Talk:Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda/Archive 8

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Contents

A New Rewrite

First, a word of thanks to Mr. Billion who actually gave me some examples of where he saw bias. I have gladly removed the reference to VP Cheney. I actually thought his side of the aisle would want it in, so I'm happy to take that out. Regarding his request for a citation, while I could find many articles on the subject. I could not find the exact source I had in mind when I wrote those words. I have removed that comment as well. Regarding the comment that I could not prove any debate about the issue, I have decided to include more information about the CIA assessment and included a discussion of the debate by one of the participants, the Deputy Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis in the Counter Terrorism Center. I have also included the fact that Mylroie’s book was influential among top officials in the Bush Administration. I do so to highlight the fact the book is important from an historical perspective. This is the reason the Bush Administration looked to Iraq first as a possible cause of the 9/11 attacks.

CSTAR provided some valuable advice on his Talk page about how to move this discussion forward. He said:

The best course of action is to take his version and putit in the talk page or somewhere else such as in your directory. To reinforce your case, use the footnote facility ( [1] ) to comment on each one of RonCram's additions you have some issue with. Avoid using words such as "right wing" etc. As far as Laurie Mylroie I think she has been generally discredited, but it's not clear that his sources can all be traced back to her.

Regarding Mylroie, CSTAR also said he believe the discussion of Mylroie should stay in the article for the historical reason I mention.

PS I'm just beginning to read this, so I'm making one brief comment without having read much else. I think it should be stated in the article that the inclusion of her name is for historical reasons. She is clearly an important figure in this story. However, the article should not give the impression that somehow her analysis has much credibility currently. --CSTAR 18:21, 25 June 2006 (UTC)

I now submit for your review - the latest rewrite:

Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda

In the lead up to the Iraq War, U.S. president George W. Bush alleged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda might work together to launch terrorist attacks on the United States[1], basing the administration's rationale for war, in part, on this allegation and others. Critics of the Bush Administration have claimed Bush was intentionally building a case for war with Iraq without regard to the facts.

Evidence of high-level contacts between Saddam and al-Qaeda raises two questions:

1. Did the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda have a cooperative relationship?

2. Did Saddam Hussein's government support the attacks on 9/11?

There are several views regarding the relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda:

  • The intelligence community (CIA, NSA, DIA, etc) view, as seen in the 9/11 Commission Report and the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq, answers these questions "No" and "No." According to this view, the difference in ideology between Saddam and al-Qaeda would make cooperation in any terrorist attacks very unlikely, although could happen in extremis, that is if Saddam believed he was to be invaded by the US. The Senate Report, however, recognizes the possibility of some cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda in the area of training and offers of safe-haven.
  • The Bush administration view, as defined by the Colin Powell speech before the UN, answers the questions "Maybe" and "No." Powell presented several credible intelligence reports vetted by the Intelligence Community showing contacts between Iraq's Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda. Powell pointed out that Saddam had already supported Islamic Jihad, a radical Islamist group and there is no reason for him not to support al-Qaeda. Powell discussed concerns Saddam may provide al-Qaeda will chemical or biological weapons.
  • A minority view held by some intelligence analysts answers the questions "Yes" and "No." According to this view Saddam and al-Qaeda had an on-again, off-again cooperative relationship and were willing to use the other for their own purposes. This view does not claim Saddam supported the 9/11 attacks but believes that possibility should continue to be investigated.
  • The "false flag" view of Laurie Mylroie answers the questions "Yes" and "Yes." Very few people share Mylroie's view but her book on the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center was very influential among several top Bush Administration officials. Mylroie claims Saddam used a "false flag" to attack the US on 9/11 and blame al-Qaeda for it.

For a full timeline of possible contacts, see Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda timeline.

Why this subject is controversial

This subject is hotly debated in part because gathering and analyzing intelligence is a difficult business. Nations and terrorists sometimes run “false flag” operations in which they act in a way to lay blame to another country or group. At other times, detainees and defectors will intentionally provide intelligence agencies with false statements and faked documents. Sometimes these people change their story and it is difficult to know which story is true, if either. The entire question of the “level of certainty” of intelligence reports and assessments is a difficult business.

Former CIA Director Robert Gates makes the point by saying:

"If the stakes and the consequences are small, you're going to want ninety-per-cent assurance. It's a risk calculus. On the other hand, if your worry is along the lines of what Rumsfeld is saying—another major attack on the U.S., possibly with biological or chemical weapons—and you look at the consequences of September 11th, then the equation of risk changes. You have to be prepared to go forward with a lot lower level of confidence in the evidence you have. A fifty-per-cent chance of such an attack happening is so terrible that it changes the calculation of risk." [2]

Another event adding controversy to the subject was the leaking of a classified memo written by Doug Feith to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during its review of Pre-war Intelligence. The contents of the memo were published in a ‘’Weekly Standard’’ article. [3] Feith’s view of the relationship between Saddam and Osama differed from the official view of the Intelligence Community and engendered a great deal of ill will between intelligence analysts and the Bush Administration.

The issue is also controversial because some Intelligence Community analysts have charged the Bush Administration with “cherry-picking” the intelligence to support a predetermined decision to invade Iraq. [4] The majority view of the Intelligence Community was that no working relationship existed between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Public statements by officials of the Bush Administration appear to disagree with the majority view.

The majority view: No working relationship existed

The 2004 Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq reviewed intelligence investigating Saddam's attitude towards Islamic extremism and reported that analysts had found "that he generally viewed Islamic extremism, including the school of Islam known as Wahhabism, as a threat to his regime, noting that he had executed extremists from both the Sunni and Shi’a sects to disrupt their organizations. ...The CIA also provided a HUMINT report [excised] that indicated the regime sought to prevent Iraqi youth from joining al-Qaida." (PDF)

The dislike was mutual. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Osama bin Laden offered to defend Saudi Arabia by sending "jihadist" warriors from Afghanistan to repel Saddam's forces. After the Gulf War, bin Laden continued to criticize Saddam's Ba'ath regime, emphasizing that Saddam could not be trusted.” Bin Laden told his biographer that "the land of the Arab world, the land is like a mother, and Saddam Hussein is fucking his mother."[5]

Many of the intelligence reports about the link between Saddam and al-Qaeda came by way of the Iraqi National Congress, a group of Iraqis supported by U.S. government in the effort to foment a revolt against Saddam. "The [INC's] intelligence isn't reliable at all," said Vincent Cannistraro, a former senior CIA official and counterterrorism expert. "Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the Defense Department what they want to hear. And much of it is used to support Chalabi's own presidential ambitions. They make no distinction between intelligence and propaganda, using alleged informants and defectors who say what Chalabi wants them to say, [creating] cooked information that goes right into presidential and vice-presidential speeches." (Dreyfuss, December 2002).

