Semiotic elements and classes of signs (Peirce)

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Logician, mathematician, philosopher, and scientist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) began writing on semeiotic, semiotics, or the theory of sign relations in the 1860s, around the time that he devised his system of three categories. He eventually defined semiosis as an "action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs" (Houser 1998, 411). This specific type of triadic relation is fundamental to Peirce's understanding of "logic as formal semiotic".

Peirce notably conceives of and discusses things like representations, interpretations, and assertions broadly and in terms of philosophical logic (which he called simply "logic"), rather than in terms of psychology, social studies, and special classes of phenomena. His semiotic is connected with his mathematics of logic. At the same time, he draws on examples familiar in experience. His semiotic is not contained in a mathematical or deductive formalism, and is about certain general aspects of positive phenomena. Peirce's semiotic, in its classifications, its critical analysis of kinds of inference, and its theory of inquiry, is philosophical[1] logic studied in terms of signs and sign processes as positive phenomena in general.

Contents

[edit] Semiotic elements

Here is Peirce's definition of the triadic sign relation that formed the core of his definition of logic.

Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. (Peirce 1902, NEM 4, 20–21).

This definition, together with Peirce's definitions of correspondence and determination, is sufficient to derive all of the statements that are necessarily true for all sign relations and, in particular, to formulate the self-perpetuative logical structure whereby the interpretant sign, by fulfilling its function as a sign, determines a still further interpretant sign. Yet, there is much more to the theory of signs than simply proving universal theorems about generic sign relations. There is also the task of classifying the various species and subspecies of sign relations. As a practical matter, of course, familiarity with the full range of concrete examples is indispensable to theory and application both.

In Peirce's theory of signs, a sign is something that stands in a well-defined kind of relation to two other things, its object and its interpretant sign. His semiotics of signs, interpretations, assertions, etc., is philosophical logic, concerned as philosophy with phenomena in general, and is not descriptive or theoretical psychology, concerned with special classes of phenomena. Although Peirce's definition of a sign is independent of psychological subject matter and his theory of signs covers more ground than linguistics alone, it is nevertheless the case that many of the more familiar examples and illustrations of sign relations will naturally be drawn from the descriptive sciences of linguistics and psychology, along with our ordinary experience of their subject matters.

To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs. (Peirce, 1868[2])

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. (Peirce, 1906 [3])

For example, one way to approach the concept of an interpretant is to think of a psycholinguistic process. In this context, an interpretant can be understood as a sign's effect on the mind, or on anything that acts like a mind, what Peirce calls a quasi-mind. An interpretant is what results from a process of interpretation, one of the types of activity that falls under the heading of semiosis. One usually says that a sign stands for an object to an agent, an interpreter. In the upshot, however, it is the sign's effect on the agent that is paramount. This effect is what Peirce called the interpretant sign, or the interpretant for short. The interpretant may be regarded as one of the sign's roughly equivalent meanings, and especial interest attaches to the types of semiosis that proceed from obscure signs to relatively clear interpretants. In logic and mathematics the most clarified and most succinct signs for an object are called canonical forms or normal forms.

Peirce held that there are exactly three basic semiotic elements:

  • A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about something. It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial.
  • An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event, relationship, quality, law, argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[4] All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is the universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs.[5] For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto but ultimately not only about Pluto.
  • An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less clarified meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference which the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory concerns meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation culminates, though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that the sign stands for the object to the interpretant.

Some of the understanding needed by the mind depends on familiarity with the object. In order to know what a given sign denotes, the mind needs some experience of that sign's object collaterally to that sign or sign system, and in this context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.[6]

"Representamen" was Peirce's blanket technical term for any and every sign or sign-like thing covered by his theory. It is a question of whether the theoretically defined "representamen" covers only the cases covered by the popular word "sign." The word "representamen" is there in case a divergence should emerge. Peirce's example was this: Sign action always involves a mind. If a sunflower, by doing nothing more than turning toward the sun, were thereby to become fully able to reproduce a sunflower turning in just the same way toward the sun, then the first sunflower's turning would be a representamen of the sun yet not a sign of the sun.[7] Peirce eventually stopped using the word "representamen."[8]

