Stalin's Missed Chance

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Stalin's Missed Chance is a study by Russian military historian Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov, author of several books and articles on Soviet military history.

Stalin's Missed Chance covers a theory of planned Soviet invasion raised by Viktor Suvorov, author of highly controversial books such as Icebreaker. Unlike Suvorov's works, Meltyukhov's book is based on archive materials, some of which were until recently classified. Contrary to many Western scholars (David Glantz, John D. Erickson, Richard Overy and others), Mikhail Meltyukhov concurs with Suvorov's claim that Stalin and the Soviet military leadership had planned an offensive against Germany in 1941.

Meltyukhov rejects, however, Suvorov's claims that the German assault (Operation Barbarossa) was a pre-emptive strike: Meltyukhov affirms both sides had been preparing to invade the other, but neither believed the possibility of either side's strike.

Stalin's Missed Chance is an extensive study of archive sources, often quoting and summarizing wartime records of the Red Army and the Soviet Union. The book also draws on a legion of published primary sources from the years 1939 to 1941.

Contents

[edit] On the eve of World War II

According to Meltyukhov, Russia had lost its position as a Great Power during the revolution and the breakup of its empire. The Soviet leadership had the option either to accept the regional status of the USSR or to become a Great Power once again. Having decided for the latter, the Soviet leadership used Communist ideology (the Comintern, the idea of world revolution etc.) to strengthen its position. (Meltyukhov 2000:491) The key objective was to exclude a possible alliance of Capitalist countries. Although diplomatic relationships had been established with the capitalist countries, the USSR was not accepted as an equal partner.

That changed, however, in the course of the political crisis of 1939, when two military and political blocs were formed: Anglo-French and German-Italian, both of which were interested in an agreement with the USSR. Moscow then had the opportunity to choose with whom and under what conditions to negotiate.

The basic aim was to retain neutrality, and after the weakening of both belligerent sides, to emerge as the decisive factor in ensuring victory for one side. Thus, “the USSR succeeded in staying out of the European war, after obtaining in this case a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, wider space to maneuver in its own interests between the belligerent sides .” (Meltyukhov 2000:491-2)

During the years 1939 and 1940, the USSR annexed several Eastern European countries and territories. The Kremlin viewed Germany as a force capable of weakening the positions of Great Britain and shaking the capitalist order. And “then at the suitable moment the Red Army could have destroyed Germany and would have freed Europe both from fascism and from “rotten capitalism.””(Meltyukhov 2000:492-4)

As for Soviet-German relationship during 1940, Meltyukhov points out that although both sides had the common goal of weakening Britain and negotiations were held in November 1940, an actual military alliance was never realised, for Soviets would have had to leave the whole continent to the German-Italian sphere of influence, i.e., relegating the Soviets to a second-rate role in the world matters. (Meltyukhov 2000:494)

[edit] The new phase

From that time on, it became clear that Germany was the main obstacle for Soviet penetration into Europe, and the relationship between the two entered a new phase. Both sides began preparing for the conflict. (Meltyukhov 2000:495)

The USSR took steps to normalise relations with the Western governments (including French and Polish emigré leaders). These negotiations intensified as rumours spread about the possible Soviet-German military conflict. In June, 1941, the Soviets proposed negotiations with Germany, which would have been useful as a disguise, and whose breakup would have given a justification to begin the assault. (Meltyukhov 2000:496)

“From the beginning of 1941, the measures for an increase combat readiness of troops were conducted in the Western boundary districts, large part of which was to be completed by July 1, 1941.” The Soviet economy had been on war footing from 1939 on, and preparations for mobilisation were made from that time on.

According to Meltyukhov, the material resources and the system of mobilization ensured the development of the army, considerably exceeding the German army in the quantity of armament and combat materials. (Meltyukhov 2000:497) By saying that, he rejects the thesis of David Glantz' work “Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War”, which portrays the Red Army as lacking any preparation.

