Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2007 July 17

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[edit] July 17

[edit] The idea that imperfect law enforcement is good

Is there a term for the belief that public happiness and/or the proper functioning of society depends on law enforcement being less than perfect? NeonMerlin 01:22, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

"Salutary neglect" is the idea that some laws are neglected for the common good. Geogre 03:08, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
Salutary neglect usually refers to the nonenforcement of the Navigation Acts or other mercantile trading regulations on the American colonies. I'm sure there ought to be a good term more specific to the idea that society functions better if many venial crimes and infractions are overlooked in many cases. Wareh 16:09, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
In Europe, there's the maxim of proportionality. Close? ---Sluzzelin talk 22:09, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
The maxim of proportionality is usually applied to the question of how severe the means of law enforcement should be, and not to the question of whether or not some laws should be enforced at all. In Continental legal terminology, we distinguish between jurisdictions employing the maxim of legality (law enforcement must, in theory, prosecute all known infractions no matter how trivial), and those employing the maxim of opportunity (law enforcement may choose not to prosecute lesser infractions for practical reasons). There is little practical difference between the two systems, as the latter is common practice in any case. Sandstein 12:25, 19 July 2007 (UTC)
Wareh, you're right. It was simply the closest thing I could think of to someone deciding that it would be good to keep the law (so you can bash 'em when you need to) and leave them unenforced in general. The OP is right: there ought to be a term. Geogre 13:03, 18 July 2007 (UTC)
I couldn't find a term for the belief that police discretion is best for society, but googling "police discretion" turns up lots of articles that speak favorably of the effect. Interestingly, our article Enforcement discretion seems to have a very negative take on the idea, only offering a couple of token "converse" examples. 152.16.59.190 06:20, 19 July 2007 (UTC)
Thanks, those are useful terms. Wareh 17:06, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Honorary consul

How does one go about becoming an honorary consul? I am interested in the process.

--Longhornsg 02:54, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Either by being a "prominent citizen" expatriate, or (if you're not an expatriate) by making some friendly association (business, cultural, diplomatic) with a foreign government. And now would be the perfect time to hold your area's first annual Tuvaluan music festival--Pharos 06:29, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Anarchism and business

Does anarchism tend to be anti-corporate, or does it tend to support the "free market" the way libertarianism and neo-conservatism do? Does it favour small businesses over large? NeonMerlin 04:01, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

I know little about the topic, but as far as I know, economics tend to be a major topic of discussion among anarchists, and the main source of disagreement. From anarcho-communism to anarcho-capitalism (the latter is sometimes not even considered anarchism by some self-labeled anarchists) you have all the spectrum of market freedom you'd like to have. As for your second question, I think it is most typical for anarchists to prefer small communities, which are better organized in a non-hierarchical way than huge imperialistic states. --Taraborn 07:26, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
Many anarchists tend, for the same reasons, to prefer small units of economic organization; a large corporation can be as hierarchical as a state. It is also quite common for anarchists to view corporations as products of state power and favoritism; but the anarcho-capitalists disagree. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 15:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
Um, how many anarcho-capitalists have you asked? At least some of us (and other libertarians) oppose the creation of limited liability corporations, and/or argue that the biggest companies would be smaller if not for the economies of scale caused by regulatory friction. —Tamfang 23:20, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
For an interesting take on the topic, you may want to check the user page of Anarcho-capitalism (talk · contribs). Specifically, this old version. Abeg92contribs 21:56, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Decline of the French monarchy

To what extent was Louis XV responsible for the decline of the French monarchy? Pere Duchesne 05:55, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

