Talk:Scientific method

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Note: this article has existed since the first year of the encylopedia and has had hundreds of editors with thousands of edits. Before making substantive changes to scientific method, it may be prudent to read the archives first, and to discuss objections on this talk page (at the bottom, or foot of the page). It is customary to post new topics to the foot of this talk page, so that when this page is archived, the developments in the article can be read in the archives, in time-order, from oldest to newest.

Archives

January 2003 June 2003 August 2003 November 1, 2003 November 8, 2003 February 2004 April 2004 June 2004 July 2004 November 2004 October 2005 July 2006 April 2007 January 2008

• See /Archive 14 for recent elided material.

Contents 1 The 2 This article is still a disaster 2.1 Falsificationism 3 Restructuring this article 4 False Alarm for Image:Ibn haithem portrait.jpg 5 page 136 6 Galileo 7 DNA-predictions 8 Truth and belief 9 This article is quite poor because... 10 Note for the parent 11 I invite you to a top to bottom critique of this article.

[edit] The

(Please don't archive this section: it is a resurrecting issue, and a permanent pointer to discussion is useful)

Shouldn't this article begin with a The? Has this debate already been had? Isn't it, "The Scientific method is a body of techniques..." Mathiastck 06:58, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Yes, right at the top of Archive 11, there is debate on the definite article The. --Ancheta Wis 08:17, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

Ok well I vote to include "The" next time :) Mathiastck 18:12, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

At the outset of the discussion about this issue, User:Wjbeaty pointed out some of the published current discussion in the field per WP:VER and WP:RS. He said: "Many scientists object to ... the very concept The Scientific Method, and they fight to get it removed from grade-school textbooks. Examples:

• D. Simanek, physicist
• J. Denker, physicist
• P. Bridgman, physicist
• R. Feynman, physicist
• W. McComas
• H. Baur, chemist

Experience has taught that scientific method should be viewed as a cluster of techniques or body of techniques. When diagrammed it might look something like a sunflower with an identifiable core with a bunch of petals representing various fields of science. Add or remove a few petals, and it still looks like a sunflower. Kenosis 19:23, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

[Is this the same P. Bridgman who suggested we might see revolutions such as Einstein's relativity earlier if we changed our scientific method: if we payed closer attention to the operations used in measuring (or observing) a phenomenon: if we add operational to the objective and natural requirements of a definition? Bridgman is referring, in the article above, to philosophies of science (IMO), not methodology - on which he has written books and many papers. Geologist (talk) 01:53, 2 February 2008 (UTC)]

My modest opinion: I disagree on "The". A laboratory experiment, a computer simulation, a theoretical model: all may be scientific but are far from using a unique and univocal method. One thing is to single out a body of criteria in order to define if a method of inquiry is scientific, and another is to say that there is only one such method. Also (but I might be wrong), I think there is an implicit usage in Wikipedia so as to use "The..." in reference to a book or a specific theory (e.g. "interpretation of dreams" and "The Interpretation of Dreams"). -- Typewritten 08:21, 29 September 2006 (UTC)

"Experience has taught that scientific method should be viewed as a cluster of techniques"

If this article is about a collection of methods, then the title should be Scientific methods. indil (talk) 02:18, 29 December 2007 (UTC)

A redirect already exists. I personally oppose a page move. This article is referenced by thousands of other articles already, under its current title, and is well-known under its current name. A google search shows that the current title is referenced over 4 times more frequently than the plural. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 11:04, 29 December 2007 (UTC)

This is absurd. The rhythm method isn't specific either: some people use calendars, some people count days, others guess. We still follow correct English grammar. I am WP:BRDing. MilesAgain (talk) 16:47, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

OK, I have done the R so D rather more than you did. This is not an issue of grammar as either is OK from that respect. It is a fundamental question and the balance is on not have the "The" there. --Bduke (talk) 22:18, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

I've changed it to "Scientific method refers to the body of techniques..."; perhaps this is a satisfactory solution? Andareed (talk) 23:39, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

Yes; good. MilesAgain (talk) 12:50, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

I have looked at the Richard Feynman link given above. He does not use the phrase Scientific Mathod", and far from arguing that it should be removed from grade school textbooks, he seems to be arguing strongly that it should be taught. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 08:47, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] This article is still a disaster

This article is still a disaster; I think it might be best to just re-write the entire thing rather than try and salvage it as it currently is. The observer bias section is a mess and needs to be completely tossed out on its ear, the section actually explaining the scientific method is often wrong and is confusing to read (no, Einstien DID prove Newton's theories to be wrong; saying otherwise is absolutely incorrect. Newton's equations are -nearly- correct at low velocities/masses but not -actually- correct). Ect. Titanium Dragon (talk) 21:26, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Richard Feynman pointed out that Einstein's changes made Newton philosophically wrong, rather than practically wrong. Practically speaking, we still use Newton in everyday life, and we include Einstein when it counts, such as in the synchronization of atomic clocks in the global positioning system. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 02:52, 12 January 2008 (UTC)

Titanium Dragon , if you have any books or other references written by any renowned physicists claiming that "Einstein DID prove Newton's theories to be wrong" I would be very interested in seeing it. DanielDemaret (talk) 00:50, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

In particular, repeated mention of creativity sounds like someone who doesn't have any idea whatsoever about science and the scientific method went through and worked on this article, potentially in an effort to sell something or perhaps because they simply didn't know what they were talking about. The entire point of the scientific method is to come up with a hypothesis, then come up with an experiment whose failure has the ability to disprove your hypothesis; at its core, that is what the method is all about. It doesn't give you the truth so much as it gets rid of everything that is wrong. Science cannot "prove" anything, but it can disprove things to the point where what is left is basically proven (but not absolutely so). Titanium Dragon (talk) 21:34, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Is there a source that science never proves anything? For example, does the fact that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen remain unproven? If so, in what manner? MilesAgain (talk) 11:43, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

Here is a counterexample: the discovery of oxygen, the discovery of hydrogen, the decomposition of water, first chemically, then by Faraday's laws of electrolysis, occurred in sequence from about 1750, onward, with the attendant concepts discovered first, and then their interrelation, discovered afterward. So the psychological sequence of discovery/proof, in this case, was from the bottom-up.

