WikiProject Books. To participate, you can edit the article. You can discuss the Project at its talk page. |
| Start | This article has been rated as start-Class on the Project's quality scale. See comments. |
Regarding the following quotation from the article: "It sets forth on an ambitious project to identify the relationship between language and reality and to define the limits of philosophy by articulating “…the conditions for a logically perfect language.” (Russell, p. 8 in the C. K. Ogden Translation)"
As far as I know that was exactly NOT what Wittgenstein had in mind. It was interpreted in that way by Russel. Wittgenstein disowned Russel's introduction and wanted to have the book revoked after he got out of the Italian POW camp. In Wittgenstein's own introduction he makes it clear that he is not busy with setting out the conditions for a logically perfect language, but rather to show that that which he DID NOT (indeed, could not) write, was the important part of the work. In proposition 6.54 he announces that the whole of the Tractatus actually is nonsensical, and therefore any "logically perfect language" is nonsensical. I am only a student of philosophy, but I am sure that someone with better credentials can confirm that what is stated in this article's introdution is actually not the case. Oom Kosie 22:49, 8 June 2007 (UTC)
I agree completely with Oom Kosie. DJProFusion (talk) 03:06, 22 January 2008 (UTC)
Contents |
[edit] Wittgenstein in popular culture
Would it be appropriate to add such a section? I am thinking in particular about the last episode of Fawlty Towers where Fawlty tells Manuel that the instruction he had just given him was "...not difficult, Manuel. This is not a proposition from Wittgenstein!"
-
-
- My 2¢: All references to popular culture in Wikipedia articles have no value.Lestrade 21:32, 1 July 2007 (UTC)Lestrade
-
I agree with Lestrade and even more worthless than usual for Wittgensetin. DJProFusion (talk) 03:06, 22 January 2008 (UTC)
[edit] 2004 talk
5.101 is a demonstration of the mapping between natural words like AND, OR, NOT, IF-THEN and binary number patterns.
To me, it does not follow that all philosophical problems are solved. The ForAll and ThereExist symbols, and the problems of object-oriented programming with Class definitions, for me, are still unsolved with the 5.101 notation.
-
- Wittgenstein was probably quite aware of this, having studied under Russell and Frege, who invented said logical apparatus. (That said, the distinction between propositional and predicate logic was not fully worked out until a good decade later). But the view expressed in the Tractatus of things like variables and names suggests that this may not have been a problem: W. arguably viewed universaly generalizations as unanalyzed propositions which, fully analyzed, would turn out to be about--to name--each specific individual object. Quantified logic could in this way be reduced to something like propositional logic (An extensional one: not, for example, counterfactually or modally robust, nor even able to accommodate unknown information.) It was, of course, problems with "hooking" up such a view of language to the actual world that (among other things) led W. to reconsider these views.
-
- In any case, your remark is confused: You say that not all philosophical problems are solved, and as evidence you present (1) Two symbols which you call unsolved. What does that mean? Do you perhaps mean that there were residual philosophical problems only formulable using those symbols? No doubt there are, but you don't present any. (2) The problems of object-oriented programming etc. But since programming didn't exist in 1922, how could any programming problems have existed then? This doesn't vitiate W's claim to have solved all philosophical problems, and even if programming problems are a kind of philosophical problem (which is rather dubious), it wouldn't vitiate a claim to have solved all philosophical problems that then existed.
