Shapiro v. Thompson
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| Shapiro v. Thompson | ||||||||||
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| Holding | ||||||||||
| The fundamental right to travel and the Equal protection clause forbid a state from reserving welfare benefits only for persons that have resided in the state for at least year. | ||||||||||
| Court membership | ||||||||||
| Chief Justice: Earl Warren Associate Justices: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, John Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron White, Abe Fortas, Thurgood Marshall |
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| Case opinions | ||||||||||
| Majority by: Brennan Concurrence by: Stewart Dissent by: Warren joined by Black Dissent by: Harlan |
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| Laws applied | ||||||||||
| U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV | ||||||||||
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court decision that helped to establish a fundamental "right to travel" in U.S. law. Although the Constitution does not mention the right to travel, it has been implied through the other rights given in the constitution.
This case examined laws that required a period of residence in a jurisdiction before welfare benefits would become available to a resident. The state asserted that its interest in requiring this waiting period was to deter needy citizens from other states from coming to the state for the sole purpose of receiving superior welfare benefits. The court held that the purpose of inhibiting the migration of needy people was a constitutionally impermissible objective. The state also argued that this requirement was an attempt to apportion services based on how much residence have contributed (i.e. longer residence means more taxes paid) but such apportionment is not allowed under the Equal protection clause.
The state asserted that the requirement served the states interest in efficient administration of welfare by providing an objective test of residence, allowing for planning a budget, minimize fraud, and encourage entry into the workforce before seeking welfare. Because the constitutional right to free movement between states was implicated, the court applied a standard of compelling interest and held none of these interests were sufficient to sustain the waiting requirement. The court held that there was no evidence that the requirement would make planning a budget more predictable, and that if a waiting period encouraged new residents to enter the workforce it should also be applied to current residents, and that the interest in deterring fraud and having an objective verification of residence could be better served by less restrictive means (e.g. calling welfare recipients periodically).
Finally the Court rejected the argument that Congress had authorized the waiting period because Congress does not have to power to authorize violations of the equal protection clause.
Warren, joined by Black, dissents. Congress has the power to authorize these restrictions under the commerce clause. Under the commerce clause, Congress needs only a rational basis to a legitimate state interest, not a necessary relation to a compelling interest.
Harlan dissents. The requirement of a compelling interest and necessary relation is an example of intermediate scrutiny.