But the history of the discovery of the structure of DNA was from the other direction.

I imagine there are cases where discovery/proof occurred from the inside-out, and from the outside-in as well.

--Ancheta Wis (talk) 12:21, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

The elimination of error as part of scientific method was one of the contributions of Francis Bacon (1620), Novum Organum. He neglected hypothesis, however, being Lord Chancellor and not actually responsible for doing science. We still rely on guessing and brute force creation of ideas to come up with anything new, ala Linus Pauling. I am afraid that it is still true that it takes a special person to come up with something new in science, and that Francis Bacon's dictum merely shows what is not rather than what is. That was the reason for the recently deleted section on DNA-Hypotheses, to give a concrete example from one piece of science. There are many examples of the hypothesis stage in Crick and Watson's discovery of the structure of DNA, so I am hopeful that a new example from Watson and Crick can be used to restore the recently deleted section. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 02:22, 12 January 2008 (UTC)

Upon re-reading Watson's book, I believe that the hypothesis that DNA is a helix is the best example and propose that the recently deleted section be restored with the hypothesis that DNA is helical. Linus Pauling hypothesized that DNA was a triple helix, for example. (That was part of the deleted section) --Ancheta Wis (talk) 02:33, 12 January 2008 (UTC)

Francis Bacon emphasized the role of observation (step 1) and experiment (step 4) to restrain hypothesis from taking wing, as he put it, and to ground theory solidly in experiment. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 11:57, 12 January 2008 (UTC)

1. "The entire point of the scientific method is to come up with a hypothesis"

Are you saying that coming up with a story which encopmasses a potentially very large amount of data AND has a plausible causativity idea behind it does not have human creativity at its core??!

[edit] Falsificationism

"then come up with an experiment whose failure has the ability to disprove your hypothesis" This pseudo-definition is one-sidedly Popperian. First, as Lakatos convincingly showed NO EXPERIMENT can falsify a hypothesis. But even if we disagree with Lakatos, it is NOT the case that falsificationism is either agreed upon or even known by all people working within science. Claiming that the the scientific community follows, or believes to be following, a method which has falsifiability at its core is simply inaccurate. As far as I can see, teh article should say it plain and simple that there is no such a thing as an agreed method in science, and then move on to discuss different trends and philosophies that various men of science as well as observes (i.e. historians and philosophers) have discussed, followedc etc. --87.202.254.56 (talk) 14:57, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

The article should be structured logically and take into account people will come here to obtain a canon description of scientific method. Something that you will find in a text book used for education THEN go on to elaborate on the reasonning behind it and it's history. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.210.156.46 (talk) 23:21, 18 January 2008 (UTC)

Adding words such as 'purported' or 'alleged' before 'method' should not make the structure illogical. It will, however, convey a less one-sided view, which is what we want, right?.

--Dakrismeno (talk) 09:34, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

See Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words and Existential quantifier. The strongest sentence is the most useful to the reader. If something is true then it will survive skeptical scrutiny with or without 'purported' or 'alleged' before it. But even the strongest sentence takes a test to verify its usefulness. And an action will trump words. So step #4 (test) in scientific method will silence the most ardent hypothesizer, if the hypothesis is in fact wrong. But when a statement is true, day after day, our minds tend to filter it out as old news, and our minds automatically go for the exception anyway. That does not make it less true. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 12:02, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

All, some, or none are better words to qualify a statement than 'purported' or 'alleged'. Note that there is is a synonym for some, and that not all is a synonym for some or none. But the siren words many or most are synonyms for not some. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 12:25, 19 January 2008 (UTC)

Sure "The strongest sentence is the most useful to the reader", but this doesn't change the fact that the a large part of the artcile is dedicated to falsificationism (more or less directly) which is ONE view of scientific method. Making a 'strong statement' which equates falsificationism to scientific method and then placing other views under such sections as 'criticism' etc is simply wrong. --Dakrismeno (talk) 13:31, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

Dakrismeno, a citation with page number would be appropriate here; even better, a sentence of Lakatos showing how a crucial experiment does not disprove some hypothesis. From the point of view of rhetoric of science, we need clear statements of the positions, then a critique of the foundations of said positions, and rejoinders. Suzanne K. Langer (1953) in Feeling and Form, page 3, notes "The usual sign of confusion in our basic ideas on any topic is the persistence of rival doctrines, all many times refuted but not yet abandoned.". We see this to this day, such as in Aristotle's theory of gravity still propounded by living editors on Wikipedia! --Ancheta Wis (talk) 14:41, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

Extract from Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Casmbridge University Press: "All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their ‘hard core’. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus tollens at this ‘hard core’. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses’, which form a protective belt around this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these. In Newton’s programme the negative heuristic bids us to divert the modus tollens from Newton’s three laws of dynamics and his law of gravitation. This ‘core’ is ‘irrefutable’ by the methodological decision of its protagonists: anomalies must lead to changes only in the ‘protective’ belt of auxiliary, ‘observational’ hypothesis and initial conditions (Lakatos 1974:133).

"To support this contention, I shall first tell a characteristic story [..]. A physicist of the pre-Einstenian era takes Newton’s mechanics and his law of gravitation, (N), as accepted initial conditions, I, and calculates, with their help, the path of a newly discovered small planet, p. But the planet deviates from the calculated path. Does our Newtonian physicist consider that, once established, it refutes the theory N? No. He suggests that there must be a hitherto unknown planet p’ which perturbs the path of p." (Lakatos 1974:100).

This is, by the way, a parody of what lead to the discovery of Uranus. Showing that not only are data (and thus experiments) unable to falsify a theory, but also that believing in a theory despite its empirical problems is progressive. Which leads to the conclusion that “There are no such things as crucial experiments, at least not if these are meant to be experiments which instantly overthrow a research programme” (Lakatos 1974:173). --Dakrismeno (talk) 20:24, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

Dakrismeno, thank you for the quote and citation.

