User talk:Romaioi

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Hello, Romaioi, and welcome to Wikipedia! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are some pages that you might find helpful:

I hope you enjoy editing here and being a Wikipedian! Please sign your messages on discussion pages using four tildes (~~~~); this will automatically insert your username and the date. If you need help, check out Wikipedia:Questions, ask me on my talk page, or ask your question on this page and then place {{helpme}} before the question. Again, welcome!

I'm answering your reply here:
Thank you for your contributions to Roman Empire, that article truly needs additional references. And, yes, some of the references in there do need to be fixed. The proper way of using references on Wikipedia is described here. It might look overwhelming, but once you get used to those templates they actually make editing easier and the articles more reliable. Drop a note on my talk page if you need any help.
I don't claim to know a lot about the Roman civilisation (though I did study their architecture for a few years), but I do agree the traditional description of the Romans is simplistic (as is the traditional description of Ancient Greek civilisation).
Regarding your user name, you are free to choose virtually any name you want. The recommendation to remain anonymous is mostly a concern for your own privacy. If you want to, you can describe yourself on your user page, but that's up to you.
Again, let me know if I can help you in any way
/ Raven in Orbit (t | c) 15:02, 27 May 2008 (UTC)


Thanks very much Raven. Sorry for the inconsitencies in my referencing. I was not intending to go into the "detail" that I did as I knew I would need my books to refer to - most of the ones I need are in storage. Its a shame about the simplicity seeing that it is based on scholarship that is now over a hundred years old. So much has been learned since then yet much of the literature available to the public continues to paint the old picture. The manner in which the other cultures are generally neglected adds to the dissappointment. On the whole though, that Roman empire article is quite goood. In fact I have been rather impressed with the degree of detail, and scope of coverage in Wikipedia in general. It is proving quite a success.
Thanks also for the offers of assistance and the tip on the tilda's. I read about them but didn't catch on until your reply.
I hope to be able to contribute more soon.
Best wishes,
Romaioi (talk) 15:36, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Julia's strength

Hello! Could you please cite the exact reference you gave for Julia having only 6,000 men? Because I am really doubtful of it. Greek sources universally give 10,800 men, which is a logical number, while 6,000 is way too low. A binary division means a division with two infantry regiments plus support services (artillery regiment etc), which is way more than 6,000 men, at least at the beginning of a campaign. If you check out the numbers on the 4 Alpine Division Cuneense, you'll see what I mean. If one Alpini Regiment had 5,206 men (taken from here), even if we suppose it was understrength, there is no way that a whole division could have numbered 6,000. Thank you. Constantine ✍ 09:59, 2 June 2008 (UTC)

Oh, I looked up an old Osprey book on the Italian Army, and it clearly says: establishment strength for an Alpine division: 13,000 men. Constantine ✍ 10:01, 2 June 2008 (UTC)


