Talk:Tet Offensive

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[edit] Re-write

Am beginning a massive re-write of this monstrosity. Only one-third of the article actually deals with the offensive itself, the rest on the fallout. RM Gillespie 16:23, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

What do you have in planned for a rewrite? If two-thirds of two thirds of the article is discusses fallout, why not just put in a request to split the article?--Kevin586 17:14, 4 September 2007 (UTC)
  • Because I plan to incorporate all of it. RM Gillespie 15:15, 6 September 2007 (UTC)
Completely agree, not only is this thing a monstrosity, but a POV monstrosity at that (see my post below). Your work is sorely needed. About a 2/3 redaction should be about right. — J M Rice 18:33, 24 September 2007 (UTC)
On what grounds is the article a "monstrosity"? What are your specific claims? It is all well and good to toss about words like "monstrosity" but what have you concrete to say? In any event there are far longer history articles on particular batles. If anything the article appears too short. Where for example, one could argue, are the details on the VC Order of battle? Why is a reduction by "two-thirds" a good thing? On what grounds? Please elucidate... LackeyOfImperialism 22:35, 27 September 2007 (UTC)
I think the fallout is important because of the profound political effect Tet had on the US, as well as the military effect (decimation of the VC). I would recommend keeping the fallout sections and building up more details of the battle. The article can use some more headings and sub-headings to make it easier to follow, but I don't see much of an issue here as regards length, nor is the article confusing. The major content for a credible presentation is in place, including detail on the Northern side and its plans. LackeyOfImperialism 22:43, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Hoopes

As Warnke saw it, both sides were disappointed by the results. The enemy failed to capture and hold any major city, and he suffered tremendous losses, perhaps 30,000 killed; also, ARVN fought better than expected. But the attacks produced devastating effects on our side as well -- many cities were overrun and then gravely damaged or destroyed in the process of recapturing them, with heavy loss of life; the enemy still held the countryside and had demonstrated the inherent fragility of the pacification program; large-scale U.S. forces were tied down in remote, uninhabited places like Khesanh and Conthien, unable to move, pounded by enemy artillery, and with their ability to resist direct assault a matter of growing doubt. Finally, it was clear that public opinion in United States had been shaken to the roots. In plain truth, Warnke argued, neither side could win militarily. U.S. strategy should henceforth be based on that reality and should aim, not at victory, but at the kind of staying power necessary to the achievement of a compromise political settlement. In military terms, this meant no further troop increases (for the enemy could and would match them), a pullback from isolated posts like Khesanh, and a far less aggressive ground strategy designed to protect the people where they lived. A revised directive should be sent to Westmoreland making clear that henceforward his primary mission would be to protect the population of South Vietnam. There should also be a renewed effort to open talks, if necessary by halting the bombing. Ken E. Beck 20:36, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

  • No argument from me. That is all pretty well spelled out by the Pentagon Papers. Unfortunately, Warnke's attempt to sway the Clifford Group went for naught. Why the Hoopes? RM Gillespie 17:48, 14 September 2007 (UTC)
    • I agree, Hoopes has little to add.Ken E. Beck 11:56, 17 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Filled with POV

Once again, as is too common in Wikipedia, this thing is someone's term paper or other pseudo-documentary or "analyis," not a proper article... that's article, not tome! There is so much opinionating here -- and using someone else's opinion as a footnote is not honest sourcing -- that it would take all day to insert citation tags. So, I just posted the POV tag atop. Thanks, Gillespie, for taking on the much needed editing! — J M Rice 18:40, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

  • Yes, it is a sprawling mess at present, but that is the nature of the beast. I could use a little help in finding what you call "opioninating". Could you be more specific? Since all authors have agendas (believe it or not) how is the use of footnotes "not honest sourcing"? RM Gillespie 17:01, 26 September 2007 (UTC)
Having read a number of articles in Vietnam, I would have to agree with Gillespie. Exactly what issues are at hand? What is all too common on wikipedia is "drive-by" tagging with few specifics on the Talk Page or elsewhere, and little substantive contribution to the article. Exactly what is "opinionating" and exactly how is it a "tome" versus an "article"? Hoe exactly is this a "term paper"? Where are the specifics of alleged "bias"? "Drive-by" taggers unfortunately provide little information. Until there are concrete specifics, I am removing said tag. LackeyOfImperialism 22:24, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] News Media and Vietnam

To shorten this thing to some controllable length I am planning on removing the media section and creating a separate article for it, since one on the subject does not exist at present. Any input or disagreement on the idea? RM Gillespie 06:45, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

