Talk:Semantic theory of truth
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I have changed "use-language" to "metalanguage" which is the standard terminology.--NoizHed 20:57, 26 December 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Sentences, not propositions
Tarski says that truth pertains to sentences, not propositions. That would be Horwich. He says in his paper The semantic conception of truth, "...it appears most convenient to apply the term “true” to sentences, and we shall follow this course." and "if the definition of truth is to conform to our conception, it must imply the following equivalence: The sentence “snow is white” is true iff snow is white…. On the right side we have the sentence itself, and on the left we have the name of the sentence…. If we wish to say something about a sentence, for example that it is true, we must use the name of the sentence, and not the sentence itself." So I changed the article from saying proposition to saying truth.
