Sameur Abdenour

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Sameur Abdenour
Born: March 28, 1973(1973-03-28)
Algiers, Algeria
Detained at: Guantanamo
Alias(s): Abdenour Sameur
ID number: 659
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Sameur Abdenour is a citizen of Algeria, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] Abdenour's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 659. The Department of Defense reports that he was born on March 28, 1973, in Algiers, Algeria.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 659 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

[edit] Background

Captive 659 is an Algerian, who had political asylum in the United Kingdom, who had traveled to Afghanistan in 2001, and who faced serious allegations. He denied the allegations, acknowledged lying about attending military training in Afghanistan, but claimed he had only done so because his interrogators had withheld medical treatment until he confessed.

The record shows that captive 659 is one of a small number of Guantanamo captives who attended his CSR Tribunal and both his first and second annual Review Boards.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[12][13] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[14]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunal to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdenour Sameur's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 9 September 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a Taliban fighter and associated with al Qaeda:
  1. The detainee left Algeria in 1999 enroute to England via Tunisia and Italy.
  2. Prior to departing Algeria, the detainee received military and weapons training.
  3. While in England, the detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan through associates at Finsbury Park Mosque, a known extremist mosque.
  4. The detainee believes in the Taliban ideology, and liked the idea that they were in charge.
  5. The detainee received AK-47 training at Al Farouq during the summer of 2001.
  6. Detainee admits to being told that something would happen to the United States approximately one week before the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  7. The detainee was in Kandahar Afghanistan when the attacks of 11 September 2001 occurred.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee fled to Tora Bora after 11 September 2001.

[edit] Transcript

Abdenour chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[15] In response to a court order the Department of Defense was forced to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request, and publish captives' transcripts. On March 3, 2006 the Department of Defense published a fifteen page summarized transcript from captive 659's Tribunal.

[edit] Confusion

His transcript starts with captive 659 expressing confusion over the Tribunal process. He shows confusion over the process through-out the transcript.

[edit] Testimony

Captive 659 says all the allegations are false.

Captive 659 says he was captured by bounty hunters, who sold him to the Americans.

Captive 659 said he was living normally in Britain, “just like anyone else”. He didn’t live near the Finsbury Park Mosque. But he acknowledged going there for some of his prayers, and frequenting its general area, because there was an enclave of Algerian shops and stores in that neighbourhood. He knew other Algerian expatriates from his visits to that neighbourhood. He acknowledged that some of the Algerian expatriates he met in Britain helped him travel to Afghanistan.

He lived in Afghanistan for four months before he fled the war, and traveled to Pakistan, where he was captured. He asked his Tribunal whether he could have joined the Taliban, or al Qaeda since he was only in Afghanistan for four months.

Captive 659’s Tribunal’s President asked him if he wanted to respond to the allegations against him. He replied that by denying that he was a member of al Qaeda or the Taliban he had responded to the allegations. So the allegations against Captive 659 are not recorded in his transcript.

Captive 659’s Personal Representative asked a few more questions, so the transcript records, that Captive 659 was living in Jalalabad, and when it fell, he fled with some other Arabs, with their families through the Tora Bora region. Captive 659, and the other Arabs, were put aboard a bus, which they were told was taking them to their embassies. But, instead, they were sold to the Americans.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[16]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sameur Abdenour's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 29 August 2005.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee fought in Bosnia in 1995.
  2. The detainee traveled from Tunisia to the United Kingdom via Italy, passing through Rome, Naples, and Sicily.
  3. In the summer of 2001, the detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he stayed at an Algerian guesthouse.
  4. The detainee traveled from London, United Kingdom to Islamabad, Pakistan and then was escorted to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  5. The detainee volunteered to go see the Al Farouq camp. While visiting Al Farouq, attempts were made to recruit the detainee and other visitors.
  6. Upon hearing that the Taliban were fleeing, detainee set out with about 150 others toward the mountains of the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders.
b. Training
  1. The detainee received weapons training during his time in the military.
  2. While at the Algerian guesthouse the detainee was trained on small arms.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee traveled to the United Kingdom. There he became involved with other Algerians.
  2. While at the Finsbury Park Mosque, four individuals attempted to recruit the detainee to go to Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee gave money to the Finsbury Park Mosque. He later found out that part of the money went to fund individuals going to Afghanistan and other areas of the world where jihad was being fought.
  4. The detainee was eventually told that he "needed to go to Afghanistan".
  5. The detainee socialized with four men at the Algerian house. Two died in the bombing of Afghanistan and two died at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee was intentionally deceptive during questioning.
  2. The detainee has recounted the details of his travel from Algeria to Italy, including his purchase of a fake identification.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. In 1992, the detainee served in the military. The detainee deserted the Algerian military.
  2. The detainee deserted the Algerian military because of bad food and poor treatment. He also resented being sent to the front lines to fight mujahedin. He disliked fighting mujahedin.
  3. The detainee acknowledged having been told that something would happen to the United States within one week of the September 11h attacks.
  4. The detainee, at a later time, when asked to discuss his time at Al Farouq, stated it was "one of the lies". He had never been to Al Farouq.
  5. The detainee is a strong supporter of the Al-Jibhat Al-Islamia Al-Inqatha [sic] , everywhere referred to as the Islamic Liberation Front (ILF). Though not a member himself, the detainee supports the group. He loves the ILF because of its opposition to the Algerian government, which is largely corrupt.
  6. The detainee fled to cross the border into Pakistan, but was captured by the Pakistani Army.
  7. As he and others were transported from the scene of arrest, there was a bus accident. The detainee escaped, but was recaptured.
  8. The detainee denied ever having been to Bosnia. He admitted saying this in the past and that it was a lie.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee does not like the Algerian government as it has become corrupt, with mafia style leadership.
b.

