Russian submarine Kursk explosion

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On August 12, 2000, the Russian Oscar II class submarine, Kursk sank in the Barents Sea. The generally accepted theory is that a leak of hydrogen peroxide in the forward torpedo room led to the detonation of a torpedo warhead, which in turn triggered the explosion of half a dozen other warheads about two minutes later. This second explosion was equivalent to about 3-7 tons of TNT^[1] and was large enough to register on seismographs across Northern Europe.^[2] (See below for alternative theories.)

Despite a rescue attempt by British and Norwegian teams, all 118 sailors and officers aboard Kursk were lost. A Dutch team later recovered the wreckage and all of the bodies, which were laid to rest in Russia.

Contents 1 The explosion 2 Rescue attempts 3 Russian government response 4 Salvage 5 Alternative theories and claims about the cause of the explosion 5.1 Test torpedo 5.2 Command failure 5.3 Collision theories 5.3.1 USS Memphis and USS Toledo 5.3.2 Emergency batteries 5.3.3 Film: Kursk: a Submarine in Troubled Waters 6 See also 7 References 8 External links 9 Further reading

[edit] The explosion

The tragedy began on the morning of August 12, 2000. As part of a naval exercise, Kursk was to fire two dummy torpedoes at a Kirov-class battlecruiser, Peter the Great, the flagship of the Northern Fleet. At 11:28 local time (07:28 UTC), high test peroxide (HTP), a form of highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide used as propellant for the torpedo, seeped through rust in the torpedo casing. The HTP reacted with copper and brass in the tube from which the torpedo was to be fired, causing a chain reaction leading to a chemical explosion. A similar incident was responsible for the loss of HMS Sidon in 1955.

The watertight door separating the torpedo room from the rest of the submarine was left open prior to firing. This was apparently common practice, due to the amount of compressed air released into the torpedo room when a torpedo was launched. The open door allowed the blast to rip back through the first two of nine compartments on the huge submarine, probably killing the seven men in the first compartment, and at least injuring or disorienting the thirty-six men in the second compartment.

After the first explosion, due to the fact the air conditioning duct was quite light, the blast wave traveled to more compartments, including the command post, filling them with smoke and flames. After the explosion, the captain was believed to be trying to order an 'emergency blow' which causes the sub to rapidly rise to the surface, but he was quickly overcome with smoke. An emergency buoy, designed to release from a submarine automatically when emergency conditions such as rapidly changing pressure or fire are detected and intended to help rescuers locate the stricken vessel, also failed to deploy. The previous summer, in a Mediterranean mission, fears of the buoy accidentally deploying, and thereby revealing the sub's position to the U.S. fleet, had led to the buoy being disabled.

Two minutes and fifteen seconds after the initial eruption, a much larger explosion ripped through the submarine. Seismic data from stations across Northern Europe show that the explosion occurred at the same depth as the sea bed, suggesting that the submarine had collided with the sea floor which, combined with rising temperatures due to the initial explosion, had caused other torpedoes to explode. The second explosion was equivalent to 3–7 tons of TNT, or about a half-dozen torpedo warheads and measured 3.5 on the Richter scale. After the second explosion, the nuclear reactors were shut down to prevent a nuclear disaster, although the blast was almost enough to destroy the reactors.

The second explosion ripped a two-metre-square hole in the hull of the craft, which was designed to withstand depths of 1000 meters. The explosion also ripped open the third and fourth compartments. Water poured into these compartments at 90,000 litres per second – killing all those in the compartments, including five officers from 7th SSGN Division Headquarters. The fifth compartment contained the ship's nuclear reactors, encased in a further five inches of steel. The bulkheads of the fifth compartment withstood the explosion, causing the nuclear control rods to stay in place and prevent nuclear disaster.^{[citation needed]}

Twenty-three men working in the sixth through to ninth compartments survived the two blasts. They gathered in the ninth compartment, which contained the secondary escape tunnel (the primary tunnel was in the destroyed second compartment). Captain-lieutenant Dmitri Kolesnikov (one of three officers of that rank surviving) appears to have taken charge, writing down the names of those who were in the ninth compartment. The air pressure in the compartment following the second explosion was still normal surface pressure. Thus it would be possible from a physiological point of view to use the escape hatch to leave the submarine one man at a time, swimming up through 100 metres of Arctic water in a survival suit, to await help floating at the surface. It is not known if the escape hatch was workable from the inside – opinions still differ about how badly the hatch was damaged. However it is likely that the men rejected using the perilous escape hatch even if it were operable. They may have preferred instead to take their chances waiting for a rescue vessel to clamp itself onto the escape hatch.

