Talk:Shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland
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Not being an expert in NI issues, which I know are contentious, I wonder if this article represents an NPOV ? Others with greater insight than me, please edit appropriately. JRL 07:10, 11 August 2005 (UTC)
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[edit] European Court of Human Rights Gibraltar Ruling
Enclosed is a link to European Court of Human Rights Gibraltar Ruling and some sections I think relevant. [1]
179. The Court observes that it would need to have convincing evidence before it could conclude that there was a premeditated plan, in the sense developed by the applicants.
180. In the light of its own examination of the material before it, the Court does not find it established that there was an execution plot at the highest level of command in the Ministry of Defence or in the Government, or that Soldiers A, B, C and D had been so encouraged or instructed by the superior officers who had briefed them prior to the operation, or indeed that they had decided on their own initiative to kill the suspects irrespective of the existence of any justification for the use of lethal force and in disobedience to the arrest instructions they had received. Nor is there evidence that there was an implicit encouragement by the authorities or hints and innuendoes to execute the three suspects.
181. The factors relied on by the applicants amount to a series of conjectures that the authorities must have known that there was no bomb in the car. However, having regard to the intelligence information that they had received, to the known profiles of the three terrorists, all of whom had a background in explosives, and the fact that Mr Savage was seen to "fiddle" with something before leaving the car, the belief that the car contained a bomb cannot be described as either implausible or wholly lacking in foundation.
182. In particular, the decision to admit them to Gibraltar, however open to criticism given the risks that it entailed, was in accordance with the arrest policy formulated by the Advisory Group that no effort should be made to apprehend them until all three were present in Gibraltar and there was sufficient evidence of a bombing mission to secure their convictions.
183. Nor can the Court accept the applicants’ contention that the use of the SAS, in itself, amounted to evidence that the killing of the suspects was intended. In this respect it notes that the SAS is a special unit which has received specialist training in combating terrorism. It was only natural, therefore, that in light of the advance warning that the authorities received of an impending terrorist attack they would resort to the skill and experience of the SAS in order to deal with the threat in the safest and most informed manner possible.
184. The Court therefore rejects as unsubstantiated the applicants’ allegations that the killing of the three suspects were premeditated or the product of a tacit agreement amongst those involved in the operation.
199. All four soldiers admitted that they shot to kill. They considered that it was necessary to continue to fire at the suspects until they were rendered physically incapable of detonating a device. According to the pathologists’ evidence Ms Farrell was hit by eight bullets, Mr McCann by five and Mr Savage by 16.
200. The Court accepts that the soldiers honestly believed, in the light of the information that they had been given, as set out above, that it was necessary to shoot the suspects in order to prevent them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss of life. The actions which they took, in obedience to superior orders, were thus perceived by them as absolutely necessary in order to safeguard innocent lives.
It considers that the use of force by agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in Article 2(2) of the Convention may be justified under this provision where it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the State and its law enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others.
It follows that, having regard to the dilemma confronting the authorities in the circumstances of the case, the actions of the soldiers do not, in themselves, give rise to a violation of this provision.
201. The question arises, however, whether the anti-terrorist operation as a whole was controlled and organised in a manner which respected the requirements of Article 2 and whether the information and instructions given to the soldiers which, in effect, rendered inevitable the use of lethal force, took adequately into consideration the right to life of the three suspects.
Control and organisation of the operation
202. The Court first observes that, as appears from the Operational Order of the Commissioner, it had been the intention of the authorities to arrest the suspects at an appropriate stage. Indeed evidence was given at the Inquest that arrest procedures had been practised by the soldiers before 6 March and that efforts had been made to find a suitable place in Gibraltar to detain the suspects after their arrest.
203. It may be questioned why the three suspects were not arrested at the border immediately on their arrival in Gibraltar and why, as emerged from the evidence given by Inspector Ullger, the decision was taken not to prevent them from entering Gibraltar if they were believed to be on a bombing mission. Having had advance warning of the terrorists’ intentions it would certainly have been possible for the authorities to have mounted an arrest operation. Although surprised at the early arrival of the three suspects, they had a surveillance team at the border and an arrest group nearby. In addition, the security services and the Spanish authorities had photographs of the three suspects, knew their names as well as their aliases and would have known what passports to look for.