The object determines (not in the deterministic sense, but in a sense of "specializes," bestimmt.[9]) the sign to determine another sign -- the interpretant -- to be related to the object as the sign is related to the object, hence the interpretant, by fulfilling its function as sign of the object, determines a further interpretant sign. The process is logically structured to perpetuate itself. From the interpretant viewpoint, every sign is an interpretant in a chain stretching both fore and aft. The relation of informational or logical determination which constrains object, sign, and interpretant is more general than the special cases of causal or physical determination. In general terms, any information about one of the items in the sign relation tells you something about the others, although the actual amount of this information may be nil in some species of sign relations. Also, when Peirce says that one thing, semiotically or otherwise, determines some other things, he means determines in some measure, a measure that is not necessarily completely deterministic.

Peirce made various classifications of his semiotic elements, especially of the sign and the interpretant. Of particular concern in understanding the sign-object-interpretant triad is this: In relation to a sign, its object and its interpretant are either immediate (present in the sign) or mediate.

  1. Sign, always immediate to itself — that is, in a tautologous sense, present in or at itself, even if it is not immediate to a mind or immediately accomplished without processing or is a general apprehended only in its instances.
  2. Object
    1. Immediate object, the object as represented in the sign.
    2. Dynamic object, the object as it really is, on which the idea which is the immediate object is "founded, as on bedrock"[10] Also called the dynamoid object, the dynamical object.
  3. Interpretant
    1. Immediate interpretant, the quality of the impression which a sign is fit to produce, not any actual reaction, and which the sign carries with it even before there is an interpreter or quasi-interpreter. It is what is ordinarily called the sign's meaning.
    2. Dynamic interpretant, the actual effect (apart from the feeling) of the sign on a mind or quasi-mind, for instance the agitation of the feeling.
    3. Final interpretant, the effect which the sign would have on any mind or quasi-mind if circumstances allowed that effect to be fully achieved. It is the sign's end or purpose. The final interpretant of one's inqury about the weather may consist in the effect which the true response would have on one's plans for the day which were the inquiry's purpose. The final interpretant of a line of investigation as such is truth and would be reached sooner or later but still inevitably by investigation adequately prolonged, though the truth remains independent of that which you or I or any finite community of investigators believe.

The immediate object is, from the viewpoint of a theorist, really a kind of sign of the dynamic object; but phenomenologically it is the object until there is reason to go beyond it, and somebody analyzing (critically but not theoretically) a given semiosis will consider the immediate object to be the object until there is reason to do otherwise.[11]

Peirce preferred phrases like dynamic object over real object since the object might be fictive — Hamlet, for instance, to whom one grants a fictive reality, a reality within the universe of discourse of the play Hamlet.[4]

Signhood is a way of being in relation, not a way of being in itself. The role of sign is constituted as one role among three — object, sign, and interpretant sign — where the roles are distinct even when the things that fill them are not. In other words, the question of what a sign is depends on the concept of a sign relation, which depends on the concept of a triadic relation. This, in turn, depends on the concept of a relation itself. There are traditionally two ways of understanding what relations are, corresponding to definition by extension and definition by intension or comprehension. Peirce regards these aspects of relation as necessary but not sufficient, and he adds a third approach, the way of information — including the idea of change of information — in order to integrate the other two approaches into a unified whole. For further discussion of Peirce's sign relations, see Sign relations.

[edit] Classes of signs

Peirce proposes several typologies and definitions of the signs. More than 76 definitions of what a sign is have been collected throughout Peirce's work.[12] Some canonical typologies can nonetheless be observed, one crucial one being the distinction between "icons", "indices" and "symbols" (CP 2.228, CP 2.229 and CP 5.473). The icon-index-symbol typology is chronologically the first but structurally the second of three that fit together as a trio of three-valued parameters in regular scheme of nine kinds of sign. (The three "parameters" (not Peirce's term) are not independent of one another, and the result is a system of ten classes of sign, which are shown further down in this article.)

