User talk:TJFrazier/coercion

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1 Coercion

[edit] Coercion

[edit] "A little research music, please . . ."

My thanks (I think . . .) to Al for throwing out this particular conversational ball. I chased it all around Robin Hood's barn; my misspelling ("coerSion") didn't help a bit.

Now, armed with the contents of the Wp article, and fortified (per the references there) with Rothbard's commentary on Hayek, and Anderson's thoughts on Nozick, I can confirm what I suspected: anyone using "coercion" in a philosophical context had better come prepared with a definition. Mine is only slightly modified from that of the little OED which came with my word processor:

coerce vt. to persuade by force, or threat thereof [my addition]

Those who wish to extend the definition to include economic pressure will probably dislike the following quote:

"The rotter who simpers that he sees no difference between the power of the dollar and the power of the whip, ought to learn the difference on his own hide—as, I think, he will." – Francisco d'Anconia in Atlas Shrugged, p.386

Amen.

My original intent was to qualify a potential laundry-list of tactics, useable to combat irrational discrimination, as non-coercive (hence, morally licit), in contradistinction to "the force of law" (coercive by definition), which is immoral when it violates rights. Except for the first tactic, "rational discussion", they all qualify as "economic pressure", which would be coercive under the broader definition. I note that even Adam Smith's "dead hand", definitely operational in a case of irrational discrimination, would qualify as coercive. This might be useful for a sneaky assault on capitalism, but I can't imagine any honest use.--TJ 10:08, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

You're not examining your premises. In specific, you're working off the deontological theory that coercion (however we define it) is inherently immoral. This assumption is not shared by non-libertarians. Moreover, the same people who argue that we should recognize economic force as potentially coercive are the ones who reject this assumption, as well as the notion of "initiation".

The honest use, then, is to recognize that there are more ways to "compel by force, intimidation and authority" than just physically. Sure, there is a difference between a dollar and a whip — trivially, everything is in some way different from everything else — but that difference doesn't necessarily matter, either practically or ethically.

Imagine an entirely hypothetical scenario in which Bill Gates sits down with Philippe Kahn and says, "If you continue to compete against me in the language tools category, I will buy Borland up and fire you". This isn't coercive? Consider that Bill could add, "And then I'll do that to every company that hires you, firing all the people who allowed your hire, before reselling." At this point, Bill's not only threatening Philippe's current job but his entire career, promising to use his economic might to ruin Philippe. But, of course, Rand would say it's not coercive.

In dealing with discrimination, just as with any other social ill, there is clearly a place for education and debate. However, there will still be people who discriminate, thus causing harm to individuals and to society as a whole. That this harm is not always physical does not stop it from being harmful. And when society responds by using force of whatever kind, it's simply acting in self-defense. If this means economic sanctions, whether public or private, I see nothing inherently wrong with it. If you do, that's just a reflection of your libertarian bias, not a basis that would compel a rational person to agree. Alienus 13:24, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Points of misunderstanding

I don't think we've ever had so many misunderstandings, all at once.

I'm speaking '$' here, rather than 'lib', because 'lib' is very weak on basic principles.
Using my narrow definition of 'coerce', I am not making an assumption, but rather stating an ethical principle. You are quite right that not everyone agrees therewith. We even have a special name for their category: "violent criminals".
(On a personal note, I am somewhat amazed that you wish to blur the line between force and non-force. I had thought it quite likely, considering the vigor and tenor of your arguments (with others, I mean, not with me), that you had intercepted a fist with your face, on one or more occasions. That tends to leave a different perspective on violence. Obviously, my musings are wrong, somewhere.)
Also on 'coerce', consider what I see as ambiguities in the definition you offer, above:
1. 'Intimidate' can have other meanings besides 'threat of force'. I am not much of a mechanic; when I open the hood of my car, I am somewhat intimidated. Should I then invoke my right of self-defence, haul out a sledgehammer, and teach the engine better manners? (Don't try this at home! :-)
2. How can 'authority' 'compel', other than by threat of force? There are always ways (usually, myriad ways) of non-forceful resistance to non-forceful pressures.
3. I still see no honest purpose in a definition so watered-down as to include, "anything I dislike". It's also very dangerous.
Finally (for this laundry-list), I consider the distinction between 'dollar and whip' to be not only non-trivial, but absolutely crucial. I defer my reasoning to the philosophy-proper discussion further down.--TJ 11:06, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

In a blind taste taste, I can't distinguish "$" from "lib". Hell, with my eyes open, I have to squint and move my head very close, and even then it's a toss-up. Please, let's not pretend that Objectivist politics are anything but a particular form of libertarianism.