It is not known with certainty how long the remaining men survived in the compartment. As the nuclear reactors had automatically shut down, emergency power soon ran out, plunging the crew into complete blackness and falling temperatures. Kolesnikov wrote two further messages, much less tidily than before. In the last, he wrote:

"It's dark here to write, but I'll try by feel. It seems like there are no chances, 10-20%. Let's hope that at least someone will read this. Here's the list of personnel from the other sections, who are now in the ninth and will attempt to get out. Regards to everybody, no need to be desperate. Kolesnikov."

There has been much debate over how long the sailors might have survived. Some, particularly on the Russian side, say that they would have died very quickly; water is known to leak into a stationary Oscar-II craft through the propeller shafts and at 100m depth it would have been impossible to plug these. Others point out that the many superoxide chemical cartridges, used to absorb carbon dioxide and chemically release oxygen to enable survival, were found used when the craft was recovered, suggesting that they had survived for several days. Ironically, the cartridges appear to have been the cause of death; a sailor appears to have accidentally brought a cartridge in contact with oily sea water, causing a chemical reaction and a flash fire. The official investigation into the disaster showed that some men appeared to have survived the fire by plunging under the water (the fire marks on the walls indicate the water was at waist level in the lower area at this time). However the fire rapidly used up the remaining oxygen in the air, causing death by asphyxiation.

According to Raising Kursk broadcast by the Science Channel: "In June of 2002, the Russian Navy recovered Kursk's bow section. Shortly afterwards, the Russian government investigation into the accident officially concluded that a faulty torpedo sank Kursk in the Summer of 2000."

[edit] Rescue attempts

Initially the other ships in the exercise, all of which had detected an explosion, did not report it. Each only knew about its own part in the exercise, and ostensibly assumed that the explosion was that of a depth charge, and part of the exercise. It was not until the evening that commanders stated that they became concerned that they had heard nothing from Kursk. Later in the evening, and after repeated attempts to contact Kursk had failed, a search and rescue operation was launched. The rescue ship Rudnitsky carrying two submersible rescue vessels, AS-32 and the Priz (AS-34) reached the disaster area at around 8:40 AM the following morning.

The rescue vessels' batteries were in poor condition — draining quickly^{[citations needed]} and difficult to re-charge.^{[citations needed]} The AS-32 proved virtually useless.^{[citations needed]} Priz was somewhat successful — reaching Kursk's ninth compartment on Monday afternoon, but failed to dock with it. Bad weather prevented further attempts on Tuesday and Wednesday. A further attempt on Thursday again made contact but failed to create a vacuum seal required to dock.

The United States offered the use of one of its two Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles, as did the British government. On August 16, 2000, the Russian government accepted the British and Norwegian governments' assistance. A rescue ship was dispatched from Norway on August 17 and reached the site on August 19. British and Norwegian deep-sea divers reached the ninth compartment escape hatch on Sunday 20 August. They were able to determine that the compartment was flooded, and all hope of finding survivors was lost.

[edit] Russian government response

The first fax sent from the Russian Navy to the various Press offices said the submarine had "minor technical difficulties". The government downplayed the incident and then claimed bad weather was making it impossible to rescue the people onboard.

On August 18, Nadezhda Tylik, mother of Kursk submariner Lt. Sergei Tylik, produced an intense emotional outburst in the middle of an in-progress news briefing about Kursk's fate. After attempts to quiet her failed, a nurse injected her with a sedative by force from the back, and she was removed from the room, incapacitated. The event, caught on film, caused further criticism of the government's response to both the disaster, and how the government handled public criticism of said response.

