Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi
Born:	1970 (age 37–38) Hudaydah, Yemen
Detained at:	Guantanamo
ID number:	570
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi is held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.^[1][2] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 570. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate that Al Qurashi was born in 1970, in Hudaydah, Yemen.

[edit] Press reports

Al Qurashi is notable because Reuters reported that his dossier, from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal contained the allegation that he was associated with terrorism because he was wearing a Casio F91W watch.^[2] Approximately one dozen of the Guantanamo detainees remain in detention because they were wearing a watch that U.S. intelligence officials identified as a Casio F91W, a watch that terrorists have used to help build time-bombs.

The BBC quoted from Al Qurashi's transcript: "All I know about the watch is that it is a Casio... I know it has a compass. When we pray we have to face Mecca"^[3]

The Casio F91W does not have a compass.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Casio F91W, in daily alarm mode. The watch is currently set to ring an alarm, and flash its light, at 7:30am.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 13 October 2004.^[4] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.

1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan in September 2000.
2. The detainee received training at al Farouq training camp for over a year.
3. The detainee received training on the Kalishnikov ^[sic] rifle and the PK while at al Farouq.
4. The detainee was in Afghanistan in December 2001, when the U.S. bombing campaign began.
5. The detainee stayed at a safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan.
6. The detainee was arrested with a Casio watch.
7. The Casio watch, which was commonly given to al Farouq attendees, indicates that the detainee most likely went through the course voluntarily.
8. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities in a raid on a [[Al-Qaeda safe house, raided|safehouse in Pakistan in February 2002.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[5]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 July 2005.^[6] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to purchase perfume for later resale, and to fulfill his religious Dawa.
2. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan; then on to Quetta, Pakistan; Spin Boldok ^[sic] , Afghanistan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan with $3,000.
4. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee in a photograph. He saw the detainee in 2001 at a guesthouse on the frontlines in Afghanistan.
5. The detainee was identified as a mujahideen fighter.
6. After Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance, the detainee joined a group of about 100 Arabs in the mountain regions. More than half were armed with Kalashnikov weapons, and they were led by Abu Muhammad Al Musri ^[sic] .

b. Training:

1. The detainee trained at the al-Farouq military training camp. He identified Abu Muhammad al Musri as the leader of the camp.
2. The detainee stated he spent about three days learning to disassemble the Kalashnikov, and then trained on a different type of weapon identified as a PK.
3. The detainee stayed at the al-Farouq camp for a total of about 45 days.

c. Connections/Associations:

1. Abu Khaloud offered to assist the detainee with travel arrangements, but was unable to complete them due to the heightened state of alert in Pakistan.
2. Abu Khaloud has been identified as the manager for the Al Ansar guesthouse. He arranged for individuals to go train at the al-Farouq camp.

d. Other Relevant Data:

1. The detainee stated that when he was arrested all of his property was taken from him, including his casio ^[sic] watch.
2. The Casio ^[sic] digital watch was given to al-Farouq attendees.
3. The Casio watch model F-91 has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
4. On 7 February 2002, the Pakistanis raided a Karachi statehouse ^[sic] and captured the detainee and approximately 15 other individuals.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee stated he did not receive any weapons, explosives or terrorist training while at al-Farouq.
b.	The detainee stated he did not know al-Farouq was an al Qaida training center until he later reached Karachi.
c.	The detainee adamantly denies being at al-Farouq.
d.	The detainee stated he learned details about the al-Farouq camp from Khalid Dossieri, a Saudi who was staying at a guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
e.	The detainee claimed the Pakistani authorities fed him the details he provided about the camp.

[edit] Transcript

Al Qurashi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[7] In the spring of 2006, in response to a court order, the Department of Defense published a twelve page summarized transcript from his Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Assisting Military Officer's initial interview with Al Qurashi

Al Qurashi's initial interview with his Assisting Military Officer (AMO) was on July 28, 2005.

His Assisting Military Officer told his Board the interview took took two hours and twenty minutes. He told the Board:

"Despite his initial reluctance the detainee opted to attend the board. The detainee expressed concern that he would have no input on the contents of the classified material the board would consider."

His AMO told his Board they met again on August 1, 2005, for two hours and ten minutes.