From the point of view of an automaton, systematically calculating the predicted values of theory N, the comparison of predicted data to actual data (observed by another automaton, say), the foundations of the theory N are immaterial. All that matters is error, the deviation of predicted data from actual data. If the errors of the automatons are known, in an error budget, accounted for in the design of these automatons, then we can safely ignore some of the error. But if there is error beyond this, then we have to examine just what is wrong with the foundation of N.

In other words, we could have Newtonian automatons, with their picture presented for consumption by the general public, but for some problems, we need a more accurate picture of the domain of study. The example would be Einstein's picture and its recalculation of Newton's elliptical orbit of Mars with a precessing perihelion of Mercury. A post-Newtonian automaton could still rely on Newton's work, but it would be tasked with the problem of calculating a correction to Newton's work.

The scientific instruments which we send into space are examples of such automatons.

If an instrument be blind to some phenomenon, then it is the job of the science teams to add additional instruments to the science package being sent, which at least look for qualitative indications of projected phenomena.

(I am actually thinking about another problem, for which I am mentally transferring the issues we discuss here, namely, the addition of an ergodic hypothesis section to the time in physics article.) --Ancheta Wis (talk) 22:50, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

I am not sure I see the relevance of this reply. The validity of a theory is decided by scientists who interpret data, regardless of who collected teh data (automatons or otherwise). The point I am trying to make is that falsificationism is NOT (necessarily) followed by scientists (i.e. Lakatos' example) and it is thus wrong to talk about falsificationism as a major part of scintific method, at least if by 'scientific method' we mean a description of what scientists actually do. If we mean it as a prescription, on the other hand, we should say so, and then face the consequences (i.e. that the thinking process which lead to the search and subsequent discovery of Uranus was an example of bad science!). Please clarify. --85.75.16.168 (talk) 14:49, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

Here is an example of a crucial experiment illustrating the divide between classical and quantum mechanics - the Stern-Gerlach experiment. According to classical theory, if a beam of silver atoms passes through a magnetic field, their magnetic moments will be spread through a continuous set of angles. But according to quantum theory, their magnetic moments will not attain continuous values, but rather will spread across a discrete set of values. In 1922, this provided an unambiguous demonstration of the validity of quantum mechanics. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 04:05, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

I disagree as to the status of the Stern-Gerlach experiment as a crucial experiment (at least synchronically speaking, which is the only methodologically meaningful option), but even if I didn't, finding a black swan is in no way detrimental to the claim that "black swans are not the norm", which was my initial point about falsificationism. Therefore my point remains: claiming that the the scientific community follows, or believes to be following, a method which has falsifiability at its core is simply inaccurate since it is NOT the case that falsificationism is either agreed upon or even known by all people working within science. Consequently, non-popperian views of scientific method ought to be included from earlier on and not confined to 'criticism' sections.

--Dakrismeno (talk) 17:32, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

From your Lakatos quote: "In Newton’s programme the negative heuristic bids us to divert the modus tollens from Newton’s three laws of dynamics and his law of gravitation." -- How does 'forbid' fit in with the re-write of gravitation? Eddington's observation at Principe island in 1919 is an overthrow, philosophically speaking, of Newton, because it fits scientific method, and catapulted Einstein to worldwide fame. How did this achievement not falsify Newton's law of gravitation, from a philosophical point of view? I have noted that we still use Newtonian mechanics, so that practically speaking, Newton's place is secure, but that philosophically speaking, Newton's attempt at a universal law of gravitation has been superseded.

The Stern-Gerlach experiment is more than a 'black swan'. It cannot be explained from a classical point of view, whereas a quantum mechanical explanation was the inspiration for a series of developments, notably the work of I.I. Rabi, which is used today, in the atomic clocks of the global positioning system. (John Rigden (1987), Rabi ISBN 0-465-06792-1 p.50: "The results from the experiment were astounding. The whole thing was a mystery. This convinced me, once and for all, that the direction of the ingenious classical mechanism was out. We had to face the fact that the quantum phenomena required a completely new orientation." --I.I. Rabi)

A categorical statement 'all swans are white' can disproven by the discovery of a 'black swan'. Before the European discovery of the existence of the platypus, an egg-laying mammal seemed impossible, like a black Australian swan. The theory was 'I have never seen a black swan before, so they cannot exist', which was as wrong as a characterization of mammals as non-egg-laying creatures. If an experiment is wrongly characterized as a crucial experiment, then an exception to the experiment does not vitiate the theory. Rather, it was not a crucial experiment in the first place. That is not the fault of the experimenter. Rather, that is a triumph for the experimenter, who has succeeded in demolishing a theory. If instead, the syllogism had been 'some swans are white' or 'some mammals can lay eggs' then the theorists would have been in the clear. But in the case of the Stern-Gerlach experiment, classical physics had nothing to say about the magnetization of the beam of silver atoms, which is why their magnetic moments were expected to be random. This statement was then countered by an experimental result, which astounded Rabi, among others. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 11:00, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

But if the rejoinder that the classical v. quantum divide is an example of a Black swan theory then I would argue that the generations of physicists who have labored to produce classical, and then also quantum theory were not deluded, but were working with the best theories they knew. If the argument is that they were ignorant of the new conditions which might give the lie to their work, I would counter that that is not their fault, but rather is a side effect of the iterative and recursive nature of scientific method, which gives rise to progress in science. Note that so far, the progress has not been a series of palace coups, but rather the building up of an enormous, integrated, interconnected series of syllogisms, which in their total has been a magnificent summary of human thought (so far).

That is what seems to be wrong about the Lakatos critique. So far, we have seen progress in science. To give the lie to the progress in science is to emphasize the minutiae rather than to realize that with each improvement or iteration, we seem to be ascending a huge mountain which lets us see more and more below us. What the progress seems to be showing is the refactoring of detail (the minutiae) in larger and larger schemes.

But, that does not ease the discomfort for the rest of us. For example, the best theoretical physicists of today currently still cannot give us testable theories for their labors. (They currently have come up with very little in predictions based on their hypotheses - Step 3 is currently looking pretty empty, so far. We currently appear to be mired in a characterization stage - Step 1.) So it apparently is the job of our current experimentalists to return the theoretical serve (Step 4), and to show us what remains to be done in physics. That does not rule out potential progress in any of the other sciences today. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 18:04, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

You are forgetting that the definition of what qualifies as a "black swan" is always and inevitably theory laden.