I agree 100% Ken E. Beck 11:57, 28 September 2007 (UTC)
Since Gillespie is the main author of the article I would defer to his judgement, but the original "Media" section did not seem excessive. At only 1541 words it weighed it at just around 10-11% of the original article, which doesn't seem like an excessive amount given its controversial impact on the US political scene, and its significance- a battle Lt general P. Davidson calls one of the the most significant US post WwII victories. "Drive-by" taggers and quibblers about "recommended" article lengths need to consider content and specifics first. In the Vietnam War political and military factors were closely related. Superficial review for example would advocate taking out several details on Communist planning, such as the influence of the Anti-revision purges on Giap, et al. But such things are a legitimate part of the story, (the north-south faction clash) mentioned in most credible histories of the conflict. They also correct a common popular misconception of Giap as "architect" of Tet, when as the article shows, he was basically opposed. To sacrifice such detail in the interest of vague recommended lengths misses the whole point of writing a history article in the first place. Still, since there is no existing article on the Media subject it cannot hurt to create one. LackeyOfImperialism 17:40, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Contemporary sources

Here are some relevant contemporary articles I dug up (mostly TIME) that are all available online. I'll post them here and let someone else roll them in. - Crockspot 22:39, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Problems with article

In my view this article has improved a great deal. Recent edits have shown knowledge and skill. However, in places, only a single point of view is represented. Statements are made as fact that should be shown as opinion with contrary opinions as well. For example: "Although the offensive was a military disaster for communist forces, it also had a profound effect on the American public, ....." This is the - Tet was a victory that was misrepresented by the media, which in turn, caused the public to turn against the war, except the media link has been throughly debunked and has been removed. This view is supported by cherry picking other information. For example some sources say that one of the goals of Tet was to demonstrate to the United States that claims being made about the war were not true. If in fact that was a goal, and that goal was achieved then that requires modification of the term "military disaster". The achievements of the communist are dismissed by saying that there were not the goals and were achieved by happenstance. By the measures used by the Americans, casualties ratios, territory occupied, Tet was a victory for the Allies, no question. However it has been argued that these are not meaningful measures. The view that Tet demonstrated to decisions makers that the war was stalemated and that financial and political costs of success were too high is not represented. Ken E. Beck 18:53, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

A fair point on impact but I don't think you are reading what Gillipsie has written closely. Look at that quote again: "Although the offensive was a military disaster for communist forces, it also had a profound effect on the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the communists were, due to previous defeats, incapable of launching such a massive effort. The most significant political result of the offensive, therefore, took place in the United States, where the first real questioning of and debate over that nation's war policies took place."
The quote says little about the American media controversy. In fact it appears to deal mostly with the effect upon the American political establishment. The media is not even mentioned. Indeed the whole media section was removed for another article.
You also say: "some sources say that one of the goals of Tet was to demonstrate to the United States that claims being made about the war were not true.."
OK, but which sources do you refer to? You offer none to back up what you say. In fact the old Media Section quotes documented Communist sources as saying that influencing the US media or elections was not even a primary objective of Tet. The main focus for Hanoi was making the ARVN/GVN crumble and to spark the reputed "General Uprising".
You also say: "The view that Tet demonstrated to decisions makers that the war was stalemated and that financial and political costs of success were too high is not represented."
THis is not true. Look at Gillepsie's writing in the "Aftermath" section re America: "The Tet Offensive created a crisis in the Johnson administration, which was unable to convince the American public that the offensive had been a major defeat for the communists. The optimistic assessments of the administration and the Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the "credibility gap" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm. The offensive also had a profound psychological impact on the Johnson administration, elite decision makers, and the public."
This pretty much sums up the point you are trying to make. The Johnson regime felt the conflict stalemated and increasingly searched for a way out.
Also the article above does not suport what you here==> "The achievements of the communist are dismissed.."
To the contrary, the article not only notes the demoralizing impact on the US political establishment, but says as to the communist forces: "Their effort to regain control of the countryside was somewhat more successful. According to the U.S. State Department the NLF "expanded their control in urban areas and have made pacification virtually inoperative. In the Mekong Delta the NLF was stronger now then ever and in other regions the countryside belongs to the VC."[123] General Wheeler reported that the Tet Offensive had brought counterinsurgency programs to a halt and "that to a large extent, the V.C. now controlled the countryside." also North Vietnam had little difficulty making up the casualties inflicted by the offensive..
All in all, the article is fairly balanced. Indeed it shows the Communist side of the coin as well, going into details of their planning, aftermath, etc.. to a degree that is much better than similar short writings, which typically just jump into things primarily from the American perspective. I think your arguments might be better held for the Media Influence article. Perhaps you can add a statement in the Aftermath section saying: "Tet demonstrated to US decisions makers that the war was stalemated and that financial and political costs of success were too high.." then back this up with a footnote from your sources. This would easily accomodate the points you raise. LackeyOfImperialism 06:48, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
Thank you for your (very civil) remarks, it think the points you make are valid. I am working on sources now. I think the article is good now, a line by line review by editors with differing points of view will improve it. At American Future some interesting quotes from the media, WSJ was the first to bail, (scroll down to Vietnam and Iraq: Public and Government Opinion) [1] this article talks about "The two primary views of Tet may be called the “revisionist view” and the “more recent view” " here [2] - it is this more recent view that I plan to find sources for. Ken E. Beck 15:33, 4 October 2007 (UTC)
  • I think you may want to find a more credible source than the second you listed above. I find it hard to credit an author who spells "guerrilla" as "gorilla". RM Gillespie 02:42, 8 October 2007 (UTC)
    • Well, you are right there, be tough editing Tet with a source about gorilla warfare, maybe "Aggression in primates". But I do think Ford might be a good source. I think the quotes in American Future shows a sense of what it was like. Time, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Art Buchwald all combined to create a sense that the public opinion had changed. Ken E. Beck 21:21, 8 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Premature qualifications