Robert Pape's exhaustive study of suicide terrorism found that "al-Qaeda's transnational suicide terrorists have come overwhelmingly from America's closest allies in the Muslim world and not at all from the Muslim regimes that the U.S. State Department considers 'state sponsors of terrorism'." [2] Pape notes that no al-Qaeda suicide attackers came from Iraq.

Daniel Byman's study of state sponsorship of terrorism similarly did not list Iraq as a significant state sponsor, and called the al-Qaeda connection "a rationale that before the war was strained and after it seems an ever-weaker reed." [3]

Members of Saddam’s government did have contacts with al-Qaeda over the years; however, many of the links are not considered by experts and analysts as convincing evidence of a collaborative relationship. Former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke writes, "[t]he simple fact is that lots of people, particularly in the Middle East, pass along many rumors and they end up being recorded and filed by U.S. intelligence agencies in raw reports. That does not make them 'intelligence'. Intelligence involves analysis of raw reports, not merely their enumeration or weighing them by the pound. Analysis, in turn, involves finding independent means of corroborating the reports. Did al-Qaeda agents ever talk to Iraqi agents? I would be startled if they had not. I would also be startled if American, Israeli, Iranian, British, or Jordanian agents had somehow failed to talk to al-Qaeda or Iraqi agents. Talking to each other is what intelligence agents do, often under assumed identities or 'false flags,' looking for information or possible defectors." [4]

Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, told Voice of America that "Saddam Hussein had his agenda and al-Qaida had its agenda, and those two agendas were incompatible. And so if there was any contact between them, it was a contact that was rebuffed rather than a contact that led to meaningful relationships between them."[6]

The prewar CIA testimony was that there was evidence of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a decade involving Iraq providing al-Qaida with various kinds of training-combat, bomb-making, and [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] CBRN, but that they had no credible information that Baghdad had foreknowledge of the 11 September attacks or any other al-Qaeda strike.[7][8]. The CIA's report on Iraq's ties to terrorism noted in September 2002 that the CIA did not have "credible intelligence reporting" of operational collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda.

A training camp in Salman Pak, south of Baghdad, was claimed by a number of defectors to have been used to train international terrorists (assumed to be al-Qaeda members) in hijacking techniques using a real airplane as a prop. The defectors were inconsistent about a number of details. The camp has been discovered by U.S. Marines, but intelligence analysts do not believe it was used by al-Qaeda. Some believe it was actually used for counterterrorism training, while others believe it was used to train foreign terrorists but not al-Qaeda members.

According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the CIA reported that "al-Qaida, including Bin Ladin personally, and Saddam were leery of close cooperation," but that the "mutual antipathy of the two would not prevent tactical, limited cooperation." (p. 338) The majority view of the Intelligence Community is that although members of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence service may have met with al-Qaeda terrorists over the last decade or so, that there was no evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda were linked operationally.[9]

The Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq reviewed several CIA intelligence products that touched on this issue, including Saddam’s past use of terrorism and the likelihood Saddam would provide terrorists with weapons capability: The CIA stated Saddam’s past use of terrorism, include:

• Attempted terrorist attacks during the 1991 war using Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) operatives and Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) operatives

• Terrorist attempts in Manila and Jakarta were conducted by IIS operatives

• IIS continued to case targets for attacks in the event of war

Regarding Iraqi weapons, the CIA was most concerned about Iraq’s interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In the CIA assessment Iraqi Support for Terrorism, the CIA noted that UAVs could be used by terrorists to deliver chemical weapons. There was no specific information that Iraq planned to give these weapons to terrorists, but the possibility presented grave consequences. (Page 343-345 of Senate Report)

The CIA determined the following possible outcomes:

• Saddam could use any or all three (Iraqi Intelligence Service, Palestinian terrorists or al-Qaeda) to strike the U.S.

• Saddam was most likely to use IIS

• Saddam could turn to surrogates (Palestinian terrorists or al-Qaeda) if he wanted deniability

• Saddam might decide that only an organization like al-Qaeda would have the worldwide reach to meet his requirements (Page 342-343 of Senate Report)

The conclusions of the Senate Report are reprinted below and hint at an operational relationship including training al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq in the handling and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. One of the sources for the CIA's claim that Iraq had trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisonous gases included the now recanted claims of captured al-Qaeda leader Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. The CIA has since recalled and reissued all its intelligence reporting about al-Libi’s recanted claims.[10] Likewise, the DIA communicated to President Bush in February 2002 its stance that al-Libi "was intentionally misleading his debriefers."[11]

The Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq published the following conclusions:

Conclusion 91. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups and with the Mujahidin e-Khalq was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups, such as Hizballah and Hamas, and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war. (Page 345)
Conclusion 92. The CIA's examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question. (Page 345)
Conclusion 93. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship. (Page 346)
Conclusion 94. The CIA reasonably and objectively assessed in Iraqi Support for Terrorism that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons. (Page 346)
Conclusion 95. The CIA’s assessment on safehaven — that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control — was reasonable. (Page 347)
Conclusion 96. The CIA's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise. (Page 347)
Conclusion 97. The CIA's judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach — al-Qaida — to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks. (Page 348)(PDF)

In short, the majority view of the Intelligence Community holds that a relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda is unlikely because Saddam was a secular leader who would not trust an Islamic radical like Osama bin Laden. In addition, Osama expressed hostility to Saddam's regime, intelligence reports from the Iraqi National Congress had been discredited and the paucity of evidence for a formal relationship did not convince most analysts that a cooperative working relationship existed.

Powell’s statement before UN Security Council

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council to explain the case for war with Iraq. [12] Powell said Iraq and al-Qaeda were connected through Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Powell described Zarqawi and his followers as “al-Qaida affiliates” who were “based in Baghdad” and “operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.” Powell stated:

“We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go.”

According to Powell, Zarqawi was only one link between Saddam and al-Qaeda. Powell also stated:

“Going back to the early and mid-1990s, when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an Al Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that Al Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early Al Qaida ties were forged by secret, high-level intelligence service contacts with Al Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with Al Qaida.”

Regarding Saddam’s support for Islamist terror organizations, Powell said:

“Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and Al Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought…And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999, and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.”

Regarding the possibility Saddam may give chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda, Powell told the story of a senior al-Qaeda detainee:

“He says that a militant known as Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.”