--Dakrismeno (talk) 18:15, 29 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Restructuring this article

I am making this new topic in conjunction with the above topic "This article is still a disaster", except with the aim of restructuring this article from the ground up instead of breaking down the current article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Vloxul (talk • contribs) 03:02, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

The facts should come first and the history lessons second since people come to this article for "scientific method" and not "the background of scientific method and associated perspectives by people with different agendas". Also the most important part of scientific method are the canon 4 steps and the reasonning behind them, this should be a repeating theme throughout the article with everything relating back to the core concepts of scientific method or not being part of the article. I am currently strongly tempted to take the liberty of moving said 4 steps to the top of the page to help those people who come to this article between now and it's restructuring.Vloxul (talk) 03:13, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

I agree in principle, but people who are looking for a brief introduction will find it in the brief introduction. Shouldn't this be where the bite-sized explanation should be? And isn't it already there? Stephen B Streater (talk) 10:00, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

Yes and yes. MilesAgain (talk) 11:39, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

I plan to archive most of this talk page, as it appears some editors have plans for work, and propose that the group be bold. If any in the group need help formulating statements or positions, the talk page can be used to construct proposed sentences, outlines, paragraphs, etc.

The archive will occur today. If you need some specific sections retained on the talk page, please note them in a reply. For the moment, I plan to retain the first section on 'The', and the last section on restructuring.

Done. Ancheta Wis (talk) 14:41, 20 January 2008 (UTC) but have moved a note up which was getting lost in the talk. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 12:13, 23 January 2008 (UTC)

Outstanding Article

How sad, I think this is a charming article. Earlier, I had reminded the author of 'scientific law' that scientists all shared a common methodology, though each has a different philosophy. Was I wrong? Had I written this article, it should have started with classification, equivalence classes, equivalence relations, model theory, &c; yet the essence of any geologist's methodology is probably covered by this article. I especially liked its range, from Arab Science in our Dark Ages to the current hoarding of data by authors. It is very pleasing to see Peirce's methods of reasoning resurrected. So, as much as this article would have differed from one by me, I prefer it. As to the above criticisms, if you people are scientists and not philosophers, you need to 'lighten up'.

Thanks regarding the addition of Peirce's methods of reasoning. User:Slrubenstein cajoled me into doing it. The Tetrast (talk) 06:37, 28 January 2008 (UTC)

Prediction is methodology; explanation is philosophy. (K. Pearson and J.S. Mill gave this a good try, though.)

Look, most seem to agree Popper was an extremist (and I disagree with most everything he wrote), and there was, to my knowledge, never a 'crucial experiment' that 'disproves' a theory (with gnashing of teeth by all) - but, there have been single experiments that did cause theories to be replaced by others. Whether Einstein makes Newton 'philosophically wrong' is getting into the philosophy of science and away from its methodology: it's a small point. Some of us who don't work on the meaning of life, the universe, &c, assign domains of application to theories. Who doesn't use Newton for everyday mechanics? The founders of classical thermodynamics used the caloric theory for most of their work, because it was simpler. Domains of application are, in fact, important in theories; they allow us to avoid logical paradoxes.

Confusing Methodology with Philosophy

My opinion is that the article is unusually good, and the adverse criticisms on this page are tiny: over-reactions to 'small stuff'. Many geologists view what they see in the field to be the product of experiments performed millions of years ago; these are trying to determine what the question was. Others view what they see as observations that lead them to experiments performed by going back to the field for more observations & measurements. Neither argues about which is right. The article was well-balanced, and captures the essence of my general methodology (though we all use certain methods more than others). Now you can dump on me. Geologist (talk) 12:18, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

Just wanted to say the first few photos are great!

Disagreement

Oh, just glanced at this opinion that proposed a rewrite: The observer bias section is a mess and needs to be completely tossed out on its ear, the section actually explaining the scientific method is often wrong and is confusing to read (no, Einstien DID prove Newton's theories to be wrong; saying otherwise is absolutely incorrect. Newton's equations are -nearly- correct at low velocities/masses but not -actually- correct). Well, I understand a little of special relativity, but never believed that. My science is founded on objective observation & measurement (which everyone agrees upon), not the absolute truth of theories. If I must design an experiment to determine which is better, then there's no experiment within the domain of Newtonian mechanics that even tells me which theory is better. Consequently, I use the simpler. (This is not parsimony, it's just laziness.)

Domains

I understand that, when two theories predict equally accurate values, one prefers that with the larger domain. (This is one criterion I use in distinguishing the physical sciences from the natural sciences.) However, as tools are refined, it may be possible to someday find that Newton's theory makes the more accurate predictions at slow speeds. Then what?

Philosophy

Personally, I don't even assume the value of a measure (value of a quantity) can be assigned using real numbers. Mathematics defines smooth curves, continuous functions; but these needn't exist in nature. We assume paths (in classical mechanics, say) are smooth only because they allow us to use mathematics. This philosophy is not only mine: read how cautious Percy Bridgman was, even with the classical laws of thermodynamics. All this, however, is merely a philosophical view that fits my temperament, and clarifies science for me. It may not for you. (It's subjective, not objective methodology that his article discusses.) I'm not upset it's not in the article; but I should be upset if it were.

Methodology

Much of the criticism of this article is of this nature. You're not criticizing objective methodology, but more subjective philosophical things. Let's skip the early scientists and move on to a thoroughly modern scientific work that everyone would consider outstanding by today's standards: the papers of Johannes Kepler. Because scientific methodology was modern by Kepler's time, shouldn't everyone who corrects factual errors in this article be able to support one's position by citing an authority in a paper written before 1650? Most anything else is more philosophy than methodology.

