Synthetic intelligence
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Synthetic intelligence (SI) is an alternative term for artificial intelligence. It emphasizes the belief of many researchers that the intelligence of machines is not an imitation or in any way artificial; it is a genuine form of intelligence. According to this view, the term artificial intelligence is an oxymoron; implying that the intelligence is not intelligent. Haugeland (1986) proposes an analogy with artificial and synthetic diamonds—only the synthetic diamond is truly a diamond.
[edit] Simulated vs. real thinking
Russell & Norvig (2003), p. 948) present this example:
- "Can machines fly?" This is true, since airplanes fly.
- "Can machines swim?" This is false, because submarines don't swim.
- "Can machines think?" Is this question like the first or like the second?
Drew McDermott firmly believes that "thinking" should construed like "flying". While discussing the electronic chess champion Deep Blue, he argues "Saying Deep Blue doesn't really think about chess is like saying an airplane doesn't really fly because it doesn't flap its wings." (McDermott 1997) Edsger Djikstra agrees that some find "the question whether machines can think as relevant as the question whether submarines can swim." (Djikstra 2006)
John Searle, on the other hand, suggests that a thinking machine is, at best, a simulation, and writes "No one supposes that computer simulations of a five-alarm fire will burn the neighborhood down or that a computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched." (Searle 1980, p. 12) The essential difference between simulation and reality is one of the key points of his Chinese room argument.
Daniel Dennett believes that this is basically a disagreement about semantics and that it is peripheral to the central questions of the philosophy of artificial intelligence. He notes that even a chemically perfect imitation of a Chateau Latour is still a fake, but that any Vodka is real, no matter who made it. (Dennett 1978, p. 197) Similarly, a perfect, molecule-by-molecule recreation of an original Picasso would be considered a "forgery", but any image of the Coca-Cola logo is completely real and subject to trademark laws. Russell & Norvig (2003), p. 954) comment "we can conclude that in some cases, the behavior of an artifact is important, while in others it is the artifact's pedigree that matters. Which one is important in which case seems to be a matter of convention. But for artificial minds, there is no convention."
[edit] References
- Dennett, Daniel (1978), Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, The MIT Press, <http://books.google.com/books?id=_xwObaAZEwoC&pg=PA197&lpg=PA197&dq=%22real+chateau+latour%22&source=web&ots=BKBnSpg1V-&sig=By-uRB-gx6Aoo7Rkd29J6T-a4Zg#PPA197,M1>.
- Djikstra, Edsger (2006), Science fiction and science reality in computing, <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions/EWD09xx/EWD952.html>
- Haugeland, John (1985), Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-08153-9.
- Law, Diane (1994), Searle, Subsymbolic Functionalism and Synthetic Intelligence, <http://nn.cs.utexas.edu/downloads/papers/law.synthetic.pdf>.
- McDermott, Drew (May 14, 1997), “How Intelligent is Deep Blue”, New York Times, <http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~reingold/courses/ai/cache/mcdermott.html>.
- Russell, Stuart J. & Norvig, Peter (2003), Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2, <http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu/>.
- Poole, David; Mackworth, Alan & Goebel, Randy (1998), Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach, Oxford University Press, pp. 1, <http://www.cs.ubc.ca/spider/poole/ci.html>
- Searle, John (1980), “Minds, Brains and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417-457, <http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html>