Talk:Project Jennifer

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[edit] Accident during lift

I've always considered the official story of "the important half broke off for some mysterious reason and we didn't go back to get it because everyone was tired" a little fishy. I mean, they would have tracked the broken piece as it fell, which means they wouldn't even have to search for it, and its doubtful that hitting the bottom a second time did much more damage than the first time. Thats what they were there to get anyways, so why would they leave after one try? 70.70.136.240 01:36, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

It does seem like a fairly obvious attempt at disinformation (why tell the Soviets just how much you did learn about their technology when you can lie about it?), but on the other hand it could be true. I doubt many people really know which is the truth. Mark Grant 06:10, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Conspiracy Theory

The article currently says: "Sewell makes the case that the particular Soviet submarine was chosen . . . ." I think "makes the case" is too strong here, because it implies that Sewell's claim is widely acknowledged and/or considered proven. I would suggest changing it to "Sewell argues . . . ." instead. Comments? Richwales 22:02, 2 November 2006 (UTC)

The Conspiracy Theory section should be spun off to a new entry on the Red Star Rogue book, with only a link from this entry. This material is non-factual and does not belong in this entry.

[edit] No sources?

How is the reader supposed to know parts of this are not just made up? -FASXFA

[edit] RED STAR ROGUE

I am making a change to the lead-in paragraph that posits the Sewell theory as fact. I have been conversing with another contributor concerning the Golf II Soviet Submarine article trying to scrub off the Sewell theory as factual representations. Sewell's book is difficult because it cleaves into areas in which the general public is totally non-conversant, and areas where security operations are in existence to minimize the proliferation of factual data. Sewell jumps into this void and rampages through ignorance and bad information to claim discovery of a heretofore unsuspected event in our history. To Mr. Sewell: extraordinary hypotheses require extraordinary proof. Red Star Rogue is a terrible example of circular reasoning and bad logic -- at best. At worst it is merely fiction masquerading as fact.

Here is part of the discussion concerning Red Star Rogue which is taking place at the Golf II article:


Your discussion of Project Jennifer is better but still utilizes Red Star Rogue's statement that almost all of K-129 was retrieved and most of the bodies were recovered. If you read carefully how Sewell comes to this conclusion, you will realize how specious his reasoning is. He utilizes the average number of feet that the claw could be moved per hour up and down, and divides that into the total time recorded by the Glomar Explorer at the wreck site. Seems reasonable so far, but he does not provide time for repositioning the ship over the next section; no time for prep of the first down movement after arrival; no time for docking the claw and prep for sea after the last lift; no time for problems and mechanical breakdowns; no time for errors and inefficiencies (and fatigue of the crew); and most importantly, provides no time to disassemble and move-out of the moon-pool area, the section or sections that were successfully retrieved. You may remember that he discussed delays in that endeavor due to the necessity to work on a section contaminated by radioactivity. Factoring in such time requirements puts paid to the idea that the Glomar Explorer made a successful lift of five or six sections.


You mentioned the discrepancy between a normal crew of 83 and the list of 94 members on this last cruise of the K-129. While I have no experience with Soviet naval practices, I do know that U.S. national strategic resources (aircraft carriers and SSBNs) always attract extra personnel when they are about to deploy. Special observers, hardware technicians, systems designers, training specialists, and officers riding for qualifications and check-out are only a few of the reasons that extra personnel appear on board prior to and during a combat deployment. I assume that the Soviets responded in a similar manner to the unique environment of a submarine on a combat patrol to study personnel and equipment under real world conditions.

While there are always inconsistencies between information provided verbally from many sources, some of whom are often unqualified to provide such information but do so to appear knowledgeable and important, Sewell appears to grab every such inconsistency as a proof of conspiracy. Such is the danger of utilizing uncorroborated verbal data. It is a reporter's job to independently verify verbal claims; and research, where possible, into the written record. Sewell does the opposite. He bends facts to fit his theory; and apparently concocts data wherever such information is lacking. Two of the most glaring concoctions Sewell wrote to bolster his theory involve the idea that the missile launch attempt was conducted on the surface rather than submerged. Open sources on the internet document that the G-II submarine with the SS-N-5 SERB missile was a SUBMERGED launch system requiring the missile tubes to be flooded prior to launch. I suspect, but do not know for sure, that attempts to launch from a dry tube would damage the submarine to the point of endangering the safety of the ship and crew. Launching with a flooded tube on the surface is similarly unpalatable due to the high center of gravity and the ensuing unstable platform thus available for launch. Sewell apparently requires a surface launch scenario in order to bolster his theory with similarly specious claims that a U.S. infrared satellite detected two explosions at the time and near the location he proposes as the site of K-129's sinking. On pages 134, 158, 180 and elsewhere, Sewell asserts that U.S. intelligence satellite assets (specifically a NORAD satellite) provided information on the K-129 sinking by detecting the explosion of the missile propellant in tubes 1 and 2 on 7 Mar 1968. Page 158 states: "The Navy was notified by the North American Aerospace Defense Command that one of its satellites had identified and recorded an event in the Northern Pacific as having some of the characteristics of a Soviet Missile launch. A satellite sensor had recorded two massive surges of radiant energy when the missile fuel in the K-129's launch tubes one and two exploded. The camera's sensors were tuned to record the light spectrum created by the burning of specific chemicals known to be used in Soviet rocket fuel." This is an unqualified statement by Sewell, and demonstrateably false, misleading and ridiculous. A quick internet key word search will show that the NORAD launched its first missile detection satellites (IMEWS-1) in 6 Nov 1970, 20 months after Sewell claims NORAD resources recorded his theoretical missile explosion aboard the K-129. As a possible defense for Sewell, he might not have known that the infrared detection satellites of the time were under the control of the NRO (National Reconnaissance Office), NOT NORAD.

