R. v. Vaillancourt

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R. v. Vaillancourt

Supreme Court of Canada
Hearing: December 10, 1986
Judgment: December 3, 1987
Full case name: Yvan Vaillancourt v. Her Majesty The Queen
Citations: [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, 1987 SCC 78
Docket No.: 18963
Court membership
Chief Justice: Dickson
Puisne Justices: Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard*, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest JJ.

(*)Chouinard took no part in judgment
Reasons given

Majority by: Lamer J. (paras. 1-43)
Joined by: Dickson, Estey, Wilson J.
Concurrence by: Beetz J. (paras. 44-46)
Joined by: Le Dain J.
Dissent by: McIntyre J. (paras. 47-54)

R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, 1987 SCC 78, is a landmark case from the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of criminal code offence of "constructive murder". The Court ruled that crimes with significant "stigma" attached, such as culpable homicide and constructive murder, require proof of the mens rea element of objective foresight of death.

Contents

[edit] Background

Yvan Vaillancourt and a friend planned to rob a local pool hall. Before the robbery they had agreed to only use knives. However, when his friend showed up for the robbery with a gun Vaillancourt made him take the bullets out and place them in his glove. Immediately after the robbery took place, Vaillancourt saw his friend go back into the hall where a fight broke out between his friend and a customer. In the struggle, the customer was shot with his friend's gun and later died of his wounds. Vaillancourt was caught by the police at the scene but his accomplice got away.

Vaillancourt was charged with culpable homicide under s. 213(d) (now s. 230(d)) of the Criminal Code of Canada because he was considered an accomplice by operation under s.21(2) of the Code. Under s.213(d), a person using a weapon resulting in death while committing a robbery was guilty of murder, regardless of whether they intended to cause death or knew that death was likely to occur.

The issue before the court was whether s.213(d) violated either s.7 or s.11(d) of the Charter.

Vaillancourt argued that it was a principle of fundamental justice that no accused should be liable for an offence without showing some degree of subjective mens rea.

[edit] Reasoning of the Court

The majority was written by Lamer J. with Dickson, Estey, and Wilson JJ. concurring.

The Court looked at the elements of the offence as well as the punishment that accompanies it. Punishment for murder was an automatic life sentence which produced a "stigma" upon the offender. The moral blameworthiness of the accused must be proportional to the punishment, thus there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective foresight. However, for the case at hand there cannot be a conviction without proof of objective foresight.

The Court accepted Vaillancourt's argument regarding the principle of fundamental justice. Thus, since s.213(d) did not require any foresight of death it was in violation of a principle of fundamental justice and so violated s.7 of the Charter, and could not be saved under s.1.

[edit] Aftermath

Section s. 213(d) was repealed in 1991.

[edit] See also

[edit] External links