Wow! The media issue has been debunked? The offensive was not (in general) misrepresented by the media and it did not turn the American public against the war. I haven't even gotten there yet. Even as it stands now, however, Tet was without doubt a "military disaster" for North Vietnam. The measures of the Americans? - they were the only meaningful measures that counted at the time. Hindsight is indeed golden. The defeat of the communist offensive was not the turning point of the war, that point had been reached well before Tet. The offensive only demonstrated to the majority what was becoming ever more obvious to large segments of the administration and the American public, that the game (as it was going to be played) was not worth the candle. That Hanoi made grist of its psychological "victory" was to be expected, but they had in no way planned for or expected it. And we have not even gotten to Clark Clifford yet.

Well, not too bad for an article that, I believe, is about one-half finished. Stay tuned for further developments. And who are you, Ken E. Beck? RM Gillespie 06:11, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

Go for it then. As to measurements, even offical communist sources are candid about Tet failures and setbacks:

Tran Van Tra, VIETNAM: HISTORY OF THE BULWARK B2 THEATER, VOL 5: CONCLUDING THE 30-YEARS OF WAR, (Van Nghe Publishing House: Ho Chi Minh City, 1982)

"In 1968, when the U.S. troops numbered nearly 500,000, with all kinds of modern weapons except the atomic bomb and with the purchasing of the services of lackey vassal troops in addition to Thieu's army, we could clearly see the enemy's weakness and our strength, and exploited that strength to a high degree in carrying out the general offensive and uprising of Ter Mau Than, (Tet Offensive) a unique event in the history of war. During Ter we not only attacked the enemy simultaneously in all urban centers, including the U.S. war headquarters in Saigon, the puppet capital, but also wiped out an important part of the U.S.-puppet manpower...

However, during Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. For that reason, although that decision was wise, ingenious, and timely, and although its implementation was well organized and bold, there was excellent coordination on all battlefields, everyone acted very bravely, sacrificed their lives, and there was created a significant strategic turning point in Vietnam and Indochina, we suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us.

  • I believe this section has been directly quoted in the article. It is a shame that the previous volumes of Tra's work (particularly Vol. 3, which deals only with 1968) are not available in the West. RM Gillespie 14:22, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 so that the revolution could stand firm in the storm. Although it is true that the revolutionary path is never a primrose path that always goes upward, and there can never be a victory without sacrifice, in the case of Tet 1968, if we had weighed and considered things meticulously, taken into consideration the balance of forces of the two sides, and set forth correct requirements, our victory would have been even greater, less blood would have been spilled by the cadres, enlisted men, and people, and the future development of the revolution would certainly have been far different.."

Keep up the good work. LackeyOfImperialism 07:01, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
Perhaps my remarks were to strongly worded. The past edits are very well done and show a knowledge of this which is deeper then my own. Having said that, I believe that the first paragraph is supposed to summarize then entire article - it says "it also had a profound effect on the American public" I do not believe that this point of view is shared by all historians. Is that correct? Ken E. Beck 12:23, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
  • Oh, it had a profound effect all right. I believe the source of that effect is the only thing under debate. As the summary then states it led to the first serious debate within the administration about the military policy since the escalations of 64-65. Is it the "public" thing that is bothering you? Are we discussing the media coverage (true or erroneous) or the credibility gap that had just widened into the Grand Canyon? The "great debate" centers around the political fallout of the offensive, not the military one. Was it the media coverage, public disenchantment, administration realization, or some combo of all three? RM Gillespie 14:22, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
    • I understand the many historians and authors assume that Tet had a profound effect on the American public, but not all. It is one thing to make claims or assumptions about public opinion, it is another thing to measure. Public opinion is measured by using polls, and some who have looked at the polls have come to a different conclusion. Stanley Karnow says "the momentous Tet episode scarcely altered American attitudes toward the war. American opinion toward the conflict was far more complicated than" Vietnam A History p 558. There is also this study The Tet Offensive and Middletown: A Study in Contradiction - which may not be usable as a source for Wikipedia. Schmitz p 158 "While the Tet Offensive was certainly a surprise to the American people and government officials alike, in its timing, size and place, it did not produce a dramatic swing in public opinion." Tet did have a profound effect on the U.S goverment - here: the Time magazine article from 1 Mar 68 (last external link in the article) says this: "In contrast, middle-and lower-echelon officials at the State Department, the Pentagon and U.S. headquarters in Saigon voiced profound pessimism." As an explanation it is my view that Oberdorfer and others may have confused the reaction "inside the beltway" with the public, something the occurs today as well Ken E. Beck 16:56, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Debate