When the Senate Report published its review of pre-war intelligence, it also published two conclusions regarding Powell's speech:

Conclusion 103. The information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency for the terrorism portion of Secretary Powell’s speech was carefully vetted by both terrorism and regional analysts.
Conclusion 104. None of the portrayals of the intelligence reporting included in Secretary Powell’s speech differed in any significant way from earlier assessments published by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Page 369 of Senate Report) (PDF)

The minority view: Saddam and al-Qaeda had a working relationship

Before the invasion

Critics of the official view have noted that Saddam has been a long-time supporter of terrorism. Some of the analysts known to have disagreed with the Intelligence Community view include a Deputy Director of CTC, a DIA analyst (both mentioned in the Senate Report) and Michael Scheuer in his 2002 book In Our Enemies' Eyes.

News account in magazines and television support the view Saddam supported many terrorists. Saddam is known to have financially supported Palestinian terrorist groups. Early in 2002, Saddam told Faroq al-Kaddoumi, head of the Palestinian political office, he would raise the sum granted to each family of Palestinians who die in the uprising against Israel to $25,000 instead of $10,000.[13] Prior to 2000, televised news reports discussed Saddam’s links to terrorists, including Carlos the Jackal, Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas and Osama bin Laden.[14]

Contrary to the conventional wisdom at the CIA, Saddam had supported Islamist groups. The Deputy Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis in the Counter Terrorism Center told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence a little about the debate inside the CIA:

’’…when we started this we had a backdrop that was pretty solid on saying Saddam is willing to deal with bad guys and has been doing it for a long time. And he has an intelligence service that has targeted us in the past. We had some information about support for Islamist groups connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. I think this is significant because I do believe there is a worthwhile debate to have on the ideology of Saddam, but I would also say, coming at this from an aggressive terrorist perspective, we did have a baseline to tell us that he had tried to work on relationship with groups we would identify as Islamist…” (Page 344 of Senate Report)

One indication of cooperation between Saddam and Osama was the dual-use facility known as Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory located in Sudan, the country where Osama bin Laden was living. The Clinton Administration believed the facility was the site of chemical weapons development jointly operated by Sudan, Iraq and al-Qaeda. President Clinton ordered Operation Infinite Reach which destroyed the plant August 20, 1998.

In December 1998, President Clinton ordered Operation Desert Fox, a four day bombing attack on targets inside Iraq. Shortly after Operation Desert Fox, a number of news reports came out around the world giving details of the new working relationship between Saddam and Osama:

• "Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Ladin have sealed a pact." - Corriere Della Sera (Milan) - December 28, 1998.

• "…several western diplomatic and security sources which have good relations with Sudan, warned in secret reports they sent at the end of [1998] that Iraq, Sudan, and bin Laden were cooperating and coordinating in field of chemical weapons" at several facilities. - Al-Watan Al-Arabi (Paris) – January 1, 1999

• "President Saddam Hussein, whose country was subjected to a four-day air strike, will look for support in taking revenge on the United States and Britain by cooperating with Saudi oppositionist Osama bin Laden, whom the United States considers to be the most wanted person in the world." - Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London)

The Weekly Standard reported:

’’The London-based Al-Majallah added even more details. According to the Saudi-backed publication, "scores of Iraqi military intelligence men . . . arrived in Afghan territory in December." Also in December, "the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad held a series of meetings between an Iraqi security official and the leaders of a number of Pakistani fundamentalist movements and elements from the Taleban, with the knowledge of Pakistani military intelligence." The purpose of such meetings was to whip up support for Saddam in his confrontation with the U.S. and Britain.’’[15]

Critics of the official view say the Intelligence Community has not properly investigated these news reports. The 9/11 Commission Report did not discuss these accounts and the Senate Report only mentioned the Milan news story of the “pact” because it was mentioned in the Feith memo.

The pact was independently cited by U.S. attorney Patrick Fitzgerald in an indictment against Osama bin Laden that was unsealed on November 4, 1998, weeks before the Milan newspaper published its story. Referring to the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan,[16] Fitzgerald wrote: "Al-Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al-Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al-Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq." (Page 128)[17]

Critics of the official position have also noted that the 9/11 Commission Report did not discuss Saddam's relationship with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a known al-Qaeda associate. [18] Nor did the Commission discuss Saddam's financial support for Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri reported in U.S. News and World Report and FOX News. [19] [20]

After the 2003 invasion

Since the invasion, the government has had an opportunity to seize and study documents and to question detainees. Many of the seized documents, called ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom documents' have not been fully translated. The documents are being released on the internet to recruit Arabic translators from around the world to help translate them. The Pentagon has cautioned it has made “no determination regarding the authenticity of the documents, validity or factual accuracy.” [21]

Just prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003, Saddam is said to have reached out to al-Qaeda again to establish a terrorist style of warfare against the U.S. Hudayfa Azzam, the son of bin Laden's longtime mentor Abdullah Azzam, has said Saddam Hussein welcomed young al Qaeda members "with open arms" before the war, that they "entered Iraq in large numbers, setting up an organization to confront the occupation," and that the regime "strictly and directly" controlled their activities. [22]

Documentary evidence exists that Saddam encouraged and recruited terrorists from within his own military to strike U.S. interests. Operation Iraqi Freedom document BIAP 2003-000654 was translated by Joseph Shahda and generated an article in the Weekly Standard. [23] The document is a memo from the commander of an Iraqi Air Force base requesting a list of "the names of those who desire to volunteer for Suicide Mission to liberate Palestine and to strike American Interests." [www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1610012/posts?page=301,48]

A U.S. government "Summary of Evidence" described an Iraqi infantryman as a sworn member of al-Qaeda and the Taliban detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It does not say how the infantryman came to join al-Qaeda or if he did so at the urging of Saddam’s regime, but it does say this: "In August 1998, the detainee traveled to Pakistan with a member of Iraqi Intelligence for the purpose of blowing up the Pakistan, United States and British embassies with chemical mortars." [24]

Recent findings such as these showing a cooperative relationship between Iraqi Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda have persuaded 9/11 Commission member Bob Kerrey the 9/11 Commission underestimated the cooperative working relationhsip.[25]

Was Saddam involved in 9/11?

On 21 September 2001, President Bush received a classified Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB), indicating the U.S. intelligence community had no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11th attacks. Furthermore, there was scant evidence of any collaborative relationship between the Iraqi leader and al-Qaeda. [26] This was also the conclusion of various U.S. government agencies that investigated the issue, including the CIA, DIA, FBI, and NSA. The Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq also reviewed the intelligence community's conclusions and found that they were justifiable.

