Talk:Problem of evil/Archive 2

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This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Contents 1 To Mr Blah 2 Blah 3 Content issues 4 what? 5 I object to this 6 What's all the fuss about Good and Evil. 7 One point 8 Epistemological Problem of Evil? 9 What's with the crappy presentation of the core peice? 10 bunch of articles 11 Passage on hell 12 Move 13 removed essay for consideration 14 Revert 15 Comment on previous revert 16 Links 17 Recent changes to summary 18 RfC 19 Recent edit 20 Augustine vs Epicurus: Nonsensical passage? 21 Origonal research in responses 22 Requested addition 23 Presuppositional Response 24 Some extra content? 25 "Moral argument" 26 Something to consider 27 'Perfect' equals 'Benevolent'? 28 Significant changes to the article in March, 2006 29 God and Satan 30 Buddhism and Islam 31 In Mormon Theology

To Mr Blah

Hi.....Mr blah you are taking on the opinion of St. Augustine who believes that Suffering is the consequence of free will.

I am a protest atheist and cannot believe that a god would give us a free will knowing the consequences.

Blah

God did not create evil, and therefore is not responsible for it. What God did create was man, with free will. It was man, armed with his free will that created evil, and it is man that is responsible for it.

Yeah, yeah. Please add new comments at the bottom, and sign your comments with ~~~~ -- infinity0 19:31, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

Also if you believe in God you believe in Satan/the devilwhich means that good and evil balance out —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.210.184.32 (talk • contribs)

You can negate God's fault/input in inventing the concept of evil by making an evil diety, but that doesn't solve the problem of evil -- why does an omnibenevolent God allow this? The answer seems to lie in free will, and how it thus justifies evil by giving us the freedom to choose, rather than a universe where everything is ordered and thus (less) meaningful. Something like that. I will need to think about this some more because it has been some time since I read anything on theodicy. Piepants 16:37, 18 August 2006 (UTC)Piepants

If god is omnipent and good he can eliminate evil since he created freewill wich in turn created "evil". But since he doesnt eliminate it he is logicly responsible for it. If i have the omnipent power to do what ever i want i am responsible for everything since i can effect everything the way i want and if i let evil be i am evil. Or atleast not omnipent

Content issues

Mel -

You are very unclear as to why you are making so many edits, especially deletions. Could we get some substantial justification? Infinity0 and I are trying to compromise and work together to make some good articles. Why not join the effort of construction rather than destruction?

By the way everyone, Mel Etitis is doing this same thing to other articles, including the Philosophy of Religion article on Wikipedia.

68.6.99.244 04:42, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

Mel Etitis, what exactly do you not understand about the current revision?? Everything is on there which was on the version YOU understand, plus a little extra which describes the format of the argument, and a few reworked arguments. Infinity0 20:04, 15 October 2005 (UTC)

Just wanted to thank Infinity0 for defending improvement rather than mass deletion of article content additions. Mel Etitis has been doing some massive, pompous deletion without sufficient justification. Be advised.

68.6.99.244 06:15, 14 October 2005 (UTC)

---

Why are there separate articles on the "The Problem of evil", "Theodicy", and "Free Will and the Problem of Evil"? Maybe these sections of the encyclopedia should be written with some kind of coherent article structure, instead of everybody's little, overlapping, essays on various topics.

Off you go, then. Be my guest. -- The Anome 12:40, 15 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Would anyone seriously object if this article were gutted completely? It's a rambling, badly-written Intro to Philosophy essay right now, not a Wikipedia article on the problem of evil. Graft 13:18, 15 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Ooh, someone did it! And beautifully... Graft

It is well written and accurate AFAIK, but nowhere near as comprehensive as the older version. I hope it gets expanded to an appropriate level of detail. --Robert Merkel 14:19, 15 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Would anyone mind if I simply folded this material into the fuller article, Free will and the problem of evil ? This page then could b turned into a redirect. The two articles are essentially the same topic. RK 19:44, 19 Aug 2003 (UTC)