  • I love it! Good criticism and excellent argument! You have no idea how rare that is on wiki. As to the media, the fiscal crisis (vis a vis the Treasury), Clifford's "conversion", more communist info, etc., that is still forthcoming. If I could just get off these 50-hour work weeks and get this hot water heater installed! RM Gillespie 12:18, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Consistancy

If you are going to interject references into the article, don't you think that they should be consistant with the 99.9 percent of the other references in the article and be placed at the end of a sentence? And, while we are on the subject, why isn't this new source listed in the References section? RM Gillespie 17:15, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

  • Yes, it belongs at the end. I'll use David Schmitz, which is already listed and change it, I have to find the proper page number. - This article, as it stands, is one of the better about Tet I have read so far anywhere. Ken E. Beck 20:26, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Westmorland, Wheeler, and Mao

"Strangely, the followers of the Maoist line called for large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong" - I don't think this is right. Mao didn't espouse protracted guerrilla war, phase three of Mao is commitment of regular forces (Hammes)

'"Wheeler's bizarre promptings"' - Is this just Westmoreland's alibi for saying "which I desperately need" when he requested more troops? Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. wrote an article on laying out this viewpoint [3] Another viewpoint is here [4] - The Joint Chiefs knew that the request would not be approved and were covering their backsides. Ken E. Beck 23:32, 12 October 2007 (UTC)

  • Oh my God, not Harry Summers! Any cursory examination of this diatribe should reveal exactly where the good Colonel stands. It is full of the half-innacuracies for which he is notorious. "McNamara knew as early as 1965 - 1966 that the war could not be won and yet he sent me to Vietnam...blah, blah, blah." Of course McNamara (and the entire Johnson administration) "knew" that the war could not be won in the traditional sense. We were not there to "win", but to convince Hanoi that it could not win. And of course there are the usual references to McNamara and Clifford not as rational human beings but as the servants of the antichrist. The only thing new that Summers has to say is that the Joint Chiefs failed the President, but I had already done that in my Master's thesis The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Escalation of the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965 back in 1994 (even beat out McMaster's Dereliction of Duty).

As to the second article, it is altogether too general and very vague. What it fails to mention is the very considerable planning and prompting by the Joint Chiefs of President Johnson to escalate the war quickly. First the bombing campaign, then introduction of marines to "protect" the airfields that had been established in SVN to carry it out, and then finally the introduction of more troops to undertake ground operations. According to the Pentagon Papers (and the much larger U.S. Vietnam Realtions of which they are a condensation) the chronology of the troop request described in the article is accurate. Initially, Westmoreland merely wanted replacements, Wheeler wanted a reserve call-up. When Westmoreland realized what his superior was up to, he went along, hoping for a change in strategy (which Wheeler was quick to ascribe to the situation).

As to Mao's strategy, the North Vietnamese never really followed it. Protracted guerrilla warfare to bleed the enemy, followed by the encirclement of the urban areas to isolate the enemy forces, and finally a general offensive and popular uprising that would end the conflict. Indeed, the failure of the North Vietnamese in following this paradigm was often elucidated to in North Vietnamese writings of the period. RM Gillespie 05:12, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] military disaster for communist forces

At present the first section says that tet was "a military disaster for communist forces" but in "The Tet Offensive" by Marc Gilbert and William Head, it says this: "the offensive, while more costly to Hanoi and the Viet Cong than anticipated and falling far short of many of its projected intermediate goals, succeeded in its primary aim of demoralizing not the American people, but their lead­ers, and in securing a bombing halt followed by the commencement of negotiations for a settlement in Hanoi's favor." - Shouldn't the first section reflect this view, which, according to the book, is the view of "Vietnamese historians, American historians of modern Vietnam, (and) Vietnam-era American policy analysts" ? Ken E. Beck 23:55, 12 October 2007 (UTC)

Im a little confused about what your asking but let have a try i think they mean it was a military diasater but a politcal win ForeverDEAD 01:24, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