204. On this issue, the Government submitted that at that moment there might not have been sufficient evidence to warrant the detention and trial of the suspects. Moreover, to release them, having alerted them to the authorities’ state of awareness but leaving them or others free to try again, would obviously increase the risks. Nor could the authorities be sure that those three were the only terrorists they had to deal with or of the manner in which it was proposed to carry out the bombing.
205. The Court confines itself to observing in this respect that the danger to the population of Gibraltar -- which is at the heart of the Government’s submissions in the case -- in not preventing their entry must be considered to outweigh the possible consequences of having insufficient evidence to warrant their detention and trial. In its view, either the authorities knew that there was no bomb in the car -- which the Court has already discounted -- or there was a serious miscalculation by those responsible for controlling the operation. As a result, the scene was set in which the fatal shooting, given the intelligence assessments which had been made, was a foreseeable possibility if not a likelihood.
The decision not to stop the three terrorists from entering Gibraltar is thus a relevant factor to take into account under this head.
206. The Court notes that at the briefing on 5 March attended by Soldiers A, B, C and D it was considered likely that the attack would be by way of a large car bomb. A number of key assessments were made. In particular, it was thought that the terrorists would not use a blocking car; that the bomb would be detonated by a radio-control device; that the detonation could be effected by the pressing of a button; that it was likely that the suspects would detonate the bomb if challenged; that they would be armed and would be likely to use their arms if confronted.
207. In the event, all of these crucial assumptions, apart from the terrorists’ intentions to carry out an attack, turned out to be erroneous. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated by the Government, on the basis of their experience in dealing with the IRA, they were all possible hypotheses in a situation where the true facts were unknown and where the authorities operated on the basis of limited intelligence information.
208. In fact, insufficient allowances appear to have been made for other assumptions. For example, since the bombing was not expected until 8 March when the changing of the guard ceremony was to take place, there was equally the possibility that the three terrorists were on a reconnaissance mission. While this was a factor which was briefly considered, it does not appear to have been regarded as a serious possibility.
In addition, at the briefings or after the suspects had been spotted, it might have been thought unlikely that they would have been prepared to explode the bomb, thereby killing many civilians, as Mr McCann and Ms Farrell strolled towards the border area since this would have increased the risk of detection and capture. It might also have been thought improbable that at that point they would set up the transmitter in anticipation to enable them to detonate the supposed bomb immediately if confronted.
Moreover, even if allowances are made for the technological skills of the IRA, the description of the detonation device as a "button job" without the qualifications subsequently described by the experts at the Inquest, of which the competent authorities must have been aware, over-simplifies the true nature of these devices.
209. It is further disquieting in this context that the assessment made by Soldier G, after a cursory external examination of the car, that there was a "suspect car bomb" was conveyed to the soldiers, according to their own testimony, as a definite identification that there was such a bomb. It is recalled that while Soldier G had experience in car bombs, it transpired that he was not an expert in radio communications or explosives; and that his assessment that there was a suspect car bomb, based on his observation that the car aerial was out of place, was more in the nature of a report that a bomb could not be ruled out.
210. In the absence of sufficient allowances being made for alternative possibilities, and the definite reporting of the existence of a car bomb which, according to the assessments that had been made, could be detonated at the press of a button, a series of working hypotheses were conveyed to Soldiers A, B, C and D as certainties, thereby making the use of lethal force almost unavoidable.
211. However, the failure to make provision for a margin of error must also be considered in combination with the training of the soldiers to continue shooting once they opened fire until the suspect was dead. As noted by the Coroner in his summing up to the jury at the Inquest, all four soldiers shot to kill the suspects. Soldier E testified that it had been discussed with the soldiers that there was an increased chance that they would have to shoot to kill since there would be less time where there was a "button" device. Against this background, the authorities were bound by their obligation to respect the right to life of the suspects to exercise the greatest of care in evaluating the information at their disposal before transmitting it to soldiers whose use of firearms automatically involved shooting to kill.
