Roman military confederation

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The Roman military confederation (or confederacy or commonwealth) is a term devised by modern historians to denote the Roman Republic's system of military alliances with the tribes and city-states of the Italian peninsula prior to the Social War of 91-88 BC, at the end of which all Rome's Italian allies were awarded Roman citizenship. The Romans themselves referred to their confederates as the socii Latini ("Latin allies"), although most were not members of the Latin tribe strictly speaking, but members of various other Italian tribes and city-states.

It was a defence system built up by the Roman republic during a century of warfare in the Italian peninsula (the late 4th/early 3rd centuries BC). It was a not a confederation technically, but a series of bilateral treaties between Rome and about 150 autonomous Italian states, with a central obligation on the ally to contribute to the Roman army, on demand, a number of fully-equipped troops up to a specified maximum each year. The confederation had fully evolved by 264 BC and remained for 200 years the basis of Roman military organisation.

From 338 BC to 88 BC, Roman legions were invariably accompanied on campaign by an equal number of somewhat larger allied units called alae. 75% of a normal consular army's cavalry was supplied by the Italian socii.

[edit] Meanings of the term "Latin"

The Romans themselves used the term "Latin" loosely, and this can be confusing. The term was used to describe what were actually three distinct populations:

1. The Latin tribe strictly speaking, to which the Romans themselves belonged. These were the inhabitants of Latium Vetus south of the river Tiber, speakers of the Latin language.
2. The inhabitants of Latin colonies. These were coloniae made up of mixed Roman/Latin colonists.
3. All the Italian allies of Rome, not only the Latin colonies, but also the other non-Latin allies (socii).

To avoid confusion, the term "Latin" in this article will be used only to refer to group (2). Group (3) will be referred to as the socii or "Italian allies". Group (1) will be called "original Latins".

[edit] Ethnic composition of ancient Italy

Linguistic map of Italy in the 6th century BC. Gallic tribes (in dark blue) had already colonised the region of Piedmont. By 400 BC, they had overrun much of the rest of the Po plain in the North, and Gaulish dialects had displaced Lepontic, Raetic, Etruscan and N. Picene in that region. Raetic survived in the Alps and Etruscan in its heartland, Etruria south of the Appenines. Note the tiny area occupied by the original Latins. Clour scheme: green shades Italic languages; red Etrusco-Raetic; blue Celtic; mauve Illyrian; yellow Greek

The Italian peninsula at this time was a patchwork of different ethnic groups, languages and cultures. These may be divided into the following broad nations:

1. The Italic tribes, that dominated central and southern Italy. These included the original Latins and a large number of other tribes, most notably the Samnites (actually a league of tribes) who dominated south central Italy. In addition to Latin, these tribes spoke Umbrian, Oscan and Messapian dialects. All were closely related Indo-European languages. Tribal-based territories of varying size. The Italic tribes were mostly tough hill-dwelling pastoralists, who made superb infantrymen, especially the Samnites. It is believed the latter invented the manipular infantry formation and the use of javelins and oblong shields that were adopted by the Romans at the end of the Samnite Wars.^[1] An isolated Italic group were the Veneti in the NE. They gave their name to the city of Venice.
2. The Greeks, who had colonised the coastal areas of southern Italy (known to the Romans as Magna Graecia for that reason) from the 8th/7th centuries BC. The Greek colonies had the most advanced civilisation in the Italian peninsula, much of which was adopted by the Romans. Their language, although Indo-European, was quite different from Latin. City-states with territories. As maritime cities, the Greeks' primary military significance was naval. They invented the best warship of the ancient world, the trireme. Some of the original Greek colonies (such as Capua and Cumae) had in the 4th century been subjugated by the neighbouring Italic tribes and become Oscan-speaking. The surviving Greek cities in 264 BC were all coastal: Neapolis, Poseidonia (Paestum), Velia, Rhegium, Locri, Croton, Thurii, Heraclea, Metapontum and Tarentum. The most populous were Neapolis, Rhegium and Tarentum, all of which had large, strategic harbours on the Tyrrhenian, the Strait of Messina and the Ionian sea respectively. Tarentum had in the late 4th century been a major power and hegemon (leading power) of the Italiote league, a confederation of the Greek cities in Italy. But its military capability had been crippled by the Romans, who defeated Tarentum in the early 3rd century.
3. The Etruscans, who dominated the region between the rivers Arno and Tiber, still retaining a derived name (Tuscany) today. The Etruscans spoke a non Indo-European language which today is largely unknown and a distinctive culture. Some scholars believe Rome may originally have been an Etruscan city at the time of the Roman kings. City-states with territories.
4. The Gauls, who had migrated into, and colonised, the plain of the Po river (pianura padana) in the 6th and 5th centuries BC. This region is now known as northern Italy, but in the 3rd century BC was not regarded as part of Italy at all, but part of Gaul. The Romans called it Gallia Cisalpina ("Gaul this side of the Alps"). They spoke Gaulish dialects, part of the Celtic group of Indo-European languages. Tribal-based territories with some citylike centres.
5. The Ligurians, occupying the region known to the Romans (and still called today) Liguria, southwest of the Gauls. It is unclear whether their language was non Indo-European (related to Iberian) or Celtic, related to Gaulish. Tribal-based territories.
6. The Campanians, occupying the fertile plain between the river Volturno and the bay of Naples. These were not a distinct ethnic group, but a mixed Samnite/Greek population with Etruscan elements. The Samnites had conquered the Greco-Etruscan city-states in the late 5th century. Speaking the Oscan language, they had developed a distinctive culture and identity. City-states with territories.^[2] As plain-dwellers, the horses played an important role for the Campanians and they had the best cavalry in the peninsula.^[3] Their main city was Capua, probably the second-largest city in Italy at this time. Other important cities were Nola, Acerrae, Suessula.