To a very large degree, and he possibly bears a greater responsibility for the outbreak of the French Revolution than any other single individual, including the well-meaning but unfortunate Louis XVI. His conduct in war, diplomacy and state-management was generally disastrous, and he came to occupy from the centre at Versailles a system which steadily poisoned the whole of the French body politic.
During the War of the Austrian Succession Louis might be said to have gained a victory but lost the peace. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, France had virtually nothing to show for years of fighting, with all of the advantages going to allies who had done far less, including the Spanish Bourbons. The esteem that Louis gained by his conduct at Fontenoy in 1745 was dissipated, as a new similie entered the French language-Bete comme la paix (as stupid as the peace). Far worse was to come with the Seven Years War, arguably one of the most disastrous in all of French history. By this a 'French World' was to give way to an 'English World', the consequences of which might be said to have continued to the present day. In Europe the war saw the humiliation of Rossbach, which Voltaire believed was a greater shame to France than all of the defeats at the hands of the English during the Hundred Years War.
The conflict had been the result of the so-called Diplomatic Revolution, which allied France with Habsburg Austria, thus reversing the traditional course of the country's international relations, the sole responsibility of Louis himself. The Versailles Treaty which brought about a new partnership so inimical to France's interests was said to have transformed the country from "being a great power into being an auxilliary of Austria." It also brought the marriage of the Dauphin Louis to Marie Antoinette, destined to be hated in France as 'the Austrian woman.'
In domestic affairs the continuing persecution of the Jansenists, a heretical Catholic sect, raised a range of issues connected with the use of arbitary power, nationalism and protection in law. The thirteen local Parlements, no more than traditional law courts, attained a common voice by standing up to attempts at royal coercion, forcing Louis into an ever more despotic position. For their part the Parlements appealed to the nation in an effective propaganda campaign, which might be said to have given shape to France's first 'public forum', a national opinion later to be so destructive of royal absolutism. In 1771 Louis abolished the Parliaments, which was to lead to demands for the summmoning of an Estates General, a national body that had last met in 1614.
At Versailles itself the worm of decay was already eating away at the heart of the outward brilliance. The most decisive vioce at court was that of Madame de Pompadour, the king's leading mistress, and her voice was usually disastrous. But there were other stories that filterd out of royal pastimes, that in their own way were just as bad, giving the monarchy a reputation for decadence and corruption. At the Parc aux Cerfs Louis established his personal seraglio, one of whose inhabitants, Marie-Louise O'Murphy, was immortalised by Boucher. Scandalous rumours spread across France, in which it was alleged that the king bathed in the blood of virgins and had ninety illegitimate children. Madame du Barry, Louis' last official mistress, was little more than a high class prostitute.
Louis' death in 1774 saw the French monarchy at its nadir, in political, financial and moral terms. It might have recovered-it had recovered in the past from similar low points-but it would require an individual of unique abilities to pull back from the precipice. Instead came the conventional and unimaginative Louis XVI, destined to inherit a Revolution along with the throne. Clio the Muse 00:25, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] French army before World War II

Why the French army was considered the best in the world in the years before World War II? How could they be defeated so hastily by an apparently inferior German army? Was it all due to the effectiveness of German tactics? --Taraborn 10:31, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_History_of_France#Modern_period. Fourth and fifth paragraphs are relevant to your query. I don't think that the German Army of WWII could be called inferior, you might want to check out the articles on the Wehrmacht and the Battle of France. Lanfear's Bane
Thanks. --Taraborn 12:35, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
One reason given for the swift defeat of France in 1940 is that the country was lacking in men age 20 to 25, supposedly because the French army was not able to father sufficient children from 1915 to 1920. This is stated in Battle of France, "Historiography." "Demographics" where it says "The conscripts of the French army were ideally between 20 and 25, meaning that in 1940 they had to be drawn from the generation born between 1915 and 1920. In these years the birthrate was extremely low, because of millions of French men being away from home fighting WWI." Did the French army not allow its soldiers any leave at all for five years during World War 1? Did the German army allow its soldiers leave during the same period, perhaps with an eye toward having an adequate stock of cannon fodder 20 years hence? The US military did not generally allow soldiers sent overseas during World War 2 to come home on leave until war's end, possibly for fear that they might not report for shipment back to the war zone. Did this cause a deficiency of 20 to 25 year old men during the Vietnam War? Edison 23:17, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Be careful of some of the details in the article on the Military History of France, Taraborn. The Maginot Line did not 'sucessfully hold off the German attacks in 1940': it was totally by-passed by Manstein's sweep to the west. Army Group C, the weakest of the three German battle formations, was specifically allocated to act as a decoy force, to pin down the enemy, and deflect from the offensive operations to the north-west of the line. Even so, the 1st, 7th and 16th German armies succesfully broke through the French defences at several points. By mid-June the fabled Maginot Line was just as porous as the rest of the French defences.