The entire article is silly since "evil" is a religious term for a variety of things more appropriately described by other terms. "Moral evil" is worse, since the person engaged in it often (if not always) perceives the same action as "good." Then it degenerates into assuming free will exists in the absolute sense, not just the obfuscatory sense used by "compatibilists", which is equivalent to "freedom" and is not relevant to discussions of ultimate choice. The example of rape represents a violation of freedom, not of free will; if free will existed, it could not be violated. Fairandbalanced 23:41, 12 Sep 2003 (UTC)

If a merge was to be done at all, I think I'd prefer it to go in the opposite direction - include other stuff here rather than making this a redirect... free will isn't the only issue related to the PoE. Evercat 19:52, 19 Aug 2003 (UTC)

I concur. Graft

The article on free will and the problem of evil, while well-written and valuable deals with one particular strand of argument about the problem of evil, This is the more general article, and you should merge the contents of the other article with this one, and redirect it here. Since you are in a merging mood, don't forget the articles on theodicy, and the logical and evidential arguments from evil, which are also on the same topic as this article. Finally, after all the merges, you might consider bringing back some of the material from this article that I removed because it was so long-winded. By the way, I was intending to do all this myself, so if you don't get around to it in the next week or so, I will probably do it, unless somebody puts forward a good argument why not.

I agree. RK

I merged the theodicy article in. This reduced the coherence of the article, but at least we have started to consolidate this material. 66.82.112.10 16:53, 30 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Great! Maybe we should turn the Theodicy article into a link to this page. They are now covering the precise same set of topics. Also, I have finally merged all the text from Free will and the problem of evil into this article, and turned that entry into a Redirect to here. RK 17:50, 30 Aug 2003 (UTC)

---

This argument is weak:

"But there is another, similar problem. Some instances of moral evil already involve violations of free will -- e.g., rape. For God to step in and deny the violator his freedom would also be to protect the victim's freedom. In such cases, it all comes down to whose free will is more valuable -- which instance of coercion would be worse? And it is morally implausible that the best thing to do is to respect a rapist's freedom to rape unhindered rather than protecting the victim's freedom. So, for a large category of moral evil -- all moral evil involving coercion -- it's automatically implausible that the value of free will can justify God's inaction. We must then narrow the domain of admissible evil yet again."

Why? The writer seems to missuse the term "will" to mean "destiny". Despite the freedom the victim has to not wanting to be raped, he can suffer from it against her will.

---

An opposing viewpoint here would state that God has already intervened in the world: he has told us that rape and similar acts are wrong.

This rather misses the point. When we ask why on earth God allows all this evil, it's rather unsatisfactory to say "well, he's politely asked us all to be good - what more do you want him to do?" --Evercat 22:36, 4 Oct 2003 (UTC)

I am deleting that since it is irrelevant to this section. Also clarifying that free will is an unverified assertion. Attempted to tighten up some other parts without significantly changing the meaning. Fairandbalanced 03:54, 5 Oct 2003 (UTC)

---

Moved to talk since I have absolutely no idea what this means:

But that argument fails because it assumes an identity between the beings in this world and God. For God to be indicted on this charge He would have had to have been capable of making a world with Himself identically reproduced in it. But He is one and indivisible, so per Plantiga's reasoning, He can't do that. His omnipotence is not impugned and the argument falls.

Huh? Why does the argument assume God has to create a clone of himself? Evercat 21:32, 19 Nov 2003 (UTC)

What's the context in this? It seems like the person is stating that God needs to create a second universe (including a second God), and thus cannot do so since God is individsible. Why does God need to make a second universe? Is it to create a universe which is orderly and has no sin? Piepants 17:01, 18 August 2006 (UTC)Piepants

what?