[edit] Al Qurashi's opening statement

Al Qurashi's opening statement started with the following exchange:

[edit] Response to the factors

• AL Qurashi testified he worked in the perfume industry. He testified he traveled to Pakistan, the centre of the Perfume industry in the Middle East, because he wanted to set up his own perfume industry. He testified he also planned to visit some religious centres.
• Al Qurashi confirmed that he traveled to Pakistan by land because there was only one flight per week. He didn't understand why this was listed as a factor favoring his continued detention.
• Al Qurashi confirmed that he arrived in Afghanistan with $3000. He had to carry cash because he didn't have any credit cards, and he needed money to set up his perfume business.
• Al Qurashi said he could not confirm or deny whether an al Qaeda lieutenant saw him at a guesthouse on the front lines in Afghanistan. He asked whether he could ask a question of this witness. He suggested the witness might be mistaken. He transcript says he concluded:

Al Qurashi:	I have a funny comment on this. Maybe someone in this room will agree with me. If we take your (referring to the Presiding Officer) picture with the flag, the American Flag, I will say this is Bush (referring to President Bush), because there are similarities in your face. Do you think this is right?
Presiding Officer:	I am sure the President would not agree with you.
Al Qurashi:	But, in my view you look like Mr. Bush (referring to President Bush), but Mr Bush has a taller face. Maybe this witness is confused and made a mistake. Maybe this witness has something to hide. Maybe he is greedy and needs something to get him out of something he said, or he was scared. There are many other possibilities. I don't know if you can bring that guy in front of me and talk to me...maybe we can solve this problem. Also, I have never been in that house [that] the witness said he saw me [in]. I was not there.

• In response to the allegation that he had been identified as a mujahideen fighter Al Qurashi asked who made the identification; whether it was the same witness as the previous allegation. Al Qurashi denied being a Mujahideen fighter.
• Al Qurashi confirmed that he fled Afghanistan after Kabul fell. He was living in the mountains, and he saw a procession of refugees.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 29 March 2006.^[8] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Pakistan to purchase perfume for resale and to fulfill his religious Dawa.
2. The detainee arrived at the Karachi, Pakistan airport and identified other Jamat-al-Tabligh members arriving there with him.
3. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used to cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
4. The detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan after he met a man in Pakistan.
5. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan with 3,000 United States Dollars.
6. After Kabul, Afghanistan fell to the Northern Alliance, the detainee joined a group of about 100 Arabs in the mountain region. More than half were armed with Kalashnikov ^[sic] rifles and they were led by Abu Muhammad al Musri.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the al Farouq military training camp. The detainee identified Abu Muhammad al Musri as the leader of the camp.
2. The detainee stated he spent about three days learning to disassemble the Kalashnikov rifle and then trained on a different type of weapon, identified as a PK machine gun.
3. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp for a total of about 45 days.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that when he was arrested, all his property was taken from him, including his Casio watch.
2. The Casio digital watch was commonly give to al Farouq attendees.
3. On 7 February 2002, the Pakistanis raided a Karachi safe house and captured the detainee and approximately 15 other individuals.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee stated he did not know al Farouq was an al Qaida training center until he later reached Kabul.
b.	The detainee stated he did not receive any weapons, explosive or terrorist training while at al Farouq.
c.	The detainee continues to claim that while in Pakistani custody the Pakistani authorities forced him to say he had been at al Farouq for training.
d.	The detainee further claimed the Pakistani authorities fed him the details he provided about the al Farouq camp as well.

[edit] Repatriation

A captive Saudi authorities called Muhammad Al Qurashi was repatriated to Saudi custody, with fifteen other men, on July 16, 2007.^[9]

[edit] References

1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
2. ^ ^{a b} "US releases Guantanamo files", Washington Post, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-14. 
3. ^ US releases more Guantanamo files, BBC, April 4, 2006
4. ^ OARDEC (13 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Qurashi, Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim page 92. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-14.
5. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), Friday March 10, 2006, pp. 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-12. 
6. ^ OARDEC (26 July 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Qurashi, Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim pages 24-26. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-14.
7. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 570 pages 187-198. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-14.
8. ^ OARDEC (29 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Qurashi, Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim pages 66-67. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-01.
9. ^ Raid Qusti. "More Gitmo Detainees Come Home", Arab News, July 17, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-07-17.