Talk:Property dualism
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"Non-reductive physicalism is the predominant contemporary form of property dualism according to which mental properties are in some sense identical with neurobiological properties, but are not reducible to them."
This is wrong. Physical properties are not identical with mental properties, according to this or any other view, in ANY sense of the word "identical". They are no more identical than the height and volume of a thing, or the color and flavor of it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.77.142.91 (talk) 17:44, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
- You're quite wrong; Identity theory holds that mental properties are physical properties. But the article is even more wrong, horribly so; non-reductive physicalism is most certainly not dualism; as the Physicalism article says, "physicalism is generally a form of monism", Physicalism is essentially monist". -- 71.102.200.232 (talk) 08:18, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
Thank you. I stand corrected. I wasn't aware of this [absurd] doctrine. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.77.142.91 (talk) 17:56, 27 January 2008 (UTC)
[edit] Extant Property Dualists?
Does anyone know if anyone actually calls him or herself a "property dualist?" It seems like a position invented in the secondary literature. Though supervenience tends to involve two sets of properties, and hence a kind of property dualism, advocates of supervenience in phil-mind are typically physicalists. In regards to this article, if there are self-proclaimed property dualists they should be cited; if not then that somewhat remarkable fact should be noted, I think. Jyoshimi (talk) 17:28, 6 February 2008 (UTC)