As for coercion, we actually agree that it comes down to persuading by force or threat thereof. However, we disagree on two major points. First, I don't see why force should be limited to physical harm. Second, I don't see coercion as necessarily immoral. I'll start with the second issue first, since I didn't cover it in as much detail last time around.

I grew up in Brooklyn, so I'm not entirely unfamiliar with violent criminals. On one occasion, a guy once demanded my money, so I told him that I'd hurt him significantly if he didn't leave immediately. Apparently he believed me, since he left promptly. I clearly used the threat of force to persuade him, which is coercion. However, I acted in self-defense, so this coercion was not immoral. Even if I'd had to actually use force in this case, it still would have been moral.

Here's another example of moral coercion, fully sanctioned by law. If you rent an apartment from me and fail to pay your rent, I can serve you with an eviction notice. If you fail to leave, I can have a marshal physically remove you from my property. This marshal is most certainly using coercion — he's got a gun and is ready to use it if necessary — yet he's acting to defend my property rights. A similar, though distinct, example would involve a repo man and the car that you missed loan payments on.

I think you need to carefully distinguish between harm and immorality. Sure, coercion is inherently harmful to the coerced, but that doesn't mean that this harm isn't outweighed by a greater good or is in any way unjustified. Consider that amputation is also inherently harmful, but less so than death by gangrene. In short, coercion is not just for violent criminals anymore than aputation is just for axe murderers.

In the end, your attempt to support the notion that coercion is immoral as an ethical principle is doomed when I apply a bit of consequentialism. This is the fate of all attempts at deontological ethics, whether they're Rand's or Kant's.

Now, moving back to the first point, you may have already noticed how the example of the marshal demonstrates the thin line between dollars and whips. In the end, dollars are just an abstraction over more physical things. When I take away your money, I'm taking away your food, enabling a uniformed thug to boot you out of your home and a legal thief to steal your car. Dollars buy whips and whips let you acquire dollars. Money and power go hand in hand, to the point where money is a form of power, as much as muscle power is.

I could address some of your minor points, such as the meaning of intimidation, and I suspect I will eventually, but for now I'll stop and let you respond to this. I'll also hold off on addressing "Capitalism" and "Philosophy proper" for right now, so please accept my raincheck. Alienus 03:52, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Rainchecks welcome; I can see you've been busy.

First, blame me for always thinking (but never writing) "initiation of" coercion. We are quite in agreement on the morality of the use of force in your two examples (would-be robber, dead-beat tenant) above. The tenant has initiated the use of force (I think the term "adverse possession" is related), by my lights.

The next point is where we disagree ("thin line"). True, money can buy whips (cf. Machiavelli on soldiers and gold). We have a name for this, which begins, "conspiracy to commit . . ." (some unlawful action). As for the converse, putting a whip in the hand of your would-be robber might change "strong-arm robbery" to "armed robbery", but the morality is unaffected. Perhaps the point is that anything can be misused, including money and whips; but I maintain that there is a great fundamental difference between the two. Also note that one can "buy" force in other ways; sex, for instance ("Kill him, and I'll sleep with you") or ideological approval ("Blow yourself up and go to Heaven").

As for '$' vs. 'lib', the political principles are indeed very similar; but I don't think you'll need your ideo-glasses (phil-laser surgery? :-) to see the difference below.--TJ 11:01, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Actually, I haven't been busy at all, at least not on Wikipedia. I made the mistake of restoring some factual, neutral and well-cited text, which deeply offended some people with badges. You know how that goes.

