User:The Tetrast
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[edit] How to reach me
I'm finding that I keep not coming back to keep track. If somebody wants to reach me or let me know that something is up, email me at baudell at gmail.com. Replace the "at" in the obvious way.
[edit] I revised and expanded the "Pragmatic model" section in the "Scientific method" article
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method#Pragmatic_model Then I reviewed the discussion page. Apparently the article has been subject to some controversy and may undergo radical revision. Well, if the Peirce section gets truncated or deleted, I can probably find use for it elsewhere. Update: I've used a considerable amount of it in the Charles Peirce wiki, in the section on Pragmatism. I noted this in the edit line when I did it. End of update.
My own view is not quite Peirce's. I think that wondering and inquiry begin not only from surprise and that which runs counter to expectation, but also from bafflement at sheer complexity, complication, etc. As to inference and scientific method: Stipulative definitions:
| = Inference that | automatically preserving: |
Ironic criterion: |
||||
| Surmise | adds & removes info; | neither truth nor falsity. | Naturalness, simplicity, optimality, shortest distance. | |||
| Induction | adds & doesn't remove info; | not truth, but still falsity. | Likeness, likelihood, redundancy. | |||
| Strict deduction | removes & doesn't add info; | truth, but not falsity. | Novelty. | |||
| Equivalential deduction | neither removes nor adds info; | truth & falsity. | Depth, complexity, sophistication. |
Current working notion of broad outline of method
Something X doesn't make sense. So
| 1. Surmise -- there's a certain thing (or a certain thing's lack) (which would explain X). | Criterion: naturalness, simplification, "optimization" |
| 2. Induction -- colors surmise in, adds info, extending/restricting the hypothesis. | Criterion: rendering likelier |
| 3. Strict deduction -- nontrivial, deducing not only X but also other and not necessarily expected things, and precisive, deducing testable predictions, consequences. | Criterion: extrication of testable particulars that would be informative, novel. |
| 4. Equivalential deduction -- formulating an experiment (or experiments) which crucially test the given prediction (crucially test the prediction, not crucially test the hypothesis). If the prediction is not crucially testable, maybe it should be considered a hypothesis instead. | Criterion: bridge of logical equivalence to replicable forms preserving the predictions's range of useful possibilities of outcome. |
In attempting an explanatory interpretation of a surprising phenomenon, one addresses 1. why?, 2. how?, 3. making what difference?, 4. established in what form?:
1. Surmises to an explanatory object (which could be an entity, law, tendency, whatever).
2. Thence induces to some mediating representation (mechanism, traits, incentive, opportunity, etc.).
3. Thence strictly deduces to what difference(s) (besides the surprising phenomenon) the represented object would mean or predict.
4. Thence equivalentially deduces to individual tests or observations to be made. The equivalence is in the sense of the experiment's being a crucial test of the prediction (not of the hypothesis). The range of possible outcomes (truth or falsehood, or some more "nuanced" range of truth statuses designated for preservation across equivalences) seems to be a good simple example of a gauge of that to which I allude by "complexity" above. (In the ironic criteria, "complexity" refers to that in some phenomenological sense, that of a sort of apposite or collateral convolution, the same sense in which "novelty" in the ironic criterion for a strict deductive conclusion refers to information.)
As Peirce said, sign and interpretant convey information but not experience of the object. But that means that semiosis needs a "confirmant" or "verificant" or "recognizant" element along with the standard triad of obect, sign, interpretant, and needs to be tetradic throughout. Now, an indexical "jab" certainly gets one's attention, but proves nothing beyond itself except through some recognition-worthiness of a correspondence to the indicated object. As meaning is formed into an interpretant, so recognition-worthiness, evidentiary status, is formed into a verificant. It's not unusual for semiotics fans to analogize sign and interpretant to encoding and decoding, respectively. The triadic version's lack of a semiotic analog -- such as the "verificant" would be -- to the info-theoretic recipient does not disturb them as it well should. (I think I'd prefer a word like "establicant". Ah, well.) Now, a symbol is a sign defined by its effect on the interpretant, i.e. by its meaning independently of indexicality or resemblance. A sign defined by its supporting a recognizant, i.e. by its recognition-worthiness, could fairly be called a proxy. This opens the way to understanding in semiotic terms how one reasonably recognizes establishments of claims sometimes without direct observation of the object in the given case. A mathematical diagram is far better understood as a proxy than, a la Peirce, as a semblance or icon; for mathematics bridges immense disparities of appearance, look, sound, sensed or imagined, etc. Imagination, as mode of access par excellence to pure-mathematical truth, is not about generating images of flowers, but about metamorphosic bridges spanning fantastic chasms of dissimilarity of appearance. And that's your friendly neighborhood Tetrast's opinion, though there's not exactly a forest of us fourists.
[edit] New draft underway: Classification of the sciences (Peirce)
Update: I've added it as a regular article to Wikipedia, Classification of the sciences (Peirce)]. The Tetrast 21:33, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Joining & Mixups
I've joined in order to attempt improvements in the articles on C.S. Peirce. I am not in academe but have read and thought about C.S. Peirce to a significant extent. Some Peirceans may remember me from the e-forum peirce-l and, I hope, remember my efforts there to "get Peirce right" even though I disagree with him in certain regards. My views are at The Tetrast which, despite its blog format, doesn't consist of new posts at regular intervals but instead consists of discussions (currently eleven), mostly works in progress, which I revise sometimes and in some cases leave off revising though most of them need improvements. There's also The Tetrast2: Speculation Lounge
Udate March 17, 2007 (further edited since): I was for a while suspected of being Jon Awbrey's sockpuppet but administrator Slim Virgin has kindly unbanned me.
My real name, which I wish I didn't feel it necessary to state, is Benjamin Udell. Well, I guess it doesn't really matter. See my blogs (linked above) and:
- peirce-l's Lyris archives, where I've posted a lot during the past several years;
- a Lyris peirce-l archive search on my name there, showing posts going back to 2002;
- a Lyris peirce-l search on Tetrast there which shows the connection with me; and
- recent archives at gmane.
Here is peirce-l's homepage at Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway.
I'm less Peircean than Awbrey is, I hold with none of Peirce's threefold structures, I live in NYC, and I really am an independently existent person!
Also see on my user talk page the draft (which still needs some edits to conform it to stylistic standards) of an article on Kinds of Signs (Peirce). I'd like to add it as a separate article to the Wikipedia but I fear that what happened to the Peirce article would happen to it too. I don't want to add it, only to have to turn around and ask for it to be protected. Update: I've now posted it as a new article Semiotic elements and classes of signs (Peirce) The Tetrast 17:15, 17 September 2007 (UTC)