The difficulty is that achieving a 1 to 50 causality ratio could be considered a tactical victory. However achieving that ratio in the Central Highlands is not the same as achieving the same ratio in the center of Saigon, or on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. Calling the first a military victory and the second a military victory and a political defeat is not consistent with military theory. It has been argued that the attacks in the cites showed that the U.S. did not have military control of the country. Ken E. Beck 22:51, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Hindsight

I think we are missing the point here. A look at any contemporary North Vietnamese documentation reveals that the primary goal of the offensive was to either topple the Saigon government or force the installation of a coalition government. A secondary result of either outcome would have been the forcable withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam. There is very little, if any, mention of the possible effect of the offensive on the U.S. public or administration, other than as a demonstration of communist power. It is quite reasonable that Vietnamese historians have replaced the military goals of the offensive with political ones, but only (and I emphasize only) in retrospect. Western historians seem to be buying into this "long view" (mainly on the basis of Tran Van Tra's later writings) of the offensive's goals, but as I have previously stated, it is not supported by the contemporary documentation. RM Gillespie 04:58, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

Marc Gilbert and William Head claim that the view that the Tet Offensive: "succeeded in its primary aim" is the view of most "Vietnamese historians, American historians of modern Vietnam, (and) Vietnam-era American policy analysts". Erik B. Villard says "most Vietnam War historians ...conclude the Tet Offensive "represented a defeat for the United States and its policy in Vietnam". So here are two sources which claim that the view, that Tet was a success for the communist and a failure for the United States is the view of most historians. However you seem to be saying that this view does not belong in this article because they hold this view in error. Is that correct? Ken E. Beck 14:48, 15 October 2007 (UTC)
  • Yes. A military defeat or a political defeat? The argument that the political result was the primary aim of the offensive is gibberish. No contemporary documentation supports it. I can understand Gilbert and Head's statement that Vietnamese historians make such a claim. I would, however, like to see a list of Western historians who make a similar one. Your second quote by Villard is ambiguous. What kind of defeat? Military, political, psychological, all of the above? Is your point that two sources (one wrong and the other ambiguous) claim that the communists achieved the primary aim of their offensive? Dozens of other historians might not agree with you. RM Gillespie 14:59, 15 October 2007 (UTC)
    • Good question. In context [5] Villard seems to be saying he agrees with Schmitz. Schmitz says "Tet was, in fact, a defeat. A defeat for the strategy of attrition and limited war....".
I am puzzled by the wide range of "facts" used by various sources. For example,Schmitz says the Offensive was timed, in large part, because of the U.S. election, other sources disagree. There is documents from the CIA that seem to support Schmitz. Also in dispute, the strength of the communist in the South both before and after the Offensive. Ford says that recently, more information from the North has become available. Some of the information is evidently from the North but some is also from U.S. sources such as the C.I.A, and Lyndon Johnson's archives recently opened but not yet fully explored.
I think perhaps that because of the wide range of views about Tet, that a new article may be needed. Focus this article on the operational and tactical side, which I think it does to some extent now. A separate article laying out the various political arguments. What do you think? Ken E. Beck 13:37, 16 October 2007 (UTC)
  • Hilarious. A "defeat" in which 7,000 troops were expended against a loss of 75,000? A "defeat" of the strategy of attrition which had forced Hanoi (by its own admission) to launch the offensive in the first place? Where in the review above do you think that Villard espouses that Tet was a military defeat for the U.S.? At some point in the future this article will undoubtedly be subdivided, but it won't be by me. RM Gillespie 14:42, 16 October 2007 (UTC)
You may be right, I though Villard seems to be agreeing with Schmitz, perhaps not. But more importantly this is not two sources who hold this point of view. This is two sources that claim that this point of view is the view held by the majority of historians. Ken E. Beck 13:01, 18 October 2007 (UTC)
    • A military defeat or a political defeat? Well, there is this view: "All military operations are policy initiatives, and the only criterion for success or failure is success or failure in achieving policy objectives." - Matthew Yglesias [6] My understanding is that the communist suffered very heavy causalities for limited tactical gains, gains which were blundered away in the second and third phases. Ken E. Beck 15:13, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

Gabriel Kolko: Anatomy of a war, p.303-4:

When the Party's Central Committee in January 1967 resolved to embark on Tet 1968, it prepared both for "a decisive victory in a relatively short period of time" and for a continuing protracted war or, at worst, an American escalation. [...] Although the Politburo regarded a coordinated military offensive and general uprising leading to a final victory as possible, its dominant opinion in December 1967 was that the enemy would continue to fight the war, though from a decisively less favorable military, political, and psychological position. [...] Smashing the United States' illusions at this time was all the more crucial because of the dollar crisis, which the Party's press analyzed in great detail in January 1968.