Peirce's three basic phenomenological categories come into central play in these classifications. The 1-2-3 numerations used further below in the exposition of sign classes represents Peirce's associations of sign classes with the categories. The categories are as follows:

Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories[13])
Name: Typical characterizaton: As universe of experience: As quantity: Technical definition: Valence, "adicity":
Firstness. Quality of feeling. Ideas, chance, possibility. Vagueness, "some". Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a quality). Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the thing with the quality).
Secondness. Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation. Brute facts, actuality. Singularity, discreteness. Reference to a correlate (by its relate). Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate).
Thirdness. Representation. Habits, laws, necessity. Generality, continuity. Reference to an interpretant. Essentially triadic (sign, object, interpretant).

The three sign typologies depend respectively on (I) the sign itself, (II) the sign's relation to its denoted object, and (III) the sign's relation to its interpretant. The sign typologies are filled out by embodiments of each of three phenomenological categories, trios of embodiments by:

I. the sign itself: qualisign, sinsign, legisign (also called tone, token, type, and also called potisign, actisign, famisign).

II. the sign's manner of denoting the object: the sign as icon, index, symbol.

III. the manner attributed by the interpretant to the sign's denoting of the object: the sign as rheme, dicisign, argument (also called sumisign, dicisign, suadisign; also called seme, pheme, delome; and also regarded as very broadened versions of the traditional term, proposition, argument).

Every sign falls under one class or another within (I) and within (II) and within (III). Thus each of the three typologies is a three-valued parameter for every sign. The three parameters are not independent of each other; many co-classifications aren't found, for reasons pertaining to the lack of either habit-taking or singular reaction in a quality, and the lack of habit-taking in a singular reaction. The result is not 27 but instead ten classes of signs fully specified at this level of analysis.

These conceptions are specific to Peirce's theory of signs and are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the notions of "icon", "symbol", "index", "tone", "token", "type", "term", "proposition", "argument," and "rhema".

[edit] I. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign

Also called tone, token, type; and also called potisign, actisign, famisign.

This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by sign's own phenomenological category (set forth in 1903, 1904, etc.).

  1. A qualisign (also called tone, potisign, and mark) is a sign which consists in a quality of feeling, a possibility, a "First."
  2. A sinsign (also called token and actisign) is a sign which consists in a reaction/resistance, an actual singular thing, an actual occurrence or fact, a "Second."
  3. A legisign (also called type and famisign) is a sign which consists in a semiotic / logical relation, a (general) idea, a norm or law or habit, a "Third."

A replica (also called instance) of a legisign is a sign, often an actual individual one (a sinsign), which embodies that legisign. A replica is a sign for the associated legisign, and therefore is also a sign for the legisign's object. All legisigns need sinsigns as replicas, for expression. Some but not all legisigns are symbols. All symbols are legisigns. Different words with the same meaning are symbols which are replicas of that symbol which consists in their meaning but doesn't prescribe qualities of its replicas.[14]

[edit] II. Icon, index, symbol

This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by phenomenological category of its way of denoting the object (set forth in 1867 and many times in later years). This typology emphasizes the different ways in which the sign refers to its object -- the icon by a quality of its own, the index by real connection to its object, and the symbol by a habit or rule for its interpretant. The modes may be compounded, for instance, in a sign that displays a forking line iconically for a fork in the road and stands indicatively near a fork in the road.