As noted in an excerpt from The Guardian:

For President Vladimir Putin, the Kursk crisis was not merely a human tragedy, it was a personal PR catastrophe. Twenty-four hours after the submarine's disappearance, as Russian naval officials made bleak calculations about the chances of the 118 men on board, Putin was filmed enjoying himself, shirtsleeves rolled up, hosting a barbecue at his holiday villa on the Black Sea.^[3]

[edit] Salvage

Most of the submarine's hull, except the bow, was raised from the ocean floor by the Dutch salvage companies Smit International and Mammoet in the fall of 2001 and towed back to the Russian Navy's Roslyakovo Shipyard. The bodies of its dead crew were removed from the wreck and buried in Russia – three of them were unidentifiable because they were so badly burned. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree awarding the Order of Courage to all the crew and title Hero of the Russian Federation to the submarine's captain, Gennady Lyachin.^[4]

[edit] Alternative theories and claims about the cause of the explosion

[edit] Test torpedo

An official 2000 page report, published in 2002, concluded that the sinking of Kursk was caused by a test torpedo that exploded in the torpedo room. Some conspiracy theorists claim that the report was a coverup to further strengthen the relations between Russia and the USA.

[edit] Command failure

Other alternative claims regarding the loss of Kursk have been broadly discredited by notable and credible investigative reports. In its 2002 review of two books on this topic, "Kursk, Russia's Lost Pride" and "A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster" The Guardian says: "The hopelessly flawed rescue attempt, hampered by badly designed and decrepit equipment, illustrated the fatal decline of Russia's military power. The navy's callous approach to the families of the missing men was reminiscent of an earlier Soviet insensitivity to individual misery. The lies and incompetent cover-up attempts launched by both the navy and the government were resurrected from a pre-Glasnost era. The wildly contradictory conspiracy theories about what caused the catastrophe said more about a naval high command in turmoil, fumbling for a scapegoat, than about the accident itself."^[3]

[edit] Collision theories

Several collision theories have emerged, suggestion that a possible collision occurred between Kursk and another submarine or surface vessel. Given that Kursk sank during large-scale Russian naval war games, many navies and governments would be interested in monitoring the activities through the use of reconnaissance and surveillance platforms, including the United States and the United Kingdom. While surface naval exercises can be monitored safely through the use of reconnaissance satellites, they can not detect missile signals and other transmissions from an exercise area, and are unable to track submarines for a variety of reasons. As a result it is common practice among nations interested in gathering such information to dispatch ships and/or submarines to the area(s) that naval exercise occur in order to obtain intelligence-worthy information.

[edit] USS Memphis and USS Toledo

After Kursk sank, the wargames were canceled, and two American Los Angeles-class submarines — Memphis and Toledo — put in at European ports. These two vessels, plus the Royal Naval submarine HMS Splendid, were monitoring the activities of the war games.^[5] Some have speculated that a collision with the Toledo, which was closely shadowing the Kursk, may have led to the disaster (see below).

[edit] Emergency batteries

Another theory for the first explosion was that one of the emergency batteries exploded. At the time it wasn't uncommon for batteries to explode due to battery leakage. The batteries, which act as a back-up power source if the reactors are shut off, are similar to a car battery in that they charge up during use, produce hydrogen, and if they leak they could possibly cause an explosion. Most people reject this theory because the torpedo tube showed signs of being blown off first.

[edit] Film: Kursk: a Submarine in Troubled Waters

French filmmaker Jean-Michel Carré, in Kursk: a Submarine in Troubled Waters,^[6][7] which aired on 7 January 2005 on French TV channel France 2, alleged that Kursk sank because of a sequence of events triggered by a collision with the US submarine USS Toledo. According to Carré, Kursk was performing tests of a new torpedo called Shkval and the tests were being observed by two US submarines on duty in the region, USS Toledo and USS Memphis.