Hello Konstantinos! Thanks for the message. This is a much better medium - more room. I have been scouring my library for an exact reference that states the Julia's numbers (this one actually states 7000) all afternoon and am still looking. I will have to keep looking (thats why I said "reference tba" in the summary of my original modification). The other references that I have been included so far are there to point illustrate that Italian divisions were binary. I stated ca. 6000 because, as a result of the binary policy, Italian divsions had between 5000 - 7000 troops - I can cite half a dozen references that state this (Bierman and Smith's Alemain book (2002) is one example off the top of my head). But as I later found that the "binary" concept was briefly mentioned earlier, they seem to have become moot. It was Mussolini's "trick" to make it appear that the Italian army was much larger than it was.
I saw the Cuneese numbers in my search and was suprised and remain somewhat skeptical. I would love to know where those numbers came from - I tried to establish it but had no luck. My skeptisim comes from the tendency of authors of English texts (particularly the older ones) not have done their homework regarding the Itatalian contributions and other minor powers, literally. Further, they tend to be almost always grossly and unfairly dismissive of Italian involvement. Another characteristic of the English texts is to ignore the binary nature of the Italian divisions, with the result being that they overstate the numbers. This has been addressed thoroughly in the Walker reference that I included (I may have to move that the section in question now). (Refreshingly, there seams to be a change in attitude in some of the more recent texts as there are now some authors who are doing their homework on the Italians and others. (The same goes for all the other minor powers, such as Greece, Romania, Slovakia, etc - they all get ignored too often). So please forgive my cinicism regarding the numbers from the Osprey book - I do not rate it for statistics regarding the Italians, with justification. Romaioi (talk) 15:26, 2 June 2008 (UTC)
Sorry for my verboseness. This is a subject that I can go on about. I started out many years ago trying to learn about the involvement of the other powers and it took a most of that time just to piece together the Italian story. Finally, a few books like Walker's have come out that have been able to sum it up nicely.
But I do note from the Commando Supremo reference the mention of 3 regiments, so I guess the Alpini could be different (and my citation indicating 7000 may be incorrect - but it may be right as per my example in th P.S. below). I would still be surprised by this seeing that other special units tended to have less men, not more. The Folgore, for example, had 5000 men at Alamein. The armoured divsions had less than 8,000 men each and were acknowledged to be the equivalenmt to an English reginement.
Getting back to our problem. Can you please do me a favour and cite one of your Greek texts on the numbers in the Julia division? I would be happy with that (and happy to have it changed back to 11,000 and my citations pulled). When I eventually find my reference that says otherwise I will add that number beside your referenced number and then look into it further.
By the way, could you please provide me with a link to a list of established userboxes? I like what you and others have put on your pages and would like to do similar, but so far have not had luck finding the link. Sorry, I am new.
Sincerely
Romaioi (talk) 14:41, 2 June 2008 (UTC)
P.S. I have just done a serach and have found plenty of websites that mention 10800 for the Julia. But on the very same pages they are getting the total troop involvement on both sides wrong. Also, on a nother page, for the Centauro division there is the indication that it is coposed of 3 regiments (1 armoured, 1 artillery, 1 Bersaglieri and several mortorcycle battalions - standard for an Italian armoured divsion), the the divsions was only composed of "4,037 men & 24 guns + 163 light tanks (90 serviceable)" [1]. 3 regiments, yet less than 5000 men!!!! This is covered in the Walker book. Consistency is lacking. Like I said if you can provide a sound citation for the 10800, I would be satisfied... and I will continue searching for my citation.Romaioi (talk) 15:26, 2 June 2008 (UTC)
Hello again! I agree with you on numerous issues you raised: the persistent underestimation of the Italians, the lack of attention paid to minor powers, etc. However, as I said, 6,000 is simply not believable for a division. It may be a division after it has suffered losses in campaign (e.g. the Alamein case), but not a peacetime establishment, even for a binary division. Indeed, after the Battle of Pindus, "Julia" may have numbered ca. 6-7 thousand men, as it suffered some 5,000 casualties. Especially considering that "Julia" was supposed to act as an independent operational command, 6,000 men would be suicidal. (Of course, attacking with 6 understrength divisions in impossible terrain in late October is also suicidal, but...) As for the Cuneese numbers, since they come from a website set up by the division's veterans, I think they ought to be reliable (indeed they are: Dati ufficiali provenienti da un documento dell'Archivio Storico Militare di Roma, firmato dal Colonnello Capo di Stato Maggiore, Lorenzo Navone.). Doubtless, the numbers represent establishment strength, possibly reinforced for the Russian campaign, but still a far cry from 6,000. Now, I didn't get the 11,000 number from the web (notoriously unreliable, except if it can be corroborated in multiple sites), but from a book, which, alas, is now about 300 km away, stored in a box in a basement... So give me some time on this... PS, if you can provide some more insight on how the Italians viewed the whole conflict, I'd be grateful (the Greco-Italian War article is what got me writing here, so it's kind of a pet project). Cheers, Constantine ✍
PS: The 7,000 division could refer to the type AS 42 infantry division, but this did not apply to 1940.

