R. v. Butler
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| R. v. Butler | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 |
|||||||||
| Hearing: June 6, 1991 Judgment: February 27, 1992 |
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
| Holding | |||||||||
| Section 163 of the Criminal Code infringes s. 2(b) of the Charter but can be justified under s.1 of the Charter. | |||||||||
| Court membership | |||||||||
| Chief Justice: Antonio Lamer Puisne Justices: Gérard La Forest, Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, John Sopinka, Charles Gonthier, Peter Cory, Beverley McLachlin, William Stevenson and Frank Iacobucci |
|||||||||
| Reasons given | |||||||||
|
Majority by: Sopinka |
|||||||||
R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on pornography and state censorship. In this case, the Court had to balance the right to freedom of expression under section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with women's rights; the outcome has been described as a victory for anti-pornography feminism[1] and the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund,[2] but a loss for alternative sexualities.[3]
Contents |
[edit] Background
The case involved one Donald Victor Butler, who owned a store called Avenue Video Boutique in Winnipeg. The business, begun in August 1987, handled pornographic videos and magazines and sexual objects. That month, the police arrived with a search warrant and confiscated the goods, and then charged Butler with possession and distribution of obscenity, crimes under section 163 (then section 159) of the Criminal Code of Canada. In October of that year, Butler simply restarted the business as it had been before, and the police arrested Butler.
[edit] Decision
[edit] Freedom of expression
The Court found laws against obscenity would breach freedom of expression. The Manitoba Court of Appeal had found that it would not, following the Supreme Court case Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) (1989) in saying the obscenity did not attempt to convey anything meaningful and might just be physical. However, the Supreme Court found fault with this opinion, saying that while the obscenity related to physical matters, they still made expression. In this case the expression was meant to be sexually exciting. The Court also noted that degrading sex may not be protected by the Charter, but a depiction of it would be expression.
The Supreme Court pointed to R. v. Keegstra (1990) to say the obscenity laws violated freedom of expression. Keegstra demonstrated freedom of expression should be interpreted expansively, and in the Prostitution Reference it was noted that whatever the message within the expression, the expression itself is protected by section 2.
The Court also considered a view suggested by the Attorney General of British Columbia, suggesting that films could not be as expressive as writing. The Supreme Court rejected the idea, noting that in making a film many creative choices in editing will have to be made.
[edit] Reasonable limits
The Court then turned to the question of whether the infringement of section 2 could be justified under section 1 of the Charter. This raised the question as to whether the law was so vague that it might fail the section 1 requirement that a limit be "prescribed by law." The Court, citing the Beetz opinion in R. v. Morgentaler (1988), said that a law that can be interpreted differently is not necessarily too vague. The Court then decided that given the past case law, the terms "indecent" and "immoral" seemed sufficiently understandable.
In asking whether the law could be demonstrably justified, the objective was considered, in accordance with R. v. Oakes (1986). Objectives suggested by the Crown included prevention of harm that may arise from the attitudes promoted by the obscenity. The protection of decency was also a proposed objective. Those challenging the law stated its only objectives were moral. Historically, the objective of the law was meant to combat immorality and its impact on society. The Charter of Rights suggested this objective would no longer be sufficient, as it contradicted the individual's rights. While many criminal laws were enacted against perceived immoral things, the Supreme Court turned away from this objective and decided the true objective of the law was to minimize dangers to society. The Court noted obscenity could encourage degrading views of women and could promote violence. This contradicted the view of Canada as a society in which people are equal. Typically, the original purpose of the law is what is considered under section 1. In this case, the Supreme Court justified itself by saying the original purpose of avoiding immorality, and the recognized purpose in this case, of preventing harm, were linked. The immorality could lead to harm. The Court also noted that Canada had international agreements that targeted obscenity, namely the Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications and the Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene Publications.
With a sufficient objective identified, it now had to be asked whether the law was rational and proportionate to the objective. The Court noted, then, that the law should not affect acceptable pornography, namely the type that might celebrate female sexuality and pleasure. Material that degrade women were similar to hate speech. It was rational to outlaw obscenity in order to protect society. Although it was disputed whether obscenity truly promotes harm, some reports did support this conclusion. The courts could then defer to the Parliament of Canada on this matter.
The Court found the law to be proportional. The legislation did not outlaw non-degrading erotica. Moreover, a vague definition of obscenity in the law was acceptable since politicians had had difficulty in drawing up comprehensive definitions. Making the obscenity public was criminalized while private materials may not be.
[edit] Concurrence
 |
Please help improve this section by expanding it. Further information might be found on the talk page or at requests for expansion. |
[edit] Aftermath
The decision has had an impact on other cases involving pornography and other alleged forms of indecency. The case Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (2000) demonstrated the Butler method of analysis of pornography applies to homosexual pornography. Critics of Butler had said the test failed to recognize pornography that promotes equality of homosexuals. However, the Supreme Court replied that "This line of criticism underestimates Butler." Butler is partially meant to avoid a situation in which a biased idea of obscenity is imposed on others. The Supreme Court also found that "It may serve repeating that the national community standard [recognized in Butler] relates to harm not taste."
In R. v. Labaye (2005), the Supreme Court considered clubs in which group sex occurred. The majority cited Butler to say that indecency can be defined as only that which causes harm. Thus, the majority disregarded the community standards test, despite the dissent's objections that this was not an inevitable consequence of Butler.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- ^ Lorraine Johnson, "Sideways Glances: Looking at Porn, Looking at Art," in Suggestive Poses: Artists and Critics Respond to Censorship, ed. Lorraine Johnson (Toronto: Toronto Photographers Workshop and The Riverbank Press, 1997), p. 16, quoting Ms. magazine.
- ^ Christopher P. Manfredi; Scott Lemieux, "Judicial Discretion and Fundamental Justice: Sexual Assault in the Supreme Court of Canada," The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 47, No. 3. (Summer, 1999), p. 500.
- ^ Segal, Lynne (February 1998), “Only the Literal: The Contradictions of Anti-pornography Feminism”, Sexualities 1 (1): 52, ISSN 1363-4607, DOI 10.1177/136346098001001003