As for initiation of force, the idea is entirely incoherant. Whether the use of force qualifies as initiation (bad) or retaliation (good) depends solely on what moment you choose as "first". This matter can be manipulated arbitrarily by reframing the chronological scope.

Consider the case where Bob breaks in to an apartment in a building owned by Al and takes all he can carry. Theft! Initation of force! BAD! But wait, it turns out that he's retaliating for Al's early conversion of property. You see, Al initated force by changing the locks on the apartment Bob was living in. If we enlarge the scope further, we might find out that Bob failed to pay Al the rent, which means Bob initated economic force, causing Al to retaliate. However, if we look even further back, we see that Al initated force by refusing to fix the heater, and that's why Bob retaliated by not paying the rent. If we stop right here, Al's in the wrong, but if we go back further, who knows?

Not only can we pick arbitrary points to stop, framing the scenario to the advantage of one participant or the other, but there may not even be a principled moment that qualifies as "first". Even worse, it may be that nobody "initiated" in the first place. Charitably, the principle of non-initation may hold when there is a clear starting point and all things are equal. This makes it worthless in the real world, where we form a society through mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.

Moving on, note how it doesn't really matter whether the force is economic or physical. Refusing to pay rent is force, just as much as kicking in the door, and I can rob you just as easily with frivolous lawsuits as I can by holding a gun to your head. What makes it force is that I am controlling you, whether I do it by grabbing you or by pulling your financial strings. And, in the end, the morality of force comes down to cost/benefit analysis, not a game of chicken. Alienus 12:04, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

I quite agree that the timeline of complex interactions can be distorted. Cf. the problems that the admins have in dealing with a certain pugnatious editor . . . (Yes, I noticed. That's what I was discretely referring to as "being busy". If and when you think you could use advice on this subject, feel free to ask; otherwise I won't waste your time and mine offering any. Meanwhile, I welcome you back, and hope that you enjoy short vacations. :-)

More directly, your combative landlord and tenant a) are not too bright, and b) should have been in l&t court long since. Let the judge sort it out.

Your "worthless in the real-world" argument seems to parallel the "gray-morality" argument: "In the real world, all issues are some shade of gray, so a black-and-white morality is useless." Do I really have to refute either (or both)?

"Mutual coercion" is probably a good description of existing societies, but ought it to be that way?

I'd call all but the "frivolous law suits" examples of force force, as opposed to economic force. (For the law suits, I'd counter-sue for malicious prosecution, and sue the other guy's lawyer, too—for champerty. Malicious use of the law is a kind of funny case.)

Cost/benefit and risk analyses are certainly applicable to the use of force <==> force is morally justifiable. Can + may is necessary but not sufficient for ought.

[I added a new section for a question, below.]--TJ 11:00, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

My recent fun with admins was a fine example of framing. They needed four reverts to convict me, so they ignored the fact that two of them were countering demonstrably bad-faith reverts and added in two more that were only incidental. While they were at it, they ignored a total of 8 reverts against me, many of which were highly questionable. Brilliant! Rand would be proud.

Actually, I never suggested that "In the real world, all issues are some shade of gray, so a black-and-white morality is useless." That's your misreading. Rather, I'm saying that "no initiation of force" (NIOF) is at best a rule of thumb that corresponds to morality in very limited situations, hence it does not constitute a sound and complete moral principle. I've also suggested consequentialism as an alternative to NIOF.

What keeps society together is that we agree to be held responsible for our decisions, which is all that "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (MCMAU) means. Note that the phrase is somewhat ironic in this context, because if we've agreed upon the use of force, it's not really coercion. Parallel it to a typical Rand character begging to be raped; you can't rape the willing. In short, MCMAU is the basis for society, not some negotiable attribute.

I don't want to spend a lot of time explaining why your view of civil law is hopelessly idealistic. Suffice it to say that if your goal is to cost your opponent money, as opposed to "winning", it's not hard to succeed. The real world is full of examples to confirm this.

My point about cost/benefit analysis was to once again invoke consequentialism, where we look at both the beneficial and harmful consequences of a choice. When the totality of both are compared, we know which options are viable, and even have some idea of which one might be best.