Hello! I am glad we are talking in this manner. You’ve got me thinking that the make up of the Alpini may not have been affected by the binary policy, for various reasons. I can relate to having the appropriate book locked away in storage. I fear the same thing for my reference. I will switch it back to 10,800 and mention that a citation is needed.

But in light of the fact that the policy was for a binary make up, that, for example, a full strength Folgore division had a compliment of 5000 (and numbers like this are quoted for various Italian divisions in various texts), why its 6000 for an Italian division not a believable? Further, Mussolini, boasted that he had 73(?) divisions, but the reality was that at the start of the war they had only enough men for 20 odd divisions (the number quoted was 200,000 men in Bauer’s book) and they were not able to fully equip them. All this has been confused by English exaggerations of Italian numbers. I can relate to you having difficulty picturing it – it took me a long time also!

P.S. I could not find that number on the Cuneese website. I’ll look further. I am starting to doubt it less and less.

On the Italian perspective on the conflict (I assume you mean Greco-Italian campaign). Well, generally speaking, Italians were against the war in general – Greco-Italian campaign no exception. Amongst the Italian public there was strong anti-German feeling well before the war, whilst Britain (and Greece also, but not Yugoslavia) was seen, by both the public and the Royalists, as a natural ally. I cannot stress this point enough. Italo Balbo was the one person of note in the Fascist camp who was vocally anti-German and pro-British, but he was shot down by friendly fire when the war started. (That being said, hypocritical British policy against the Italians pushed Mussolini towards Germany). He (Balbo) claimed that they would end up licking the German boots and was right.

Whilst Mussolini did not enjoy anywhere near the same total support as Hitler did, he was able to silence any opposition by various means, typically through thuggery, but also often by false accusation and incarceration. So he was able to do things with free hand, but only so long as he produced enough results.

The public were aware of the strain of previous wars on the economy. The Ethiopian invasion is well known to have cost far more than predicted and place enormous strain on the economy. However, the Spanish civil war, in which Italian involvement to not finish until 1939, cost even more, amounting to around 14% of the GDP. Unlike the Germans, who ensured that they received payment from Franco for their services, Mussolini gave Italian aid for free (only later presenting a bill that was never paid). The economic impact of these wars is discussed by Walker (yet again) and in Anton Beevor’s Spanish Civil War.

Even Mussolini was aware that the country needed to consolidate – they had actually made good plans to do so. He actually informed the Germans that Italy would not be ready for any conflict until 1943. And Hitler promised no wars until then. This “deceipt” by Hitler is partly what catalysed Mussolini’s motivation to jump in. But mainly, Mussolini was merely being opportunistic and thought the war would be over in months. He went in knowing full well that Italy was not prepared and he was aware that the military was not sufficiently modernised, equipped or coordinated – he has never been forgiven. (He was even so silly as to declare war when half the merchant fleet was at foreign ports – all lost overnight.) It was also an opportunity for him to distract the public from the growing economic troubles at home (standard political practice really).

The decision to invade Greece (which obviously came later) was solely Mussolini's (I have read conflicting stories on what Cianno wanted – all I know is he wanted an expansionist policy but I am not sure how Greece fared in his mind), yet the the rest of the high command, Bodaglio included, irrespective of how much they may have dissagreed, were incompetently complacent. So they are equally to blame. There are plenty of texts about all this (most only talk about it in patches though), but I can’t list all of them off the top of my head. (You know of Bauer, Walker and now Beevor. But also Bierman and Smith’s book on Alamein talks about it. The two books by Eugenio Corti also talk about the soldiers perspective in general. That’s what I can remember off the top of my head.)

Whilst the public could not do much to stop the war from occurring there was a great deal of sabotage of the War effort “from home”. Munition supply cases were often sent to the fronts full of sand, for example. This happened a great deal and I am surprised there isn’t much written in English texts (actually I am not surprised). My grandfather, spoke of this frequently. He was an arditi who served in Yugoslavia and North Africa. And won a silver medal for bravery for successfully diverting an enemy attack, that otherwise would have taken his unit by surprise, onto himself (or his general direction). Prior to that he was shot in the neck (a superficial wound), but refused to be left to wait for medical aid (as it usually never arrived and it meant death or capture), so he continued on.

