Shifta War

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Shifta War
Date 1963 - 1967 Location North Eastern Province, Kenya Result Kenyan victory
Belligerents
Kenya	Northern Frontier District Liberation Movement Somalia

The Shifta War (1963–1967) was a secessionist conflict in which the Somali people in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya attempted to join with their co-ethnics in a Greater Somalia. The Kenyan government named the conflict "shifta", after the Somali word for "bandit", as part of a propaganda effort. The Kenyan counter-insurgency General Service Units forced civilians into protected villages as well as destroying a large number of animals kept by the pastoralist Somalis. The war ended in 1968 when Abdirishid Ali Shermarke, president of the Somali Republic, signed a ceasefire with Kenya. However, the violence in Kenya deteriorated into disorganized banditry, with occasional episodes of secessionist agitation, for the next several decades. The war caused large-scale disruption to the way of life in the district, resulting in a shift from pastoralist and transhumant lifestyles to sedentary, urban lifestyles.

Contents 1 Background 2 Conflict 3 Effects 4 References and notes

[edit] Background

From 1926 to 1934, the Northern Frontier District (NFD), comprising the current North Eastern Province and the districts of Marsabit, Moyale and Isiolo,^[1] was closed by British colonial authorities. Movement in and out of the district was possible only through the use of "passes".^[2] Despite these restrictions, pastoralism was well-suited to the arid conditions and the residents were relatively prosperous. Anthropologist John Baxter noted that, in 1953,

the Boran and the Sakuye were well-nourished and well-clothed and, though a pastoral life is always physically demanding, people led dignified and satisfying life... They had clearly been prospering for some years. In 1940, the District Commissioner commented in his Handing Over Report: "The Ewaso Boran have degenerated through wealth and soft living into an idle and cowardly set"...^[3]

On June 26, 1960, four days before granting British Somaliland independence, the British government declared that all Somali areas should be unified in one administrative region. Almost two-thirds of Somalis live in Somalia, while the rest are separated into Djibouti (then French Somaliland), the Somali Region of Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. On the eve of Kenyan independence in August 1963, British officials belatedly realized that the new Kenyan administration were not willing to give up nearly one-fifth of the land area of their newly emerging nation. In response, Somalia declared:

It was evident that the British Government has not only deliberately misled the Somalia Government during the course of the last eighteen months, but has also deceitfully encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe that their right to self-determination could be granted by the British Government through peaceful and legal means.^[4]

[edit] Conflict

The province thus entered a period of running skirmishes between the Kenyan Army and Somali-backed Northern Frontier District Liberation Movement (NFDLM) insurgents. One immediate consequence was the signing in 1964 of a Mutual Defense Treaty between Jomo Kenyatta's administration and the government of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.^[4] The start of the Bale revolt in Ethiopia in 1963 indicated to both Kenya and Ethiopia the need for cooperation in checking Somali irredentism.^[5] However, the treaty had little effect as neither Kenya nor Ethiopia were able to stem the cross-border flow of materiel.^[4]

At the outset of the war, the government declared a State of Emergency. These augmentations included allowing security forces to detain people up to 56 days without trial, confiscate the property of communities in retaliation for acts of violence and curtail assembly and movement. A 'prohibited zone' was created along the Somali border and the death penalty was made mandatory for unauthorized possession of firearms. "Special courts" without guarantee of due process were created. The northeast, declared a "special district", was subject to nearly unfettered government control, including the authority to detain, arrest or forcibly move individuals or groups, as well as confiscate possessions and land.^[6] However, as part of its effort to reassure the public, the Voice of Kenya was warned not to refer to the conflict as a "border dispute", while a special government committee decided to refer to the rebels as "shiftas" in order to minimize the political nature of the war.^[5]