Confusion

Should scientific questions be experimentally verifiable or 'falsifiable'? Kepler tacitly assumed so. Which should they be? Although examples have been given, it's not yet clear to me there is a distinction. What's more important, it's not useful to our methodology that we know which is important: either will do. Assuming each correct leads to different philosophies of science, not different methodologies. Geologist (talk) 18:10, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] False Alarm for Image:Ibn haithem portrait.jpg

Thanks for uploading Image:Ibn haithem portrait.jpg. I noticed that the file's description page currently doesn't specify who created the content, so the copyright status is unclear. If you did not create this file yourself, then you will need to specify the owner of the copyright. If you obtained it from a website, then a link to the website from which it was taken, together with a restatement of that website's terms of use of its content, is usually sufficient information. However, if the copyright holder is different from the website's publisher, then their copyright should also be acknowledged.

As well as adding the source, please add a proper copyright licensing tag if the file doesn't have one already. If you created/took the picture, audio, or video then the {{GFDL-self}} tag can be used to release it under the GFDL. If you believe the media meets the criteria at Wikipedia:Fair use, use a tag such as {{non-free fair use in|article name}} or one of the other tags listed at Wikipedia:Image copyright tags#Fair use. See Wikipedia:Image copyright tags for the full list of copyright tags that you can use.

If you have uploaded other files, consider checking that you have specified their source and tagged them, too. You can find a list of files you have uploaded by following this link. Unsourced and untagged images may be deleted one week after they have been tagged, as described on criteria for speedy deletion. If the image is copyrighted under a non-free license (per Wikipedia:Fair use) then the image will be deleted 48 hours after 16:41, 31 January 2008 (UTC). If you have any questions please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you. Papa November (talk) 16:41, 31 January 2008 (UTC)

Though I didn't upload the photo, before you erase it please be aware that it's just a photo of a fresh Iraqi dinar. Is that under copyright? (All photos of it will look the same.) Geologist (talk) 01:09, 2 February 2008 (UTC)

Please treat this as a false alarm. Here is a note of clarification from Papa November:

• "The commons description page for the image seems to have been completed already and the deletion tag has been removed. Cheers Papa November (talk) 10:24, 6 February 2008 (UTC)"

--Ancheta Wis (talk) 18:22, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] page 136

The comment requesting explanation of page 136 -- this is from Sambursky's collection of scientific translations from pre-Socratic times to the twentieth century. Specifically, a selection of Alhazen' writings were translated for Sambursky's book into English from German by M. Schwarz. The German translation was made in 1882 from "Abhandlung über das Licht", J. Baarmann (ed. 1882) Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft Vol 36. And the whole citation is from p. 136 by Shmuel Sambursky (1974), Physical thought from the Presocratics to the Quantum Physicists, ISBN 0-87663-712-8. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 00:51, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Galileo

It is quite well known that Galileo was instrumental in the history of science, the scientific revolution and scientific method.

However, the history is not the topic in an introductory section on scientific method. What happens when we interject Galileo into an introduction is that we get all these interesting asides and a generally triumphal statement much like Andrew Dickson White (1896). History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. That is not the purpose of the introduction. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 18:12, 5 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] DNA-predictions

The section headed DNA-predictions previously said "When Watson and Crick hypothesized that DNA was a double helix, Francis Crick predicted that an X-ray diffraction image of DNA would show an X-shape." My understanding from The Double Helix is that they had already seen an X-shaped diffraction image before hypothesizing the double helix. The section headed DNA-experiments appears to support this - "Before proposing their model Watson and Crick had previously seen x-ray diffraction images by Rosalind Franklin, Maurice Wilkins, and Raymond Gosling." I have removed the word double. The resulting text is (probably) true, but (probably) misleading. I understand that the X-shape was already a well known consequence of a helix structure. Looking at the section just before, it would (probably) be better to say "When Watson and Crick hypothesized that DNA was a helix, Francis Crick was aware that the consequence was that an X-ray diffraction image of DNA would show an X-shape." Unfortunately, this would reduce the power of this as an example of predictionn. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 06:21, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

I'm not sure about this, but I think the X shape is the unique transformation of a double helix, not just every helix. This is why they were able to disprove Pauling's suggestion of a triple helix. okedem (talk) 07:37, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

My understanding is that Pauling's proposed structure was falsified because it was not an acid. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 07:41, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

See here: "For those familiar with diffraction photos, the X in the image clearly indicates why this photo shows a double helix..." okedem (talk) 07:45, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

You have accurately quoted the text of your source, however the later text and the diagram in that source seem to suggest that any regular helix - 1, 2 or 3 chains - produces an X-shaped image. Watson (Double Helix, page 132, Penguin edition, 1970) says of the celebrated Rosalind Franklin image: "the black cross of reflections which dominated the picture could only arise from a helical structure." Even after seeing this picture, Watson and Crick were debating whether to build a 2 or 3 chain model. Watson's argument for 2 chains was biological, not based on the X-ray crystalography. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 08:11, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

Consider this (from the NOVA website dedicated to Photo 51), specifically the section "Missing Smears". Essentially they say that the X shape is indeed indicative of any helix, but this specific one has "missing smears", which indicate a double-helix - two strands crossing each other. okedem (talk) 10:46, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

This source says "Watson immediately recognised the telltale "X"-shaped diffraction pattern of a helical structure (though he did not immediately notice the second helix). This cross pattern jumpstarted Watson's thinking about how to build a successful model of DNA." I think the word "immediately" is true but misleading. He was not an X-ray crystalographer and would not have been able to make such a connection - he certainly makes no mention of it in The Double Helix. Crick might have been able to make the connection, but AFAIK he did not see the crucial photograph until after they had constructed the double helix model. The second sentence is (probably) innacurate. According to The Double Helix, Crick and Watson had been "thinking about how to build a successful model of DNA." long before Watson saw the photo. I am not sure whether this is relevant or not, but my quick reading of Rosalind Franklin's Nature article about photo 51 (http://www.nature.com/nature/dna50/franklingosling.pdf) does not appear to contain the term double helix or two strand. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 11:17, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

From this article about Franklin's contribution, it seems Watson didn't have any idea how to interpret the X-ray pattern, except knowing that X means helix. It was Wilkins who helped him understand what it really means.