Most of the evidence regarding a possible relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda does not relate to the attacks of 9/11. However, some disputed evidence does exist tying one of the 9/11 attackers to Iraqi intelligence. In addition, Dr. Laurie Mylroie has published two books on the subject and supplied expert testimony in a U.S. District Court which convinced the judge that Iraq played a role in the 9/11 attacks.

Atta in Prague

In the days following 9/11, a picture was published of Mohamed Atta, one of the leaders of the attacks. Officials of the Czech Republic immediately identified Atta as the man who met Ahmad Samir al-Ani, the consull at the Iraqi Embassy, at a café in Prague. This story was immediately disputed. As it stands today, certain Czech officials still believe Atta is the man who met al-Ani and was deported from the country. [27] But U.S. officials doubt the accuracy of the story. [28]

In the final analysis, the 9/11 Commission Report makes this statement (Page 229): "These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January and would in July when he took his next overseas trip)." [29]

Foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks?

On July 21, 2001, the state-run Iraqi newspaper Al-Nasiriya published an opinion piece written by Naeem Abd Muhalhal. This piece praised Osama bin Laden and includes the following, which James Woolsey has interpreted (in testimony before Judge Baer) as a "vague" foreshadowing of the 9/11 attacks: bin Laden "continues to smile and still thinks seriously, with the seriousness of the Bedouin of the desert about the way he will try to bomb the Pentagon after he destroys the White House." The opinion piece also reads that “Bin Ladin is insisting very convincingly that he will strike America on the arm that is already hurting.” On the floor of the Senate, Senator Ernest Hollings interpreted this as foreknowledge, saying: “In other words, the World Trade Towers. Here, over a year ahead of time in the open press in Iraq, they are writing that this man is planning not only to bomb the White House, but where they are already hurting, the World Trade Towers.” Senator Hollings read the opinion piece into the U.S. Congressional Record. [30]

Dr. Laurie Mylroie

In 2000, Dr. Laurie Mylroie published a book titled “Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein's War Against America.” The book developed the thesis that Saddam Hussein was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Mylroie claims the 1991 Gulf War never ended for Saddam. Shortly after 9/11, Mylroie issued a revised version of the book with a foreward by former Director of the CIA James Woolsey. The book is said to have had a strong influence on certain members of the Bush Administration.

Mylroie wrote a second book titled “Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror.” Mylroie’s thesis is that officials at CIA and the U.S. State Department systematically discredited vital intelligence about the threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The book documents the “massive intelligence failures” that led to 9/11.

The mastermind of the 1993 bombing was Ramzi Yousef. The mastermind of the 9/11 attacks was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The official view of the Intelligence Community is that.Mohammed is the uncle of Yousef. Mylroie rejects that concept and identifies both men as agents of the Iraqi Intelligence Service traveling under false passports. While Mylroie investigations have persuaded several terrorism experts, she has not persuaded the Intelligence Community to modify its view. The debate between the two camps has been heated. [31].

U.S. District Court finds Saddam and Osama jointly responsible for 9/11

Dr. Mylroie and James Woolsey provided expert testimony in a case brought to U.S. District Court of Judge Harold Baer. The plaintiffs were the family of victims of the 9/11 attacks that sued Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden for the wrongful death of their family members. Judge Baer ruled in part that the plaintiffs had "shown, albeit barely ... that Iraq provided material support to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda." [32]

Please make any comments you wish in the article using the method CSTAR described above. RonCram 19:23, 24 June 2006 (UTC)

Ron's revision

Looks basically the same to me as the previous version of Ron's rewrite. Far too POV, distorts the facts completely, and heavily weighs the issue towards legitimizing claims that have been completely rejected by every investigative body on earth that has looked at this question objectively, including the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, State Dept, 9/11 Commission, and SSCI. So I would vote against it. I don't mind some of these issues being mentioned, but, again, not in such a manner heavily weighted toward making a case that has been soundly rejected by the mainstream media, all intelligence organizations that have examined it, and even the Bush Administration. I've also made several specific arguments against this version - I believe I counted 16 major arguments before - none of which have been adequately addressed by Ron.--csloat 11:18, 25 June 2006 (UTC)