[edit] Roman conquest of Italy 338-264 BC

Map of the Roman confederation in 100 BC, on the eve of the Social War. Note the patchwork political configuration. The Roman possessions (in grey-blue) straddle the strategic centre of the Italian peninsula and the Tyrrhenian coastal plain. Latin colonies (dark red) are scattered in strategic locations. Other socii (pink) are concentrated in the mountainous interior

The 75-year period between 338 BC and the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264 BC saw an explosion of Roman expansion and the subjugation of the entire peninsula to Roman political hegemony, achieved by virtually incessant warfare. Roman territory (ager Romanus) grew enormously in size, from ca. 5,500 to 27,000 km², ca. 20% of peninsular Italy. The Roman citizen population nearly tripled, from ca. 350,000 to ca. 900,000, ca. 30% of the peninsular population.^[4] Latin colonies probably comprised a further 10% of the peninsula (about 12,500 km²). The remaining 60% of the peninsula remained in the hands of other Italian socii who were, however, forced to accept Roman supremacy.

The expansion phase started with the defeat of the Latin League (338 BC) and the annexation of most of Latium Vetus (Old Latium, the territory of the original Latins, a small region south of the river Tiber). Subsequently, the main thrusts of expansion were southwards towards the Volturno river, annexing the territories of the Aurunci, Volsci, Sidicini and the Campani themselves; and eastwards across the centre of the peninsula towards the Adriatic coast, incorporating the Hernici, Sabini, Aequi and Picentes. The years after the departure of Pyrrhus in 275 BC saw a further round of expansion: the annexation of substantial territories in southern Italy at the expense of the Italic tribes of Lucania and Bruttium. The Bruttii lost large forest lands, whose timber was needed to build ships; the Lucani had to give up their most fertile land, the coastal plain on which the Latin colony of Paestum was established in 273 BC. In the North, the Romans annexed the ager Gallicus, a large stretch of plain on the Adriatic coast from the Senones Gallic tribe, with a Latin colony at Ariminum in 268 BC. By 264, Rome controlled the entire Italian peninsula, either directly as Roman territory or indirectly through the socii.

The prevailing explanation for this explosive expansion, as proposed in W. V. Harris' War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (1979), is that the Roman state was an exceptionally martial society, whose every class from the aristocracy downwards was militarised and whose economy was based on the spoils of annual warfare. Rome's neighbouring peoples, on the other hand, were seen as essentially passive victims who strove, ultimately unsuccessfully, to defend themselves against Roman aggression. More recently, however, Harris' theory of Roman "exceptionalism" has been challenged by A. M. Eckstein, who points out that Rome's neighbours were equally militaristic and aggressive and that Rome was just one competitor for territory and hegemony in a peninsula whose interstate relations were largely anarchic and lacking effective mechanisms for resolution of interstate disputes. It was a world of continuous struggle for survival, of terrores multi for the Romans, a phrase from Livy that Eckstein uses to describe the politico-military situation in the peninsula before the imposition of the pax Romana. The reasons for the Romans' ultimate triumph was their superior manpower and political and military organisation.^[5]

Eckstein points out that it took 200 years of warfare for the Rome to subdue just its Latin neighbours: the Latin War did not end until 338 BC. This demonstrates that the other Latin cities were as martial as Rome itself. Before pax Romana, the Etruscan city-states to the north existed, like the Latin states, in a state of "militarised anarchy", with chronic and fierce competition for territory and hegemony. The evidence is that every Etruscan city until 500 BC was sited on virtually impregnable hilltops and cliff edges. Nonetheless, by 400 BC they were all walled. Etruscan culture was highly militaristic: graves with weapons and armour were common and captured enemies were offered as human sacrifice and their severed heads displayed in public e.g. the fate 300 Roman prisoners at Tarquinii in 358 BC.^[6] It took the Romans a century and 4 wars (480-390) just to reduce Veii, a single neighbouring Etruscan city.

[edit] Pattern of Roman expansion

The rise of Roman hegemony by three main means: (a) direct annexation of territory and incorporation of the existing inhabitants; (b) the foundation of Latin colonies on territory confiscated from defeated peoples; and (c) the binding of defeated peoples to Rome by treaties of perpetual alliance.