- Re: it does not follow that all philosphical problems are solved: Wittgenstein realized this in his later life and wrote the Philosophical Investigations... although it doesn't address the formal logic problems, but rather philosophical problems with his methodology. --Wikiwikifast 02:26, 18 Apr 2004 (UTC)
Can anyone provide info on the copyright status of the Tractatus? Banno 23:06, May 1, 2004 (UTC)
- i have a 1986 reprint of the Routledge 1981 paperback parallel German/English edition. It gives dates of 1922 (original), 1933 (corrected), and 1955 (with index), plus a bunch of reprint dates, but nary a copyright notice in sight. The current Amazon image of the parallel edition gives a 1999 printing, and says "All rights reserved", but there is still no copyright notice, so I think someone forgot to renew it. Amazon images of the Pears & McGuinnes translation give 1961 and 1974 copyrights. --Blainster 00:10, 16 October 2005 (UTC)
Wouldn't it be better to put an index/summary of the seven main propositions, and then discuss them in detail, so that it's not too overwhelming? It would make more sense structurally if "What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence" wasn't immediately followed by 8 "Influence and Reception of the work". But I guess you wanted to preserve the numbering order of the seven propositions, to start with 1 instead of 1.1? Wikiwikifast 20:02, 8 May 2004 (UTC)
- At present I'm just attempting to précis the flow of the argument. I want to make sure that the summary clearly sets out which section is being summarised, in the hope of avoiding controversy. I find it easier to do so with the headings in place. Perhaps a rearrangement can be done when the article has some more body to it. Banno 20:53, May 8, 2004 (UTC)
[edit] 5.101
After thinking about it for a few days, I've decided to remove the material on prop. 5.101. Mostly because I could not determine exactly what it was that Wittgenstein was being praised for, but also because the table was rather difficult to fathom. Banno 12:11, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
- I think Wittgenstein was being praised for proposition 5.101 for contributing to engineering, and that it should be kept. Wikiwikifast 18:57, 10 May 2004 (UTC)
Obviously, but what exactly was his contribution? Truth tables were apparently in use elsewhere, although he certainly popularised their use. He provided a way to sequence propositions, but that does not seem to be what the author thought was important. The claim is that Wittgenstein demonstrated that bit-patterns, such as TFTT can correspond directly to word concepts, such as If C then A . Wittgenstein says nothing at all about bit-patterns, and although it is obvious to us that TFFT can be made into a bit pattern, this is not a claim made by Wittgenstein. I was also unable to find reference to this claim that does not derive from this very article ? perhaps you might be able to. And finally the author claimed to parse the truth functions in C-code, but does not. Banno 21:42, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
By all means, re-instate it, but it does need some justification and editing. If you wish to use it, I started constructing a HTML table of the values at user:banno/scratch ? with an extra column to insert the absent C-code. Banno 21:42, May 10, 2004 (UTC)
[edit] stuff moved from biographical article
The present edition is ugly and unclear. But I am unable to see a way to improve it. Please, some edit it into a coherent article! Banno 23:41, May 15, 2004 (UTC)
[edit] 2005 talk
The details of the two English translations were useful, but there's no clear agreement about which is the better - the Ogden translation was done with the assistance of Wittgenstein and two of the contemporaries who best understood his work. It uses slightly old-fashioned language, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's a worse translation. --Andrew Norman 13:12, Feb 21, 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Cleaned Up Article
I have tried to clean up this article per the above request. Though it covered many important aspects of the text previously, it was a very jumbled and difficult to read article. I have provided a main theses section with subsections for the various propositions. I did not give every proposition its own heading though, because I felt that truly going in depth on each one would make the article far too long. I believe that it is quite a bit more readable now. Tyrell turing 17:15, 2 May 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Distance / distinction between meaning and sense (Sinn)
This article is not currently distancing the words 'meaning' and 'sense'. When I read it, I think 'Russell/meaning' and 'Frege/sense'. Although the words are related, there is a difference in the history of the usage, and where Wittgenstein uses the word 'sense' in Tractatus, I propose that commentary in this article about the corresponding Proposition use the word 'sense'. Thus in Propositions 3.3*, Wittgenstein indeed uses 'meaning'. But in Propositions 6.4*, Wittgenstein uses the word 'sense'. It would change the tone of the article if care were taken to preserve the distinction between the words 'meaning' and 'sense'. I propose to wait a week or so, before editing. Any objections? Ancheta Wis 00:26, 31 May 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Ethics and esthetics
6.421 advertises the equivalence of ethics and esthetics. Some indication of the validity of this statement can be seen in the reaction of some people to a crime or to a transgression, such as disgust, horror, and other non-positive emotions. These reactions are visible even to a child, or to a family pet, such as a cat or dog. Rarely is pleasure or happiness ones reaction to a crime committed to one's self. Thus the 'sense of' (or reaction to) some happenstance in the world is due to something which transcends that happenstance. It appears that this is the 'sense' to which Wittgenstein appeals in 6.41 onward. Ancheta Wis 01:55, 31 May 2005 (UTC)
[edit] recent interpretations
Someone ought to add in discussion of more recent interpretations of TLP. Cora Diamond and others have focused on the question of what to make of that fact that Wittgenstein calls his own work nonsensical. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.70.119.241 (talk) 05:48, August 29, 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Motto?
"...whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring in his head, can be said in three words" - Kurnberger.