Sloat, you have not provided any sources for your arguments against my rewrite, so it is impossible to provide a response to every specific argument you raise. You have not raised any objections to any of the sources I quote. You are not willing to admit that a serious debate existed, and still exists, inside the Intelligence Community. You are not willing to admit that the minority view is gaining ground in this debate and winning converts like former Democrat Senator and 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerry. I have removed the portions Mr. Billion found as POV. If there are other statements that are not well supported by the facts, I am willing to look at those as well. The current version is both far too POV (the rewrite is much closer to the goal of NPOV) and almost unreadable. If you are serious about your 16 major arguments, then follow CSTAR's advice and "use the footnote facility ( [5] ) to comment on each one of RonCram's additions you have some issue with." If you really think the facts are distorted, then show where they are distorted. Or if you think something needs a source, put a fact tag on it. I want this article to be helpful to readers. The current version is not accurate. RonCram 13:50, 25 June 2006 (UTC)
Ron, the sources are all in the timeline and very easy to find. I made clear where each one was when you pressed for specifics above, so please do not continue with that red herring. I raised specific objections to each of your arguments above and I do not see why I should have to repeat these points now. I do admit that a debate existed, and it has been settled by every investigation of the issue. The Kerrey issue has been dealt with above, but if you think he is so important then I will not object to having a sentence about him. The current version is far more NPOV than your version Ron, this much is quite obvious. There is nothing "unreadable" about it, although we are agreed that the timeline is too long and that the main arguments there should be summarized -- I proposed above how it should be summarized in a very long post which you basically ignored other than pressing for "sources" that are already available. I have already made my 16 arguments and I really don't have time to re=state them as footnotes - if you are serious about using that format, start with the suggestions I made above and include your footnotes there. I think you are just using this tactic to avoid the issues. When I get back to the US I will have more time to engage in this more; but at the moment, what I will say is that you are flat out wrong that the current version is "not accurate" -- too long perhaps, but you have yet to identify what is "inaccurate" about it. You are just trying to shift the debate to an extreme POV version of this page.--csloat 19:08, 25 June 2006 (UTC)
Sloat, you have not provided any links. Pointing to a page to say I can find the link there is not helpful. There are many links on the page and I cannot find any support for your points from the links I have read. I have provided links and you know full well that doing so is standard practice. If you want any respect or credibility on wikipedia, you need to cooperate with other editors and provide links when they are requested. On to the next point: a debate existed and is still ongoing as can be clearly seen by the fact Bob Kerrey has just switched sides. My goal is to shift the POV of this version to something much more NPOV. Anyone who is not willing to admit they debate is ongoing, and is not willing to admit that OIF documents are converting people like Bob Kerrey, is not in a position to say what is NPOV. You are too strongly emotional about this issue to deal with it on a factual basis. As proof of my comment, I point to your unwillingness to provide links for your obviously erroneous comments above. RonCram 01:31, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
I provided links on the timeline Ron, I really don't see the need to do it again if you're not even willing to read the page you claim is in urgent need of massive overhaul. How many times are you going to mention Bob Kerrey? Is it because he's the only example of someone you can find who thinks the way you do? You say your goal is "to shift the POV of the article" -- that much is quite obvious to all -- but then you say "to something much more NPOV," yet you have not presented a single argument as to what is not NPOV about this article! You say "the debate is ongoing" -- that claim is already reflected in the article as it is, Ron. You say the OIF documents are converting "people" -- by "people," of course, you mean "Bob Kerrey," based on one vague comment where Mr. Kerrey never even points to a single document that changed his mind, and never really says he changed his mind anyway! But that's irrelevant -- your point is already made in the article; we do not need a massive overhaul to make the point! You bring up my "unwillingness to provide links" -- I provided them Ron! The Salman pak article is here and the links to the various issues on Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda can be found in the timeline here. The claims are not ambiguous, so it's easy to find what you're looking for. Want information about the DIA analysis that concluded there was no evidence of cooperation? A quick "find" for "DIA" immediately offers up this sentence "Likewise, the DIA communicated to President Bush in February 2002 its stance that al-Libi "was intentionally misleading his debriefers."[8]" with a link to a NYT article. Now, that only tells us about al-Libi, so an additional "find" command lands us on this sentence "The DIA report also cast significant doubt on the possibility of a Saddam Hussein-al-Qaeda conspiracy: "Saddam’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control." [136]" and note 136 points us to the same NYT article. See how easy that was? Pressing for links like this seems to be a way to avoid discussing the actual issues. If you aren't willing to even read the page to find the information you seek (which, by the way, I already presented above), how can you be so adamant that a massive overhaul is needed?--csloat 07:46, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
Sloat, you have not provided links. There are numerous links in the timeline. Which ones are you referring to? Your example on DIA is not applicable. One DIA link says it believes al-Libi was lying. Another cast doubt on the link, but does not rule it out. Where is the link that says the DIA fully investigated the issue and stated positively no relationship existed? I have not seen one and you cannot produce one. That is my point. You are not dealing with reality here. Your sources do not back up your statements. That is why you are unwilling to provide links for all of your statements. When editors read your sources, they will see that you constantly overstate the evidence. I try very hard not to do that. And I provide links to my statements so editors can call me on it if it happens. I expect you to do the same. RonCram 14:13, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
I provided information about how to find the links, Ron; please read the timeline for specifics. How can you say the DIA link "is not applicable"? It confirms the claims made that use the link as support. Your claim that there is no "positive" proof that no relationship existed is something I am sick of responding to -- it is a shift in the burden of proof. Please read this page before making it again. It is the burden of conspiracy theorists to prove a conspiracy, not the other way around. There is no positive proof of conspiracy, Ron, and that is the claim here. Please stop telling me I am not "dealing with reality" -- this page is not about your hypothesis that I hallucinate. I am not unwilling to provide sources. I painstakingly researched this topic for like two years now for this page and have meticulously documented every claim in the timeline. You are complaining that I won't do it again because you ordered it. I'm not here to follow your orders. Why are you so unwilling to read the very page you claim needs this massive overhaul?--csloat 11:00, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

Sloat, you claimed the DIA conducted an investigation into the possibility of an operational relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda and concluded there was none. Your links do not prove that point. One link had to do with one witness only. The other source said an operational relationship was not likely, but did not conclude that one did not exist. Those two conclusions are not the same thing. That is my point. All I want is for you to provide the links to support your claims. The DIA links you provided did not support your statement. I have read the page and the links do not support your claims. I have supplied links and CSTAR is going through them now. All I am asking is for you to do the same. RonCram 14:21, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

Re I have supplied links and CSTAR is going through them now. Well not quite. I'm still discussing the new intro. I think I've made the case for reformulating the sentence regarding the relevence of the Iraq Freedom Documents. I'm thinking about your remarks about my using the term "consensus view." Certainly any term is acceptable to me so long as it is accurate. The consensus view (or majority view, or conventional view or accepted) is the view largely shared by the intelligence community, the majority of former intelligence officers, many foreign intelligence officers and most journalistic sources. The minority view is that of the administration, a minority of intelligence officers and a minority of journalistic sources. Do you agree that is accurate? I am asking everybody to please comment (including csloat).
Organizationally, part of this comment should appear in one of the sections below, but I'll leave it here to save time. --CSTAR 15:24, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
"Concensus view" has the connotation of "no reasonable opposition" and that is certainly POV. "Majority view" is accurate, NPOV and corresponds to "minority view." I think "majority view" is the best choice.RonCram 15:49, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
Actually, "consensus view" means the view for which there is consensus. I don't see a NPOV issue with using that terminology and will continue to use the term until it is shown to be inaccurate.--csloat 10:56, 29 June 2006 (UTC)

Comment

Rather than go through the article as a whole, comparing Ron's version (in toto) with the existing version, I propose to go through Ron's version slowly section by section, asking (a) Is it significantly different from what's in the article now (b) Is it better, that is more accurate. Now that's a lot of work, and I don't get paid for doing this, so this may take a long time. I hope nobody expects a quick turnover here. But there is little point in continuing the above kind of exchange between csloat and RonCram.

I'm not sure why we need a new version, although I'm perfectly happy to have a version which does say there are individuals that believe the what the artcle calls the "minority view", what the this view is, who believes it and why. I admit (and Ron knows this) I don't believe the minority view (having an opinion and saying what it is, is acceptable on a talk page). Nevertheless it's useful to have a clear statement of what this view is, since for whatever reason, it will be re-presented (or perhaps "recycled") in some form. --CSTAR 02:53, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

I don't see why we need a new version either. I also believe I have made 16 arguments against Ron's version already -- I'm not sure the process you describe is necessary, though I am willing to participate when I have time. Unfortunately, none of us get paid for this.--csloat 07:35, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
Re though I am willing to participate when I have time. Thanks.
BTW, I said "I'm not sure why we need a new version", not that "I don't see why we need a new version." I don't "see" anything yet, because I haven't read it. --CSTAR 13:39, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

Intro

There is (1) an official view, (2) a view shared by most intelligence experts (official or not) (3) A minority view. As far as I can tell (1) and (2) are largely the same. Calling it the official view has a somewhat conspiratorial ring about it, suggesting there is an "offical" coverup. Whether or not there is, we don't know this and we shouldn't use language to suggest there is. That's why the term "consensus view" is preferable, in my opinion.