In the article you linked, Franklin discusses "co-axial molecules" along the axis, specifically two or three co-axial units, and concludes that "It therefore seems probable that there are only two co-axial molecules and that these are unequally spaced along the fibre axis" (see the second page, first column, about two-thirds down, for the beginning of that discussion). okedem (talk) 11:45, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

You're quite right about Rosalind Franklin's article; I hadn't noticed that. On the other hand, I still feel that saying Crick predicted the X shape from the double helix hypothesis is untrue. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 12:16, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

Well, it seems you're right about that, I don't think he predicted or understood the fine details of the image at first, just the helical structure. Franklin mentions Crick, Cochran and Vand predicted the general characteristics of diffraction patterns of helical structures, but doesn't mention anything about double-helix in that context. If we can access their paper (citation, also discussed in retrospect here), we can see what they were talking about there. okedem (talk) 12:39, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

This paper by Crick from 1954 might be of interest, by the way. okedem (talk) 12:42, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

The Crick paper is of interest; it is a good summary of where things stood in 1954. I have't seen the Crick, Cochran and Vand paper, but Watson talks about it in The Double Helix. It was apparently the first mathematical analysis of the expected X-ray crystolographic results from a helical structure. It presumably showed why a helical structure produced the X shape and accurately predicted measurements of the alpha-helix. It seems to be a better example of "prediction" than the double helix hypothesis, but still not perfect since there was an existing photograph of the alpha-helix that already showed the x shape for a known helical structure. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 14:08, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

It is true that the Cochran-Crick-Vand transform will not distinquish the number of strands. It took the Avery Chargaff ratios and Watson's concrete model of the nucleotides to justify the dismissal of Pauling's triple helix. What Crick's model did was to establish the dimensions of the unit cell of the helical molecule. The work could only have been completed by Crick and Watson together. That is why multiple iterations were needed to converge on the complete model. The single iteration which established a helix is what was discussed in the first sentence of the 'DNA predictions' thread. The second sentence does not follow from the first, and is part of another iteration. The 'it has not escaped our notice' clause is yet another prediction which could only have come after the iteration described by the second sentence. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 00:26, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

I don't understand what Ancheta Wis means by "The single iteration which established a helix is what was discussed in the first sentence of the 'DNA predictions' thread." The thing that established a helix was surely Rosalind Franklin's crucial x-ray diffraction image. My understanding is that by the time Watson and Crick proposed their double helix model, Watson had seen this image and Crick knew about it. The X shape in an x-ray diffraction image of at least one form of DNA wasn't a prediction in either the normal English sense of the word or in the technical Popper sense. Crick and Watson knew about the X shape and indeed some other crucial facts established by Franklin and used them to formulate their proposed structure. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 07:53, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

• 1)Characterization, iteration A: DNA is the stuff of the gene. Crick and Watson understood this, in the face of others who did not even get it, at first.
• 2)Hypothesis, iteration A: DNA is a helix.
• 3)Prediction from the Hypothesis, iteration A: If DNA is a helix, then a Cochran-Crick-Vand transform (the diffraction pattern) of DNA, ought to reveal an X shape. Thus if DNA is not a helix, then the transform ought not to be an X shape.
• 4)Test, iteration A: Watson sees photo 51, falsifying the null hypothesis that DNA is not a helix.

• 1)Characterization, iteration B: Now that DNA is shown to be a helix, what are the details? Avery Chargaff discovers the constant ratios of the base pairs, but no analytical method for proceeding exists. Impasse.
• 2)Hypothesis, iteration B: Pauling guesses a triple helix. Watson guesses a double helix from his observation that biological forms come in pairs. Watson and Crick cannot decide whether the base pairs are on the inside or the outside of the posited helix.
• 3)Prediction from the Hypothesis, iteration B: If quantum mechanics holds, then it should be possible to deduce sizes of the bonds holding the unit cell of a DNA molecule together. Watson and Crick decide to build physical models of the base pairs.
• 4)Test, iteration B: Watson notices that his cardboard models of the base pairs have analogous shapes, in the Avery Chargaff ratios, which suggest how to hold the strands of a double helix together.

• 1)Characterization, iteration C: Now that DNA is shown to be a double helix, Watson and Crick show off their model to Franklin, who immediately agrees on the validity of the model
• 3)Prediction, iteration C: "it has not escaped our notice that the double helix suggests a copying mechanism ... etc etc."

The DNA example illustrates that scientific method unifies the horse-race of ideas by multiple researchers, who are vying for priority. Watson's Double Helix memoir illustrates this quite dramatically. What I call iteration A refers to the 'single iteration which established a helix'. Franklin's photo alone does not establish the structure of the model; she vehemently opposed the structure at first. It took the combination of all four steps. Watson demonstrably did not know about the X shape of the B form until he saw photo 51, when his jaw dropped and his pulse raced. They saw other photos but not that one. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 12:16, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

How about the following? (I'm not sure where it would go!) (Other comments to follow)

"The hypothesis that DNA had a helical structure implied the prediction that it would produce an x shaped X-ray diffraction pattern. This followed from the work of Cochran, Crick and Vand who had provided a mathematical basis for the empirical observation that helical structures produce x shapes. This hypothesis as to the structure of DNA was confirmed by Franklin's photo 51."

Rjm at sleepers (talk) 14:25, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

Rjm at sleepers correctly points out that I mean Chargaff's ratio's, not Avery's ratios. Thank you. What covered up Chargaff in my memory was Chargaff's admission that he did not understand the significance of his discovery, and Avery is the one who triggered Chargaff (as documented in H.F. Judson Eighth Day of Creation) --Ancheta Wis (talk) 15:19, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

Rjm, I have no objection to your proposed edit. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 20:36, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

My edit differs slightly from the above. I thought it was worth mentioning that Watson and Crick supported the helical hypothesis. Also, the confirmation by Franklin's photo 51 is already in the article. Rjm at sleepers (talk) 05:53, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

I think the wording "Also in their first paper, Watson and Crick predicted that the double helix structure that they discovered would prove important in biology, writing "It has not escaped our notice that the specific pairing we have postulated immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material"" needs to be worked on. I believe there is little doubt that Watson and Crick had in mind the idea that each of the strands of DNA would act as a template for creation of a new second strand during cell division. They chose not to include any specifics in their Nature article. The quoted sentence was a peg in the ground to allow them to claim priority. They did make a prediction, but the Nature article only makes an allusion to what this prediction is. Most of their readers would have guessed what they meant and they were probably more open in their presentations. This is a much more specific (and falsifiable) prediction than that the structure "would prove important in biology". Rjm at sleepers (talk) 06:12, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