The detainee left Algeria because he hated the country. He denied going to fight jihad and denied being a member of al Qaida.
c.

The detainee knows nothing of Usama Bin Laden or any ties between ILF and the al Qaida and Taliban.
d.

The detainee denies knowledge of any rumors of plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
e.

The detainee has stated that if the "United States is killing innocent civilians like we are told, that is not right, but if they are just fighting with the Taliban and other armed groups, I do not have a problem because I am not part of any of it.
f.

The detainee does not feel that the United States is a threat to Islam as a religion, just to groups that use Islam as a reason to fight against the United States. He does not agree with using religion as a reason to fight because that is not what Islam is about.
g.

The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprising at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

[edit] Transcript

Captive 659 chose to participate in his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.[17] In response to a court order the Department of Defense was forced to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request, and release captives' transcripts. In the spring of 2006 the Department of Defense published an eighteen page summarized transcript from captive 659's first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdenour Sameur's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 17 May 2006.[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee met Nourdine at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, England. Nourdine showed the detainee videos of the jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya, and convinced the detainee to go to Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee paid for his own ticket to Afghanistan with money he received from his brother.
  3. The detainee gave Nourdine approximately 600 British Pounds, and Nourdine made the detainee's travel arrangements and bought his airline ticket. The detainee traveled alone on a direct flight from England to Pakistan.
  4. Finsbury Park Mosque's Nourdine is a well-known Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching [sic] (GSPC) recruiter who handled large number of Mujahedin transiting to Afghanistan.
  5. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat [sic] (GSPC) is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced they had killed a Yemeni al Qaida operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside Algeria.
  6. The detainee left London for Afghanistan in the summer of 2001.
  7. In Pakistan the detainee was asked if he wanted to train in Afghanistan or go directly to Chechnya, and he decided to train in Afghanistan.
  8. The detainee landed in Islamabad, Pakistan and met a man at an ice cream shop. The man took the detainee to the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  9. The detainee stated he spent approximately five months at the Algerian guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and was assigned a Kalashnikov rifle (AK-47) while there.
  10. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistand and stayed at the Arab House.
  11. While at the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee volunteered to go see the al Farouq training camp because he was interested. The purpose of the camp was to train Mujahedin for jihad in Algerian and Chechnya.
b. Training
  1. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov [sic] and the Makarov handgun in the Algerian military.
  2. The detainee attended the al Farouq Camp in the summer of 2001, but could not recall the specific months that he attended training. The detainee was at al Farouq Camp approximately 14 days, and received limited training on firing the Kalashnikov rifle.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. Another person at the Finsbury Park Mosque also told the detainee that he needed to go to Afghanistan.
  2. This other person is a well-known Finsbury Park facilitator reported to be in custody in the United Kingdom.
  3. The detainee's Finsbury Park recruiter, Nourdine, arrived at the guest house during the detainee's al Farouq training. Nourdine died in the group's retreat to Tora Bora.
  4. The detainee admitted that he was a member of the Algerian resistance group al-Jibhat al-Islamiat lil-Inqath [sic] , meaning the Islamid Liberation Front (ILF).
  5. The detainee claims the Islamic Liberation Front only fights within Algeria, not against the United States.
  6. The detainee gave money to the Finsbury Park Mosque that helped fund individuals going to Afghanistan and other areas of the world where Jihad was being fought.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee returned to the Algerian House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Upon hearing that the Taliban was fleeing, the detainee fled with about 150 others towards the mountains of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.
  2. The detainee said opposition forces blocked them on the road. The detainee was ordered to put down his weapon, but he refused.
  3. While crossing the border the detainee engaged in a battle with Pakistani forces. He was shot in the legs, captured, and spent about four months in several hospitals, before being sent to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee acknowledged having been told that something would happen to the United States within one week of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  5. The detainee said it was his right to lie.
  6. The detainee denied ever firing his weapon at a person while he was in Afghanistan. He stated he would carry his weapon when he left the guest house for protection.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that he never went to al Farouq Camp, and that this information was provided to interrogators so that he could obtain medical attention for his legs.
b.