[edit] Soviet and German offensive plans

As Meltyukhov shows with his study, the General Staff of Red Army had already begun developing a plan for an assault on Germany in October 1939. This process intensified in March 1940, and at least four different versions of the plan were developed throughout 1940 and 1941. The concentration of troops was disguised as maneuvers; in May/June 1941 the preparation for Soviet invasion in Germany reached the final stage, as the full-scale concentration of troops began. (Meltyukhov 2000:497)

It is worth mentioning that the draft plan from March 11, 1941 demanded to “start the offensive [on] 12.6.”, which in Meltyukhov's opinion should refute Gorodetsky's[1] affirmation that the draft assumed defensive strategy.[2] As it is known, the precise date of the outbreak of war is determined by the side which plans to strike first. Thus, the author thinks that the idea that the Red Army must strike first (clearly formulated in Zhukov's plan from May 15, 1941) was in a concealed form already present in all the previous drafts.

As for the usual suggestions that the Red Army was preparing a counteroffensive, a possible Wehrmacht invasion is suggested in plans cited by Meltyukhov, but with obvious lack of depth: the estimation of the enemy’s intentions, with exception of the possible direction of the main attack, did not undergo substantial changes. Furthermore, Meltyukhov claims those plans did not proceed from factual data and two possible Wehrmacht assault directions (Southern version, through Ukraine and Northern version, through Lithuania and Latvia, the latter being abandoned later) were taken into consideration, while an assault on Byelorussia was excluded without any reason. Thus, one might wonder if this was merely guess-work. Aleksandr Vasilevsky has recalled himself[3] that there was no straight answer to the probability of a German invasion, nor was a possible timing discussed. (Meltyukhov 2000:379-80) This fact and the absence of a connection between a possible strike by the enemy and the actions of the Red Army makes the version of a 'counter-strike strategy' very implausible. (Meltyukhov 2000:413)

On the other hand, the concentration of Red Army on the borders was elaborated throughout different plans (Meltyukhov reports five different versions of the plan) and went through substantial changes. As also indicated by M. A. Gareyev, who is himself skeptical of the Soviet strike thesis, "the direction of the concentration of basic efforts by Soviet command was chosen not in the interests of the strategic defensive operation (this operation was simply not provided and was not planned -, and that’s the main error), and conformably entirely to other methods of operations". (cited in Meltyukhov 2000:381)

Military actions would have began with the surprise blow by the Soviet Air Force on the airfields of Eastern Prussia, Poland and Romania. The overall Soviet superiority in aviation would have made it possible to subject German airfields in a 250 km-deep border zone to continuous airstrikes, which would have led to a significant weakening of the enemy and would have facilitated Red Army ground forces operations. The ground forces were supposed to have two major strike directions: one striking towards Eastern Prussia and Poland and the other into Romania in the South. (Meltyukhov 2000:503)

The basic idea of Soviet military planning consisted in the fact that the Red Army was to concentrate near the border under the disguise of maneuvers and to go over into a sudden, decisive attack. “The absence of any references to the possible defensive operations of the Red Army shows that the discussion was not about the preparation for a pre-emptive strike but for the assault on Germany and its allies. This idea is clearly expressed in the document of May 15, 1941, by which the Red Army was to be guided in the beginning of war.” Meltyukhov suggests, that the assault on Germany was initially planned to take place on June 12, 1941, but was postponed due to the fact that the Soviet leadership feared an Anglo-German reconciliation against Soviet Union after the flight of Rudolf Hess May 12, 1941. (Meltyukhov 2000:498-9)

The basis for this assumption is revealed by Molotov's recollection 40 years later in a conversation with Russian journalist Ivan Stadnyuk: "I don't remember all the motives for cancelling this decision, but it seems to me that Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess' flight to England played the main role there. The NKVD reconnaissance reported to us, that Hess on behalf of Hitler had proposed Great Britain to conclude peace and to participate in the military march against the USSR... If we at this time would have unleashed ourselves a war against Germany, would have moved forces to Europe, then England could have entered the alliance with Germany without any delay... And not only England. We could have been face to face with the entire capitalist world"[4]