At some point, the film portrays Kursk and the Toledo as having collided, damaging the former (video footage shows long gashes carved in the side of Kursk) and, in order to prevent Kursk firing upon Toledo (allegedly presaged by the audible opening of Kursk's torpedo tubes), Memphis fired a Mark 48 torpedo at the Russian submarine. It is claimed that Kursk was opening its torpedo tubes in order to launch the Shkval in accordance with the exercise, however if the torpedo had been launched at the Toledo the US Submarine would not have been able to avoid the attack. According to this story, the US torpedo would have hit an old type Russian torpedo on Kursk which did not explode until later, but when the explosion did occur it seriously damaged Kursk. Carré claims that Russian president Vladimir Putin deliberately concealed the truth about what happened and let the crew members die in order to not strain relations with the US Government.^[8] The New York Times later revealed that Memphis had in fact been observing Kursk during the torpedo tests.

Another incident purportedly supporting the veracity of this story is that Toledo arrived at the Håkonsvern Naval Station in Bergen, Norway, where -- per standard practice -- no non-Americans were allowed to inspect the submarine in its dock.^[9] Another circumstance purporting to confirm the story and its coverup is that the USA freed Russia from payment responsibility for a substantial monetary loan and even gave Russia permission to take out another loan. In addition, although the submarine was later raised by a Dutch salvage company, the damaged front section was cut off and left on the seabed. Despite this apparent secrecy, video footage of the raised submarine showed what appeared to be concave impact damage.^[10] The documentary claims this to be typical indication of U.S. MK-48 torpedoes. Today, the salvaged portions of Kursk have been melted down and recycled.

Some Western submarine experts point out that there are a number of flaws with the theory regarding a collision scenario^{[citation needed]}:

1. A Russian Oscar II class submarine has more than twice the submerged displacement (physical mass) of a Los Angeles-class submarine, and a considerably thicker hull; it is therefore not credible from a fundamental physics perspective that Kursk would have sustained far worse damage in such a collision.
2. U.S. peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) would not in any way have permitted a U.S. submarine to fire upon Kursk without first being fired upon, and no credible argument has been made by anyone for that scenario.
3. If the alleged collision had actually taken place, the proximity of the colliding U.S. submarine to Kursk would have prevented the other U.S. submarine captain—even a hypothetical "renegade" one—from firing a MK-48 (which uses acoustic homing for target acquisition) torpedo at Kursk, as this would have equally endangered the Toledo.
4. The idea that a U.S. torpedo would be capable of 'hitting' an on-board Russian torpedo — which only later detonated—is extremely improbable; torpedoes function by getting very close to their target and then detonating their massive warheads, crushing the target with the force of the explosion. No weapon in any nation's submarine force makes a small hole like the claimed entry hole.

[edit] See also

• Russian submarine K-141 Kursk
• List of the Kursk submarine dead
• Major submarine incidents since 2000
• Nadezhda Tylik
• Soviet submarine K-129 (Golf II)
• List of sunken nuclear submarines
• Travel is Dangerous, a song by Scottish post-rock band Mogwai
• National Geographic Seconds From Disaster episodes

[edit] References

[edit] External links

• The Recovery of the Russian Federation Nuclear Powered Submarine Kursk, Peter Davidson, Huw Jones, John H. Large, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers - World Maritime Technology Conference, October 2003
• Risks and Hazards in Recovering the Nuclear Powered Submarine Kursk, John H. Large, Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 23-24 June 2005
• Site in Russian
• The Kursk Tragedy
• In depth coverage by the BBC
• Flash Animation of the explosion and the rescue attempts (Turkish)
• Pictures of Kursk in dry dock after explosion
• The Kursk Odyssey, a symphony to the 118 submariners of the Kursk, composed by Didier Euzet

[edit] Further reading

• Robert Moore (2002). A Time To Die: The Kursk Disaster. Bantam Books. ISBN 0-553-81385-4. 
• Barany, Zoltan (2004). The Tragedy of the Kursk: Crisis Management in Putin's Russia. Government and Opposition 39.3, 476-503.
• Truscott, Peter (2004): The Kursk Goes Down – pp. 154-182 of Putin's Progress, Pocket Books, London, ISBN 0-7434-9607-8