(a) Since the inhabitants of Latium Vetus were the Romans' fellow-tribesmen, there was no reluctance to grant them full citizenship. But annexations outside Latium Vetus soon gathered pace. The Romans then encountered the problem that their new subjects could, if granted full Roman citizenship, outnumber original Latins in the citizen body, threatening Rome's ethnic and cultural integrity. So they invented the civitas sine suffragio, a second-class citizenship which carried all the rights and obligations of full citizenship except the right to vote. By this device, the Roman republic could enlarge its territory unlimitedly, without losing its character as a Latin city-state.^[7] The most important use of this device was the incorporation of the Campanian city-states into the ager Romanus: this brought the most fertile agricultural land in the peninsula and a large population under Roman control.^[8] But tribes neighbouring Latium Vetus, all traditional enemies of Rome, also figured large on the sine suffragio rolls: Aurunci, Volsci, Sabini, Aequi.

(b) Alongside direct annexation, the second vehicle of Roman expansion was the colonia (colony), both Roman and Latin. The 19 Latin colonies founded in the period 338-263 outnumbered the Roman ones by 4 to 1. This is because they involved a mixed Roman/original Latin/Italian allied population and so could more easily attract the necessary number of settlers. But because of the mix, they did not hold citizenship (the Romans among them lost their full citizenship). Instead, they were granted the iura Latina ("Latin rights") held by original Latins before their incorporation into the citizen body. These rights included connubium ("inter-marriage", the right to marry a Roman citizen), commercium (the right to use Roman courts) and migratio, the right to migrate to Roman territory. In essence, the rights were similar to the civitates sine suffragio, except that the Latin colonists were not citizens, but peregrini (foreigners), although they could recover their citizenship by returning to Roman territory.^[9] The question arises as to why the Latin colonists were not also accorded citizenship sine suffragio. The answer is probably for reasons of military security. Classified as non-citizens, the Latins served in the allied alae, not the legions. There they could act as loyal "watchdogs" on potentially treacherous Italian socii, while the Romans/original Latins performed the same function in the legions on their sine suffragio colleagues.

The post-338 Latin colonies comprised 2,500-6,000 adult male settlers (average 3,700) based on an urban centre with a territorium of an average size of 370 km².^[10] The territorium would frequently consist of some of the defeated people's best agricultural land, since the social function of colonies was to satisfy the Romans' land-hungry peasantry.^[11] But the choice of site for a colonia was dictated by strategic considerations. Roman and Latin colonies would be located so as to be able to guard key geographical points: the coasts (e.g. Antium, Ariminum), the exits to mountain passes (Alba Fucens), major road intersections (Venusia) and river fords (Interamna).^[12] Also colonies would be sited to provide a defensive barrier between Rome and her allies and potential enemies, as well as to separate those enemies from each other and kep watch on their activity: a divide-and-rule strategy. Thus Rome's string of colonies and eventual annexation of a belt of territory across the centre of the Italian peninsula was driven by the strategic aim of separating the Etruscans from the Samnites and interdicting a hugely dangerous coalition of these powerful nations.^[13]

(c) However, the Romans mostly did not annex the whole of the conquered enemy territory, but only selected portions. The defeated peoples generally retained the major part of their territory and their political autonomy. Their sovereignty was only limited in the fields of military and foreign policy, by a treaty with Rome always requiring them to provide troops to serve under Roman command and usually requiring them to "have the same friends and enemies as Rome" (in effect prohibiting them from conducting independent diplomacy).^[14] In some cases, no territory was annexed. For example, after the defeat of Pyrrhus in 175 BC, the Greek city-states of the South were accepted as Roman allies without any loss of territory regardless of whether they had backed Pyrrhus. This was due to the Romans' admiration of Greek culture and the fact that most of the cities contained pro-Roman aristocracies that could be installed in power by the Romans.^[15]

A good case study of how the Romans employed sophisticated divide-and-rule strategies in order to control potentially dangerous enemies is the political settlement imposed on the Samnites after three gruelling wars. The central aim was to prevent a restoration of the Samnite League, a confederation of these warlike tribes which had proved hugely dangerous. After 175 BC, the League's territory was split into three independent cantons: Samnium, Hirpinum and Caudium. A broad belt of Samnite territory was annexed, separating the Samnites from their neighbours the Marsi and Paeligni to the north. Two Latin colonies were founded in the heart of Samnite territory to act as "watchdogs".^[16]

The final feature of Roman hegemony was the construction of a number of paved highways all over the peninsula which revolutionised communication and trade. The most famous and important was the Via Appia from Rome to Brundisium via Campania. Others were the Via Salaria to Picenum, the Via Flaminia from Rome to Arretium (Rimini), and the Via Cassia into Etruria.

[edit] Extent and structure

At the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264 BC, about 150 autonomous Italian states (that is, Italic tribes or Greek and Etruscan city-states) were bound by treaty to Rome.^[17] At this time, the confederation comprised most of the Italian peninsula south of a line formed by the Arno and Rubicon rivers: about 125,000 km², of which ca. 20% was Roman territory, 10% Latin colonies, and 70% Italian socii.^[18] During the period of expansion, a complex pattern of civitates (communities) had evolved, but they may be grouped into three broad categories:

1. Roman civitates. Communities in the ager Romanus, including Roman colonies. Roman territory was concentrated along the Latium - Campania coastal plain, Umbria and Picenum. The inhabitants of most civitates on Roman territory were full Roman citizens. A minority, most importantly the Campanians, were civitates sine suffragio, citizens without the vote who nonetheless served in the legions. In addition to the Romans and original Latins, civitates of the following Umbrian tribes were at this time Roman citizens (with or without suffragium): Aurunci, Sabini, Hernici, Aequi, Volsci, Picentes, Sidicini. Adult male Roman citizens numbered 292,000 in 264 BC, implying a total Roman population of ca. 900,000.^[19] The population of the city of Rome itself was at this time ca. 90,000, making it one of the largest cities in the Mediterranean in the early 3rd century.^[20]
2. Latin colonies were distributed widely over the peninsula, but tended to be sited on the borders of Roman territory or on the coasts. These colonies were generally founded by mixed Roman/original Latin settlers. Latin colonists served in the allied alae. They probably numbered about 25% of the total socii population, i.e. ca. 500,000 persons. In 218 BC, on the eve of the Second Punic War, there were 30 Latin colonies, 19 of which were founded during the period of expansion after 338 BC.^[21] Each therefore had an average of ca. 17,000 inhabitants.
3. Other Italian socii occupied the rest of peninsular Italy and probably numbered ca. 1.5 million in 225 BC (exc. the southern Greeks and Bruttii).^[22] They included the Etruscan city-states, the Umbrian tribes of central Italy and the Oscan tribes of Samnium (south-central Italy).

[edit] Political organisation

The modern term "Roman confederation" is misleading, as it implies some form of common political structure, with a common forum for policy-making, with each constituent of the alliance sending delegates to that forum. Instead, there were no federal political institutions, and indeed not even formal procedures for effective consultation.^[23] Any socius that wished to make representations about policy could do so only by despatching an ad hoc delegation to the Senate. Policy-making in military and foreign policy lay entirely in the hands of the Roman executive authorities: the Consuls and the Senate.^[24] There existed Italian precedents for a federal political structure e.g. the Latin League and the Samnite confederation. But the idea of sharing power with the socii was anathema to the Roman Senate. Livy relates how after Cannae, with the Senate ranks depleted by the deaths of 80 senators, a proposal was put forward that the vacancies should be filled from the ranks of allied leaders. It was indignantly rejected quasi-unanimously. Livy adds that a similar proposal had been made previously by the Latins themselves, with the same result.^[25]

The Roman institutions thus served as the whole confederation's political institutions. In theory, Rome's republican constitution was democratic, based on the principle of the sovereignty of the Roman people. It had also developed an elaborate set of checks-and-balances to prevent the excessive concentration of power. The Consuls, together with other Republican officials, were elected annually by the Roman citizenry (male citizens over 14 only) voting by centuria (constituency) at the comitia centuriata (electoral assembly), held each year on Mars Field at Rome. The popular assemblies also had the right to promulgate laws (leges). The Consuls, who combined both civil and military functions, had equal authority and the right to veto each other's decisions. The main policy-making institution, the Senate, was an unelected body composed mostly of Roman aristocrats but its decrees could not contravene leges and motions in the Senate could be vetoed by one of 10 elected tribunes of the plebs. The tribunes could also veto consular decisions.

These constitutional arrangements were less democratic than they might appear, as elections were rigged heavily in favour of the aristocracy: the two orders of nobility, the senators and the equites (knights) were, until 220 BC, allocated a majority of the centuriae, despite being a tiny minority of the population;^[26] even after the reform of that date they controlled 45% of the votes. Even the concilium plebis, the popular assembly which elected the tribunes of the plebs, became dominated by the wealthier classes. Further, the period of the Samnite wars saw the emergence of the Senate as the predominant political organ at Rome. Senators, 300 in number, held office for life and were appointed by the Censors, periodic officers who were elected to conduct a census of citizens every 5 years. In practice, new appointments were mostly restricted to a narrow group of ex-Consuls (consulares) and other ex-officers. The Consuls were reduced to executive servants of the Senate. The Senate controlled finance, war (the decision to make war and the levying of troops), diplomacy, public order and state religion. The rise of the Senate's role was the inevitable consequence of the increasing complexity of the Roman state due to its expansion, which made government by short-term officers such as the Consuls and by plebiscite impractical.^[27] It is thus more accurate to describe the Roman republic as an oligarchy rather than a democracy. In the words of T. J. Cornell, a contemporary scholar: "The outcome of the political struggles of the 4th century was the formation of a self-serving and self-perpetuating oligarchy which restricted the magistrates' scope for independent political action and at the same time emasculated the theoretical sovereignty of the people's assemblies."^[28]

In any case, the non-citizen socii had no vote and no influence on Roman policy-making.

[edit] Benefits of Roman hegemony

Incorporation into the Roman military confederation thus entailed significant burdens for the socius: the loss of substantial territory, the loss of freedom of action in foreign relations, heavy military obligations and a complete lack of say in how those military contributions were used. Against these, however, must be set the very important advantages of the system for the socii.