Maginot also has some wider relevance to your main question, being a concrete expression (literally!) of the 'defensive mentality' that had emerged in France in the 1930s. France had made a huge sacrifice during the Great War, at places like Verdun, which had bleed the country to near death. With a smaller population than Germany, the proportional losses were all the greater. The full realisation of the terrible cost only began to emerge in the 1920s. One response was to create the 'Maginot Shield'. Originally this was really only to safeguard the privinces of Alsace Lorraine, the point where it was always to be strongest, though it was later extended, to a highly ineffectual extent, all the way to the Channel. In essence it was a nineteenth century solution to a twentieth century problem, and one that created the illusion of invulnerability.

German tactics were, indeed, highly important in 1940; and it seems reasonably certain that a repeat of the old Schlieffen Plan would have succeeded just as brilliantly in 1940 as the offensive that was actually put in operation. Why? Was it because the German Army was stronger? No, it was not. It was because the Germans had learned the lessons of 1918, when their army had been broken in the west by a combination of infantry, armoured and air attacks, and the French had not. The German response was Blitzkrieg. In terms of the number of tanks at their disposal, they were no stronger than the French; but their armour was concentrated in Panzer Divisions, intended to operate independently from the infantry as a cutting spearhead, whereas French armour was spread loosely across the whole army, wasted in the task of infantry support. German airpower-particularly the Stuka dive bombers-was used in the form of aerial artillery, supporting ground advances by destroying enemy bases in the line of attack. The whole thing was devastatingly effective.

Finally, we should should not neglect the internal political divisions within France, which deepened in bitterness throughout the 1930s, and contributed to a defeatist mentality. Lacking political and military leadership of the highest order the Third Republic might be said to have willed itself to death, reflected very much in the attitude of men like Philippe Petain. Defeat was born on the inside. Clio the Muse 01:17, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

Aha, I think I get it now. Thank you again, Clio and Edison. --Taraborn 16:53, 18 July 2007 (UTC)
You did not address the question of policies of "German leave" compared to "Frence leave" for the soldiers in World War 1 from 1915 to 1920 relative to the availability of 20 to 25 year old cannon fodder/draftees in 1940. Edison 04:27, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Jesus the Logos

In our article Jesus the Logos it seems to be indicating that the term "Jesus" is not actually a person, but that meaning the definition of Logos. Logos looks like can have a large variety of definitions, many of which are listed in the article on Logos. In this article it talks of Philo's definition of Jesus and logos, saying: Unlike Jesus, Philo's logos is not a singular person or a savior, and it is not a messiah. Instead, logos is only a device "to solve certain philosophical problems." What would be your take on Philo's philosophy on Jesus and logos?--Doug talk 13:44, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Al Qaida

