Schneider v. New Jersey
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Schneider v. State of New Jersey | ||||||||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States | ||||||||||||
Argued October 13 – 16, 1939 Decided November 22, 1939 |
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Holding | ||||||||||||
The Court held that the purpose of the ordinances (to keep the streets clean and of good appearance) was insufficient to justify prohibiting defendants from handing out literature to other persons willing to receive it. | ||||||||||||
Court membership | ||||||||||||
Chief Justice: Charles Evans Hughes Associate Justices: James Clark McReynolds, Louis Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Harlan Fiske Stone, Owen Josephus Roberts, Hugo Black, Stanley Forman Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas |
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Case opinions | ||||||||||||
Majority by: Roberts Joined by: Charles Evans Hughes, James Clark McReynolds, Harlan Fiske Stone, Hugo Black, Stanley Forman Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas |
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Laws applied | ||||||||||||
U.S. Const. amend. XIV |
Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), was a United States Supreme Court decision that combined four similar appeals, each of which presented the question whether regulations embodied in municipal ordinances abridged the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
The appellants were charged with a violation of a local ordinance that barred persons from distributing handbills on public streets or handing them out door-to-door.
In 1939, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the purpose of the ordinances to keep the streets clean and of good appearance was insufficient to justify prohibiting defendants from handing out literature to other persons willing to receive it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution resulted from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press. Concerning the distribution of materials from house to house without a permit, the ordinance was void.
This right is not absolute, however. Municipalities may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets, for the purpose of keeping them open and available for movement of people and property, so long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech or the distribution of literature.