Talk:T-43 tank
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[edit] Service
Did the T-43 actually see service? Zaloga's T-54/55 book (2004:4) mentions it in passing, but says:
Although a small number of T-43 tanks were manufactured and saw some combat in the autumn of 1943, the focus of attention was an accelerated program to mount the more powerful 85mm gun on the existing T-34 hull.
I haven't seen this mentioned anywhere else, including Zaloga's other books that I've seen. Is there any corroborating source? —Michael Z. 2006-10-06 03:30 Z
[edit] Biased Entry
This is biased and incorrect. Was it taken from Soviet propaganda?
"The decision to improve on an existing design rather than commit to a major retooling of the factories was characteristic of Soviet philosophy which held production as paramount. While Germany—with double the industrial resources of the Soviet Union—suffered a string of production and logistical difficulties to achieve technical superiority, the Soviets—maximizing productivity—accepted a compromise by significantly improving their main tank, but not matching the new German Panther. The result was that while in May 1944 the Wehrmacht only had 304 Panthers operating on the Eastern Front, the Soviets were producing T-34-85 tanks at a rate of 1,200 per month."
This contrasts the Germans developing a brand new tank, the Panther, with the Soviets upgrading their existing T-34 from a 76.2mm gun to an 85mm gun. What it ignores is that the Germans also upgraded their Panzer IV tank, from a short-barreled 75mm (not effective against the T-34) to a long-barreled 75mm (somewhat effect against the T-34 -- analogous to how the 85mm T-34 was only somewhat effective against Panthers and Tigers). Thousands of upgraded Panzer IVs were made. So, the main point of the paragraph is incorrect.
Also extremely misleading is the statement "while in May 1944 the Wehrmacht only had 304 Panthers operating on the Eastern Front, the Soviets were producing T-34-85 tanks at a rate of 1,200 per month". This compares tanks on the front to production rates. At a minimum, the same thing should be compared, and Panzer IVs should be included with the Panthers. Also misleading is that the Soviets lost 5-9 T-34s for every Panther they destroyed, so a production rate of 1,200 T-34-85s meant a much lower actual strength equivalent. Indeed, Soviet propaganda cited production rates since the Soviets actually lost massive numbers of tanks at the front (to all causes, not just Panthers).
- You make some good points, but it's not propaganda or a compare-the-tanks contest: it's trying to teach a lesson about why the T-43 wasn't built. The gist is that the Soviets chose not to start producing an all-new main tank design but instead to make their old one good enough—in the meantime, the Germans chose to leap ahead and build a high-tech "medium" tank as heavy as the Soviet heavy tank.
- The comparison does give a good idea of the state of the production race at a particular point in time, even though the Panther hit the Eastern battlefield before the T-34-84 was even designed. If you think it sounds like propaganda, then how about this comparison: take all of the Panzer IVs ever built, then throw in all of the Panthers too, and together they still won't quite equal the 15,000 T-34s built in the twelve months of 1943, by a country with less resources than Germany. Retooling the lines to build the T-34-85 in 1944 slowed down production some, but not too much, because another 22,000 of them were made by the end of the war.
- In 1941, when the Soviets had by far the best tank and the most tanks, they were losing badly because they didn't know how to fight a war. In 1944–45, when the Germans had the better tank but the Soviets had learned how to fight, the Germans started losing even worse, because their decision meant that they couldn't build enough tanks. Too bad for them the Panther wasn't good enough to kill T-34s at twelve-to-one (and speaking of all causes, too bad the over-engineered Panther's early breakdown rates were extremely high). Who knows, maybe they would have done better building several times as many Panzer IVs instead.
- The point of the comparison is critical to this article: that after the Soviets had overcome their morale and training problems, production efficiency would be decisive in winning the war. And the T-43 would have been a better tank, but it had to be abandoned to maintain that all-important efficiency.