It doesn't look like you've addressed my argument about economic force. Alienus 17:59, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

(I'm famously long on kindness, but notoriously short on sympathy. So, I won't say, "Poor fellow! Everybody's wrong but him!", because it would be unkind. "That would be–wrong." –Buffy from TV :-) (It's also easy to see why one dispute might be given short shrift, while another might get more thorough and even-handed attention; and why the judges might feel entirely justified in both cases.)

In your earlier remarks about what you have subsequently labeled "NIOF", you stressed the problem of picking an arbitrary point, by which tactic one could make either side look 'good'. I generalized this to, "the difficulty in sorting out the history", and considered it parallel to, "the difficulty in sorting out the black and white", the latter from one formulation of the "gray morality" problem (which I introduced because of the supposed parallel; certainly, you never said any such thing). Your assertion about the "limited situational utility" of NIOF is quite clear; it's your argument in support thereof which I'm questioning. If I have misread your intent, I apologize, and ask for correction.

MCMAU, I'll have to think about. I'm not happy with some of the implications, but then, I tend to think prescriptively. Are you offering MCMAU as a descriptive short-hand analysis of the social contract?

I agree that my view of civil law is highly idealistic (but maybe not hopelessly: I said I'd sue; I didn't say I'd win, or collect).

I also agree that "economic force" is probably the heart of the matter, and almost every word I've written on this page has been aimed in that direction. If I understand you correctly, "society" may, in "self defense", use its coercive powers (physical force) to prevent "harm" from non-physical "economic force". I'll pause right here, in case I don't understand you correctly.--TJ 10:42, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm not particularly interested in either your kindness or your sympathy. Quite frankly, people who rely on others for their self-image deserve everything they get. I brought up my recent fun precisely because it exemplifies the abusive potential of re-framing an issue, so let's stick to that aspect.

The problem with NIOF isn't that it's difficult, but that there is no principled basis for choosing a starting point, making it inherently susceptible to framing. This is a fatal weak point; an attack to which it has no defense. Basing blame on "initiation" turns life into a game of chicken, where the one who twitches loses. Doesn't matter who's right; just who acts first. Or, even better, only matters who gets caught crossing the line first.

Fundamentally, NIOF is a non-starter because there is no inherently fair initial state to work from, whose violation is therefore wrong. In contrast, the success of SCT comes from the fact that it builds up from an inherently unfair initial state and does not depend on people being angels.

As an example of SCT, consider the issue of Ike the individual, who is certain that he's a fundamentally good person, but not so sure about everyone else. He trusts himself, but is surrounded by potential murderers, so he would love to get his neighbors to agree (in an enforceable manner) not to kill him.

In return, he's willing to make a commitment not to kill them, either. From his point of view, it's a small price to pay, since all he's done is give up his natural freedom to do something that, as a good person, he would never want to do anyhow. Of course, his neighbors see it just the same way, varying only in who they identify as the one person who can be trusted. We all think we're good people, worthy of full trust, and we all just want others to be as good as we think we are. That's why we're each willing to agree mutually to mutual coercion. Of course, sometimes we're mistaken about how good we are, which is why the agreement has provisions for punishment.

Note also how this line of thinking applies just as well to a variety of harms, not just murder. Ike wouldn't want the fruits of his labor taken, so he agrees to respect the fruits of his neighbors' respective labor, and so on. Property rights, like all others, are created by this contract, not assumed up front. They might be implicit in our interests, but the contract makes them explicit and punishable. The contract also spells out the details of these rights, limiting their extent to what we agree on so as to further our interests. There was, for example, a time when Ike could have had a human being as his property, but the current social contract (in America, at least) disallows such an option.

