Spa Road Junction rail crash

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Spa Road Junction rail crash
Details
Date and time: 8 January 1999
Location: Spa Road Junction
Rail line: London to Dover
Cause Signal passed at danger
Statistics
Trains: 2
Passengers: ~300
Deaths: 0
Injuries: 4
List of UK rail accidents by year

The Spa Road Junction rail crash was an accident on the British railway system which occurred during the peak evening rush hour of 8 January 1999 at Spa Road Junction in Bermondsey, southeast London.


Contents

[edit] The incident

On a dark and wet evening, a Connex South Eastern train from Dover Priory to London Charing Cross collided with a Thameslink train from Brighton to Bedford causing derailment to both trains. The accident resulted in no fatalities and only four injuries.

The Thameslink train had been held at a danger (red) signal until the track ahead was clear before the signal for that train was changed to clear (green). The Connex train passed a preliminary caution (double yellow) signal then a caution (yellow) signal and then a danger (red) signal. The Connex train continued for 283 metres (309 yards) past the red signal until the point where the two lines converged. The Connex train was travelling at an estimated speed of around 39 mph when it converged with the Thameslink train estimated to be travelling at around 31 mph. This caused both trains to derail and damage to be caused to most of the rolling stock.

Disruption was caused to other rail services, although trains continued to run past the accident site. The emergency services struggled to access the accident scene but eventually 282 people were evacuated from these two trains. 200 people from another train a short distance behind (Connex South Central service from London Bridge to Guildford train) was not well organised resulting in some passengers being left to find their own way to evacuate themselves in the inclement weather. Trains were still running on the south eastern side, some 30 to 40 feet away from passengers evacuating the Guildford bound train.

It is thought that the Automatic Warning System (AWS) indicators on both trains were working correctly, although the shock of a collision can change the appearance of an AWS indicator.

The driver of the Connex train had previously passed another signal at danger and was already under special supervision because of this. Following the accident, he was permanently removed from driving duties. This particular signal had never been passed at danger (red) before.

[edit] The junction

Spa Road Junction is a large junction a short distance south east of London Bridge station where the railway line splits into four directions towards (listed from north to south):

  • Deptford for trains to Greenwich
  • New Cross for trains to all other destinations along the main line to southeast London and Kent
  • New Cross Gate for trains to Forest Hill or East Croydon
  • South Bermondsey for trains to Peckham Rye and the South London Line

[edit] Vehicles

The Thameslink train (now First Capital Connect) was an eight-coach train consisting of two Class 319 four-coach electric multiple units (EMUs).

The Connex South Eastern train (now Southeastern) was also an eight-coach train consisting of a four-coach Class 411 EMU and a four-coach Class 423 EMU.

[edit] Investigation

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) concluded that the accident was caused by the Connex train passing a signal at danger (red). The HSE concluded that this was probably due to human error as no evidence of malfunction was found in any equipment tested.

The investigation of the accident found "deficiencies" in the training and experience of staff in dealing with emergency situations. The cause of the accident was concluded to be driver error due to poor staff training.

The conclusion was train protection might have stopped or at least slowed the Connex train down if it had been installed. The Railway Safety Regulations 1999 were introduced in the August, which stipulated that train protection must be implemented throughout the network by the end of 2003. The regulations stopped short of requiring Automatic Train Protection (ATP) to be installed.

[edit] External links

  • Railways Archive - Accident at Spa Road (Summary)
  • Railways Archive - Report by the Health and Safety Executive's Railway Inspectorate into the train accident at Spa Road (PDF)