Meltyukhov believes that “the question about the new period of the completion of war build-up was solved on May 24, 1941, at the secret conference of military-political leadership at the Kremlin. Now accessible sources show that the full concentration and the development of the Red Army on Soviet Western districts was to be completed by July 15, 1941. The rate of the concentration of the Red Army on the Western borders was increased. Together with the transfer of 77 divisions of the second strategic echelon, from June 12 to June 16, 1941, began the re-dislocation of troops of the second echelon of armies and reserves of the military districts near Western boundary. (Meltyukhov 2000: 499)

As for German offensive plans, Meltyukhov rightly points out that the German leadership hoped for a rapid crushing defeat of the USSR which would have given Germany necessary resources for victory in a long war with England, and maybe the USA. Hitler’s idea could thus be characterised as striving for a victory in the East for the purpose of winning the war against the West. (Meltyukhov 2000:500)

Therefore, Meltyukhov claims, the apologies by Nazi leaders of a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union were groundless, since Hitler had regarded the concentration of Soviet troops as merely defensive. Operation Barbarossa was scheduled a long time before, and Hitler hadn't really comprehended the Soviet invasion threat, the concentration of Soviet troops was estimated as defensive reaction to the discovered Wehrmacht deployment. With regards to the failure of the Soviet leadership to comprehend the German threat, Stalin hadn’t believed Hitler was going to invade and risk war on two fronts. (Meltyukhov 2000:502)

What is more, it is believed that Stalin was looking forward to German ultimatum and thus the Soviets evaluated the concentration of German troops as a means to pressure the Soviets.

[edit] Had the Soviet assault taken place

Meltyukhov asks the hypothetical question, what would have happened if the Soviets had carried out its initial plan and begun the invasion in June 12, 1941. By that time, German troops had completed preparations for the Operation Barbarossa and concentration on the Soviet boundaries, where in the strip from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea it had already gathered 81.6% out of the divisions which Wehrmacht would have on June 21[5]. The remaining troops were in motion and Luftwaffe had completed re-dislocation after the Balkan campaign, but “Wehrmacht had neither defensive nor offensive group [yet], and Soviet attack at this moment would have placed it on a very complicated position and made it possible [for the Red Army] to tear its forces apart.” (Meltyukhov 2000:502-3). For Soviet troops concentration, see http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/s07.gif.

The situation at the border strip from Ostroleka to the Carpathians is shown in the table (Meltyukhov 2000:503-Таблица 59)

Red Army German Army (inc allies) Relation
Divisions 128 55 2.3 : 1
Personnel 3,400,000 1,400,000 2.1 : 1
Artillery 38,500 16,300 2.4 : 1
Tanks 7,500 900 8.7 : 1
Aircraft 6,200 1,400 4.4 : 1

It is important to point out, however, that this table ignores powerful German forces positioned north of Ostrolenka, who could have interfered with the Soviet plan. These included the whole of Army Group North with the Sixteenth Army, the Eighteenth Army, and Fourth Panzer Army, as well as Army Group Centre's Ninth Army and the Third Panzer Army to the North of Lomzha. The number of tanks in the Second Panzer Army south of Ostrolenka may be disputed, since Wehrmacht records put it at 950 tanks, and not 900 as Melthyukhov states.[6] Additional to those tanks are up to 377 Sturmgeschütze, the total number present in the Wehrmacht in June 41, although not all of them would have been in Poland or East Prussia). Finally, in a straightforward comparison there is the fact that German guns had a higher calibre (105mm vs 76mm as standard divisional artillery, 150mm vs 122mm as heavy divisional artillery), and therefore higher destructive power[citation needed].

According to estimations by B. Sokolov, on the basis of Georgy Zhukov's proposal from May 15, 1941, 152 Soviet divisions had to break 100 German divisions as the main attack was provided for the South-Western Front in the direction Kraków, Katowice.[7]

It is also important to note that many of the Mechanized Corps, which would have been the main maneuver element in an attack, were considerably understrength. Tank strengths of these formations in the Western Military District ranged from 63 for the 17th Mechanized Corps to 1,131 for the 6th Mechanized Corps, which was probably up to or at least close to full strength in terms of tanks. [8] The Mechanized Corps also lacked motor vehicles and artillery tractors which would have been necessary to conduct a deep operation.