"Karma's not a normal response from religions that are vulnerable to the PoE. Moving it to a less prominent position." (user:evercat, edit note) I'd like some explanation of what you mean by this. Are you saying that believers in karma are "invulnerable" to the problem of evil argument? If so, I think the deserves a particularly prominant place in this article :) Jack 19:41, 30 Jan 2004 (UTC)

My understanding is that the PoE is usually applied to Christianity, Judaism and Islam - the religions that believe in a single all-powerful fully-merciful God. These don't, to my knowledge, believe in karma. So karma is not a typical response to the PoE. Are there any religions that believe in an omnipotent omnibenevolent God and karma? Evercat 21:02, 30 Jan 2004 (UTC)

Sanathana Dharma / Brahman Hinduism? Also, Karma is perfectly compatable w all faiths, Christianity included. I know of may christians who interpret "as you sow, so shall you reap" as karma. I agree it is not a "typical response" but it is a valid one. It appears that you agree w me that karma is a solid answer to PoE? If so, this deserves alot more attention, not a cover up. Jack 02:32, 31 Jan 2004 (UTC)

I just moved it down. That's not a cover up. Is karma an answer? Well, if one only believes in a single life and not reincarnation (as the 3 religions that I named do, to the best of my knowledge) then it doesn't explain relatively sinless lives that are nevertheless awful. Karma only works to solve the PoE if one believes in reincarnation. So perhaps it can work for Hinduism, if indeed Hinduism really portrays an omnipotent omniscient omnibenevolent God (I don't have the knowledge of Hinduism). But you agreed with me above that it's not a typical response. That's why I moved it down. Evercat 13:49, 31 Jan 2004 (UTC)

I direct you to [1]. I'm sorry if the word "cover up" came across harshly, but I feel this is an area which has been covered up (not necessarilly by you! :) and is consistantly glossed over. Reincarnation is probably necessary in order for karma to be an answer to the PoE, but reincarnation is generally seen as a byproduct of Karma. Its not easy to understand how Karma could work w/o it. Anyways, I plan to write more on this subject, and I do not agree that it must be relagated to a lower position due it's unconventional nature in western debate of this concept. You may want to look into Brahman if you have any confusion about the Hindu God. Jack 04:27, 1 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I object to this

"Some atheists believe that the problem of evil can be used to prove that God does not exist by the method of reductio ad absurdum. "

I was about to remove it, but I figured I should hear any evidence for, or explanation of this. It seems absurd to me ;) Sam Spade 05:50, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I think it is just historical fact that thi8s has been used by some atheists as a profe that God does not exist. In my opinion not a very good proof, but see http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/james_still/evil.html and http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/evil.html. The paragraph should therefore stay. -- Chris Q 07:37, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Wow, that really wasn't ment to stand up to scrutiny, was it? Ok, I accept your evidence. I put in a disclaimer about lack of imagination. Sam Spade 08:12, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Sam, I changed your sentence from "Others see the as a better example of argument from lack of imagination." to "Others see the atheists argument as an example of argument from lack of imagination.". This is what I think you were saying, but you left some words out!

Also, I changed "Atheists" to "Some atheists", because I think many atheists see this as a rather limited and week argument. -- Chris Q 12:18, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I should hope anyone would (esp. the author!), if they had bothered to give it much thought. Good eye catching my earlier edit blunder :S I have since made a couple of changes, but I don't think I've changed the meaning at all, just made the wikilink work, and improved the sentance I added (reduced it mainly). Sam Spade 12:33, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

What's all the fuss about Good and Evil.

What is the problem with evil? God is God. Is it so hard to accept that his existence is beyond good and evil, beyond our understanding of certain issues ie: if evil exist then God doesn't because God is supposed to be all good?

Good and evil are attributes of human nature/understanding of what they mean in relationship to one another (to good and evil) and to our existence. They are nothing more than experiences for our understanding of life. How we choose to apply, understand or experience it is up to us.

Certainly good or evil can not be used to validate or invalidate God's existence. It is not a mean for us to use individually or in conjunction with any other thing to prove or disprove God's existence. God's existence is unlimited and without bound in any and every direction. "Good and evil" have already limited God to within our scope of understanding or what we want God to be. God would not and could not be God if his existence requires our validation or understanding.

