Ridah Bin Saleh Al Yazidi

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Ridah Bin Saleh Al Yazidi is a citizen of Tunisia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] Al Yazidi's Guantanamo detainee ID number 38. The Department of Defense reports that he was born on January 24, 1965, in Unfidel, Tunisia.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Al Yazidi chose not to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Al Yazidi were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[2][3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee attemded the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan. One of the leaders of the mosque was Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban who spoke frequently of the Jihad ongoing in Bosnia. Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban was subsequently killed in the fighting in Jihad in Bosnia.
  2. The Italian Islamic Culltural Institute, referred to as ICI, was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.
  3. The detainee decided to join the Jihad in Afghanistan in 1996. He was influenced in his decision by Sheikh Soubeihi, an Egyptian, who spoke at the Mosque in Milan and Sheikh Silman Al Ouda Abdullah Azzan. Once he made this decision, the detainee began saving money and intensifying his religious studies.
  4. Abudallah [sic] Azzan stated that individuals should follow Usama bin Laden [sic] by imitating his devotion to Islamic Jihad, both physically and financially.
  5. The detainee was identified by Italian authorities as a member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide identifies the GIA as a terrorist organization.
  6. The detainee said he was provided with a letter of introduction for admission to the Khalden Training Camp. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan using a forged passport. The detainee traveled to Khost, Afghanistan via Switzerland, Islamabad, Pakistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee fought on the front lines in Karabel, Khwaja Ghar and Bagram, Afghanistan from March 2001 to November 2001.
  8. The detainee admitted to fighting against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces.
b. Training
  1. The detainee spent nine months at the Khalden military training camp, from May 1999 to February 2000, undergoing extensive training to include rocket-propelled grenade launchers, Kalishnikov rifle, machine guns, pistols, explosives, mountain and urban warfare.
  2. The detainee received additional explosives training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan which involved the manufacture of explosives using fertilizer and ammonium.
c, Connection/Associations
  1. The detainee was recruited by Moussa at the ICI Mosque in Milan, Italy, Moussa also recruited the first Emir of the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) to go to Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee received explosives training from Abu Khabab, an Egyptian.
  3. Abu Khabab is an Egyptian-born al Qaida explosives trainer who instructed jihadists on improvised explosive devices in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in 2000.
  4. The detainee stayed at the Tunisian house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  5. A Tunisian terrorist cell, with possible ties to al Qaida, operated a Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Khandahar [sic] , Afghanistan during the Spring of 2000 for approximately two weeks.
  7. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities along with thirty other Arabs, a number of them suspected of being bodyguards for Usama Bin Laden [sic] .
d. Intent

[edit] -- page 3 of 4 of the memo missing --

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

  • The detainee denied charges by foreign government authorities. The detainee stated he was not a member of GIA and did not know anything about any terrorist activity associated with the 1998 World Cup Soccer tournament.
  • The detainee denies receiving any counter-interrogation training while at Khaldan Training Camp or the other camp he attended.

[edit] References

  1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Ridah Bin Saleh Al Yazidi Administrative Review Board, May 4, 2005 - pages 51-53
  3. ^ OARDEC (May 4, 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Yazidi, Ridah Bin Saleh page51-53. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-09.