Your repeated attempts to invoke civil suits as the cure for all non-physical harm is typically libertarian, and typically unrealistic. Game theory necessitates that suing will never replace pro-active legislation and other forms of "invasive government intrusion" into the private sector. Therefore, the net result of the libertarian ideal is that it would lead to a further disparity between those who have power and those who lack it, which translates directly to a net loss of societal wealth. Alienus 21:36, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Ontology

[edit] Deontology

I fail to understand your term, "deontological", and my casual research has not been very fruitful. Your elucidation would be appreciated. You may assume that I have passing (but not deep) familiarity with ontology, although the "subject of the subject", so to speak, always reminds me of an expression that "Doc" Smith used to use: "the whichness of the why".--TJ 11:00, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

There's this web site called "Wikipedia" that's sometimes helpful for reference. Maybe you've heard of it. If not, try http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontology. Alienus 18:05, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Obviously, "deontology" has evolved from "de[hyphen]ontology", and hence will be explained, or at least referenced, at that philosophical concept, or at one of the links there. Or should be. Obviously.

Well, no. The spelling similiarity is a coincidence. The etymology shows two different Greek roots. Thanks for the reference, which clarified the matter.

Still, I'd be leary of applying the term to Rand. She strongly denounces unchosen duties. "A priori rights" might not fit too well, either. As I understand it, the basis of rights is in the nature of Man, a metaphysical matter, and the job of ethics is to discover and enumerate those rights, and elucidate thereon.

But it's your word, and I see no great harm therein, so I won't argue the point.--TJ 11:25, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Our nature constrains our interests, sure, but to jump from interests to rights without the medium of a social contract is a deontological move. Deontological approaches start off with duties, virtues and rights, then work from there. Consequentialist approaches start with our interests, then detetermine what would optimize for them, including which rights we create through the social contract. To put it more bluntly, I'm saying Rand is jumping the gun in trying to speak of rights so early on; she's ignoring implicit dependencies. Alienus 17:44, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Thank you again; that's much clearer. (At least, I have a better understanding of what I'm disagreeing with. :-) But, if Rand ignores anything, bet on it: it's deliberate, and probably explicit.--TJ 10:28, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

No doubt, it was intentional! The path from "is" to "ought" is a difficult one, to the point that some philsophers have famously (notoriously?) claimed that no such path is possible, so any attempt is an automatic fallacy. Rand avoids this problem by jumping over that path. This is consistent with her reputation among academic philosophers — even those sympathetic to some of her conclusions — for being lazy. I've heard her compared unfavorably with Shermer on this account. Alienus 21:11, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Is / Ought

I don't find it surprising that some philosophers find that journey hard. They start with some shining other-worldly dimension (Plato's world of Forms, Kant's noumenal world, the various heavens so beloved of theologians, or any other grandiose imagining which belongs on this dishonor roll). They tailor an ethical system to their particular dimension. Then they try to relate the result to reality, and run into the old joke: "You can't get there from here." (The theologians can take a short-cut: "God said so!" The rationalists are stuck.)

What does surprise me is the fate of those who give up, and conclude that ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy itself, are useless. They are welcomed—even honored—by their academic colleagues, though the logical conclusion from their results is that philosophy departments should be abolished as a waste. (I suppose that everybody gave up on logic, too . . . yes, "notorious" is my choice of words.)

It might surprise you that Rand develops her ethics in the fashion you describe for consequentialists. She develops the necessary conditions for the life of Man as based on the nature of Man, which should correspond to the "interests" you mention, and doesn't use the term "rights" until she gets all the way to politics.

Early on in this process, she develops (this is my condensation) the conceptual chain:

life as conditional → choices → code of virtues and values = ethics

With ethics as a vital necessity for every-day life, the "is / ought" problem kind of evaporates.--TJ 10:17, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm disappointed that you focused on this -- and still got it wrong -- while ignoring more important points.

The is/ought problem is not insoluble, but it also doesn't come pre-solved. There is a distance between Is and Ought, and while it's certainly not infinite, the gap has to be crossed carefully. One of the Is's that needs to be considered when finding the Ought is our interests, but that's not enough for a comprehensive moral system. We each have many potentially conflicting interests, and an individual's interests may conflict with those of others. This is where game theory, consequentialism and social contract theory come in, forming an integral but non-trivial structure that grounds ethics in reality.

Rand's failure was that she started with her Ought's and declared them to be Is's, an act of momumental hubris and laziness. Consider how she reasoned directly from her certain knowledge of the nature of man to conclusions as bizarre as a prohibition on female Presidents. She was clueless.