The strategy of Hanoi was not simply to topple the South Vietnamese regime "in a single blow". This is a extremely abridged assertion. Furthermore the political goal was right from the start part of the Vietnamese planning, because of apparent reasons the role of the US was always a decisive matter for Hanoi. --81.173.142.91 (talk) 10:02, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] POV

Wikipedia POV policy is: All Wikipedia articles and other encyclopedic content must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), representing fairly and, as much as possible, without bias all significant views (that have been published by reliable sources). Two source have been provided showing the the view of most historians differs from this article. One is Marc Gilbert and William Head claim that the Tet Offensive: "succeeded in its primary aim" is the view of most "Vietnamese historians, American historians of modern Vietnam, (and) Vietnam-era American policy analysts". The second is Erik B. Villard claim "most Vietnam War historians ...conclude the Tet Offensive "represented a defeat for the United States and its policy in Vietnam".

This view, that has been called the view of the majority of historians, is significant and is not represented in this article. Ken E. Beck 14:33, 9 November 2007 (UTC)

  • Well, you, Gilbert, and Head are all entitled to your opinions. They do not, however, reflect the opinions of the vast majority of Vietnam War historians. See above as to disagreement with your sources. RM Gillespie 19:02, 12 November 2007 (UTC)
    • My opinions on the subject of Tet are irrelevant,as you know, as are yours. Tet Offensive has been called the most controversial battle in modern American history. This article, to conform with policy should show the main views. Here are perhaps the three main American views [7] Don Oberdorfer wrote an article in which he acknowledges that new documents from the North have altered historians views. [8] Ken E. Beck 22:02, 12 November 2007 (UTC)
  • I'm afraid that opinions are all that have been expressed. Although Gilbert and Head can claim that Tet "succeeded in its primary aim" (regardless of extant documentation), where is the historical basis for it? What documents support it? To express the opinion that "most American historians of the Vietnam war" blah, blah, blah, agree with Gillbert and Heads' assessmant is alright in itself, but which historians are we talking about? The documents referred to in the Oberdorfer article are already cited in the Wiki article, so what is your point? The most controversial battle in modern American history? That is quite a claim. Not the fall of Battan or the Battle of the Bulge? Not Peleliu or the Hurtgen Forest? Not the advance to the Yalu River and the Chinese counteroffensive? RM Gillespie 06:48, 14 November 2007 (UTC)
    • Here is some info about Ford [9] Ang Cheng Guan says documents were released by China and Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979, opening of Soviet archives when the cold war thawed, Tran Van Tra in 1982, the research of Ngo Vinh Long, and of course Ang Cheng Guan himself. Ken E. Beck 13:55, 14 November 2007 (UTC)
  • The documents described in the History article (Resolutions 13 and 14) were captured and translated (by Ford) in 1967 and 1968. As far as I know, most of the Soviet and Chinese documents deal primarily with diplomatic matters and logistical activities between those nations and North Vietnam. I don't believe (as far as my research goes) that any of the work by the other three contradicts the article. RM Gillespie 15:56, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] U.S. elections

According to the article: There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S The footnotes say Hoang offered opposing viewpoints

Hoang's claim is not that the Offensive was intended to influence the election but rather that Johnson would find it more difficult to escalate the war in the face of public opposition during the election season. This is on page 22. This is repeated on page 23, the outcome of the election was only a reshuffling but that the U.S. president would be unable to make bold policy decisions in an election year. Ken E. Beck 18:30, 9 November 2007 (UTC)

  • I reverted your separate section on "Communist goals" due to the fact that it was not necessary as a separate section. Integrate the text with the existing article if you feel that strongly about it. Alterations, after all, are what this discussion page is all about. RM Gillespie 19:06, 12 November 2007 (UTC)
  • A reading of Hoang's work offers several takes (captured enemy prisoners, documents, etc...) on whether the offensive was planned to have an effect on the elections. RM Gillespie 06:59, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Changes

Mr. Beck your alterations to the introduction to this A-Class article on the basis of one source, seems a little extreme. You do realize that it now contradicts the entire rest of the content of the article? Or, did you not even bother to read it to find out? I then reverted your deletion of the majority of the following paragraph due to the fact that it had nothing to do with your contention. There was (and is) no doubt about the political and public consequences of the offensive, as is stipulated (once again) by the rest of the article. RM Gillespie 19:12, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