It is by choice not by logic that one will begin to understand God or know God exist. It is a given, that God exist, whether we choose to accept this or not.

Say Yang

You are right of course. Would you like to form a user account? Sam [Spade] 06:14, 30 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Surely the discussion is about the existence of evil, not particularly the existence of God. The mention of using evil to invalidate the existence of God is a tangential reference. Moreover, the way you describe God, Say, is to describe anything which is "beyond," such that God could be something else equally beyond our understanding yet influences the world (Consciousness? Satan? 12th dimensional hyperspace?). Apparently, God made mortals so inept at understanding (even those who "choose" to understand him) that your approach so far has not succeeded in ridding the problem of evil from the world - thus we have this Wikipedia article.

Nice try, though. I honestly admire your effort.--Psients 13:39, 18 Aug 2004 (UTC)

People arn't enept, were busy suffering/learning. Progress is good. Sam [Spade] 00:32, 19 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The only philosophical "problem of evil" would be if, 1.) there actually is moral "evil" -- not just subjective, personal dislikes, and 2.) the being ultimately in control of that "evil" intends it for an "evil" purpose and / or directly causes it. Without one (1), the events and thoughts designated as "evil" are simply more amoral facts of the universe, such as the fact of fingers or toes (some are disturbed by them, some have a fetish for them). Without (2), there is no "problem" insofar as the being in control of the "evil" does not have an "evil" motive and does not directly engage in the "evil" (which implies nothing about that being's ability to prevent the "evil").

One might note the problem of Adam and Eve eating from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and thus their loss of innocence leading to the fall. That might be one point of analysis for the user beginning this particular subject.

Yes, it's a very touchy subject. But I just reason: Parents can influence a child greatly, perhaps for the better. Parents can keep children from doing bad things. (Just bear with me :)) But some decide not to so that they can learn for themselves that doing bad things is... bad. I think it's just the same as with God. We're the children, he's the parent. He doesn't want to be such a control freak that we try to kill ourselves because our lives are being controlled. Of course, he could make us fail, but then we would just be more depressed. So he just hopes we'll figure it out on our own. 1337 r0XX0r 14:35, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

The point of the problem of evil isn't to say no god exists just that an all loving, all knowing , all powerful god doesn't exist. The problem of evil allows for an all loving god, as long as 'he' is not all powerful or all knowing. It allows for an all knowing god as long as 'he' is not all powerful or all loving. Finally it allows for an all powerful god as long as 'he' is not all knowing or all loving.Your god as parent could be seen as all loving, but without the power or the knowledge to help us. -- SamuellusSoccus 19:54, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

One point

"But Plantinga reminds us that there are always trivial limits on omnipotence -- God can't make 2+2=5 or create a married bachelor."

This means God is not omnipotent. If the evil demon of Descartes can deceive us about logic in such a way, making married bachelors possible, why can't God do it? It seems absurd that some demon is more powerful than God...

Plantinga is a Christian-Theist of the Reformed camp. Most Christians through-out history, including the Reformed Christians, have defined Omnipotence along of the lines of 'being able to do all that is not contrary to your nature, having no external power exerted on your being or will, your own self the source and original of all power'. Thus, when Plantinga speaks about God not being able to make '2+2=5' a true proposition, he is really making two statements: God's own thinking (part of His nature) is logical and coherent, and God is Omnipotent. Also, what Descartes' "Evil Genius" hypothesis referred to was the reliability of sense perception, i.e., the metaphysics of knowledge, viz., epistemology; what Plantinga was referring to was the actual state of affairs about the world, viz., ontological facts. I'm fairly certain that Plantinga would have no problem granting that God would have the raw capacity to deceive people about propositions like '2+2=5', so that they would hold to false beliefs, though I'm equally certain that he would argue that God's nature is such as to rule out that kind of behavior.

But surely there is a false argument here: the definition of bachelor is someone who is not married.

Yes, a bachelor is only a word that humans have given its meaning, so that part of the argument doesn't make sense.