ANother point: As I mentioned before I think the sentence

The official view has come under increasing criticism as new information from Operation Iraqi Freedom documents comes to light.

is misleading, particularly the word "increasing". To say it's increasing, means that that the number of people who have altered their view is significantly increasing. Is that true and verifiable?

For example, note the following claim (in the article currently) about these documents:

Commission member Bob Kerrey changed his position due to the release of these documents.

That would seem to suggest that Kerrey himself is in that set of people criticising the official (or consensus) view. But look at what the cited article in the New York Sun (March 24, 2006) actually says:

Bob Kerrey, was careful to say that new documents translated last night by ABC News did not prove Saddam Hussein played a role in any way in plotting the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Nonetheless, the former senator from Nebraska said that the new document shows that "Saddam was a significant enemy of the United States." Mr. Kerrey said he believed America's understanding of the deposed tyrant's relationship with Al Qaeda would become much deeper as more captured Iraqi documents and audiotapes are disclosed.

I think a better sentence might be something like

Some critics maintain that information from the Operation Iraqi Freedom documents undermine the current consensus view.

Enough for now.--CSTAR 14:55, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

FWIW, I agree with your comments. -- User:RyanFreisling @ 15:32, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
CSTAR, I appreciate your comments. I would like to clarify a few matters. I used the term "official view" because it is the official view of the Intelligence Community, not the Bush Administration. I did not intend to convey an "official coverup" and would like to avoid that connotation if at all possible. However, I am not comfortable with the term "concensus view" as that tends to convey little or no opposition to the official view. Actually the debate inside the Intelligence Community was significant prior to the invasion. I can provide more information the debate if you think that is necessary. Perhaps there is third term we can both agree on. How about "majority view by the Intelligence Community?" The minority view is the view espoused by a minority of intelligence analysts but affirmed by the Bush Administration. This view is that Saddam and al-Qaeda did have a cooperative relationship but Saddam was not involved in 9/11. The third (very small minority) view is that Saddam was actually involved in 9/11. Those to hold this view include Laurie Mylroie and James Woolsey, and it is possible Woolsey may be getting soft on the view. I hold to the minority view but am willing to be persuaded if additional evidence came forward for the super minority view.
Regarding the statement that criticism of the official view increasing, the best example is Bob Kerrey who obviously changed his view. Winning over a Democrat before an important election is not a minor point. Also, the number of news and opinion articles being published criticizing the view is increasing. Not only is Weekly Standard publishing criticism of the majority view, but so is FOX News, National Review (which seems to have changed its view as well), Human Events, WorldNetDaily and others. Perhaps you will say the documents have only strengthened the position of the opponents, but I think that is also significant. Regarding Kerrey, he is not a proponent of the super minority view that Saddam was involved in 9/11, but he has switched sides to the Bush Administration view that a cooperative relationship existed. On page 2 of the news article cited, Kerrey is quoted as saying "I personally and strongly believe you don't have to prove that Iraq was collaborating against Osama bin Laden on the September 11 attacks to prove he was an enemy and that he would collaborate with people who would do our country harm. This presents facts should not be used to tie Saddam to attacks on September 11. It does tie him into a circle that meant to damage the United States." The documents clearly tie Saddam to al-Qaeda, as the news article makes clear.
CSTAR, I appreciate your looking taking the time to look at this. Let me know if you want to see more information on the debate inside the Intelligence Community or any other point you have questions about. RonCram 20:46, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
Re : Kerrey's comments: "I don't think there is much doubt that Saddam can be tied into a circle that meant harm to the United States." That's a very vague statement because it doesn't say what "tied in" means. This statement may mean many different things; however, we are talking about identifying specific kinds of relationships with AL Qaeda. Also note that Eli Lake has a definite interest in this matter; I'd certainly like to know more details about what Kerrey thinks but this doesn't prove that he has changed his view.
As far as I can tell NRO and Fox have never seriously called into question the "minority view". The fact that may now be publishing it more openly is consistent with my suggested formulation Some critics maintain that information from the Operation Iraqi Freedom documents undermine the current consensus view.
--CSTAR 21:47, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
I do not think FOX ever accepted the majority view, but they were not aggressive in reporting stories that supported the minority view until the OIF documents came out. Since then they have had several stories. Regarding NRO, they were particularly skeptical of Iraqi documents leaked to CNS News. In November 2005, NRO published "More Proof That There Are No Links Between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein" by Cliff May. In April, 2006, NRO published "Saddam: Funding and Arming Al Qaeda in Iraq Before The War" by Andy McCarthy. [33] I think it is clear that NRO would be more easily persuaded than Bob Kerrey, but they also have changed their view.RonCram 22:35, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

Reply to Ron Cram

I don't see evidence that NRO changed it's position. Looking at the NRO acrhives for 2005 I could not find the article from November 2005 you mentioned, but I did find this from June 2005 from Andy McCarthy[34]. Here are some excerpts:

It's that the administration has not done a good enough job of probing and underscoring the nexus between the Saddam regime and al Qaeda. It is absolutely appropriate, it is vital, for him to stress that connection. This is still the war on terror, and Iraq, where the terrorists are still arrayed against us, remains a big part of that equation.
On that score, nobody should worry about anything the Times or David Gergen or Senator Reid has to say about all this until they have some straight answers on questions like these. What does the “nothing whatsoever” crowd have to say about:
  • Ahmed Hikmat Shakir — the Iraqi Intelligence operative who facilitated a 9/11 hijacker into Malaysia and was in attendance at the Kuala Lampur meeting with two of the hijackers, and other conspirators, at what is roundly acknowledged to be the initial 9/11 planning session in January 2000? Who was arrested after the 9/11 attacks in possession of contact information for several known terrorists? Who managed to make his way out of Jordanian custody over our objections after the 9/11 attacks because of special pleading by Saddam’s regime?
  • Saddam's intelligence agency's efforts to recruit jihadists to bomb Radio Free Europe in Prague in the late 1990's?
  • Mohammed Atta's unexplained visits to Prague in 2000, and his alleged visit there in April 2001 which — notwithstanding the 9/11 Commission's dismissal of it (based on interviewing exactly zero relevant witnesses) — the Czechs have not retracted?

