Said Ibrahim Ramzi Al Zahrani

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Said Ibrahim Ramzi Al Zahrani is a citizen of Saudi Arabia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 204. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1981, in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.

[edit] Identity

Captive 204 was identified inconsistently of official Department of Defense documents:

• Captive 204 was identified as Said Ibrahim Ramzil Al-Zahran on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 September 2004.^[2]
• Captive 204 was identified as Said Ibrahim Ramzi Al Zahrani on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board, on 14 October 2005, and on five official lists of captives' names.^{[3][1][4][5][6][7]}
• Captive 204 was identified as Sadi Lbrahim Ramzi Al-Zahrani on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board, on 8 June 2006.^[8]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[9][10] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[11]

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Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Said Ibrahim Ramzil Al-Zahran's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 September 2004.^[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban.

1. The detainee is a Saudi Arabian citizen who traveled to Afghanistan to train at the al-Farouq camp and fight against the Northern Alliance.
2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Saudi Arabia; to Jeddah; to Karachi, Pakistan; and finally to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee attended training on the Kalishnikov ^[sic] and Beeka ^[sic] rifles, tactical combat training, trench digging, field tactics, and physical exercise while at the al-Farouq camp sometime prior to 11 September 2001.
4. The detainee stated that while he was at the al-Farouq camp mosque, Usama Bin Laden spoke about the Jihad and lectured on the three followers of Mohammed.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.

1. The detainee was transported to the front line, in an area called Karabagh, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was issued a Kalishnikov ^[sic] rifle, four magazines, and two hand grenades at the front line and was placed in a bunker facing the Northern Alliance positions.
3. The detainee stated that during the winter ^[sic] , he was on the front line and the United States air strikes began and they were expecting United States paratroopers.
4. The detainee stated that he and others were attacked by the Northern Alliance, which prompted them to retreat to Konduz, Afghanistan.
5. The detainee was captured by Dostum's Northern Alliance forces and taken to Mazar-E Sharif ^[sic] .
6. The detainee was at the Mazar-E Sharif prison during the riot.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 2004 participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[12]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Said Ibrahim Ramzi Al Zahrani's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 14 October 2005.^[7] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Around 25 April 2001, the detainee decided on his own to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance.
2. The detainee left Saudi Arabia with about four thousand five hundred Riyals. He got the address, phone numbers and points of contacts from a guy in Taif, Saudi Arabia by the name of al Sufaira.
3. The detainee flew from Taif through Jeddah to Qatar, then on to Karachi, Pakistan. He then traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee said that he resided in a Taliban House named Daftar Taliban while he stayed in Quetta.
4. The detainee said that from Quetta he was taken to Kandahar in a small car (taxi). He advised that he completed the entire trip alone.
5. In early 2001, the detainee and another individual traveled to Manama, Bahrain, where Customs Officers temporarily detained them.
6. The Bahraini customs officer confiscated a videotape of a speech from Usama bin Laden calling for a jihad and an Arabic booklet entitled "An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Ministerial Appointments." This letter criticized the Saudi Regime.
7. The detainee spent two days at the Muaz house in Kabul and then took a truck to the front lines. He was given a Kalashnikov with four magazines and two hand grenades. The detainee then was sent to a bunker facing the Northern Alliance in a position called the Bilal Position.
8. The Bilal unit is part of the 55th Arab Brigade.
9. The al Qaida Force, or 55th Arab Brigade, is Usama bin Laden's primary formation supporting Taliban objectives. Information indicates that the ideology of those in the 55th Arab Brigade includes willingness to give their lives for tactical objectives as declared by Usama bin Laden and the Taliban.
10. The detainee's name appears on a translation of a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
11. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts found on computer media recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi.

b. Training

1. The detainee said he went to al Farouq Camp for one month then on the Kabul. He did not finish the training because he just wanted to leave.
2. The detainee said that while at the al Farouq Camp he trained for only a short period of time because every time he started to train he would get sick and have to stop. He related that he only trained at the al Farouq Camp for a total of two to three weeks.
3. The detainee said that he received no explosives training. He advised that he was at the camp for three to four weeks. He trained on the Kalashnikov, RPG and learned tactical skills and sign language.
4. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan ^[sic] .

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said that Bin Laden spoke at the al Farouq Camp mosque while he was there.
2. The detainee claims that he has met Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, at an unknown mosque located at an unidentified training camp.
3. On the front lines, the detainee was placed with an individual named Hassan Al Ashmawi (possibily a Saudi) who was responsible for distributing the troops around the area.
4. Hassan Al Ashmawi's name appears on a list of al Qaida martyrs and those who are missing from Mazar-e-Sharif; Jangi Fort ^[sic] .

d. Other Relevant Data

1. While at al Farouq training camp, the detainee says he received an injection for treatment of nerves, shaking and fainting spells. He does not know the name of the illness and cannot recall the type of medication.
2. When the U.S. air strikes started, the detainee and approximately 130 Arabs surrendered to Dostom of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance took them into custody and brought them to the castle (Mazar-e-Sharif).
3. At Mazar-e-Sharif, the detainee was shot in the leg. He could not get away because he was tied up.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he has no intention of ever joining a jihad that is outside of Saudi Arabia.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sadi Lbrahim Ramzi Al-Zahrani's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 8 June 2006.^[8] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] Repatriation

A Saudi name "Saad al-Zahrani" was repatriated on July 16, 2007 with fifteen other men.^[13][14]

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} list of prisoners, US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (21 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 20-21. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-14.
3. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
4. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
5. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
6. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
7. ^ ^{a b} 14 October 2005 OARDEC (14 October 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of pages 53-55. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-09.
8. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (8 June 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al-Zahrani, Sadi Lbrahim Ramzi Al-Zahrani pages 17-20. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-14.
9. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
10. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
11. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
12. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
13. ^ Raid Qusti. "More Gitmo Detainees Come Home", Arab News, July 17, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-07-17. 
14. ^ Andy Worthington. "Who are the 16 Saudis Released From Guantánamo?", Huffington Post, July 18, 2007.