Another bit of hubris, popular among those who know nothing of philosophy outside of Randism, is the notion that only Rand's amateur effort is realistic and practical. Yes, there are academic philosophers who live in the middle ages (Plantinga) or in postmodernist castles in the sky (Derrida), but there's a whole world out there of sensible philosophers who neither deny our ability to gain knowledge by means of rationality (as the afformentioned pair do) nor conflate knowledge with certainty (as Rand does). Get out of your shell and read Dennett or something. Limiting yourself to Rand is intellectual provincialism at its worst. Alienus 02:41, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] NIOF and the other game theory

Fundamentally, NIOF is a non-starter because there is no inherently fair initial state to work from, whose violation is therefore wrong. In contrast, . . .

(Al's remarks copied from above.)

I suggest that what we need here is the other game theory: the one from TA. Their definition of "game" involves an interaction with covert motives and communications, and a payoff. I suggest that your "game of chicken" fits exactly into this category of minor psychological aberration, and has no metaphysical significance whatsoever. To borrow another TA concept, what's needed is an "antithetical move", which breaks up the game (in contrast to either winning or losing).

There was a "real-life" (and almost real-death) case in the papers not long ago. It started out as road-rage; probably only an "angel . . . writing in a book of gold" could sort out who started what. But, one of the drivers made an antithetical move: he pulled off the road, into a parking lot. The second driver then a) followed him into the lot; b) blocked in the first guy's car with his own; and c) got out of his vehicle and approached the first guy with belligerant intent.

(The second guy was lucky; he survived. He was even able to drive himself to the hospital, where he was treated for a stab wound.)

With the possible exception of the second driver, nobody, including the cops, had any trouble affixing blame. Even under Florida's old, "Duty to retreat" standard, I think the first guy would have skated; under the new law, it was open and shut. Since the first guy declined to press charges against the second guy, no further legal action was taken.--TJ 10:17, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

To get to a principled point, NIOF forbids the use of force "to gain a value from another." (The immediate use of force to keep a value is another matter.) Where no value is involved, as with the road-rage incident, what we have is a bar-room brawl.

The theoretical initial, neutral state is non-interaction, i.e., before the parties met.TJ 10:47, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

I am at a loss as to how you managed to so badly misunderstand my point. I re-read my last message and it seems quite clear, but apparently it wasn't. So, instead of using metaphors like "chicken", let me give you a real-world (or real-Wiki-world) example.

Earlier today, Nandesuka acted like an asshole, with the apparent intent of getting me to call him an asshole so that he could have me banned for the dreaded WP:NPA. He was playing the old schoolyard game of seeing how much offense he could give while nominally being on the up-and-up, ready to cry to mommy if I reacted.

The key here is that he knew there was a line in the sand that I'd be punished for crossing, so he danced on the edge of that border with the hopes that I'd cross it to throttle him. If I was seen as initiating verbal force with an overt personal attack in response to his covert attacks upon me, I could be further punished by the authorities. The fact that this asshole got me banned by lying is not seen as sufficient justification for my calling him what he is.

The initial state here is not non-interaction. Even before we met, he was part of the pro-circumcision cabal, gleefully joining in their efforts to set people up for bans if they tried to inject any medical facts into "their" article. By the time he first reverted me, he was already guilty of conversion, and had possession of what is not his. I dared to try to take it away from him, and was punished for "initiating" force by reverting.

By your definition, we must assume that whatever things of value a person had when you met them are necessarily deserved. You would have us ignore the history of how they got these things of value, and who they got them from. This is deeply naive, deeply conservative and deeply wrong.

Rather than simply knocking your ideas, let me offer something better, taken from SCT. Earlier, I mentioned that the goal of the social contract is the fair and efficient production and distribution of what is of value to us. Efficiency speaks for itself, but what constitutes fairness? Rawls had an interesting definition, rooted in the notion that unfairness is what we get when people try to serve their own interests at the cost of others'. He suggested that fairness should be defined in terms of what we'd chose if we were forced to be impartial by somehow not being able to identify which individual were were. Decisions made behind this veil of ignorance constitute the original position, from which all deviations count as "iniating". Alienus 03:29, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

Let me take these from the bottom.