I don't think that's a valid objectoin. Every word is merely a term to which human beings have given meaning. Without these meanings, there can be no rational discourse. The point is that the term "bachelor" does have meaning (i.e. an unmarried man); hence, it makes perfect sense to say that God cannot create a married bachelor.

The 'married bachelor' error (not a paradox) proof against God's omnipotence (if it can even be called a proof) isn't very strong. It assumes some premises: that a bachelor is an unmarried man, and that God can make premise 1) false, thus making the premise 'a bachelar is a married man' true.

Either one or the other is true, but as they are contradictory statements, they can't both be true. That's the silent assumption.

A better claim might be that God can't turn back time (err..maybe falsifiable) or that God can't make 2 = 3. Piepants 17:23, 18 August 2006 (UTC)Piepants

There's more than one definition of omnipotence, and the married bachelor style of paradox only poses a problem using the least refined definition. Take a look at the page on the omnipotence paradox here - it's got a fantastic overview of the problem. 195.97.248.74 11:06, 14 September 2006 (UTC)

Epistemological Problem of Evil?

Shouldn't the article list both forms of the "problem of evil" -- ontological and epistemological? Right now there is only the ontological problem listed under the definition: God is all good / powerful, evil exists, therefore God is either not all good / powerful, or evil doesn't exist. But there is also an epistemological form of the problem: the existence of evil would make it impossible to know that God is all good (on the basis of experience alone), evil exists, therefore one cannot know that God is all good. The epistemological form of the problem is not very strong against 'revealed' religions, which claim to have knowledge of God's Omnibenevolence by direct revelation rather than by an inductive survey of human experience, but it is still a distinct form of the problem and probably merits some mention.

How come nobody commented on this? (And who wrote it in the first place?) Maybe because it makes too much sense? The problem is that humanity is trying to define the undefinable — God. (The God in the Old Testament wasn't exactly benevolent.) If God is the be all and end all, then who are we to say that what we define as "good" is "God", and what we define as "evil" is not "God"? Who are we to define and completely understand God? Who created Lucifer? Who created the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil? Who put said tree into the Garden of Eden? God created the temptation (the fruit). God created the temptor (the serpent). God created the naïve sinners (Adam and Eve). Sounds like entrapment to me ;) We have a deviant shape-changing angel who became the first traveling salesman, "here... try this tasty apple, guaranteed to make you as wise as a god". We have the woman whom God created to be susceptible to ploys from traveling salesmen and we have man whom God created to be susceptible to ploys from beautiful women. Not only that... Eve ate the apple first, and then tempted Adam by showing off her newly acquired mental prowess. Adam didn't stand a chance. --Thoric 16:25, 17 November 2005 (UTC)