Later in the book, on page 184, Sewell conducts a discussion of intelligence satellite resources circa 1968. He discusses the CORONA PhotInt (photo intelligence) satellite as if it could have been the system that reported an explosion in the Northern Pacific in March 1968. However, this system returned its photos to earth within re-entry capsules, so photos were carefully rationed to high-interest targets. The probability is it using film on an empty northern Pacific water area is nil. He then discusses the TIROS weather satellite as a possible sensor of such an explosion (a hail-Mary pass requiring the ideas that this system 1) had such a capability; 2) was secretly connect to CIA and/or USAF customers; and 3) that this subterfuge has never come to light in the intervening 40 years). Finally he discussed the SAMOS and MIDAS systems. SAMOS satellites took pictures on film, developed the film in orbit, and transmitted TV scans of the pictures to Earth. Because the TV pictures were much blurrier than the film, SAMOS had low resolution even for its day (5–20 feet), and some authorities have claimed that SAMOS never produced useful data. Again, because each photo utilized irreplaceable satellite resources, the idea of a SAMOS satellite expending film on open ocean night photography is untenable.

MIDAS satellites transmitted launch indication via radio links; if two MIDAS satellite picked up the same indication, launch location could be calculated. Each MIDAS satellite was stationed at a much higher altitude then CORONA or SAMOS (e.g., 2170 miles vs 200 miles), from which it could see most or all of the Soviet Union at any moment. The MIDAS satellites were designed to observe Earth in the infrared band of the electromagnetic spectrum. The goal was to detect the heat radiation (infrared light) given off by missile and rocket launches; specifically ICBM launches from Russia or China. Twelve attempts to orbit MIDAS satellites were made between February, 1960, and October, 1966. Most failed, but experience with MIDAS made possible its successor, IMEWS, and the later third generation DSP satellites. The MIDAS system was rather primitive and detection of short duration signals was never attempted; nor desired (short duration signal processing would overload the downlink bandwidth and was specifically programmed out as noise). The long-duration boost phase of an ICBM (which may exceed 10 minutes), was part of the signature of an attack profile used by MIDAS signal analysis. Attempts to detect and analyze theater range missile launches (say 400 nm or less) with their much shorter boost phase became a goal of satellite IR detection only with the third generation DSP satellites in the 1980s. The idea that the explosion of two missiles on the surface of the waters of the northern Pacific in 1968 was detected by a MIDAS and forwarded via downlink as a signal of interest, overestimates the state of the art of satellite IR detection by over 20 years.

In the cases of MIDAS, IMEWS and DSP satellites, the IR signature being sought is generated by the heat of the missile exhaust plume. The IR signature is a function of heat and chemistry, so the satellites were provided with detectors which covered a band of IR frequencies centered on 2.7 microns. There is nothing in open source literature to indicate that spectrographic data was part of MIDAS' signal analysis criteria for reporting targets; thus nothing to indicate that an explosion bearing such spectrography would be processed and reported by a MIDAS. Finally, an explosion confined by missile launch tubes would have little infrared similarity to a boost phase missile exhaust plume and thus would be missed by MIDAS detectors directed specifically toward detecting plume characteristics.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Sewell has populated his book with spurious data and purposefully presented his "facts" without regard to normal and traditional independent verification testing. It is tempting to conclude that Sewell's efforts were never intended to represent historical reality, but rather are the most recent example of that most troublesome form of imaginative writing: fiction masquerading as fact. Gwyncann 21:38, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

The theory has additional problems. For example, United States intelligence knew China had not developed a missile for it's Golf class submarines in 1968[1]. Furthermore, China did not have a thermonuclear weapon small enough to be launched from a submarine [2]. --Work permit 06:39, 30 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] U.S. Government Continuing Security

I think this section adds no value to the article. The section Public disclosure is more detailed and free from speculations on motive--Work permit 19:37, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

I removed the section--Work permit 18:34, 16 September 2007 (UTC)