Whether any of this is true or not is a seperate issue. My contention here is that the I don't think it is accurate to claim that the NRO is a new entry the list of subscribers to the minority view. I really think it was already on the list. The only thing that I see one can accurately claim is that these critics claim that these documents undermine the majority position.--CSTAR 23:20, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

Just a note - the alleged Atta visit to Prague in 2000 turned out to be a different person with that same name. He stopped there another time on his way somewhere (Spain I think), but the 2000 visit that was so controversial turned out to be the wrong Atta (the link is in the timeline under the Atta/Prague section). As for the Czechs, the claim that they have not "retracted" the claim is misleading -- they did pull the claim, then backtracked on that, and then when an interviewer asked about it in 2005 they threw it back at the CIA in disgust. It was a huge embarrassment in Czechoslovakia for the politicians perceived as responsible for that information being leaked. There is nobody in Czechoslovakia who can be shown to still stand by that alleged meeting. Ron believes someone does, but the person he is talking about is the same one who threw it back at the CIA in 2005 (it's the Opinion Journal article cited in that section). To say the Czechs have not retracted the claim is completely misleading, since nobody appears to still believe it, and all the evidence appears to go against it, except for a single notoriously unreliable witness. I'm not sure where the claim on the 9/11 Commission interviewing "exactly zero" witnesses is relevant at all; their conclusions are based on the conclusions of intelligence organizations who investigated as well as the Czechs. I don't think they saw it as their job to interview witnesses, and I'm not sure how someone finds relevant witnesses to something that appears not to have happened.--csloat 02:07, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
CSTAR, you may be right. Andy McCarthy evidently has held to the minority view. I am still not convinced Byron York held the minority view. The Cliff May link I mentioned can be found here. [35] After looking at that link, it appears the title of the link is tongue in cheek. It links to a Drudge Report that mentions al Qaeda cell is trying to kill the judge of Saddam's trial. After actually reading the story, it appears Cliff May held to the minority view also. RonCram 00:29, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

Edit on "cherry-picked" intelligence

One of the criticisms Sloat put forward for the rewrite was that it did not contain any information on the charge the Bush Administration had "cherry-picked" the intelligence. Sloat is correct that the charge should be included in the article. I have added a paragraph with a link to a Washington Post story featuring Paul R. Pillar.RonCram 00:11, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

Proposal for intro

I think the article might be less a source of contention, if the intro made the following points:

  • In the lead up to the Iraq War, U.S. President George W. Bush (and others in the administration) alleged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda might work together (N.B. it basically does this in the current version and in Ron's version)
  • Critics of the Bush Administration have made the claim Bush was intentionally building a case for war with Iraq without regard to the facts.(N.B. it basically does this in the current version and in Ron's version)
  • Then State briefly
  1. what the positions regarding the relationship between SH and AQ (as per some of the discussion above) and
  2. who holds these positions. In some cases we will have to use adjectives such as "most" to describe these. For example, most intelligence analysts believe BLAH.
The rest of the article could elaborate on these points, including history of the claims
Ron's section on why this is controversial could fit in either before or after.

Is this proposal too naive? --CSTAR 00:41, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

This sounds reasonable. This is a lot like what I have proposed above, in much more detail.--csloat 02:07, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
Where? I missed it. Perhaps proposing too much detail is itself problem. Let's start with an outline.--CSTAR 02:18, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
My proposed outline is here. Perhaps we should make separate pages for my proposition and Ron's proposition so we can discuss them in more detail in a more organized fashion.--csloat 11:00, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
Your proposal for the Intro seems reasonable as long as it is brief. BTW, I think the article itself should have a section on Powell's statement before the UN. That seems to be an important historical event the article should address. I will attempt to write something brief.RonCram 11:59, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
Yes I think the characterizations in the intro should be brief, defining roughly what the various positions are. --CSTAR 15:36, 28 June 2006 (UTC)
I agree with Ron on having a section on Powell's statement, though of course we need to include that its main points were based on misinformation and that the statement has been widely disputed by nearly every expert who has addressed it. Again, the term "consensus" may be relevant here.--csloat 11:00, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
COuld I get somebody to list briefly what the relevant positions are? --CSTAR 14:34, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
This is a tricky business because POV can enter so easily. I will try to keep it NPOV as much as possible by including the people or documents best define the position. First, the Majority position is the one presented by the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, etc etc). This position is presented in the 9/11 Commission Report and the Senate Report. If you read the conclusions from the Senate Report, it is clear they recognize the possibility of some cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda in the area of training and offers of safe-haven. The majority view is not convinced Saddam and al-Qaeda cooperated in any terrorist attacks against the U.S. In fact, they are skeptical that could happen. They admit it could happen in extremis, that is if Saddam believed he was to be invaded by the US. The Bush Administration view is best defined by the Powell speech before the UN. His speech was completely vetted by the Intelligence Community and the Senate Report found no problems with the Powell speech in regarding to terrorism (the Senate Report did find fault on the issue of WMD). The only real difference I could find between Powell (Bush) and the majority view of the IC is that Powell went out of his way to condemn the view that Saddam was not likely to support al-Qaeda for ideological reasons. Powell pointed out that Saddam had already supported Islamic Jihad, a radical Islamist group and there is no reason for him not to support al-Qaeda. Third, the Minority view: this is best defined by news reports of cooperation going back to 1998. Certain analysts in the Intelligence Community appear to agree: Deputy Director of CTC, the DIA analyst mentioned in the Senate Report and Michael Scheuer in his 2002 book. The minority view is that Saddam and al-Qaeda had an on-again, off-again relationship. Both parties wanted to use the other for their own purposes. But at certain times (in extremis, i.e. after the four days of bombing in 1998 or possibly after Bush was elected) Saddam and al-Qaeda did work together to attack US interests. Fourth, the "False flag" view of Laurie Mylroie. Mylroie claims Saddam used a "false flag" to attack the US on 9/11 and blame al-Qaeda for it. She claims Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, is really an Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) officer traveling under a Kuwaiti passport he got after the invasion of Kuwait. She claims al-Qaeda was willing to take the blame because it raised their status and contributions from radical Islamists. I hope this is helpful. RonCram 17:29, 29 June 2006 (UTC)

I shortened RonCram's summary. I deleted some stuff but (I don't think) added anything since I am trying to be neutral as best I can. I would request others to provide some input. If you say it's wrong or POV, please be specific and not refer to, for example, "my comment above".

