Siege of Smolensk (1632-33)
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Siege of Smolensk | |||||||
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Part of Smolensk War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Poland Lithuania |
Russia | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Samuel Drucki-Sokoliński | Mikhail Borisovich Shein | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
~3,000 soldiers 170 artillery pieces |
~25,000-35,000 soldiers 160 artillery pieces |
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
Unknown | ~15,000 |
The Siege of Smolensk lasted almost a year between 28 October of 1609 and 4 October of 1611, when the Muscovite army besieged the Polish-Lithuanian city of Smolensk during the war named after that siege.
By mid-1632 the deputy voivode (podwojewoda) of Smoleńsk, Samuel Drucki-Sokoliński, had about 500 volunteers from pospolite ruszenie and 2,500 of regular army soldiers and Cossacks..[1]
A large Muscovite army under Mikhail Borisovich Shein begun the siege of Smolensk on 28 October.[2] This army numbered about 35,000 soldiers, although only about 25,000 took part in the siege iself, with others being sent against other targets.
The Russian heavy artillery = mostly of foreign (Western) production[3] reached Smolensk in December 1632, with even heavier guns arriving in March 1633.[4] After an artillery bombardment ordered an assault, which was however repulsed by the Polish defenders.[5] Nonetheless the siege was progressing, fortifications were damaged, defenders suffered heavy casualties and were running out of supplies.[6] In June some soldiers started to desert, and others talked of surrender.[7]
In the meantime, Field Hetman of Lithuania and Voivode of Vilnius, Krzysztof Radziwiłł and voivode Gosiewski set up a camp about 30 kilometers from Smolensk (moving from Orsha to Bajów and later, Krasne). By February 1633 they had about 4,500 soldiers (including over 2,000 infantry) and constantly raided the rear of the Muscovite army, disrupting its logistics.[8] Hetman Radziwiłł also managed to breake through the Muscovite lines on several occasions, breaking through Russian lines, bringing about 1,000 soldiers and supplies to reinforce the fortress, raising the defenders morale.[5][3][6]
By first days of September the relief forces, approaching Smolensk, numbered around 14,000; the Muscovy army, recently reinforced, numbered 25,000.[9] It would be only when the Cossack reinforcements, numbering between 10,000 to 20,000, arrived on 17 September, led by Tymosz (Timofiy) Orendarenko, that the Commonwealth army would gain numerical superiority.[9][10] The Cossacks under Orendarenko and Marcin Kazanowski would take over raiding the Muscovy rear lines, which freed all elements of the Polish-Lithuanian army to engage the Muscovy force and break the siege.[11]
ładysław's brother, Jan Kazimierz, commanded one of the regiments in the relief army.[12] Another notable commander was the Field Crown Hetman, Marcin Kazanowski.[13] Polish king Władysław IV, a great supporter of modernization of Commonwealth army, proved to be a good tactician, and his innovative tactics in use of artillery and fortifications - based also on the Western ideas - greatly contributed to the Polish-Lithuanian victory.[5][12] He replaced the old arquebusiers with musketeers, and standarized the Commonwealth artillery (introducing 3 to 6 pounder regimental guns), both to great effect.[14] Polish cavalry, including the Winged Hussars, significantly restricted the Russian mobility, forcing them to stay within their trenches.[4]
At Smolensk, in a series of fierce engagements, with Commonwealth forces slowly taking over Muscovite field fortifications, the Muscovites were first forced to break their siege of Smolensk by late September;[12] on 28 September the Commonwealth forces took the Muscovites main supply magazines.[15] By 4 October the siege of Smolensk was lifted, with Muscovites retreating to their main camp, which was in turn surrounded by forces of the Commonwealth in mid-October.[5][15] The surrounded Russians waited for relief but none arrived, as Commonwealth and Cossack cavalry was sent to disrupt Russian rear and logistics.[12] Some historians also note dissent and internal conflicts in the Russian camp, as responsible for their inaction and ineffectiveness (Jasienica blames the Russian warlords,[3]; Parker - foreign mercenaries[16]). Due to the Tatar invasion threatening south Russian borderlands, many soldiers and boyars fromthat regions deserted the Russian camp, choosing to protect their homeland instead of besieging Smolensk.[3] Foreign mercenaries in turn deserted to the Polish camp.[17] Shein started negotiations about surrender in January; by February the were in full swing.[18] Finally the Muscovites signed the capitulation treaty on 25 February 1634[12][5][18]; on 1 March they left their camp[18] (some schoolars, ex. Rickard and Black, simplify that and give the date 1 March for Steins capitulation).[4][14] The Muscovites had to leave most of their artillery, but were allowed to take their banners (after a ceremony in which they were laid before king Władysław; they had to promise not to engage Commonwealth forces for the next three months.[18] The Muscovite army numbered 12,000 at the capitulation, but over 4,000 - including most foreign troops - decided to immediately defect to the Commonwealth.[19]
After the fall of Smolensk, the Commonwealth army moved towards Biała, arriving in its vicinity in late March, but the siege was not successful.[20] The negotiations begun on April 30, and would end with the Treaty of Polanów in May.[21]
[edit] References
- ^ Mirosław Nagielski, Diariusz kampanii smoleńskiej Władysława IV 1633-1634, DiG, 2006, ISBN 8371814100. P.7
- ^ Nagielski, p.8-9
- ^ a b c d Paweł Jasienica, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów: Srebny Wiek, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1982, ISBN 9306007883, p.370-372
- ^ a b c Rickard, J (26 July 2007), Smolensk War, 1632-1634. Retrieved on 2 August 2007.
- ^ a b c d e Józef Andrzej Gierowski, Historia Polski, 1505-1764, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1979. ISBN 8301001720, p.235-236
- ^ a b Nagielski, p.12-13
- ^ Nagielski, p.18
- ^ Nagielski, p.11-12
- ^ a b Nagielski, p.21
- ^ Nagielski, p.21-23
- ^ Nagielski, p.24
- ^ a b c d e Władysław IV Waza 1595-1658. Władcy Polski Nr 23. Rzeczpospolita and Mówią Wieki. Various authors and editors. 24 July 2007.
- ^ Nagielski, p.21-23
- ^ a b Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1494-1660, Routledge, 2002, ISBN 0415275318, Google Print, p.137
- ^ a b Nagielski, p.26-27
- ^ Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years' War, Routledge, 1997, ISBN 0415128838, Google Print, p.124
- ^ Nagielski, p.36-37
- ^ a b c d Nagielski, p.43-44
- ^ Nagielski, p.46
- ^ Nagielski, p.47-50
- ^ Nagielski, p.50
[edit] Further reading
- Mirosław Nagielski, Diariusz kampanii smoleńskiej Władysława IV 1633-1634, DiG, 2006, ISBN 8371814100