By far the most important was the replacement of the anarchic and endemic inter-tribal warfare of 4th century BC Italy by the pax Romana. Each socius' remaining territory was secure from aggression from neighbours. As warfare between socii was now prohibited, inter-social disputes were settled by negotiation or, ever more frequently, by Roman arbitration. The confederation also acted as the peninsula's defender against external invasion and domination. Gallic invasions from the North were, from 390 BC when the Senones Gauls destroyed Rome, seen as the most serious danger and continued into the 1st century BC. Many were so large that they could only realistically be turned back by a common effort of all Italians, organised by the confederation. Such a mobilisation even had a specific name: the tumultus Gallicus, an emergency levy of all able-bodied men, even old men normally exempt from military service.^[29] The last such levy was as late as 60 BC, on the eve of Julius Caesar's conquest of Gaul itself. In the 3rd century, the confederation successfully repulsed the invasion of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal, which threatened to subject the whole peninsula to Greek and Punic domination respectively.^[30]

The Italian allies enjoyed complete autonomy outside the fields of military and foreign policy. They maintained their traditional forms of government, language, laws, taxation and coinage. None were even required to accept a Roman garrison on their territory (except for the special cases of the Greek cities of Tarentum, Metapontum and Rhegium), and even then only when the 2nd Punic War broke out in 218 BC).^[31] Despite this autonomy, many socii voluntarily adopted Roman forms of government, law and coinage.

The military obligations, though onerous, had their rewards. The socii were allowed to share in the spoils of war with Roman citizens, the main remuneration of Republican levy soldiers. This allowed socii soldiers to return home at the end each campaigning season with substantial capital. This was important in persuading socii to serve outside Italy, especially in the 2nd century BC.^[32]

[edit] Military organisation

In the absence of any confederate political bodies, the one institution of Rome's defence system that could be described as confederate was the consular army, (and navy) which brought together both Roman and socii units. For the 250 years between 338 and the Social War, legions were always accompanied by allied alae on campaign. Usually, a consular army would contain an equal number of legions and alae, although because of variations in the size of the respective units, the ratio of socii to Romans in a consular army could range from 2:1 to 1:1,^[33] though normally closer to the latter.

In most cases, the socius' sole treaty obligation to Rome was to supply to the confederate army, on demand, a number of fully-equipped troops up to a specified maximum each year.^[34] The vast majority of socii were required to supply land troops (both infantry and cavalry); but many of the coastal Greek colonies were socii navales, whose obligation was to provide fully-crewed warships to the Roman fleet. Little is known about the size of contingent each socius was bound to provide, and whether it was proportional to population or wealth. But overall, the Romans required the socii to provide not much over half of the total confederate levy. Since the socii population outnumbered the Romans by ca. 2 to 1, the military burden on Roman citizens was proportionately nearly twice as heavy as on the socii.^[35] During the Samnite Wars, the standard levy was raised from 2 to 4 legions. With military operations taking place every single year, this meant ca. 16% of all Roman adult males spent every campaigning season under arms. At times of emergency, when 6 legions were raised, this figure could rise to 25%.^[36] The burden on the socii was half those exceptional proportions.

Apart from a few strategic garrisons such as the ones in the three Greek cities (above), the confederation did not maintain standing or professional military forces, but levied them, by compulsory conscription, as required for each campaigning season. They would then be disbanded at the end of a conflict. To spread the burden, no man was required to serve more than 16 campaign seasons.^[37] The mechanism for this would be a Senate decree (senatus consultum) authorising one or both the Consuls to raise a consular army either of normal size (about 20,000 men) or double-size in emergencies. The Consuls would then issue a levy proclamation ordering each socius to deliver a specified number of troops by a specified date to a specified place where the Consuls would assume command of their armies.^[38] The Senate might also authorise half-size armies to be commanded by the second-ranking Roman elected officials, the Praetors. Although the command authority (imperium) of Consuls and Praetors expired after 12 months, it could be extended by the Senate.^[39]

The Roman and allied levies were kept in separate formations. Roman citizens were assigned to legions, while the Latin and Italian allies were organised into alae (literally: "wings", because they were always posted on the flanks of the Roman line of battle). A pre-Social War consular army always contained an equal number of legions and alae: a normal consular army would contain two legions and two alae, or about 20,000 men (17,500 infantry and 2,400 cavalry).^[40] In times of emergency, a Consul might be authorised to raise a double-strength army of 4 legions and 4 alae e.g. at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, where each Consul commanded an army of about 40,000 men. There were no professional officers. The tribuni militum, the senior officers of a legion, were elected as were the Consuls themselves.^[41] The commanders of the alae, the praefecti sociorum, were appointed by the Consuls.^[42]

[edit] Legions

The legion of this time contained ca. 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry.^[43] To distinguish it from the cohort-based legion of the late Republic, it is often referred to as the "manipular legion" because of its division into 35 manipuli (maniples) of 120 men each. However, in emergencies, the Senate might authorise legions of up to 5,000 strong.^[44] Each legion had 6 tribunes assigned to it, who would take turns to command it in pairs. The cavalry, which was drawn exclusively from the Roman aristocracy, senators and the order of noble knights, was divided into 10 turmae of 30 men each; each turma was officered by 3 decuriones. One of the decurions would command the turma overall.^[45] An important characteristic of legionary recruitment is that it was based on a property qualification: at each census, Roman citizens would be registered in six classes based on wealth. Each soldier was expected to pay for his own equipment, so persons of the lowest class below a certain property rating were not eligible for military service. According to the Greek author Polybius, those with a property rating of under 400 drachmae (a Greek denomination that served as Rome's main silver coin until the launch of the denarius, of similar value, in 211 BC) were assigned to naval service,^[46] which required little equipment. Of those sent to a legion, the poorer troops would join the velites (light infantry), whose equipment was less expensive than a heavy infantryman's.^[47] Those with the highest property rating, and thus able to afford their own horse, joined the cavalry.^[48]