  1. An icon (also called likeness and semblance) is a sign that denotes its object by virtue of a quality which is shared by them but which the icon has irrespectively of the object. The icon (for instance, a portrait or a diagram) resembles or imitates its object. The icon has, of itself, a certain character or aspect, one which the object also has (or is supposed to have) and which lets the icon be interpreted as a sign even if the object does not exist. The icon signifies essentially on the basis of its "ground." (Peirce defined the ground as the pure abstraction of a quality, and the sign's ground as the respect in which it resembles its object.[15])
  2. An index* is a sign that denotes its object by virtue of an actual connection involving them, one that he also calls a real relation in virtue of its being irrespective of interpretation. It is in any case a relation which is in fact, in contrast to the icon, which has only a ground for denotation of its object, and in contrast to the symbol, which denotes by an interpretive habit or law. An index which compels attention without conveying any information about its object is a pure index, though that may be an ideal limit never actually reached. If an indexical relation is a resistance or reaction physically or causally connecting an index to its object, then the index is a reagent (e.g. smoke coming from a building is a reagent index of fire). Such an index is really affected or modified by the object, and is the only kind of index which can be used in order to ascertain facts about its object. Peirce also usually held that an index does not have to be an actual individual fact or thing, but can be a general; a disease symptom is general, its occurrence singular; and he usually considered a designation to be an index, e.g., a pronoun, a proper name, a label on a diagram, etc. (In 1903 Peirce said that only an individual is an index[16], gave "seme" as an alternate expression for "index", and called designations "subindices or hyposemes,[17] which were a kind of symbol; he allowed of a "degenerate index" indicating a non-individual object, as exemplified by an individual thing indicating its own characteristics. But by 1904 he returned to allowing indices to be generals and to classing designations as indices. In 1906 he changed the meaning of "seme" to that of the earlier "sumisign" and "rheme".)
  3. A symbol* is a sign that denotes its object solely by virtue of the fact that it will be interpreted to do so. The symbol is a habit or acquired law (be it a habit of nature or a habit of convention which must be learned), a habit that lacks (or has shed) dependence on the symbolic sign's having a resemblance or real connection to the denoted object. Thus, a symbol denotes by virtue of its interpretant. Its sign-action (semeiosis) is ruled by a habit, a more or less systematic set of associations that ensures its interpretation. For Peirce, every symbol is a general, and that which we call an actual individual symbol (e.g., on the page) is called by Peirce a replica or instance of the symbol. Symbols, like all other legisigns (also called "types"), need actual, individual replicas for expression. The proposition is an example of a symbol which is irrespective of language and of any form of expression and does not prescribe qualities of its replicas.[18] The word is an example of a symbol which prescribes qualities (especially looks or sound) of its replicas.[19] Not every replica is actual and individual. Two words with the same meaning are symbols which are replicas of that symbol which consists in their shared meaning.[14] A book, a theory, a person, each is a complex symbol.

 *Note: in "On a New List of Categories" (1867) Peirce gave the unqualified term "sign" as an alternate expression for "index," and gave "general sign" as an alternate expression for "symbol." "Representamen" was his blanket technical term for any and every sign or signlike thing covered by his theory[20]. Peirce soon reserved "sign" to its broadest sense, for index, icon, and symbol alike. He also eventually decided that the symbol is not the only "general" sign and that indices and icons can be general, too. The general sign, as such, he eventually called, at various times, the "legisign" (1903, 1904), the "type" (1906, 1908), and the "famisign" (1908).

[edit] III. Rheme, dicisign, argument

Also called sumisign, dicisign, suadisign; also called seme, pheme, delome; and seen as very broadened versions of the traditional term, proposition, argument)

This is the typology of the sign as distinguished by the phenomenological category which the sign's interpretant attributes to the sign's way of denoting the object (set forth in 1902, 1903, etc.):

  1. A rheme (also called sumisign and seme*) is a sign that represents its object in respect of quality and so, in its signified interpretant, is represented as a qualisign (a kind of icon)[21], though it actually may be icon, index, or symbol. The rheme* (seme) stands as its object for some purpose.[22] A proposition with the subject places left blank is a rheme; but subject terms by themselves are also rhemes. A proposition, said Peirce, can be considered a zero-place rheme, a zero-place predicate.
  2. A dicisign (also called dicent sign and pheme ) is a sign that represents its object in respect of actual existence and so, in its signified interpretant, is represented as indexical[23], though it actually may be either index or symbol. The dicisign separately indicates its object (as subject of the predicate).[24] The dicisign "is intended to have some compulsive effect on the interpreter of it".[22] Peirce had generalized the idea of proposition to where a weathercock, photograph, etc., could be considered propositions (or "dicisigns," as he came to call them). A proposition in the conventional sense is a dicent symbol (also called symbolic dicisign) . Assertions are also dicisigns.
  3. An argument (also called suadisign and delome) is a sign that represents its object in respect of law or habit and so, in its signified interpretant, is represented as symbolic (and was indeed a symbol in the first place)[25]. The argument separately "monstrates" its signified interpretant (the argument's conclusion); an argument stripped of all signs of such monstrative relationship is, or becomes, a dicisign.[24]. A novel, a work of art, the universe, can be a delome in Peirce's terms.