In my rant about modern philosophers, Rawls was one I had in mind, and this is a good example. Rawls is touting the benefits of ignorance in decision-making. What does this imply about the value of reason? Or epistemology? Naturally, information can be misused, and is, just as anything can be and is. But the remedy is better thinking, not ignorance. (Do you notice the logical chain that starts with Rawls, and ends in the (forced!) shutdown of Wikipedia?)

The best I can claim for my analysis is 'independent invention' and 'fundamental'. I do not claim that it is 'profound' or 'non-obvious', much less 'original'. Since you saw fit to cite his proposal, I assume that you can point me at some related thinking, if I don't find it through his article. I've been putting off digging into Rawls, because I expect it to be deadly dull work; he's been on my to-to list because of his quote about "pain / pain relief". In the short quote, the example works better against him than for him, but I want to see it in his own fuller context.

In a wider view, SCT seems to have a problem with conflicting interests among men. This is a consequence of whatever process defines those interests. Conversely, Objectivism's methodology allows for a very strong statement. Properly qualifying 'rational' to include long-range, in-context, and honest ("NIOF to gain values"), Objectivism holds that "men's rational interests do not conflict." (The differing consequences of the different methods should be of interest to a consequentialist! :-)

I rather doubt that "efficiency speaks for itself". It is, or was, fairly common to attack capitalism on "efficiency" grounds: "Do we really need Ford and GM and Chrysler?" The full answer is very long; the very short answer is, "At least for the moment, yes."

Finally getting back to the top, you're right: I don't understand your point. NIOF, as a moral principle for honest people, is clear. As a rule for third-party neutrals to judge by, NIOF is still bed-rock, but I see at least two problems. The general case runs into the 'historical inequities' problem, and any particular case may run into a scam. These difficulties are not unique to NIOF, and have to be solved or guarded against in any judgement.

Living in society (under a social contract) introduces another complication for judgements: I refer to style (lawful / unlawful) vs. substance (right / wrong). Judgements in real courts are usually based on style (law) rather than substance (equity). People who "do right", but break the law in the process, can be punished for it, particularly if there is a lawful way to do the same "right" thing.--TJ 10:05, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

Actually, Rawls has argued that we should have available to us all relevant knowledge that we are capable of processing quickly enough to make a difference. The only thing he argues against (and even then, only in the hypothetical initial state) is knowledge of your own identity, as that would allow bias. Quite frankly, this is a key point, so if you missed it, you don't really understand what Rawls is arguing for, and are instead attacking a straw man. (Your wikilink didn't lead to any Rawls quotes.)

SCT is the solution to conflicting interests, in that it acknowledges the reality that rational interests can conflict, yet doesn't require otherwise. You can find conflict even among your own interests, especially in the context of membership in different groups and considerations over different durations. Randism offers an illusion of certainty, but it's just an illusion.

Efficiency speaks for itself in that it doesn't require much additional definition. In contrast, it's not always clear what it would mean for something to be fair. That's why Rawls specified a process by which to determine fairness.

NIOF is unclear regardless of honesty. In the example I gave, people honestly disagreed over which state to start from.

As you might have noticed, this response is shorter and less detailed. That's because I'm running into your limits of comprehension. If you understood but disagreed, it would be worthwhile to put more effort into this. As it stands, you disagree precisely because you do not understand, and I can't cure that. You have to fix your own ignorance. Alienus 20:07, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Utilitarianism

[This may aid in discrimitation between '$' and 'lib'.]

Utilitarianism and related philosophical strains (pun intended) are a "pet peeve" to Objectivists. To make a charitable anology, they are regarded as sturdy structures, quite capable of resisting fire, tornadoes, even earthquakes—but built on sand. Comes a really high tide (tsunami, storm surge), and the sand dissipates; the whole structure washes out to sea, and promptly sinks. This leaves whatever admirable cause they were defending (to grant them the purity of their intentions) generally worse off with their "help" than without it.