What exactly does Al Qaida hope to achieve by harming the US? What is it that they want? It's funny how we never hear about this in the new. Maybe the NPOV of Wikipedia will enlighten me. --Russoc4 13:45, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Our article Al-Qaeda may help. --Richardrj talk email 13:52, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
The US DoD's definition of the group is actually pretty straightforward: "A radical Sunni Muslim umbrella organization established to recruit young Muslims into the Afghani mujahideen and is aimed to establish Islamist states throughout the world, overthrow ‘un-Islamic regimes’, expel US soldiers and Western influence from the Gulf, and capture Jerusalem as a Muslim city." Why harm the US? Because the US props up a lot of "un-Islamic regimes", has gobs of soldiers and influence in the Gulf, and is best pals with Israel, who is not about to let Jerusalem become a Muslim city. --24.147.86.187 14:06, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
They actually say that somewhere? 68.39.174.238 16:16, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
See the Al qaeda article. --24.147.86.187
(ec)Al Qaida's goal is (roughly, as "Al Qaida" isn't really a coherent organisation, and so can't really be said to have an entirely coherent set of goals) to establish a Caliphate in the islamic world, in place of the nation states that cover that area now. Whether this should encompass muslim places outwith the middle east/central asia area (places such as Indonesia or parts of Africa) is something debated. They want to rid that caliphate of infidel influence (particularly foreign militaries) and unseat the various non-islamic rulers of those countries (many of whom are backed by the west). In and of itself that doesn't make Al Qaida and the West automatic enemies (so it's false to think that AQ's primary purpose is to destroy the US), but in practice the west is heavily involved with the islamic world, being the backers of most of the (generally rather unsavoury) regimes in those counries. And the west really doesn't want to see the oil-producing regions on which it so heavily depends being run by what would in essence be a bad-tempered Wahabi superpower, oil rich and nuclear armed. So AQ's goal is to get the West, and particularly the US (it being the most influential and most interventionist of the western powers) to quit the "muslim lands" and to stop supporting the governments of the nations that presently run those lands. Israel isn't especially a priority on the AQ christmas-list (although I guess Jerusalem is), although it's pretty hard to imagine Superwahabistan not sweeping it away. To an extent this plays well on the arab street - most of those western backed rulers are murderous nutters, and it's tough understand why one should be poor in an oil-rich country - but only the most radicalised are under much doubt that Superwahabistan would be a pretty unpleasant place for the ummah to live (particularly for Shia), perhaps to the extent of being talibanism writ large. So in summary - AQ "take your toys and go home" ; US "you'll mess everything up; we're staying" -- Finlay McWalter | Talk 14:18, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
Read Salafism for background. Neutralitytalk 16:33, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] What is the negative and positive effects of globalization on Indian farming sector?

im tired of searching but can some someone tell me what are the poitive and negative effects of globalisation to the indian farming sector and other industries--Angelofwrath 15:20, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Probably the same effects on most sectors placed in similar relative locations. If it hasn't been invaded by an edit war yet, Globalization should suggest analogous or general answers. 68.39.174.238 16:18, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
The effects of globalization on Indian agriculture are rather different from its effects on some other industries. For example, India's business process outsourcing sector owes its prosperity and its very existence to globalization. On the other hand, India's farmers have faced severe difficulties as a result of globalization. The use of government subsidies in other countries, including the United States and the EU countries, together with the widespread use of labor-saving capital (mechanization) in many other countries, has resulted in a rise in the global supply of staple commodities produced by Indian farmers, such as wheat and rice. This rise in supply has led to a drop in prices for most staple cereals (though the recent jump in demand of maize [corn] for ethanol has stabilized prices for cereals other than maize). Even the more mechanized farmers of Punjab suffered from the decline in prices for their crops. Most Indian farmers use traditional manual methods. They already lived a marginal existence, and falling prices for their staple crops on the global market left them unable to compete and lacking in capital to mechanize so that they could compete. One result has been a wave of farmers' suicides in India. It is difficult to think of a positive effect of globalization on Indian agriculture, except perhaps that the most mechanized and efficient farmers (a small minority) may have been able to expand sales by taking advantage of a liberalized export market. Marco polo 18:13, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Versailles

Is there nothing positive to be said for the 1919 Treaty of Versailles? Captainhardy 16:21, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

From the article: "The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was the peace treaty which officially ended World War I between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany." I'd say that is pretty positive. Do you mean from a specific point of view? There is also the section on Treaty_of_Versailles#Alternative_viewpoints and Treaty_of_Versailles#Reaction_in_Germany. Lanfear's Bane