Over the course of the war, the new Kenyan government became increasingly concerned by the growing strength of the Somali military. At independence, Somalia had a weak army of 5000 troops that was incapable of exerting itself beyond its borders. However, in 1963, it appealed for assistance from the Soviet Union, which responded by lending about $32 million. By 1969, 800 officers had received Soviet training, while the army had expanded to 23,000 well-equipped troops. The Kenyan fear that the insurgency might escalate into a conventional conflict involving Somali regular troops was coupled with a concern about the new insurgent tactic of placing land mines. In a July 29, 1966 letter, Kenyan Defence Permanent Secretary Danson Mlamba warned Information and Broadcasting PS Peter Gachathi of

mounting casualties to the army and police... and the last incident, which we are keeping quiet about, when a police Land Rover was blown up by a mine which killed two officers and wrecked the vehicle is a very serious development.^[5]

The Kenyan government response may have been inspired by the counter-insurgency efforts taken by the British during the Mau Mau Uprising, which had been spearheaded by the Kikuyu, who now dominated the Kenya African National Union-led government. Gachathi mused that they should perhaps "take a leaf from the (British) operations carried out during the emergency against the Mau Mau movement which, I am sure you will agree, were considerably effective.^[5] In 1967, Kenyan fears reached a height and a special government committee was created to prepare for a full-scale war with Somalia.^[5] The government also adopted a policy of compulsory villagization in the war-affected area. In 1967, the populace was moved into 14 Manyattas, villages that were guarded by troops. East Africa scholar Alex de Waal described the result as "a military assault upon the entire pastoral way of life," as enormous numbers of livestock were confiscated or killed, partly to deny their use by the guerrillas and partly to force the populace to abandon their flocks and move to a Manyatta. Thus made destitute, many nomads became an urban underclass, while educated Somali Kenyans fled the country.^[6] The government also removed the dynastic Sultans, who were the traditional leaders, with low-ranking government-appointed chiefs.^[7]

In 1967, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda mediated peace talks between Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal and Kenyatta. These bore fruit in October 1967, when the governments of Kenya and Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding that resulted in a ceasefire. The Manyatta strategy is seen as playing a key role in ending the insurgency, though the Somali government may have also decided that the potential benefits of a war simply was not worth the cost and risk. However, Somalia did not renounce its irredentist claim to Greater Somalia.^[4]

[edit] Effects

Lacking a secessionist direction and with Somalian support withdrawn, many former rebels returned to the traditional activities of inter-clan feuding and livestock rustling. However, the raids were now carried out by the blooded and well-armed fighters. A key check upon the escalation of clan warfare was the authority of the Sultans. The dissolving of this leadership structure during the war left the region without an accepted mechanism of conflict management.^[7]

The forced villagization also resulted in an economic bifurcation of the residents. Those with means diversified into trade and sedentary farming. Those without became wage laborers, while the poorest were reduced to dependence on outside relief aid. Anthropologist John Baxter returned to the village in Isiolo District that he had researched in 1953:

In 1982, only a few fortunate ones still maintained themselves through stock pastoralism. Some 40 percent of the Boran and Sakuye of the District had been driven to peri-urban shanty villages in the new administrative townships. There, they eked out a bare subsistence, hanging around the petrol stations for odd jobs, hawking for miraa, making illicit alcohol, engaging in prostitution and the like.^[8]

The war thus marked the beginning of decades of banditry, insurrection and security crackdowns, in which northeastern Kenya gained a reputation as an uncontrollable and violent region. By far the worst single incident was the 1984 Wagalla Massacre, in which the Provincial Commissioner ordered security forces to gather 5000 men of the Degodia clan onto the airstrip at Wagalla, Wajir, opened fire and then attempted to hide the bodies. The government admitted in 2000 that 380 people had been killed, though independent estimates put the toll at over 2000.^[9] Not until the administration of Provincial Commissioner Mohammoud Saleh in late 2000 was there a serious drop in violent activities, partially attributable to Saleh's zero tolerance policy towards abuse by security forces.^[1]

[edit] References and notes