Being of Italian descent and having spoken to plenty of people (mainly southern Italians) who lived through the war, my father included, I always received the same message: Italians did not want the war. Most of the evidence suggests this to be genuine.

From a personal perspective I do not see why the Italians did not attempt to align themselves with Greece and Yugoslavia in the form of a genuine economic/military alliance. To me it seams obvious. I believe that is would have been win-win, both defensively, economically and regional stability. But of course, this is all from the luxury of my own arm chair.

My own pet interest in the war is the plight of the common soldier on both sides, who was always sent in to do the dirty work and die for the political cronies who sent them to fight, almost always for the wrong reasons. Equally, I am interested in the fate of civilians. And I enjoy learning of the lesser known stories.

Sorry, I have written a lot.

Sincerely,

Romaioi (talk) 03:57, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

I fully understand the passion with which you write. It was a stupid, needless war, on which both sides suffered. As you can imagine, I too had family members in the front (my grandmother's brother was actually killed during the first days of the war in Pindus), so I too grew up with tales of it. My own grandfather was very reluctant to go, so his tales were always a bit more realistic and gritty than what one heard on TV or read in books. I don't think that we, today, could endure as much as they did. But here in Greece, the repulsion of the invasion is (justifiably) a major source of pride, with the result that public perception of it is neither very critical nor objective (it often reminds one of the Soviet/Russian stance on the "Great Patriotic War").
The attitude towards the Italians is ambivalent: on the one hand, they are looked down upon for having been defeated and then claiming victory by clinging to the heels of the Wehrmacht (which often leads many to underestimate their valour as individual soldiers). In turn, as a people they are well liked - there is the saying "una fazza, una razza" - and their relatively humane and un-warlike comportment as occupiers makes them more sympathetic in tales. But still, to many Greeks, even today, as far as WW2 is concerned, they were invaders and occupiers, and only that. I remember that about 15 years ago, some family friends, who had been born a few years after WW2, visited Italy, around the Festa della Liberazione. They were outraged that the Italians had the temerity to celebrate Resistance against the Germans. Very few people here know or bother to know anything of what happened in Italy after 1943, and the Occupation was a traumatic event for Greece...
As for the Italian army, the only book I've read that covers the Italian war effort as a whole is "Hitler's Italian Allies" by MacGregor Knox. As is evident from the title alone, he doesn't take a sympathetic point of view, but still, the data he presents are both shocking and overwhelming in quantity and their implications. Even taking account for some bias, they show a military machine that is outdated, totally unprepared, with serious deficiencies in the command echelons and the strategic level, not to speak of the armaments industry and the national economy. To go to war, even as opportunistically as Mussolini did, with such a military, was simply a crime, tantamount to treason.
However I don't think that Mussolini or the Royalist elite would have even thought of the alliance you proposed with Greece or Yugoslavia. Their minds, already since the 1910s, had been set on a "Mediterranean Empire" which involved the subordination of these countries. Bear in mind that Italy occupied the Dodecanese in 1912, promised freedom to the islands' population and to Greece, even signed a treaty to this effect in 1919, and then unilaterally withdrew. In 1920, during the war in Anatolia, they offered shelter to Kemal's irregulars in their occupation zone, and after they withdrew, they supplied the Turks with weapons. Then they applied pressure in favour of Albania on the Northern Epiruys issue, and then there was the Corfu episode. So there was a lot of bad blood between Greece and Italy, even before Mussolini came to power. Ironically, in the early 1930s, Venizelos steered Greece away from Britain and towards Italy. If Mussolini had been a more far-sighted man, that could have been the beginning of a close relationship. Of course, given the internal political turmoil in Greece at the time, making such predictions is tricky, and either way, whether this "alliance" would have succeeded in remaining neutral during or after WW2, is questionable. Cheers, Constantine ✍ 11:17, 4 June 2008 (UTC)