The sentence "The control is very important." sticks out to me. While the control may very well be important, it sounds very opinionated, just throwing my two cents out there, thanks --FallingDarkness (talk) 18:46, 22 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Truth and belief

Ok, i'm no regular on wikipedia but i was reading through this article out of personal interest and the above section really makes no sense to me. It may be a widely held example illustrating the value-ladeness and theory-ladeness but popularity doesn't make it any better at illustrating a point - with or without pretty graphics of horses. If i painted a hedge into Géricaults painting of Epsom... i think we would have something far from flying horses. But then i'm not a horse specialist either. I'm just saying that, having also flicked through the archives, i think the article either needs a better example of what it is trying to illustrate... or it needs to get rid of of the philosophy of science all together. JJ Effix (talk) 11:40, 25 April 2008 (UTC)

I think it is only an example of observer bias. Theory-ladenness is something quite different. As I understand it, theory-ladenness is the idea, credited to Popper that all observation statements are made against a background of theories and assumptions. If an observer looks at a stick of chalk and says “here is some chalk”, we assume they know what the visible properties of chalk are in form, texture and so on. These assumptions could of course be wrong and what they are in fact observing is some other mineral with similar visible properties to chalk.

Observer bias doesn’t strike me as being deeply philosophical. If I were to make a change it would only be to the heading and use ‘Observer bias’ instead --ChrisSteinbach (talk) 14:22, 25 April 2008 (UTC)

JJ Effix, the 'flying horse' example comes from Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China. The sample picture I found is from England, but Needham was using the 'flying horse' as an example for Chinese science (or lack of it in the past). So incorrect observation is worldwide, as shown by the contrast between a believed situation (a flying horse) and the truth (a stop-action picture which shows how a horse really does gallop). It's not just a philosophical point. That is the reason for the Alhacen quote. Scientists pursue truth. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 01:51, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

Reproducibility is another avenue to truth. If something is really hard to see, then repeated trials can help our understanding. That is how Galileo arrived at the law of falling bodies. He repeated an experiment hundreds of times: he timed how long it took for a ball to roll down a ramp, hundreds of times, and the measurements came out the same. Thus Galileo discovered an invariant (9.8 meters per second per second, the acceleration of gravity at the surface of the earth). Galileo had to polish the ramp to make it very smooth, and lined it with parchment to make the process as frictionless as possible. He also had to select as round a ball as he could find, again to eliminate a source of error in his measurement.

Isaac Newton eventually abandoned his studies in alchemy because they were irreproducible (Richard Westfall Never At Rest ISBN 0-521-27435-4 p.530) even after 30 years of toil. Centuries later, we finally have a materials science.

And in sciences where time is not an option, we have to search sample spaces, as in geology and astronomy, as well as sales and marketing.

The experimental control is another technique for dealing with observational error. This technique uses the contrast between multiple samples (or observations) under differing conditions, to see what varies or what remains the same. We vary the conditions for each measurement, to help isolate what has changed. Mill's canons can then help us figure out what the important factor is. Factor analysis is one technique for discovering the important factor in an effect.

Ludwik Fleck writes about the fate of observations in his Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935) p. 29 of the English translation (1976, ISBN 0-226-25325-2): "Take an example from everyday life. At a time when sexuality was equivalent to uncleanliness and naiveté to purity, naive children were thought to be asexual. How amusing it is that sexuality could not be recognized in them! Everyone has the experience of having himself been a child and now lives not entirely isolated from children. Yet it took psychoanalysts to discover children's sexuality.". Of course, if someone doesn't 'get it', then no amount of trials can transmit the point across. Scientific method allows a 'division of labor' so that we don't all have to be observational geniuses to survive, hopefully.

And of course, observation is only a part of scientific method, which is for discovering new truths: "Discovery consists in seeing what everyone else has seen and thinking what no one else has thought." --Albert Szent-Gyorgyi.

--Ancheta Wis (talk) 10:48, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] This article is quite poor because...

It seems to divulge in criticism of the scientific method too much. Kuhn and Feyerabend are critics of the scientific method that the public love to latch on to. It is not fair on the young readers that in an article on scientific method, it is first explained, and then dismissed. Example: the peer review process does actually allow new ideas and theories in, and there is no conspiracy of "orthodox science" whatever that means. Its a disappointing article, with critics given more credance than actual scientists or people like Karl Popper. If you loosen the definition of science in this way it opens the door to scams we see on infocomercials and Oprah; because the public are confused and cynical about "orthodox science". Psychmajor902 (talk) 17:12, 27 April 2008 (UTC)

Criticism of scientific method does not necessarily entail an anti-science stance. If it did then Popper would have been dubbed an enemy of science along with Kuhn and Feyerabend. I understand you are suggesting that Popper was not a critic of scientific method? Could I have understood correctly?

A recent book "Kuhn vs. Popper" by Steve Fuller explains how characterizations of Popper as the conservative and Kuhn as the liberal are fundamentally flawed. If that is the case, might it change what you think about Kuhn?