 *Note: In his "Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmatism" (The Monist, vol. XVI, no. 4, Oct. 1906), Peirce uses the words "seme", "pheme", and "delome" (pp. 506, 507, etc.) for the rheme-dicisign-argument typology, but retains the word "rheme" for the predicate (p. 530) in his system of Existential Graphs. Also note that Peirce once offered "seme" as an alternate expression for "index" in 1903[16]

[edit] The three sign typologies together: ten classes of sign

The three typologies, labeled "I.", "II.", and "III.", are shown together in the table below. As parameters, they are not independent of one another. As previously said, many co-classifications aren't found, for reasons pertaining to the lack of either habit-taking or singular reaction in a quality, and the lack of habit-taking in a singular reaction. The slanting and vertical lines show the options for co-classification of a given sign (and appear in MS 339, August 7 1904, viewable here at the Lyris peirce-l archive[26]). The result is ten classes of sign.

Words in parentheses in the table are alternate names for the same kinds of signs.

Phenomenological category:

Sign is distinguished by the phenomenological
category embodied by...		 1. Quality
of feeling.
Possibility.
Reference to
a ground.		  OR  

 2. Reaction,
resistance.
Brute fact.
Reference to
a correlate.		  OR 

 3. Repre-
sentation.
Habit, law.
Reference to
an interpretant.
I. ...the SIGN ITSELF: QUALISIGN
(Tone, Potisign)		  OR  SINSIGN
(Token, Actisign)		  OR  LEGISIGN
(Type, Famisign)
AND Image:Peircelines2.PNG
II. ...the sign's way of denoting its OBJECT: ICON
(Likeness, etc.)		  OR  INDEX
(Sign*)		  OR  SYMBOL
(General sign*)
AND Image:Peircelines2.PNG
III. ...the sign's way --
as represented in the INTERPRETANT --
of denoting the sign's object:		 RHEME
(Term**,
Sumisign, Seme);		  OR  DICISIGN
(Proposition**,
Dicent sign, Pheme)		  OR  ARGUMENT
(Suadisign,
Delome)

 *Note: As noted above, in "On a New List of Categories" (1867) Peirce gave the unqualified word "sign" as an alternate expression for "index," and gave "general sign" as an alternate expression for "symbol." Peirce soon reserved "sign" to its broadest sense, for index, icon, and symbol alike, and eventually decided that symbols are not the only general signs. See note at end of section "II. Icon, index, symbol" for details.
 **Note: A term in the conventional sense is not just any rheme; it is a kind of rhematic symbol. A proposition in the conventional sense is not just any dicisign, it is a kind of dicent symbol.

Peirce's Ten Classes of Sign (from CP2.254-263 1903)
Sign's own
phenome-
nological
category		 Relation
to
object		 Relation
to
interpretant		 Specificational redundancies
in parentheses		 Some examples
(I) Qualisign Icon Rheme (Rhematic Iconic) Qualisign A feeling of “red”
(II) Sinsign Icon Rheme (Rhematic) Iconic Sinsign An individual diagram
(III) Index Rheme Rhematic Indexical Sinsign A spontaneous cry
(IV) Dicisign Dicent (Indexical) Sinsign A weathercock or photograph
(V) Legisign Icon Rheme (Rhematic) Iconic Legisign A diagram, apart from its factual individuality
(VI) Index Rheme Rhematic Indexical Legisign A demonstrative pronoun
(VII) Dicisign Dicent Indexical Legisign A street cry
(VIII) Symbol Rheme Rhematic Symbol (–ic Legisign) A common noun
(IX) Dicisign Dicent Symbol (–ic Legisign) A proposition (in the conventional sense)
(X) Argument Argument (–ative Symbolic Legisign) A syllogism
Peirce's triangular arrangement from MS 540.17
Boldface is Peirce's own and indicates non-redundant specifications. Any two adjacent cells have two aspects in common except in three cases where there is only one aspect in common (II & VI; VI & IX; and III & VIII); there the border between the adjacent cells appears extra thick.
(Roman numerals added.*)
(I)
Rhematic
Iconic
Qualisign
(V)
Rhematic
Iconic
Legisign
(VIII)
Rhematic
Symbol
Legisign
(X)
Argument
Symbolic
Legisign
(II)
Rhematic
Iconic
Sinsign
(VI)
Rhematic
Indexical
Legisign
(IX)
Dicent
Symbol
Legisign
(III)
Rhematic
Indexical
Sinsign
(VII)
Dicent
Indexical
Legisign
(IV)
Dicent
Indexical
Sinsign