If you mean for Germany, then yes - surprisingly. An expressed right to freedom of transporting people, mail and goods (I think) from "Main Germany" to East Prussia. And of course, every negative for Germany was a positive for someone else. eg. A demilitarised Rhineland was of immense strategic importance to France. Her loss of the Polish Corridor meant more territory for Poland. Loss of territory in the North to Denmark was good for... well... Denmark.martianlostinspace 17:20, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Right up until all three countries were conquered by a revanchist Germany, of course. Algebraist 22:00, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
Just on a simple point of information, Algebraist: although Denmark was occupied in 1940 it continued to function within its existing borders, and the Germans did not detach those areas of northern Schleswig, lost in the plebiscite of 1920. Clio the Muse 02:25, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

In the conclusion of her superb book on the treaty, Paris 1919, Margaret MacMillan says the treaty has gotten a bad rap. True, the peacemakers made mistakes and were not always true to their stated principles. But they tried to create a better world. The establishment of a League of Nations, the use of plebescites to determine who gets what territory, treaties to protect minorities, the International Labor Organzation -- they may not have worked as planned, but they were a great improvement over the old way of doing things, which was just to fight it out and see who was the last left standing. To blame Versailles for World War II, MacMillan writes, is to ignore the failures of everyone who came after Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Even if the treaty had not been as harsh, Hitler would still have been able to demand the annexation of Austria, the destruction of Poland and the Jews, control over Bohemia and the conquest of the Soviet Union. -- Mwalcoff 23:00, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

  • If you want to read MacMillan's book, note that it has also been published as Peacemakers. --Anon, July 18, 03:04 (UTC).
I remember when I studied Versailles as part of an undergraduate course on international relations, I used to wonder just what kind of peace treaty would have been acceptable to a defeated Germany in 1919? They could certainly point out the inconsistencies in the position of the Allied and Associate powers, by saying that the were denied the right of self-determination, allowed to so many others by President Wilson's idealistic Fourteen Points. But a union between Germany and Austria, shorn of its non-German empire, would only have made the country stronger than it had been in 1914, an intolerable outcome for the French. Would the Germans have accepted the return of Alsace-Lorraine to the French? Yes, probably. Would they have accepted the loss of territory in the east to the Poles? No, they would not. Setting aside the single issue of the infamous War Guilt Clause, really only a form of words to justify reparations, I do not accept that the treaty was harsh. But what it was was a crude balance between the real and the ideal; a desire for security amidst a celebration of nationality. Compared with the peace that Germany forced on Russia at Brest Litovsk Versailles was almost benign. The simple fact is that the Germans refused to accept the reality of defeat; and it was that, not Versailles, that led to the eventual collapse of the peace. The real failure of Versailles lies in the failure of the 'enforcers', particularly the British and Americans, to ensure that it was a truly lasting settlement. The League of Nations, was only ever the sum of its individual parts; and when those parts began to lose cohesion in the early 1930s the whole basis of the 1919 settlement began to unwind. The ideal of 1919 became the nightmare of 1939. Clio the Muse 02:25, 18 July 2007 (UTC)
Am I right in thinking that the treaty was seen as harsh by politicians in the 30's and one of the reasons appeasement happened was a feeling that it was just undoing past injustices? (Along with a desire to avoid war at all costs of course). Had Hitler simply wanted the Sudetenland, Alsace-Lorraine and Austria, we might all be praising Chamberlain's reasonable stance now. Cyta 07:40, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

Cyta: other than France, which was well... always the toughest supporter of Versailles, then yes. All shades of German politicians disliked it - of course, to varying degrees. But it was at least a contributary reason to the stunning success of the Nazi foreign policy in the 30's (and Stresemann's more progressive methods) that especially Britain had something of a conservative backlash to Versailles. Partly, I suppose, Lloyed George at Versailles had been telegrammed (?) by 400 MP's to hold him to his electoral promise to "Squeeze Germany until the pips squeek". For example, take the 1938 Anschluss. Germany was German speaking, so was Austria. So why should some war that finished twenty years ago stop them making a perfectly natural union? I think at the time, it made some sense that Versailles had been too harsh.martianlostinspace 10:25, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