The motto is appropriate, perhaps all the more so because Kurnberger was an Austrian writer and revolutionary. I notice he doesn't rate a Wikipedia article of his own, but did he have three words in mind? He seems to have been rather vocal - Max Weber chooses to quote him as well ("They [Americans] make tallow out of cattle and money out of men").Adambisset 17:14, 18 October 2005 (UTC)
[edit] The Soul and 5.5421
I think a little bit about this point may be appropiate as it is here that Wittgenstein denies the unifying quality of the soul and subsequently the soul, itself.
5.542: It is clear, however, that `A believes that p', `A thinks p', `A says p' are of the form "`p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.
5.5421: This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul--the subject, etc.--as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
Perhaps there is someone more qualified than me to make the addition? Aindriu 14:10 11 May 2006
- This is a complicated subject, because it gets to Wittgenstein's point that the soul is part of the category which language cannot express. He is not explaining that the soul does not exist, only that as conceived by psychology it does not exist, because it is not part of the world. This is illustrated in 5.641 "The philosophical I is not ... the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world." The logical positivists avoided the fact that their hero was a mystic. Such statements as 6.41 "The sense of the world must lie outside the world", 6.44 "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is," and 6.522 "There is indeed, the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical" demonstrate his position. To him the world (universe) and the language that describes it are by themselves incomplete (6.54 paraphrased: the world must be transcended to be entirely understood). --Blainster 21:08, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
[edit] 5.101
Could someone explain this sentence please: "In 5.101 Wittgenstein showed, possibly for the first time, that bit-patterns such as "TFTT" can be mapped directly to sentences such as "If C then A", much to the amusement of contemporary cyberneticists." (added by Banno in March 2005)
Who were these contemporary cyberneticists? Given that the term "cybernetics" was not introduced until 1948, does it mean "modern day cyberneticists" rather than "contemporary"? And why is this amusing to anyone, particularly cyberneticists? Definitely some more explanation needed here. --Spondoolicks 10:18, 25 November 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Nand or nor?
It says he uses nand operators, but isn't it nor? In 5.5 the bit pattern is -----T, not -TTTTT. Nor is expressively adequate too, so it would do just as well. Michael Keats 11:32, 21 January 2007 (UTC)
The instruction - - - - - T can be interpreted in the following non standard way. When taken in conjunction with the variable and its values it expresses an operation that generates a truth function of the form (FFFFFT). The next two truth tables draw out the potential implications.
| Fx | a | b | ~Fx | & | ~a | & | ~b |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | T | T | F | F | F | F | F |
| F | T | T | |||||
| T | F | T | F | F | T | F | F |
| F | F | T | T | T | T | F | F |
| T | T | F | F | F | F | F | T |
| F | T | F | T | F | F | F | T |
| T | F | F | |||||
| F | F | F | T | T | T | T | T |
Two rows of values have failed to complete. This is because they threaten a contradiction. If a and b are to be values of the function Fx, then they cannot contradict the truth status of the variable. Which is to say neither a nor b can be true if -Fx is the case, and neither -a nor -b can be the case when Fx is true. With the rows failing to complete a formal relationship between variable and value is expressed. Only then can we write an abridged table of the following form:
| Fx | a | b | ~Fa | & | ~Fb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | T | T | F | F | F |
| F | T | T | |||
| T | F | T | T | F | F |
| F | F | T | T | F | F |
| T | T | F | F | F | T |
| F | T | F | F | F | T |
| T | F | F | |||
| F | F | F | T | T | T |
This can be abridged still further.
| Fx | a | b | ~Fa | & | ~Fb |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | T | T | F | F | F |
| T | F | T | T | F | F |
| T | T | F | F | F | T |
| T | T | F | F | T | T |
Thus N(Fx) = ~Fa & ~Fb.
The formal relationship between the variable and its value, as demonstrated by these tables cannot be expressed by the Nand operator. However neither is this a standard Nor operation. Furrowed Brow 20:35, 18 February 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Article Quality: See Here for Tags
I am suspicious of the quality of this article on the Tractatus. It does not seem to do justice to Wittgenstein's work. Over the course of the next year, a group of research students (including myself) will be reading and discussing the Tractatus. I will check back on this article periodically to see if there is anything that can be done to improve it.
For now, in the sections below, I will list what I can already see that is wrong with it, and open these topics up for discussion. You may also use my talk page to discuss topics related to what I have suggested, or my tags on the article itself.
[edit] Opening Section
I will leave editing the historical aspects of this article to someone else, though I think that what is said about it now could use a good deal more sourcing and verification.