*The Roman numerals appear on the manuscript but were added by an editor. [27]

[edit] Abbreviations

  • CP n.m = Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. n, paragraph m.
  • EP n, m = The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. n, page m.
  • CDPT = The Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ For Peirce's definitions of philosophy, see for instance "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", CP 1.183-186, 1903 and "Minute Logic", CP 1.239-241, 1902. Peirce's definitions of philosophy can be viewed at CDPT under Philosophy and Cenoscopy.
  2. ^ "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" (Arisbe Eprint), Journal of Speculative Philosophy vol. 2 (1868), pp. 103-114. Reprinted (CP 5.213-263, the quote is from para. 253).
  3. ^ "Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism," pp. 492-546, The Monist, vol. XVI, no. 4, Oct. 1906, see p. 523. Reprinted (CP 4.530-572; see para. 551).
  4. ^ a b A Letter to William James, EP 2, 498, 1909, viewable at CDPT under Dynamical Object
  5. ^ A Letter to William James, EP 2, 492, 1909, viewable at CDPT under "Object".
  6. ^ See pp. 404-409 in "Pragmatism", EP 2. Ten quotes on collateral observation from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here. Note: Ransdell's quotes from CP 8.178-179, are also in EP 2, 493-4, which gives their date as 1909; and his quote from CP 8.183, is also in EP 2, 495-6, which gives its date as 1909.
  7. ^ "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2, 272-3, 1903
  8. ^ A Draft of a Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Significs, p. 193, 1905
  9. ^ See "What Is Meant by 'Determined'", P 28: Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868):190-91
  10. ^ In EP 2, 407, viewable at CDPT under "Real Object"
  11. ^ See Ransdell, Joseph, "On the Use and Abuse of the Immediate/Dynamical Object Distinction]" draft 2007, Arisbe Eprint
  12. ^ See "76 Definitions of The Sign by C. S. Peirce" collected and analyzed by Robert Marty, Department of Mathematics, University of Perpignan, Perpignan, France, With an Appendix of 12 Further Definitions or Equivalents proposed by Alfred Lang, Dept of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, Arisbe Eprint.
  13. ^ "Minute Logic", CP 2.87, c.1902 and A Letter to Lady Welby, The Collected Papers, vol. 8, paragraph 329, 1904. Relevant quotes viewable at CDPT, under "Categories, Cenopythagorean Categories"
  14. ^ a b "New Elements (Kaina Stoicheia") MS 517 (1904); EP 2, 300-324, Arisbe Eprint, scroll down to /317/, then first new paragraph]
  15. ^ Cf. the Scholastic conception of a relation's foundation, Deely 1982, p. 61 (Google Books, registration appears not to be required in this case)
  16. ^ a b In 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2, 274, 1903, and viewable under "Index" at CDPT.
  17. ^ In 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2, p. 274, 1903, and viewable under "Subindex, Hyposeme" at the CDPT.
  18. ^ MS599 c.1902 "Reason's Rules," relevant quote viewable under "MS 599" in "Role of Icons In Predication", Joseph Ransdell, ed. Arisbe Eprint.
  19. ^ "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2, 274, 1903, and "Logical Tracts, No. 2", CP 4.447, c. 1903. Relevant quotes viewable at the CDPT, under "Symbol".
  20. ^ "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2, 272-3. Relevant quote viewable at CDPT, under "Representamen"
  21. ^ A Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Significs pp. 33-34, 1904, viewable at CDPT under "Rhema, Rheme".
  22. ^ a b Peirce, 1906, "Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism," pp. 506-507 in 492-546, The Monist, vol. XVI, no. 4, Oct. 1906, reprinted in CP 4.538
  23. ^ A Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Significs, pp. 33-34, 1904; also "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2, 275-276 and 292, 1903; all three quotes viewable at CDPT under "Dicent, Dicent Sign, Dicisign".
  24. ^ a b "New Elements (Kaina Stoicheia)", Manuscript 517 (1904), and EP 2, 300-324, see 308, viewable in Arisbe Eprint, scroll down to /308/
  25. ^ "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2, 296, 1903, quote viewable at CDPT under "Argument".
  26. ^ the image was provided by Bernard Morand of the Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique.
  27. ^ See peirce-l post by Anderson Vinicius Romanini (and a cached resume during server problems) "Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected)" 2006-06-16 Eprint and peirce-l post by Joseph Ransdell "Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)" 2006-06-18 Eprint. The manuscript can be viewed (and magnified by clicking on image) here at the Lyris peirce-l archive. The image was provided by Joseph Ransdell, Professor Emeritus, Philosophy, Texas Tech University.