I completely understand the Greek perspective. It is to be expected. In the same fashion, Italians could justifiably have the same attitude towards the French and Austrians, in so much they are invader/occupiers - but for some reason they do not. Instead they have these attitudes against each other. And I certainly applaud the achievements of the Greeks in defending their homeland. No invasion with that kind of motivation is justified, benevolent rulers or not. But Mussolini was an irrational megalomaniac; his mindset being akin to that of the British and French 40+ years prior. So he and his cohorts sought expansion in the same fashion. Treason is precisely the right word for what Mussolini etc did, particularly in light of the fact that they were aware of the issues and actually had a timeline in place to modernize etc.
Whilst I can understand the perspective of your friends, it does highlight that progress come comes from understanding all perspectives. Going back to the Italian perspective as an example, it is important to realize that the situation in Italy was rather complicated. For Italians, beyond their immediate poverty, their main concerns were the oppression they experienced under Mussolini’s Fascism, their brothers, fathers and sons being sent to foreign lands to be slaughtered for causes they did not believe in, and their suffering under the Nazi’s (which was rather immense). From this perspective, they have every right to celebrate their liberation. I would hope that your friends would appreciate this and the fact that post-WWII Italy was governed by the very people who fought against the fascists and the Nazi’s (they fought against them in Spain also).
The hardships were no less severe than in any other place. My grandfather, after returning from his ordeals (the chap spent three days in the morgue because he was believed dead from his wounds after his drawing of the enemy attack I spoke of) had to then hide and defend his family from the General Juin-sanctioned rapes and murders that were occurring around Monte Cassino. My wife’s grandfather, a Bersiglieri, survived 2 years in a Nazi concentration camp (extra special treatment was reserved for Italians as a result of their perceived betrayal). A family friend’s father, who served at Tobruk, does not so much begrudge the Germans as he does feel that the Italian betrayal of the Germans was shocking (though he does not appear to be fully aware of the Germans provocation) – but I understand where he is coming from. Another family member, a priest, was shot for hiding Jews during the German occupation. I am sure you could draw many parallels.
To my knowledge Italy has apologized for her wrong doings (with the possible exception of some atrocities in Africa). Though it will be no consolation to Greece, Italy certainly received more punishment that she gave. In the end, my opinion does not matter. There is nothing I can do. But all I know is that if all nations refuse to understand events from all perspectives then we will never move forward. Moreover, those who chose to slant history, or chose to ignore the facts, are almost as guilty as those who committed the crimes. Many historians are guilty of this. Reconciliation is always possible, Australia and Turkey are an example of this. Unfortunately, Turkey and Armenia are an example of the opposite.
Yet, same theme continually re-emerges: the politics of the few always destroys the prospects and relationships of the many.
On another note, you may not be aware of it but there were Royalists that were pro-Greece. Given that Italy’s queen was from Montenegro, it also stands to reason that pro-Yugoslav factions were present. The Corfu incident was Mussolini (taking advantage of the death of one of his Generals), Albania was considered by the Italians as within their sphere of influence in accordance with the 1915 Treaty of London (it was not an anti-Greek affair, the motivation was the protection her interests) and the Dodecanese was to be returned to Greece in exchange for land in Anatolia, which did not occur as a result of the Greco-Turkish war. I am also sure that the Greek occupation, by force, of Turkish territory that was designated to Italy under the 1917 Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne did not help things. So as we can see, those events were not as simple as suggested in your text (I am not critcising, I am merely highlighting that there is probably much more to it than either of us understand). I have never come across a source that discusses the Italians giving aid to Kemal’s troops in that manner, so I cannot comment. I do find it surprising, however, given that the two countries were extremely antagonistic towards each other since prior to the Italo-Turkish war – there was greater animosity between Italy and Turkey than Italy and Greece.
My suggestion of a Greco-Italo-Yugoslav alliance was not based on any historical precedent – it just seams logical to me. I was aware of Venizelos’s motives towards Italy and have always found Mussolini’s decision to invade Greece all the more outrageous for it. Una fazza, una razza is so very true, which made it all the more a shame for what occurred. Most Sincerely Romaioi (talk) 17:39, 7 June 2008 (UTC).