There are several views regarding the relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda

  • The intelligence community (CIA, NSA, DIA, etc) view presented in the 9/11 Commission Report and the Senate Report. According to this view, cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda in any terrorist attacks against is very unlikey, although could happen in extremis, that is if Saddam believed he was to be invaded by the US. The Senate Report, however, recognizes the possibility of some cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda in the area of training and offers of safe-haven.
  • The Bush administration view defined by the Powell speech before the UN. Powell pointed out that Saddam had already supported Islamic Jihad, a radical Islamist group and there is no reason for him not to support al-Qaeda.
  • A minority view held by some intelligence analysts: specifically, the Deputy Director of CTC, a DIA analyst mentioned in the Senate Report and Michael Scheuer in his 2002 book. According to this view Saddam and al-Qaeda had an on-again, off-again relationship and were willing to use the other for their own purposes.
  • The "false flag" view of Laurie Mylroie. Mylroie claims Saddam used a "false flag" to attack the US on 9/11 and blame al-Qaeda for it.

--CSTAR 19:28, 29 June 2006 (UTC)

CSTAR, you rewrite is very good. I have only two suggestions at this point. I think the Bush Admin view should contain the fear that Saddam would supply al-Qaeda will chemical or biological weapons. Regarding the minority view, I suggest using the term "including" rather than "specifically." After the suggestions, I want to ask a question or two. I understand the need to keep this brief but I'm wondering if we should also say that some members of the Bush Administration hold the minority view? Doug Feith clearly did. I'm wondering if we should mention Feith since he played such a prominent role in the controversy? It would be good if Mr. Billion or csloat commented on this. RonCram 19:55, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
I think Feith is important here, and should be included. It should also be included that his position has been severely indicted, that the Pentagon considered his release of classified information to be unethical, and that prominent voices in the intelligence community find Feith's analysis and actions profoundly disturbing in this issue. I would also insist that it be recognized that the "majority" view represents the consensus of the intelligence and journalistic communities. I would also insist that if we feel the need to cite Scheuer's 2002 statements, that we also need to include the fact that he did a study of the links based on the classified information available in 2004 and came to the opposite conclusion (i.e. Scheuer now believes there was no Saddam/AQ conspiracy). Finally, I do not think Mylroie's "false flag" view is substantially different from Feith's view or the "minority" view in general. It offers a more specific analysis of the alleged conspiracy, but it does not present a substantively different conclusion. Thus I would suggest outlining only three major views. Perhaps two, since the differences between the Bush Admin view and the Feith et al. view seem to be a matter of degree rather than substance (that is, the Bush Admin was less vehement about asserting a link, since they were politically more accountable than Laurie Mylroie and even Feith - though he of course was a part of that admin). Does that make sense? I mean, when it comes down to it, there are only two main views here -- those who believed there was evidence of collaboration between Saddam and al Qaeda, and those who believe that no evidence of such collaboration could be found. We could certainly break those groups down ad nauseum but I don't see the point of that.--csloat 22:15, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
  • it be recognized that the "majority" view represents the consensus of the intelligence and journalistic communities.
OK
  • if we feel the need to cite Scheuer's 2002 statements, that we also need to include the fact that he did a study of the links based on the classified information available in 2004 and came to the opposite conclusion (i.e. Scheuer now believes there was no Saddam/AQ conspiracy).
OK
  • Finally, I do not think Mylroie's "false flag" view is substantially different from Feith's view or the "minority" view in general.
Is this "non-distniction" really important?
--CSTAR 22:22, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
My only concern here is accuracy. First, it is true someone leaked the Feith memo, but that only happened after Feith delivered it to Congress. It could well have been leaked by a Congressman or a staffer. Feith was never charged or even named as a suspect in the leak. It would be wrong for wikipedia to hint the Feith was the guilty party. Second, it is completely inaccurate to say Feith and Mylroie have the same view. Feith presented information on Atta and stated the information was contradictory. Feith never talked about the possibility that KSM was IIS (which is Mylroie's view). The minority view is unconvinced (even if suspicious) that Saddam was part of 9/11 but Mylroie is convinced KSM was carrying out the orders of Saddam. These are very different positions. Mylroie's position has very few supporters but the minority view has a growing list of supporters. RonCram 00:47, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
Ron is correct that there are differences in the details, but these differences are not necessary on this page. Mylroie's specific views are not notable; as Ron notes, the specifics are not persuasive to the bush administration figures under consideration here. The fact that she had an influence can be noted, as well as the fact that her theories have been pretty soundly refuted, but I don't see the need for another category of opinions. I could easily point out that Michael Scheuer's post-2004 position differs in substance from Richard Clarke's position, Paul Pillar's position, and Rohan Gunaratna's position on what evidence there was or wasn't for cooperation between Saddam and AQ, but there is no need to have separate categories for each of those views, even when they differ somewhat significantly. So I think we should go with two main categories - those who believe the evidence of conspiracy existed, and those who do not believe the evidence substantiated a conspiracy.-csloat 07:12, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

This is a complicated topic. I should clarify. Mylroie's first book "Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein's War Against America" was published in 2000. It dealt with the first World Trade Center bombing. Mylroie makes the case that the mastermind of the 1993 attack, Ramzi Yousef and the bombmaker, Abdul Rahman Yasin, were Iraqi IIS agents. Interestingly, Yasin showed up back in Baghdad living on an Iraqi stipend. Several top Bush Admin officials were influenced by the book. I think that is historically significant because it helps to explain why Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld were looking at Iraq right after 9/11. But the Bush Admin could not find proof of Saddam's involvement in 9/11, so they never pressed that case. Mylroie published her next book "Bush vs. the Beltway : How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror" in 2003. In this book she makes the case that the mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is an IIS agent and not a long-time radical Islamist and not the uncle of Ramzi Yousef. There is a strong indication Mylroie's first book influenced the Bush White House. I have not seen any indication the White House has been influenced at all by the second book. The thesis of the second book is that Bush did the right thing in removing Saddam, but the reasons for doing so are Mylroie's not Bush's.

Mylroie is strongly convinced of a connection on 9/11. Bush is not. That is a huge difference. It would be unfair to both of them to put them in the same grouping. That said, I think it would not be a terrible injustice to include the Bush Admin in the Minority view section. Certainly several officials in the Bush Administration favored the view, even if it was not presented during Powell's speech. The Powell speech would need to be presented under the minority view section. Even though I do not think that is entirely accurate, it is not entirely inaccurate either. RonCram 13:54, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

OK, I don't understand what you mean. My position is that we should only have two main categories, the consensus view and the minority view (call it something different if you like). Then you can identify differences between Mylroie and Powell or whoever if you want within the category. I don;'t dispute that the difference is major between Mylroie and Powell (for example); what I dispute is that it is notable for a wikipedia article. Mylroie's view is only notable insofar as it once influenced folks like Cheney and Rumsfeld, who now seem to have seen that the view was incorrect.--csloat 18:28, 2 July 2006 (UTC)