Talk:Quasi-realism
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[edit] Quasi-realism vs. constructivism
I would like others' opinions on this question; it seems important enough to me to deserve clarification in an encyclopedia article on quasi-realism. What is the relationship between quasi-realist and constructivist theories in metaethics?
According to Russ Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism, 2003, Oxford University Press, p. 14):
"Constructivists endorse the reality of a domain, but explain this by invoking a constructive function out of which the reality is created. This function has moral reality as its output."
Subjectivists, relativists, Kantians, and contractarians all get classified as constructivists by Shafer-Landau. So should ideal observer theories and rational preference theories, I think. The main point of such theories seems to be that normativity is irreducibly subjective, and so if there are normative facts they must be constructed by a subjective (or intersubjective) constructive function (such as, "X is good" = "An ideally rational agent would choose/prefer X").
According to Blackburn (Essays in Quasi Realism, p. 5)
"'Humean Projection' [is] the mechanism whereby what starts like as a non-descriptive psychological state ends up expressed, thought about, and considered in propositional form."
The point of quasi-realist projection is, I think, supposed to be that moral or normative judgments start as subjective attitudes and get projected so that we treat them as facts or propositions. Is projection itself a kind of constructive function?
I know that Blackburn rejects various forms of constructivism, and I don't think he claims to be a constructivist, but I have read at least one philosopher (Thomas L. Carson, in Value and the Good Life, Notre Dame University Press, 2000) who I take to be a constructivist (he's a rational preference theorist) who does identify himself as quasi-realist.SCPhilosopher 22:43, 9 November 2007 (UTC)