Richardson v. Perales
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Richardson v. Perales | ||||||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States | ||||||||||
Argued January 13, 1971 Decided May 3, 1971 |
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Holding | ||||||||||
Court membership | ||||||||||
Chief Justice: Warren E. Burger Associate Justices: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, John Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan, Jr, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun |
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Case opinions | ||||||||||
Majority by: Blackmun Joined by: Burger, Harlan, Stewart, White, Marshall Dissent by: Douglas Joined by: Black, Brennan |
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Laws applied | ||||||||||
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 556(d), Social Security Act |
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), was a case heard in front of the United States Supreme Court that decided whether physicians' written reports of medical examinations they had made of a disability claimant could constitute "substantial evidence" supportive of finding nondisability under the Social Security Act.
Pedro Perales, a San Antonio truck driver, had claimed he had received a back injury by lifting an object at work. His doctors were unable to find an objective neurological explanation for his continuing pain. His doctors' medical reports were submitted to the state Division of Disability Determination.
At an agency hearing, the Division had called an independent "medical advisor", Dr. Leavitt to assess the medical reports from Mr. Perales' doctors. Dr. Leavitt did not examine Perales but stated that the consensus of the medical reports was that Perales had suffered an impairment of only mild severity. The Division denied Perales' claim for disability benefits.
The Supreme Court held that Dr. Leavitt's interpretation of the medical data was acceptable evidence in an agency hearing, even if it would have been inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure.
Justice Douglas joined by Justice Black and Justice Brennan dissented saying that although Section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act provided that "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received," which could include hearsay evidence, hearsay evidence could not by itself be the basis for an adverse ruling.