212. Although detailed investigation at the Inquest into the training received by the soldiers was prevented by the public interest certificates which had been used, it is not clear whether they had been trained or instructed to assess whether the use of firearms to wound their targets may have been warranted by the specific circumstances that confronted them at the moment of arrest.
Their reflex action in this vital respect lacks the degree of caution in the use of firearms to be expected from law enforcement personnel in a democratic society, even when dealing with dangerous terrorist suspects, and stands in marked contrast to the standard of care reflected in the instructions in the use of firearms by the police which had been drawn to their attention and which emphasised the legal responsibilities of the individual officer in the light of conditions prevailing at the moment of engagement.
This failure by the authorities also suggests a lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation of the arrest operation.
213. In sum, having regard to the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least, be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of the Convention.
214. Accordingly, it finds that there has been a breach of Article 2 of the Convention.
The ruling appears to be on the issue that there was a lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation of the arrest operation. That they should have arrested the suspects prior to entering Gibraltar or attempted to wound the suspects. Insufficient training was given to the soldiers in respect to wounding rather than kiling. It does explicitly state that there was no premeditated policy in regards to this. Therefore I can only conclude that this does not amount to a ruling on a alledged "Shoot-to-Kill" policy, but on operational inadequecies. --Strangelyb 05:28, 17 August 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Insurgents
I changed this word as it is not associated with the Republican movement in Ireland. I lived there for most of my life and never once heard this phrase. The implication may be that it is commonly used in that context. --PhilipO 05:58, August 24, 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Martin McCauley
According to [2], the "Colombia 3" McAuley was "in his 30s" in 2004, and is from Lurgan, Co. Armagh. So his age/hometown are consistent with him being the same person who was involved in the shoot-to-kill incident (he could have been 17 at the oldest in 1982), but I've added a {{Fact}} tag pending verification. Demiurge 13:14, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
- It's mentioned here[3]. Stu ’Bout ye! 14:28, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
- I've added some citations instead of the {{fact}} tag. Two are from the Times and Scotsman which say that the IRA trio were suspected of exporting the 'barrack buster' (or knowledge thereof). The third is from Australian Hansard because it's the most 'respectable' source I could find in a brief Google search for the 'Colombian' McCauley being the same person as the 'Shoot-to-kill' McCauley.--Aim Here 12:36, 13 March 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland
(copied from User talk: Aim Here) I have removed the following from the above article.
"The shootings were initially investigated by other members of the RUC, and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland decided to bring prosecutions. At the first trial, relating to the shootings of the two INLA men, Constable John Robinson admitted to having been instructed to lie in his statements. The resulting public outcry caused RUC Chief Constable John Hermon to ask John Stalker to investigate the killings."
I have done a lot of reserach on this and have never come across any archival evidence relating or remeber this public outcry. So I think this assertion initailly looks POV. Can you provide background info so we can be sure this is accurate.
No offence is intended.
Cheers
--Strangelyb 23:44, 16 March 2006 (UTC)
Hi there.
That part of the article I merged/redirected from the old 'Stalker Inquiry' article, though I rephrased it since the original appeared to be a straight copy of this article on the Charter 88 website. I'm a little young to remember the exact timescale of the public outcry over the Stalker affair assassinations, but there was certainly a HUGE outcry at the time, whether it began after the initial court proceedings or after the Inquiry or after Stalker was suspended is something I can't recall. I remember deciding to shove it in because there was a gap in the article between the shootings and the suspension of John Stalker. CAIN, a bunch of academics who seem to me to be both neutral and accurate, verify some of the trial details and say that Hermon made a public denial of the policy between the Robinson trial and the Stalker Inquiry, which at least suggests someone was moaning.[4] --Aim Here 00:16, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
After looking at your references I think I'll revert the article to reinsert the section. I'll do some more digging to try and get some more background, but what you have provided seems to back up this section staying. Thanks.
--Strangelyb 09:46, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Deleted link
I have deleted the link to http://www.madden-finucane.com , cited in the article as "Information regarding the murder of Pat Finucane". The link leads instead to a homepage for a law firm. It's possible this link has become outdated. If in fact said informatioon is to be found within this law firm's page, then a more direct link is needed. 23skidoo 21:23, 12 January 2007 (UTC)