Meltyukhov believes that the Western leaders would have approved the Soviet strike, for it was difficult for Great Britain to win the war alone and the British had already done everything within their means to convince the Soviets to take a less benevolent attitude towards Germany.

In a telegram to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from June 15, 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested providing the Soviets with every possible assistance in case a war between Germany and the USSR broke out. Roosevelt accepted this proposal without reserve on June 21. (Meltyukhov 2000:507-8)

Taking everything into account, Meltyukhov sums up: “Certainly, this offensive by the Red Army would not have led to the immediate solution on the outcome of war, but […] the Red Army could have been in Berlin no later than 1942, which would have made it possible to gain much greater territory in Europe under the control of Moscow, than it really did in 1945.” (Meltyukhov 2000:506)

[edit] Reception of the book in the West

The work of the remarkable thoroughness and important subject received several reviews in western academic publications and was referred to in several late World War II studies.

Meltyukhov's study—namely the chapter dealing with the Soviet military takeover of the Baltic states—has been used by Estonian historian Magnus Ilmjärv [9] for specifying Soviet military planning against the three republics and Soviet forces allocated. Meltyukhov's book has also been reviewed quite positively by Estonian historians.[10] Russian emigré historian Constantine Pleshakov, also supportive of the planned Soviet offensive theory, has used Stalin's Missed Chance (just like books by V. Nevezhin and V. Danilov) in his recent study.[11] Meltyukhov's book, as well as other similar titles, has been reviewed by professor Raack in the Russian Review.[12]

[edit] References

  • Мельтюхов М.И. Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939-1941 (Документы, факты, суждения). — М.: Вече, 2000 -- Electronic version: [1]
  1. ^ Городецкий Г. Миф "Ледокола": Накануне войны. Пер. с англ. М.,1995. С.284.
  2. ^ "Наступление начать 12.6." - Meltyukhov 2000:386f. The author refers to Гареев М.А. Неоднозначные страницы войны. (Очерки о проблемных вопросах Великой Отечественной войны). М.,1995. С.93; also: 1941 год. Документы. Кн.1. С.741—746
  3. ^ Новая и новейшая история. 1992. № 6. С.7.
  4. ^ Стаднюк И.С. Нечто о сталинизме//О них ходили легенды. М.,1994. С.423—424.
  5. ^ Группировка войск сторон взята по: Сборник военно-исторических материалов Великой Отечественной войны. Вып. 18. С.66—68, 79—85; 1941 год. Документы. Кн.2. С.216—219.
  6. ^ Müller-Hillebrand 'Das Heer, Band III'
  7. ^ http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/02.html; Бобылев П. Н. Репетиция катастрофы // Военно-исторический журнал. 1993. №№ 6, 7, 8.
  8. ^ Tank strength of Mechanized Corps
  9. ^ Silent Submission: Formation of Foreign Policy of Estonia, Latvia & Lithuania Period from Mid-1920-s to Annexation in 1940'' By Magnus Ilmjarv. December 2004. Almqvist & Wiksell ISBN 9-122-02086-1
  10. ^ See for example a review in English: “Russia in the thrall of its own history”
  11. ^ Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2)
  12. ^ Raack, R.C. "Preventive Wars?" [Review Essay of Pietrow-Ennker, Bianka, ed. Präventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. 3d ed. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-596-14497-3; Mel'tiukhov, Mikhail. Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor'ba za Evropu 1939–1941. Moscow: Veche, 2000. ISBN 5-7838-1196-3; Magenheimer, Heinz. Entscheidungskampf 1941: Sowjetische Kriegsvorbereitungen. Aufmarsch. Zusammenstoss. Bielefeld: Osning Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-980-62861-4] The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 134–137

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