[edit] Numbering
Wittgenstein does not only number n.1, n.11, n.111, etc. He also occasionally puts in n.01. This is definitely intentional, and seems to me to denote a clarification, rather than an elaboration. I am not sure if this is the scholarly concensus or even verifiable. However, any discussion on the numbering in the Tractatus should at least address this point.
- The description in the article probably derives from the footnote on 1, which probably isn't taken literally. I'll look in journals. –Pomte 22:32, 19 January 2008 (UTC)
[edit] Wittgenstein's Goal
The article currently says, "It sets forth on an ambitious project to identify the relationship between language and reality and to define the limits of philosophy by articulating “…the conditions for a logically perfect language.” (Russell, p. 8 in the C. K. Ogden Translation) The goal was a philosophical system that would complete Bertrand Russell's early philosophy of "logical atomism.""
Where is this coming from? Wittgenstein sets out his aim for the book in his own "Preface" to it as follows:
The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather -- not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to thnk both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.
Wittgenstein wishes to set the limit (in language) of things that we may discuss and things which we cannot and should not discuss. It does not follow from this that he is attempting to create a "logically perfect language" and especially not that he was trying to flesh out Russellian "logical atomism".
What's more, the quote in the article doesn't even fairly represent what Russell said about the book! Here's the full quotation from the Ogden translation, Russell's introduction:
"In order to understand Mr Wittgenstein's book, it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned. In the part of his theory which deals with Symbolism he is concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language."
Russell only says that in a specific part of the book, Wittgenstein is concerned with "the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language", which is to say, if we were to have one. It does not follow that it was Wittgenstein's aim to create one; he might (and I think did, to some extent) simply show the failings of natural language.
[edit] Section 1: "Main theses"
[edit] Propositions
I am not sure whether or not Wittgenstein himself called the numbered statements in the Tractatus "propositions" or not, but even if he did, I can hardly see how linking the Wikipedia article on propositions is relevant here. The article in question mostly discusses (and rightly so) what philosophers of language and truth theorists refer to as propositions, in terms of their ontological status and their truth value. This sort of technical discussion of a proposition hardly relates to whatever term we choose to name the Tractatus' constituent statements.
[edit] Translation
In setting out the seven main theses, what translation was used? There are several apparent errors here:
(2) is rendered "What is the case (a fact) is the existence of atomic states of affairs."
This seems to conflate both the Ogden and the Pears & McGuiness English translations:
Ogden: "What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts." P & M: "2. What is the case--a fact--is the existence of states of affairs."
Notice that in neither case is "a fact" parenthetical. I personally prefer the Pears & McGuiness rendering, as it seems less circular.
(3) is rendered "A thought is a logical picture of a fact."
This is perhaps an acceptable paraphrase, except for one thing:
Ogden: "The logical picture of the facts is the thought." (emphasis mine) P & M: "A logical picture of facts is a thought." (emphasis mine)
Wittgenstein's language, particularly in the Tractatus, is very deliberate. Facts is plural for a reason, and any paraphrase should keep this, I would think.
(4) is rendered "A thought is a proposition with sense."
Again, a tiny detail is missing, because the two translations were misused (I think):
Ogden: "The thought is the significant proposition." P & M: "4. A thought is a proposition with a sense." (emphasis mine)
A "proposition with sense" sounds like a sensible proposition. A "proposition with a sense" probably refers to the Fregean notion of sense. These are quite distinct.
The last half of (5) is missing: "(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)"
(7) is rendered "Where (or of what) one cannot speak, one must remain silent."
This statement, the closing statement of the Tractatus, is not only crucial (Wittgenstein himself saw it as the whole aim of the book), but fairly straightforward. Paraphrasing it is unnecessary and, I think, sloppy.
Ogden: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." P & M: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."
As my reading group and I move through our discussion, I will revisit the following sections of the article and attempt also to improve them. In particular the first section strikes me as hugely oversimplified. That's enough for now. Heelan Coo 21:14, 25 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Suggest that there are eight main propositions
I suggest that there are eight, and not seven main propositions in the Tractatus.
The eighth is at paragraph 5.1362 which concerns the freedom of the will:
'the freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future.' 80.189.119.38 (talk) 15:04, 18 May 2008 (UTC)Alex Smith
Easily the best introduction to the Tractatus is Roger White's book: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Continuum Books, 2006).
Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 15:26, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