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Kuhn "gained his master's degree in physics in 1946, and his doctorate in 1949, also in physics (concerning an application of quantum mechanics to solid state physics)". And in 1957 Feyerabend "gave a paper on the quantum theory of measurement to the Colston Research Symposium at the University of Bristol". If we can agree that Kuhn and Feyerabend were not entirely untutored, does that lend any credence to their writings? --ChrisSteinbach (talk) 20:44, 27 April 2008 (UTC)

Psychmajor902, how is your reasoning valid? Since science is arguably the most successful enterprise of human civilization, how can its method be less successful than it already is? By the editorial policy of the encyclopedia, NPOV demands criticism, even of successes such as scientific method. Would criticism make scientific method any less valid? No, it would not. Those who choose not to use scientific method can of course do so. Those who choose to learn how to use such methods can profit by its use. Technology rests on the accomplishments of science, and we use technology every day, including on this encyclopedia. If on the other hand, this article brooked no dissent, we would then see the spectacle of someone making scientific method mandatory. That would be entirely inappropriate method, as free unfettered thought is the hallmark of scientific method. The submission of unfettered thought to experimental test (step 4) is what makes it successful, not criticism of this thought. I would argue that the reverse is true: The mere fact that everything in scientific method is provisional and subject to revision shows that making scientific method mandatory would subvert the intention of scientific method itself. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 22:48, 27 April 2008 (UTC)

Well, criticism that suggests the success of science should not be attributed to method would endanger the validity of scientific method (see for example Feyerabend). That is still not an argument for removal from the article. Either the criticism is warranted, in which case an emissary of truth is obliged to acknowledge it. Or it is erroneous, and can be argued against. Mills' On Liberty, a classic text regarding the freedom of speech, goes into some depth to explain how the truth is undermined by the suppression of opposing views. --ChrisSteinbach (talk) 06:35, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

Chris, thank you. As you point out, success is a utilitarian concept. Now suppose something is so successful that it crowds out all competition; what is lost? If we were to use the analogy of the monoculture of a farm or forest, the smallest antithetical has potential for wiping out all the supposed gains of the monoculture. Norman Borlaug has recently written that new strains of wheat rust threaten his green revolution of the 1970s, which has global implication. I wonder how much of the recent rise in the price of rice worldwide might also be due in part to new diseases. There are gene banks which attempt to preserve diversity ... and the encyclopedia article is open to additional critics who will hopefully point out weaknesses. ... --Ancheta Wis (talk) 11:03, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

Re-reading this I note that a mature forest is not a monoculture. Rather it supports a climax ecosystem, which is a mix of species. And as time progresses and things change, the ecosystem itself evolves. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 11:22, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

I think I understand what you are getting at. Science in all its diversity is not a monoculture and for this reason we can be confident that even if scientific method were discredited, science would continue to flourish. The only potential problems would be a) the loss of nifty heuristic, and b) a definitional problem for those who define science in terms of scientific method. I’m aware as I say this that discrediting scientific method is, depending on how you understand it, anything from a completely nonsensical notion to an event that has already taken place. --ChrisSteinbach (talk) 13:29, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

While we are in the mood for analogies, here’s another one that may or may not be fitting. Traditional rain-dances are superstitious. If a tribe were to stop rain-dancing, that would not have any impact on rainfall. Likewise a defunct scientific method might not be an impediment to scientific progress. Hmm…this sounds vaguely confrontational now that I see it in writing. I guess my point is that science is not threatened by methodological disagreements. --ChrisSteinbach (talk) 14:44, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Note for the parent

I have just reverted a good faith edit by an anonymous poster. Science projects and recipes for getting a good grade defeat scientific method, which requires that the contributor take on the risk of being wrong (step 4 = test). If there is no risk, then there is no reward; it is just an exercise which might as well be performed by a robot. ChrisSteinbach's comment in the paragraph above, about the rain dance applies here as well. The issue is "what is the unknown?" If there is no unknown, then scientific method is not needed. But when something goes wrong, that is the perfect place to start using scientific method, because we then have a chance to learn something. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 00:22, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

For a kid, with ambition in science, Step 1 is probably the hardest. The task for a mom and dad is to allow their kid to nurture their questions. For example, Einstein was given the freedom to wonder what would it be like to ride on a beam of light?, rather than worry "will I get an F?". And he did get failing grades.

1. Use your experience: Consider the problem and try to make sense of it. Look for previous explanations. If this is a new problem to you, then move to step 2.

2. Form a conjecture: When nothing else is yet known, try to state an explanation, to someone else, or to your notebook. If a kid does not have the habit of writing a journal, this could be a start. Step 2 is the guessing stage, which is the easy part, because step 3 will easily weed out the bad guesses. When a guess survives all the Step 3 challenges as the kid can issue, then the experiments of step 4 can be planned out. Parents can help out here, within the limits of ethics.

3. Deduce a prediction from that explanation: If you assume 2 is true, what consequences follow? Here is where parents can help out. Kids can ask each other, as well as parents, as this part requires imagination. And there is a large gap between steps 3 and 4. If a kid can visualize the result of an explanation, they will have demonstrated independent thinking, because this step is subjective. This is also the step which shows whether a kid understands step 1 or not.

4. Test : Look for the opposite of each consequence in order to disprove 2. It is a logical error to seek 3 directly as proof of 2. This error is called affirming the consequent. This is the part where science project kits and recipes fail. They fall into the logical error of calling something "true for the wrong reason". This is also the part where a professional scientist must work the hardest, not to fool oneself.

--Ancheta Wis (talk) 01:56, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] I invite you to a top to bottom critique of this article.

The first sentence is wrong.

"Scientific method refers to the body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge."

If there was a technique that was illogical but intended to acquire new knowledge it would be pseudoscientific because it has no logical basis, thus the basis for what is considered a scientific method must be the logic behind it and not the intentions of the author. Therefore scientific method refers to methods which provide scientific proof.Doctor Correct (talk) 16:10, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

So Alhacen was pursuing his question: "what is the path of a beam of light?" and he found an answer. He certainly was investigating phenomena, and he was clarifying knowledge, probably more precisely than most men did up to his time. How is this illogical? --Ancheta Wis (talk) 02:13, 29 May 2008 (UTC)

Sorry but for the sake of keeping things organised I believe we must address problems one at a time, I deleted the image and some text from this discussion because it filled up too much space. You can post it again when we are discussing Alhacen. Do you agree that the first sentence ought to be changed? If so what do you believe it should be changed to. Doctor Correct (talk) 04:51, 29 May 2008 (UTC)

The first sentence is a lead for the article. It is correct because the criterion you seek needs to include experience (the basis for step 1) and imagination (the basis for step 2), which are as important as logic (the basis for step 3) in scientific method. The proof step you seek is in step 4 - experiment. And that is the reason for the Alhacen statements in the article, which is the entire article in a nutshell. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 10:58, 29 May 2008 (UTC)