By contrast, Objectivism regards itself as built on sterner stuff: metaphysical entities, epistemological identifications and definitions, and ethical evaluations and discriminations, leading to defensible political principles. (Critics may disagree . . . :-)--TJ 10:17, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

Critics just did; see above. Your characterization is simply out of touch with reality. Alienus 03:31, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Capitalism

With respect to your scenario of the billionare and the competitor, capitalism handles this kind of thing quite well, with no more force than that implied by "contract law". A smart billionaire would find it much cheaper and more productive to begin with, "Hey, come work for me! Write your own ticket. You can do great work, exercise vast influence, have the time of your life, and wind up very, very rich! Think it over. Come see me at work, look over the place and the organization, and we can hash out the details." For our purposes (i.e., to keep the narrative going) we must assume that the billionaire didn't say that, or the competitor refused the offer, or perhaps they couldn't agree on the details. Then the billionaire issues a statement of malign intent, as above. Then what (he asks rhetorically)?

The first thing to do is for the competitor and his company to put "anti-takeover" measures in place, if they aren't already; I am thinking primarily of "golden parachutes", but there are others. These may discourage the billionaire; if not, those "adversely" affected (by being fired) wind up with a great deal of money, not to mention the windfall to the other stockholders; the billionaire may have to answer some awkward questions from his own stockholders, too.

From this point, there are two major possibilities, which I would call 'classical' and 'modern'. The 'classical' solution points out that the competitor need find only one employer, out of hundreds or thousands, who can and will resist being bought. Or, the competitor may have enough capital, or be able to attract enough capital, to start a new business, which could certainly be set up as buyout-proof.

The 'modern' solution says that the competitor will have a flood of job offers, from companies just hoping and praying that they will in turn be bought out. If indeed they are, then the cycle continues, while the competitor gets richer and richer from the golden parachutes, until somebody has a change of mind.

But you are quite right about another thing: Rand would say this is all non-coercive. So do I.--TJ 11:06, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

As it happens, I based my example on a real event, in which the attempt at coercion was successful. Alienus 18:06, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Philosophy proper

A fully reasoned and rationally persuasive argument regarding the use of force in society requires nothing less than the norming of the social contract, that is, applying ethical principles to determine what the social contract ought and ought not to specify. (This top-down and prescriptive approach to philosophy has the advantage of putting 'ought' where 'ought' can actually be useful, not to mention that it is desperately needed.) This is a major undertaking, probably book-length, or at least thesis-length, for a philosopher.

I'm neither a philosopher nor a writer looking to publish. What I can usefully do is to start with a sketch of the conceptual chain involved, then fill it out until the "rational reader" can at least follow it (not to say agree with it, much less be compelled thereto :-). It is a great help (and pleasure) to have a friendly antagonist in this work. At worst, we (and others) should be able to identify exactly where and why we must "agree to disagree"; my optomistic projection is that the work may become "food for thought"; I regard reaching "compelling" status as highly unlikely. TJ 09:51, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Social contract theory is about how we arrive at rights, therefore it can't start with them. What norms the social contract is whether it is successful at fulfilling our interests in an efficient and fair manner. Alienus 18:08, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Conceptual chain

Metaphysics: "Man as a rational being." Note 'definition by essentials'. "Life as conditional" → choices → ethics.

Epistemology: Reason and logic, definition by essentials.

Ethics:

"Rationality as cardinal virtue." Required to identify other virtues. Principal facilitator of human survival. Requires commitment not just to reason, but to the ongoing use of reason to inquire, identify, integrate, and judge.
- Note: 'violation' easy, 'only possible' harder, to prove.

Politics:

Force (incl. threat of force and fraud) as only possible violator of rationality; a Bad Thing :-(
Natural right to live → natural right of self-defense.
[Target] Primacy of individual; Society as tool.
[Target] Social contract as partial delegation of self-defense rights, esp. over time (preemptive, excessive, revenge). Source of legitimacy for use of retaliatory force. "Harm" as unsuitable criterion; only "initiation" qualifies; "fraud" part of "force".--TJ 09:51, 18 March 2006 (UTC)