The detainee claims that he never attended any training camps, never bought against the Northern Alliance or the United States, and never carried a weapon.
c.

The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan with pure intentions to study the Koran and help the Afghan people.
d.

The detainee does not know where he wants to live when he leaves prison. He does not want to fight jihad. The detainee wants to get married and have a family and a job.
e.

The detainee denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
f.

The detainee says he is not a terrorist and has never done anything wrong.
g.

The detainee swears that he did not come to Afghanistan to train. He just wants to return to England, work and save some money, and then return to Algeria. The detainee says he did not talk to anyone about the Islamic Liberation Front while in Afghanistan.
h.

The detainee knows nothing of Usama bin Laden or any ties between the Islamic Liberation Front and al Qaida or the Taliban.
i.

The detainee emphatically denied ever having been to Bosnia.

[edit] Transcript

Captive 659 chose to participate in his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing.[18] In response to a court order the Department of Defense was forced to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request, and release captives' transcripts. In September 2007 the Department of Defense published a twenty page summarized transcript from captive 659's second annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Testimony

Captive 659 acknowledged traveling from England to Afghanistan, via Pakistan, in 2001. He denied attending any training camps, or having any contact with terrorists.

Captive 659 wanted to point out that he was in the United Kingdom legally, that he had legal residency there because he had been granted political asylum.

Captive 659 explained that he had traveled to Afghanistan because he had never tried to live a proper Islamic life. In the United Kingdom there were temptations like bars, drugs, women, and he had indulged in all of them. Even in Algeria there had been temptations.

Captive 659 acknowledged that he had been wounded, but it had not been during a firefight crossing the border. He and other Arabs had been invited to board buses that they were told were taking them to their embassies, to arrange travel back to their home countries. However some of the other Arabs spoke Urdu, and overheard the Pakistanis talking about selling them to the Americans in return for a bounty. Some Arabs took over his bus. He fled with the other Arabs, and this was when he was shot.

Captive 659 acknowledged that he had lied to his interrogators. He explained that he had been forced to lie, because the truth didn't satisfy them. He told his Board that it was routine for interrogators to arrange for medical treatment to be withheld from wounded captives when they weren't getting the answers they wanted.

Captive 659 acknowledged lying about attending the al Farouq training camp. Captive 659 mocked the idea that he had advance knowledge of the attacks of September 11, 2001, when he didn't even know any al Qaeda members.

Captive 659 denied being a member of Al-Jibhat Al-Islamia Al-Inqatha. He said he was too young to be interested in this group when he still lived in Algeria.

[edit] Release negotiation

On August 7, 2007 the United Kingdom government requested the release of Sameur Abdenour and four other men who had been legal British residents without being British citizens.[19] The UK government warned that the negotiations might take months.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ a b OARDEC (9 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Sameur, Abdenour pages 24-25. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-05.
  3. ^ a b OARDEC (17 May 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of pages 1-4. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-05.
  4. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  5. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  6. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index of Transcripts and Certain Documents from ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  7. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  8. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Transcripts and Certain Documents from Administrative Review Boards Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  10. ^ a b OARDEC (29 August 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Abdenour, Sameur pages 82-84. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-05.
  11. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  12. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  13. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  14. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  15. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 38-52. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-05.
  16. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  17. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 659 pages 28-45. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-04.
  18. ^ OARDEC (26 May 2006). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 659 pages 1-20. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-05.
  19. ^ David Stringer. "UK asks US to release 5 from Guantanamo", Houston Chronicle, August 7, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-08-07.