[edit] References

  • Hardwick, C.S. (ed.), Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between C.S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, Texas Technological University Press, Lubbock, TX, 1977, 2001.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1867), "On a New List of Categories", Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 7 (1868), 287–298. Presented, 14 May 1867. Reprinted (Collected Papers, vol. 1, paragraphs 545–559), (Chronological Edition, vol. 2, pp. 49–59), (EP 1, 1–10). Arisbe Eprint.
  • Peirce, C.S. (c.1902) "Minute Logic", CP 2.1-118.
  • Peirce, C.S. (c.1902) "Reason's Rules", Manuscript 599 Eprint
  • Peirce, C.S. "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP2:
    • Peirce, C.S. (1903) "Sundry Logical Conceptions", EP2, 267-288.
    • Peirce, C.S. (1903) "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", EP2 289-299
    • Peirce, C.S. (1904) "New Elements (Kaina Stoicheia)", pp. 235–263 in Carolyn Eisele (ed.), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, Volume 4, Mathematical Philosophy. Reprinted (EP2, 300-324). Eprint.
  • Peirce, C.S. (c.1903), "Logical Tracts, No. 2", CP 4.418–509.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1904), A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.329.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1905), A Draft of a Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Significs p. 193
  • Peirce, C.S. (1906), "Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism", pp. 492-546, The Monist, vol. XVI, no. 4, Oct. 1906 (links embedded in page numbers and edition numbers are via Google Book Search, full access not yet available widely outside the USA). Reprinted (CP 4.530-572). Eprint
  • Peirce, C.S. (1931-1935, 1958), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958.
  • Peirce, C.S (1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, 4 volumes in 5, Carolyn Eisele (ed.), Mouton Publishers, The Hague, Netherlands, 1976. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1976.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1981-), Writings of Charles S. Peirce, A Chronological Edition, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1981–.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1992) The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 1 (1867–1893), Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, eds. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1998) The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913), Peirce Edition Project, eds. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
  • Ransdell, Joesph (2007 draft), "On the Use and Abuse of the Immediate/Dynamical Object Distinction", Arisbe Eprint.

[edit] Bibliography

Main article: Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography

[edit] External links

  • Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway, Joseph Ransdell (ed.)
  • The Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, Mats Bergman & Sami Paavola, eds.
  • Marty, Robert (1997), "76 Definitions of The Sign by C. S. Peirce" collected and analyzed by Robert Marty, Department of Mathematics, University of Perpignan, Perpignan, France, and "With an Appendix of 12 Further Definitions or Equivalents proposed by Alfred Lang, Dept of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, Arisbe Eprint. Marty's semiotics.

List of external links at main Peirce wiki.