[edit] Alae

It is unknown whether allied recruitment was based on wealth ratings as was citizen. Compared to the manipular legion, Polybius gives little detail about the structure of an allied ala. It was commanded by three Roman praefecti sociorum, contained 4-5,000 infantry and 900 horse, three times the legionary cavalry contingent. The presence of 3 prefects is deduced from Polybius' statement that the two Consuls appointed 12 prefects in all (for their 4 alae).^[49] The allied infantry appears to have been divided into cohortes, the first appearance of such units, which were adopted by the legions after the Social War. The size of the allied cohorts is unknown, and may not have been standard units at all, but simply a general term denoting the contingent from each socius. However, cohorts of 400-600 men are mentioned in the literature,^[50] which is broadly in line with the size of a later legionary cohort. It is not known whether the alae fought in three ranks as did the legions. No detail is given about the ala cavalry's subdivision. A select group of the best allied troops, denoted extraordinarii, would be detailed to act as an escort for the Consul. They would normally be one-third off the cavalry and one-fifth of the infantry^[51] (i.e. in a normal consular army, 600 horse and about 1,800-foot).

In battle, it was the custom to draw up the Roman legions in the centre of the infantry line, with the Latin alae on the flanks. The Roman cavalry was posted on the right wing, the Latin cavalry held the left. The left wing thus outnumbered the right by 3 to 1, a practice exploited by Hannibal at Cannae, who drew up his best cavalry to face the much smaller Roman cavalry and quickly routed it. The order of battle of a normal consular army could be summarised thus:

[edit] Manpower

Polybius states that the Romans and their allies could draw on a grand total of 770,000 men fit to bear arms (of which 70,000 met the property requirement for cavalry) in 225 BC, shortly before the start of the Second Punic War. The Romans reportedly asked their allies for an urgent register of all "men fit to bear arms" for a tumultus Gallicus: an emergency levy in the face of an imminent Gallic invasion.^[53] Polybius' subtotals, however, are garbled, as he divides them into two sections, troops actually deployed and those registered as available. It is mostly believed that Polybius' figures refer to adult male iuniores i.e. persons of military age (16-46 years of age).

There are a number of difficulties with Polybius' figures, which are discussed in detail in P. A. Brunt's seminal study, Italian Manpower (1971):^[54]

1. The most important problem is that by listing those troops deployed separately from those registered, Polybius is probably double-counting the former.^[55] Therefore, the figures for Romans and general socii deployed should be stripped out. On the other hand, the figures for specified socii deployed, (Etruscans/Sabines and Umbrians/Sarsinates) probably refer to their registered totals (the Sabines were Roman citizens by this time, so the former total refers to Etruscans only).^[56]
2. The Campanians registered are included in the Roman total: correctly, as they were Roman citizens (sine suffragio). But in view of their distinctive identity and the fact that they went over to Hannibal after Cannae, it is best to separate them. According to Livy, the Campanians registered fit for service were 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry in 216 BC.^[57] However, these figures, quoted in a speech to the Capuan senate by the defeated consul Varro after Cannae, probably exclude the Campanians already serving in the legions. These would have suffered losses in the battles of Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae proportionate to the Romans'. Since these amounted to c.60,000, the Campanians may have suffered c.8,000 losses (15% of the Roman total, comparing Varro's to Polybius' figures) of which c.1,000 cavalry (12%, the same as in Varro's figures). Therefore, the total Campanian capacity was probably c.37,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.
3. Polybius' "Iapygians/Messapians" (i.e. Apulians) are given an improbably large cavalry. It is possibly a copying error, and should perhaps be 6,000 instead of 16,000.^[58]
4. Polybius does not give figures for the Greeks or the Bruttii allies in southern Italy. This probably because the Greeks were normally called upon to supply crews for the fleets and the Bruttii were perhaps too far away (or too unreliable) to be asked to contribute to the defence against the Gauls. According to Livy, the Bruttians attacked Croton with 15,000 men in 215 BC.^[59] As for the Greek cities, it is believed that their population had suffered severe losses due to attacks by their Italic neighbours in the late 4th/early 3rd centuries and, as socii navales, in the 1st Punic War. Most were now very small (e.g. Croton with under 2,000 citizens), save for Tarentum and Neapolis. Tarentum was the most powerful Greek city. Strabo suggests 30,000-foot and 4,000 horse at an unspecified time, probably around 300 BC, when Tarentum controlled a much larger territory. Thus the figures are probably major overestimates for 225 BC.^[60] The Strabo figures will therefore be assumed to represent the total land forces the Greek cities could deploy.

On the basis of the above points, Polybius' figures may be reasonably revised as follows:

* Campanians were technically Roman citizens sine suffragio, not socii.