In my view "Tet was a military disaster" is too vague, Why not specify? What, setbacks resulted, on each side? The same is true of "a profound effect on the American administration" ,why not say exactly the results? Ken E. Beck 22:33, 15 November 2007 (UTC)
  • Mainly due to the fact (and Wiki protocol) that the introduction is what it says it is - an introduction. It also explains why I disagree with your alteration of the stated goals of the campaign (I find it hard to believe, based on one document, that an offensive by 85,000 men was launched into the urban areas so that the communists could "gain control of the countryside" - which also, by the way, failed. The primary goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government, hence "General Offensive, General Uprising".) Historiopgraphically speaking, the consensus is that the offensive followed the stipulations of the original text. I believe that if you continue on with the article, you will find the details of "a military disaster" and the "profound effect on the American administration". -- RM Gillespie (talk) 17:31, 16 November 2007 (UTC)
    • To conform with Wikipedia NPOV policy all significant views must be represented. I believe there are three main views. First from Kevin Drum "There's the military perspective: Tet was a huge setback for the North Vietnamese. They were badly defeated, took huge losses, were operationally crippled, and achieved none of their objectives." The second view, is that the public lost faith in the war because of media coverage. The third view, the view of Schmitz and others, is that Tet reveled that reports of progress in the war were incorrect, the war was stalemated and could not be won at reasonable cost. While the sentence in question supports the first view it fails to support the second and third views. On he other hand saying it was a tactical defeat for the communist and the results are controversial(or similar) supports all three views. The point is not what are our views, but what are the significant views of reliable sources. Ken E. Beck (talk) 10:30, 17 November 2007 (UTC)
  • Well, thats nice, but your quote has little to do with the problem at hand. I believe we are discussing the military outcome of the campaign ("military disaster"), which seems to be supported by Drum. What does the media coverage of the offensive have to do with its military outcome? As for the third view, what exactly does the prospect of stalemate have to do with the military defeat of the communists in the Tet Offensive? The war was a stalemate before Tet and it continued to be one for the next five years of the American involvement. The controversy concerning the media's role during the offensive is linked to this article and as to the political ramifications of the prospect of stalemate, I believe that it is duscussed at length in this one. So, where is the problem of keeping the introduction short and to the point? RM Gillespie (talk) 17:47, 17 November 2007 (UTC)
Calling the outcome a military disaster requires a narrow view of the term. The offensive failed to cause an uprising and was costly to the communists but the overall aim of the offensive was to produce a political shock which would, according to Kissinger, bring "to a head the compound weakness - or as the North Vietnamese would say, the internal contradictions - of the American position." The military operations were intended to and did produce a shock to the political system and the result of that shock the "credibility gap" widened and contradictions between Johnson's desire for a limited war, and the failure of limited war, resulted in the breakdown between Johnson, the public, and the military. The shock was far less then the communists hoped but because of "compound weakness", the relationship between Johnson, the public and the military was fragile and unable to withstand the shock. Giap was aware that Johnson was losing political support and he was also aware that Westmoreland wanted more troops and that Johnson didn't want to give him any. These tensions snapped when the military was thrown physiologically off-balance by the surprise of Tet. As a result of being off-balance, on the 12th of Feb. Westmoreland sent Wheeler a message On the assumption that it is our national policy to prohibit the enemy from seizing and permanently occupying the two northern provinces, I intend to hold them at all cost. However, to do so I must reinforce from other areas and accept a major risk, unless I can get reinforcements, which I desperately need. This message, as well as the request for 206,000 troops which came later, accepted at face value or the explanation of duplicity given in the article is a direct result of enemy action.
"The Tet Offensive" Gilbert and Head" "the Tet Of­fensive was a three-phase application of military pressure that governed operations conducted as late as November of 1968 and was not a failed, desperate gamble that had to win the war at one stroke, but a successful, multifaceted effort to drive the Americans to the negotiating table.
From the same book: From a purely tactical military standpoint the Tet attacks were not successful. Communist leaders failed to gain two of their many parallel objectives: inflicting a signal defeat on American forces and creating a mass southern uprising. Worst of all, they suffered grievous losses which took two years to replace. It is clear, however, that the most important of the enemy's tactical objectives was the breaking of the morale of what Tran Van Tra called the "war party" in Washington; and this breakdown, from the panic that Tet caused in the Pentagon to the demoralization of the "Wise Men" who advised Johnson, was fully achieved.
From Schmitz: The Tet Offensive demonstrated that the United States could not win a limited war of attrition in Vietnam and had to change policy. In these terms, Tet was in fact a defeat. A defeat for the strategy of attrition and limited war in Vietnam and the strategy of using military power to force a political structure on Vietnam"
    • The sentence in question could be easily edited to give a wider range of views without unduly lengthening the first section. Ken E. Beck (talk) 01:39, 18 November 2007 (UTC)
  • Once again, we are back to the stated goals of the offensive. Kissinger's quote is nice, but it is also ex post facto. Your Westmoreland quote was part of the attempt to gain more forces and build up the strategic reserve described in detail in the text of the article. Giap's main objective in the offensive was "weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military through popular revolt." Hoang, p. 26. Resolution 13 of the Lao Dong Party, the theoretical basis of the offensive, stated that the goal of the offensive was to create "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a dsecisive victory in the shortest time possible." Since the offensive failed in creating such an uprising, capturing the cities, (or in your opinion the countryside), and the loss of 75-80,000 men while inflicting only 8,000 casualties in return, that is the basis of a "military disaster".
If you will notice, the article stipulates that as an adjunct to the "shock" of the offensive, a reappraisal of the U.S. position in Vietnam was undertaken, but this was an unforseen windfall for the North Vietnamese, who must have been rather shocked (as is also stipulated in the article by a North Vietnamese general) by the political outcome (hence strategic psychological victory). Tet, after all, only signaled the end of the escalation and the beginning of negotiations (which the U.S. had sought for the previous three years), not American withdrawal, which did not begin until one year later. The Schmitz quote tends (as do other more recent writers) to put the cart before the horse. The strategy of attrition was succeeding. It was the basis for Hanoi's attempt to break the deadlock and once again gain the initiative. The limitation of the quote brings us back, once again, to the initial issue (which is, in fact, a non-issue), what kind of victory, what kind of defeat?
A "narrow view of the term"? It has always been considered that since the U.S. was "forced" to reconsider its political position vis a vis Vietnam and enter into negotiations, this was a defeat for American policy. Then surely the shoe must fit the other foot. The Party hardliners in Hanoi (who had continuously opposed any form of negotiations) were forced to accept the position of the centerists and moderates and began negotiations in Paris. Was this not political defeat? Breaking the will of the "war Party" - that's hilarious. Hubert H. Humphrey was defeated at the polls in 1968 by Richard Nixon, who would continue (and escalate) American involvement for the next five years. Was this what the North Vietnamese desired as a "political solution" in the U.S.? RM Gillespie (talk) 17:11, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] 5,800,111 civilians killed

