Pseudomathematics

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Pseudomathematics is a form of mathematics-like activity that does not work within the framework, definitions, rules, or rigor of formal mathematical models. While any given pseudomathematical approach may work within some of these boundaries, for instance, by accepting or invoking most known mathematical definitions that apply, pseudomathematics inevitably disregards or explicitly discards a well-established or proven mechanism, falling back upon any number of demonstrably non-mathematical principles.

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[edit] An illustrative contrived example

Consider the following flawed attempt at a theorem:

Theorem: All positive integers are prime, except those divisible by 2, except 2, which is prime.
Proof: By mathematical induction.
Let P = {n | n is prime}.
Let n = 1. Then n ∈ P.
Since n + 1 ∈ P and (n + 1) + 1 ∈ P, and skipping those divisible by 2, all numbers are prime (except those that are divisible by 2), due to induction.
Q.E.D.

While the above "proof" suffers from various flaws (such as the flawed invocation of mathematical induction and 1 is not prime ), all that is required to topple it is to show a counterexample, such as the positive integer 33. This number is not prime, and if it is shown by way of arriving at a contradiction that numbers evenly divisible by any number (other than 1 or themselves) are not prime (by definition) and this thus contradicts the definition of primes, the counterargument might make an appeal such as "then the definition of primes is flawed since the above proof shows that numbers such as 33 (which is not divisible by 2) are prime."

In mathematics, a statement presenting itself as a mathematical truth is provably incorrect (that is, not a mathematical truth statement) if even one counterexample showing it to be false can be found. Indeed, a statement cannot rightly be called a "theorem" if a counterexample disproving it exists. While it is possible to call something a conjecture until a full formal proof is provided, until and unless that proof is provided, it does not become a theorem. Conjectures, too, may be shown to be false if a counterexample exists.

An appeal that a mathematical definition is in itself wrong (i.e., that primes were somehow poorly defined in the first place) is an appeal to an argument that attacks a well-established and well-understood definition: Primes are prime by definition, and such classes of numbers may or may not have properties that make them interesting. Pseudomathematics, however, sometimes appeals to change definitions to suit its claims. At this point, pseudomathematical arguments exit the world of mathematics altogether, and even the appearance of following long-established mathematical models falls apart.

Any statement purporting to be a theorem must hold within the framework of the pre-existing definitions about which it purports to assert a truth. While new definitions may be introduced into a framework to substantiate a theorem, these new definitions must themselves hold within the framework addressed, without introducing any contradiction within that framework. Asserting that 33 is somehow prime because a flawed proof arrives at this eventuality, and then asserting that the definition of primes itself is flawed is pseudomathematical reasoning.

[edit] Some taxonomy of pseudomathematics

The following categories are rough characterisations of some particularly common pseudomathematical activities:

  1. Attempting to solve classical problems in terms that have been proven mathematically impossible;
  2. Misapprehending standard mathematical methods, and insisting that use or knowledge of higher mathematics is somehow cheating or misleading.

[edit] Attempts on classic unsolvable problems

Investigations in the first category are doomed to failure. At the very least a solution would indicate a contradiction within mathematics itself, a radical difficulty which would invalidate everyone's efforts to prove anything as trite.

Examples of impossible problems include the following constructions in Euclidean geometry using only compass and straightedge:

For more than 2,000 years many people have tried and failed to find such constructions; the reasons were discovered in the 19th century, when it was proved that they are all impossible. This category also extends to attempts to disprove accepted (and proven) mathematical theorems such as Cantor's diagonal argument and Gödel's incompleteness theorem.

[edit] Practitioners

Pseudomathematics has equivalents in other scientific fields, particularly physics, where various efforts are made to continually attempt to invent perpetual motion devices, disprove Einstein using Newtonian mechanics, and other feats that are currently accepted as impossible.

Excessive pursuit of pseudomathematics can result in the practitioner being labelled a "mathematical crank." The topic of mathematical "crankiness" has been extensively studied by Indiana mathematician Underwood Dudley, who has written several popular works about mathematical cranks and their ideas.

Not all mathematical research undertaken by non-mathematicians is pseudomathematics. Non-mathematicians have produced genuinely solid new mathematical results. Indeed, there is no distinction between an amateur mathematically correct result and a professional mathematically correct result; results either are, or are not correct, and pseudomathematical results, by relying on non-mathematical principles, are not about professionalism but about incorrectness arrived at by improper methodology.

[edit] Current trends in pseudomathematics

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In recent years, pseudomathematicians have devoted their energies to disproving Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (efforts that fall in the first category mentioned above) and to proving Fermat's Last Theorem or the Riemann Hypothesis[1] using elementary mathematical techniques (second category). Fermat's theorem now has a lengthy and extremely technical orthodox proof drawing on many different areas of advanced mathematics. Even so, numerous attempts have been made to either overturn the orthodox proof or to provide a more "elementary" proof closer to the implied "simple" proof to which Fermat is conjectured to have alluded. (Such attempts are not pseudomathematical unless accepted mathematical methods are disregarded; perhaps there really is an uncorrectable error in the published proof, and it has not been conclusively demonstrated that Fermat was mistaken in his supposed "proof".)

Other related activities include attempts to create lossless data compression algorithms which will compress all possible inputs or to disprove the four-color theorem; both of these belong to the first category of problems proven to be impossible (assuming that there is no significant error in the accepted proof of the latter). In the former case, there is a trivial proof of impossibility—such an algorithm would need to map a finite large set of input onto a smaller set of output on a one-to-one basis.

Other common subjects of pseudomathematicians include the meaning of infinity, the nature of complex numbers, and the indeterminate expression 0/0. As an example of the last, James Anderson's recently publicized work on transreal numbers would generally be considered pseudomathematics.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Collected pseudomathematical proofs of RH
  • Underwood Dudley (1992), Mathematical Cranks, Mathematical Association of America. ISBN 0-88385-507-0.
  • Underwood Dudley (1996), The Trisectors, Mathematical Association of America. ISBN 0-88385-514-3.
  • Underwood Dudley (1997), Numerology: Or, What Pythagoras Wrought, Mathematical Association of America. ISBN 0-88385-524-0.
  • Clifford Pickover (1999), Strange Brains and Genius, Quill. ISBN 0-688-16894-9.

[edit] See also