Talk:Science of Logic
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article is within the scope of the WikiProject Philosophy, which collaborates on articles related to philosophy. To participate, you can edit this article or visit the project page for more details. | |
| Stub | This article has been rated as Stub-Class on the quality scale. | |
| ??? | This article has not yet received an importance rating on the importance scale. | |
why is it that logic is a Science?
Because, according to Hegel, science is the rationally organized form of knowledge. Jeremy J. Shapiro 08:29, 10 September 2005 (UTC)
It's also important to remember that at this time so many things were considered sciences, things that have since lost this classification in English usage and academia (eg painting). A good deal of this changed in the 20th century, especially with philosophy of science. In German academia, however, philosophy still holds "science"-like status under the umbrella of Geisteswissenschaft--here, recognize the familiar Geist and then Wissenschaft, the German word for science. But, to think of that as the science of Geist requires thinking of science in a non-standard way, distinct from, say, physics. Much the same applies here with Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, his "Science" of Logic. --Tedpennings 10:58, 10 August 2006 (UTC)
[edit] "Since for Hegel all of reality is ultimately rational"
"Since for Hegel all of reality is ultimately rational"
It is evident that the author of the article is complately ignorant about the Hegelian connection between "rationality" and "actuality". I would like to quote from "Shorter Logic" to prevent any confusion:
"In the Preface to my Philosophy of Right, p. xxvii, are found the propositions:
What is reasonable is actual and What is actual is reasonable.
These simple statements have given rise to expressions of surprise and hostility, even in quarters where it would be reckoned an insult to presume absence of philosophy, and still more of religion. Religion at least need not be brought in evidence; its doctrines of the divine governments of the world affirm these propositions too decidedly. For their philosophic sense, we must presuppose intelligence enough to know, not only that God is actual, that He is the supreme actuality, that He alone is truly actual; but also, as regards the logical bearings of the question, that existence is in part mere appearance, and only in part actuality. In common life, any freak of fancy, any error, evil and everything of the nature of evil, as well as every degenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way the name of actuality. But even our ordinary feelings are enough to forbid a casual (fortuitous) existence getting the emphatic name of an actual; for by fortuitous we mean an existence which has no greater value than that of something possible, which may as well not be as be. As for the term Actuality, these critics would have done well to consider the sense in which I employ it. In a detailed Logic I had treated among other things of actuality, and accurately distinguished it not only from the fortuitous, which, after all, has existence, but even from the cognate categories of existence and the other modifications of being.
The actuality of the rational stands opposed by the popular fancy that Ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and philosophy a mere system of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the very different fancy that Ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have actuality, or something too impotent to procure it for themselves. This divorce between idea and reality is especially dear to the analytic understanding which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams though they are, as something true and real, and prides itself on the imperative ‘ought’, which it takes especial pleasure in prescribing even on the field of politics. As if the world had waited on it to learn how it ought to be, and was not! For, if it were as it ought to be, what would come of the precocious wisdom of that ‘ought’? When understanding turns this ‘ought’ against trivial external and transitory objects, against social regulations or conditions, which very likely possess a great relative importance for a certain time and special circles, it may often be right. In such a case the intelligent observer may meet much that fails to satisfy the general requirements of right; for who is not acute enough to see a great deal in his own surroundings which is really far from being as it ought to be? But such acuteness is mistaken in the conceit that, when it examines these objects and pronounces what they ought to be, it is dealing with questions of philosophic science. The object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea is not so impotent as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist without actually existing. The object of philosophy is an actuality of which those objects, social regulations and conditions, are only the superficial outside."
Hegel; Shorter Logic; Introduction: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/
Mehmet Çagatay
I believe that this is highly pompous of Cagatay. He has quoted two long paragraphs in response to a single sentence and has not gone on to draw his point from it. This is quite pretentious, and one wonders whether Cagatay actually has the ability to do so. Moreover, while the sentence in question is certainly a little truncated, and hence perhaps not quite accurate, or ambiguously so, considering that the article is only a stub the author's use of words is not entirely off the mark. There is no reason to assume that the author is completely ignorant. Moreover the author correctly draws out the most important thing about the Logic, that it is a derivation of the categories (in response to Kant) as inhering in being itself, and that it is thus an ontological work as well as an epistemological one. In so far as this is the author's point in the stub as a whole, I believe that the author is largely right. However, if they would care to expand the article, that would be welcome.