Hi, Cyta. Yes, you are right, though reaction against the Treaty set at an early stage among some important corners of English opinion. John Maynard Keynes, for example, described it as a 'Carthaginian' settlement in "The Economic Consequences of the Peace", published in the same year, which had a huge impact on public perceptions, both in Britain and the United States. Indeed, it played a significant part in ensuring that America withdrew back into isolationism. It would be possible to write a huge dissertation on the complexity of Anglo-Saxon attitudes towards Germany, because it reveals so many nuances and shades in the national character. Hatred quite quickly gave way to sympathy, and sympathy finally gave way to appeasement. I remember reading a story told by Anthony Eden at the time when Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland in 1936, the first major test of the Versailles settlement, which might serve to illustrate this point. Taking a taxi to the Commons, Eden asked the driver what he thought of the move, to which the response was given that 'Gerry was only marching into his own backyard', or words to that effect. For Eden this was enough to sum up the outlook of the 'common man.' The 'backyard', of course, got wider and wider, but could be justified, even so far as Munich, by the contention that Hitler was only taking 'German' lands, consistent, I suppose, in a perverse fashion, with Wilson's 14 Points. Chamberlain's 'epiphany moment' came in March 1939, when the Germans occupied the purely Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, which could not be justified in terms of national self-determination. However, it should also be said, an argument not often aired, that appeasement at least bought time for England. After all, the country was simply not ready for war in 1938. Clio the Muse 00:14, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Bill gates, larry page and sergey brin

Business is different from life. Or isn't it? We all know these three people are good in business. how about them in real lives? How about their characters? What are the things important in non-business life? And how do they fare in them?

That's a rather subjective judgment on all counts, seeing as you can attribute the successes of Microsoft and Google to the CEOs, Ballmer and Schmidt. And that many different people have different criteria for what is important outside of business.

The Rhymesmith 17:55, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Well, Bill Gates is now a well-known philanthropist (see Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), while Page and Brin set up Google.org (the philanthropic arm of Google), which has been granted $1 Billion to "help with global poverty, energy and the environment", although unlike Gates, I'm not sure how much of that came from Page and Brin personally. Laïka 00:12, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Pope Urban V - first in 46 years

There was a continuous residency of the Avignon papacy from 1316 of Pope John XXII, through Pope Benedict XII, then Pope Clement VI, then Pope Innocent VI, then to Pope Urban V. Wasn't Pope Urban V the first pope that tried to move the papacy back to Rome during this 46 years of continuous residency of popes in Avignon?--Doug talk 19:38, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Yes, much of the Urban V article talks about that. Adam Bishop 21:13, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Interesting also is the fact that these pope numbers add up to 46 (22 + 12 + 6 + 6). Isn't there something about a Temple and 46 years in the New Testament?--Doug talk 21:39, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

The Temple had been under construction for 46 years when Jesus threw the money changers out of it. Is there a reason you are asking all these rhetorical questions? Adam Bishop 01:00, 18 July 2007 (UTC)
They come time and again. This one appeared last December, the 30th in anyone wishes to check the archives. It would appear to be an obsession. Clio the Muse 01:32, 18 July 2007 (UTC)
I'm betting historical novel. Donald Hosek 01:28, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

It's Dan Brown for his next book.hotclaws 11:02, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

More likely, it will get added in some form to Wikipedia articles, and experience has shown that it's a major headache to restore the damage done. Wareh 17:05, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Benjamin Robert Haydon bronzework

I am interested in finding a list of bronzework created by Benjamin Haydon or his son Frank.

captzero —Preceding unsigned comment added by Captzero (talk • contribs) 23:16, 17 July 2007

Wikipedia has an article on Benjamin Haydon, but not apparently one on his son. DuncanHill 23:20, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
Benjamin Haydon is known only as a painter, I think, not as a sculptor. You aren't thinking of Samuel James Bouverie Haydon (1815-1891), who is known for portrait busts, but not for bronzes. --Wetman 06:50, 18 July 2007 (UTC)