I have no idea what the actual number should be, but this one is obviously wrong since it far exceeds the total population of the city as listed in the same section. Mild Bill Hiccup (talk) 09:25, 11 December 2007 (UTC)

  • Just another case of vandalism. RM Gillespie (talk) 10:05, 11 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Communists

The article speaks about "Communist" forces, which sounds a bit too polemic and POV, IMO (in particular as the opposing forces aren't singled out for their political affiliations, and political affiliation isn't necessarily the most important characteristic in this context anyway), how about using more neutral NLF/PAVN (which do get mentioned though), or like? 89.27.19.182 (talk) 20:55, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

  • I'm afraid that you are incorrect in your assumption. The label "communist forces" goes far beyond any political connotation. The armed forces of socialist states were (and are) organized differently than those of other nations. They are doctrinally and ideologically unique in their outlook, training, and motivation. To try to separate the political from the military is, in fact, literally impossible. Just think about it - three man cells, political commissars at every level, manditory indoctrination and "self-criticism", over-control and lack of individual initiative - these are some of the hallmarks of a "communist" military system. RM Gillespie (talk) 05:32, 29 February 2008 (UTC)
Sure, they're communist. Maybe you're right and their structure is somehow "essentially" communist. But that isn't relevant here. This is not an article on the structure or ideology of the NLF. This is an article on one of their campaigns. The neutral term is the official title of the force, or it's acronym, NLF. I'm editing this article accordingly. Nonplus (talk) 22:28, 1 May 2008 (UTC)
  • Well, another essential reason that "communist" is utilized as a descriptive is purely to keep repitition to a minimum. But go ahead and over-acronymize. NLF and North Vietnamese get kind of old after a while, especially in an article of this length. RM Gillespie (talk) 20:20, 9 May 2008 (UTC)
The Vietnamese government today is proud of being communist, so there is no issue of anyone being insulted. Besides, the only alternative is to use some awkward acronym like "NLF/PAVN". This is almost like writing in code since no normal person talks this way. "NLF/PAVN" is seven syllables long and upside of abbrevations is that they are supposed to be shorter! The official communist history of the war classifies the Vietcong as part of the PAVN just to avoid the need to write both names together all the time. In Vietnamese, the problem is even more serious since the Vietcong is formally referred to as "MTDTGPMNVN".(No, I didn't make that up.) Hanoi dropped the pretense that the Vietcong was a group with an independent political outlook a long time ago. As a practical matter, the Vietcong commander was a North Vietnamese army officer who reported to the Politburo in Hanoi, not to the NLF's executive committee.Kauffner (talk) 03:27, 14 June 2008 (UTC)

[edit] January 30

There is an explanation for this claim:

For reasons that are still not completely understood, a wave of attacks began on the preceding morning in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones.

Helmer Aslaksen explains that on August 8, 1967, the North Vietnamese government approved a new lunar calendar specifically compiled for the UTCC7 time zone. Troops in Saigon and other cities to the South were using the traditional calendar and attacked a day later.[10] -- Robocoder (t|c) 18:25, 15 April 2008 (UTC)