The Second Punic War, which followed soon after the figures were drawn up, stretched Roman military manpower to the limit. Not only did most of the southern Italian allies defect to Hannibal (see 2nd Punic war, below), reducing Rome's available manpower by c150,000, but at least 100,000 Romans and socii were killed in the great battles of 218-6 BC. This left the Romans with available manpower of c400,000. In the period 214-203, the Romans kept an average of 21 legions (i.e. 10 consular armies) in the field at all times.^[62] Together with an equal number of accompanying allied alae, this means a standing force of c210,000. In addition, c30,000 were serving in the Roman fleets at the same time.^[63] Thus about 60% of the confederation's available manpower was under arms continuously. This barely left enough to tend the fields and produce the food supply. Even then, emergency measures were often needed to find enough recruits. After Cannae, the normal ban on criminals, debtors and slaves serving in the legions was lifted. Twice the wealthy class were forced to contribute their slaves to man the fleets and twice boys under military age were enlisted. Livy also implies that the minimum property qualification for legionary service was largely ignored. In 209, 12 Latin colonies informed Rome that they had run out of able-bodied men to contribute to the army.^[64]

[edit] Historical cohesion

This section deals with how successfully the Rome's alliance with the socii withstood the military challenges it faced in the two and a half centuries of its existence (338-88 BC). The challenges may be divided into three broad phases: Phase I, the late 4th/early 3rd centuries BC when the confederation was tested mainly by challenges from other Italian powers especially the Samnites; Phase II, the 3rd century BC, from 280 onwards, when the main threat to the confederation was intervention in Italy by non-Italian powers i.e. Pyrrhus' invasion (280-75 BC) and Hannibal's invasion (218-03 BC); Phase III, the 2nd century BC, when the socii were called upon to support the Rome's imperialist expansion outside Italy. Elements of all three phases overlap: for example, Gallic invasions of the peninsula from the North recurred throughout the period.

[edit] Samnite Wars

Phase I (338-280 BC) was dominated by the three Samnite Wars, the result of which was the subjugation of the Romans' main military rival on the peninsula, the Samnite league. The loyalty of the socii during this period appears to have remained largely solid. There were sporadic revolts: in 315, 306, 269, 264 BC by some Campanian cities, the Aurunci, Hernici and Piceni respectively. But these were isolated cases and never turned into a general revolt of the socii. Most importantly, when in 297-3 Rome faced its gravest threat in this period, a grand alliance of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians and Gauls, the socii did not abandon Rome. At the Battle of Sentinum (295), where a huge combined army of Samnites and Gauls suffered a crushing defeat, the socii contingents actually outnumbered the 18,000 Romans (4 legions deployed).^[65]

[edit] Pyrrhic War

Phase II (280-203 BC) saw even greater tests of the confederation's cohesion by external invaders with large and sophisticated armies. The invasion of the Epirote king Pyrrhus, invited by the Greek city of Tarentum, resulted in a generalised revolt of the southern socii, the Samnites, Lucani and Bruttii. Although evidence is thin, it was clearly a serious challenge: it continued for a decade and resulted in ten triumphs.^[66] But even in this case, the revolt was far from universal. The Campanians and Apulians largely remained loyal to Rome. This was probably due to their long-standing antagonism to the Samnites and Tarentines respectively (both had in the past been victims of the latters' aggression). This showed a critical element in the success of Rome's military confederation: the socii were so divided by mutual antagonisms (they often regarded their neighbours as greater threats than the Romans) that they were never able to stage a universal revolt.

[edit] 2nd Punic War

The confederation's gravest test came with the 2nd Punic War and Hannibal's invasion of Italy (218-03 BC). This was not only because the Romans suffered a string of devastating defeats, but also because Hannibal's entire war strategy was to break up the confederation by inducing the socii to rebel against Rome's hegemony and join a counter-alliance under Hannibal's overall command. In the event, he had only mixed success:

1. Of the Roman citizens sine suffragio (which were mainly Italic tribes wholly annexed to the Roman state) Hannibal scored one major success: the defection of most of the Campanians. This was the most surprising of the defections, as the Campanians had been loyal allies of Rome since the late 4th century, when they called for Roman protection against incursions by the Samnites. They had also remained loyal during the Pyrrhic invasion, which was unsurprising as Pyrrhus was the champion of the Campanians' other main rivals, the Greeks. The deciding factor in Capua's defection to Rome appears to have been the prospect of replacing Rome as Italy's leading city.^[67]
2. Not a single Latin colony defected to Hannibal, despite the latter's policy of releasing also Latin prisoners without ransom and sparing Latin colonies from devastation.^[68] The closest any Latin colonies came to mutiny was in 209 BC (after 8 years of war) when 12 colonies sent a delegation to Rome to inform the Senate that they had run out of men and money and could supply no more troops.^[69] But even this was not a defection to the enemy but an attempt to pressure the Senate into making peace. The inhabitants of the colonies were descendants of Romans and original Latins. Although they had nominally lost their citizenship, they could automatically regain it when moving to Roman territory. In addition the colonists occupied land seized from the neighbouring Italic tribes, which the latter were keen to regain. They therefore had little to gain and everything to lose by joining Hannibal's Italic coalition. (None even joined the Italian coalition in the Social War over a century later, when there was no external threat).
3. Of the non-Latin socii, Hannibal largely failed to win over the central Italians. The Etruscans, Umbrians, Marsi, Marrucini and Frentani remained loyal. In the later years of the war, the Romans repeatedly suspected the Etruscans of plotting treachery and took some military precautions, but no substantial revolt ever materialised.^[70] The central Italians' loyalty to Rome was a critical strategic obstruction to Hannibal, as it cut off his southern domain from his Gallic allies in the Po valley, preventing the latter from sending him reinforcements.^[71]
4. Hannibal won over most of the southern Italian socii: the Samnites, Bruttii and Lucani and most of the Greek city-states.^[72] The adherence of much of Southern Italy enabled Hannibal to establish a stable power base which sustained his military presence in Italy for 13 years after Cannae. The Samnites, Bruttii and Lucani were, as demonstrated above, the biggest losers in Rome's territorial expansion. The Greek cities of the Ionian Sea (Thurii, Heraclea, Metapontum, Locri and Croton) followed the lead of Tarentum, which longed to reestablish its old hegemony among the Greeks. But even in the South, defections to Hannibal were by no means universal. Apart from the Arpini in the north of Apulia, the Apulians and Messapians mostly remained loyal to Rome, as they had done during the Pyrrhic invasion. The Greek cities on the Tyrrhenian Sea - Rhegium, Paestum and Neapolis - refused to defect. Neapolis' staunch loyalty to Rome was an especial blow to Hannibal, as it deprived him of the largest seaport in Campania, which in turn was the most important region being fought over with the Romans. Rhegium controlled the Strait of Messina and thus hindered Hannibal's communications with Carthaginian forces in Sicily. Hannibal's failure to take these two ports greatly complicated the reinforcement and resupply of his army from Africa.^[73] The most likely explanation for their stance was their traditional antagonism towards the Campanians and Bruttii respectively and hostility to Tarentine hegemony. Of the Samnites, the Pentri, one of the Samnites' four main subgroups, refused to defect.^[74]

Even among those city-states that did defect, opinion was often bitterly divided. This division was based on ideological grounds. The city-states of southern Italy were riven by a class struggle between the aristocracy and the demos, or general citizen body. The local aristocracies tried to retain a monopoly of political power (i.e. an oligarchy). The other classes favoured a democracy in which all citizens exercised power through a popular assembly. In the 2nd Punic War, the two sides supported opposing ideologies. Rome supported oligarchies, similar to their own system. The senates of cities such as Capua were therefore largely pro-Roman. Carthaginian society was itself even more oligarchic than Rome's.^[75][76] But by necessity the Carthaginians backed the democratic factions in the cities that the two sides were contesting (although Hannibal himself personally favoured democracy: after the war, he supported democratic reform at Carthage). Both Capua (216 BC) and Tarentum (212 BC) were delivered to Hannibal by the local democratic factions.

Using the military manpower figures given in the table above, the Italian forces available to Hannibal can be estimated. Assuming that two-thirds of the Samnites, Campanians, Greeks, Lucani and Bruttii and one-third of the Apulians were on his side, the total rebel Italian manpower was c150,000 men. This was in addition to Hannibal's own Carthaginian army plus Gallic allies. In contrast, the Romans could draw upon c500,000 Romans and Italians of undisputed loyalty. Of these, at least 100,000 perished in Rome's great military disasters of 218-6 BC. The remaining 400,000 were roughly double the maximum manpower available to Hannibal in Italy.

But in reality, Hannibal's position was even weaker than this. Rome's Italian allies were organised in the regular structures of the military confederation under unified Roman command. Hannibal's Italian allies, on the other hand, served under their own commanders and in their own units. Only the Lucani are recorded as having joined Hannibal in operations outside their own territory. The rest were only concerned with defending their own territory against Roman counterattacks and were unwilling to join Hannibal's operations elsewhere.^[77] Hannibal faced a slow but steady shrinkage of his manpower. His own army could not be easily reinforced. Reinforcements from the north, whether of Gauls or other Carthaginians, were successfully blocked by the Romans, while reinforcements by sea were hindered by Roman seapower (although some reinforcements did get through by sea). His Italian allies, in the meantime, were steadily reduced by Roman counterattacks.

[edit] Social War

[edit] Citations

[edit] References

[edit] Ancient

• Livy, Ab Urbe Condita (early 1st c. AD)
• Polybius, Histories (2nd c. BC)

[edit] Modern

• Briscoe, J. Second Punic War in Cambridge Ancient History 2nd Ed Vol VIII (1989)
• Brunt, P. A. Italian Manpower (1971)
• Cary & Scullard History of Rome (1980)
• Cornell, T. J. "Conquest of Italy" in Cambridge Ancient History 2nd Ed Vol VII Part 2 (1989)
• Eckstein, A. M. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome (2006)
• Goldsworthy, A. Roman Warfare (2000)
• Goldsworthy, A. Cannae (2001)
• Goldsworthy, A. The Complete Roman Army (2005)
• Staveley, E. S. "Rome and Italy in the early 3rd Century" in Cambridge Ancient History 2nd Ed Vol VII (1989)
• Scullard, H. H. A History of the Roman World (1984)