A wise man once said, "I think therefore I am". Simply put, "I exist because I am aware that I exist". Logic also dictates that, "If something can exist, then it does exist". The existence of that "something" in a physical or imaginary state is irrelevant. Existence is existence. For example, a fantasy exists in dreams in the mind. They are not physical, but they are still in existence; and are happening. Existence is a state of awareness. Yet at the same time, it is possible to be unaware that you exist and still be in existence. For example, a baby exists but doesn't perceive their own existence due to a lack of maturity. Omnipotence is (1.)the ability to do anything. (2.)The state of being all powerful. This ability is generally attributed to deities. "If it is possible to do anything, then it is possible to create anything; including a reality where absolutely everything can exist. Even creations who could resist their creator". One of the most asked questions by many is, "If an omnipotent being could make another being with the ability to resist their control, would they"? "And if so, why"? Many Gods of many faiths and fictions have varying rationales behind their actions. The God of the Christian faith gave his creations the freedom to choose not to serve his commands. Abstract arguments abound as to why this was done. The most accepted explanation is that God is a deity who has chosen to take on the attributes of good and love as defining characteristics of his nature. So much so in fact, that he can become the physical manifestion of these attributes. It would be logical that a God with such a character would prefer to have servants that obey because they have made a conscience choice to do so. It is also Logical that their would be creations that would choose just the opposite. The bible teaches that God has chosen to exist in a constant state of self denial towards anything that is of a negative state. It also teaches that his creations can exist in this same state of being when they are with him. If God is good incarnate and hince pleasurable to be around, then to exist in a state without him is to exist in evil and suffering. The next question is, "Why give these servants free will"? One logical explanation is that an omnipotent and omniscient being knows that just because you can be evil doesn't mean you will be. That being said, it is then logical that a reality in which good and evil co-existing in the same state with a God of such a nature can indeed exist. It is also logical that for an omnipotent being, a reality can be created where all its inhabitants exist in an infinite positive state. "If God is a creator of everything, did he create the Devil?" According to the logic above the answer could be considered an affirmative. God created beings that eventually chose to challenge him. But because these being had a choice to co-exist with him, it can then be argued that they were self made creations; hince God's involvement in their creation is an indirect result of his nature. "If a Good God can exist, then an Evil God can as also". Christanity calls this God "Lucifer, the evil one". The co-existence of a good diety and evil diety is logical in a world where all things can exist. An omnipotent being though can create realites where there exists only good and only evil. According to the bible, this will be the end result for the current conjoined reality will be replaced with the two separated forms of existence. The current will only exist as a memory in the minds of the inhabitants of the afermentioned. Cross reference Alternate Reality, Omniscience, Omnipresence and Parallel Dimension. References to these topics can also be found in such pop culture media as the Matrix Trilogy. I suggest cross referencing with other religions and their idealogies on Good and Evil; as well as thier thoughts on Heaven and Hell.

What's with the crappy presentation of the core peice?

I've seen some crappy presentations but that takes the cake. It's like 1 line. There's a whole nice logical presentation that only takes a few lines.

1. God is all-good.
2. God is all-powerful.
3. God is all-knowing.
4. All-good beings would seek to destroy evil.
5. All-powerful beings could destroy evil.
6. All-knowing beings would know evil would be created.
7. If an all-good, all-powerful all-knowing being existed, evil would not.
8. Evil exists.
9. An all-good, all-powerful all-knowing does not exist.

Responses.

1. Middle-knowledge. No free will/fideism.
2. Limited Omniscience. God didn't know Satan would go bad and create evil.
3. Fatalism. God created evil? And... he's still God!
4. Contradiction. Sure, it is contradictory but its all still true.
5. Additional response from LukeH 18:11, 30 May 2005 (UTC): There is a flaw in the logic is at point "4.": All-good beings would seek to destroy evil. That is not necessarily true, particularly in the light of the justice of God (which is one of the things that makes Him perfect), and man's agency. The fact that He could destroy evil (point "5.") does not necessarily mean that He would destroy evil; and the fact that God is all-good does not necessarily mean that He would destroy evil either, if there is a higher purpose in the existence of evil. (For example, perhaps opposition is crucial to our development, so evil may exist for the "higher good".)
6. It is also arguable that good would not exist without the existence of evil as a comparative. LukeH 18:11, 30 May 2005 (UTC).

Seen some better presentations, for the formal logic argument. This one here is off the top of my head and I'm sleepy. So it's kinda weak. Tatarize 13:10, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

You are assuming that things can be created and destroyed. This violates the laws of thermodynamics. Also, you assume that God isn't good and evil combined (God = All), and that evil isn't necessary. I would say that without evil, good would have alot less meaning, that evil is the lack of, or distance from, God. [[User:Sam Spade|Sam Spade Arb Com election]] 18:50, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

• First off, you don't understand the laws of Thermodynamics. That's the only explanation for your first comment. They have nothing to do with creation or destruction. Conservation of matter and conservation of energy perhaps, thermodynamics does involve conservation of entropy. But you still lack a leg to stand on there. Thermodynamics is heat exchange, not a magical law that says God exists.
• Yes, the problem of evil includes the assumption that God is omnibenevolent. If you reject that assumption the argument holds no weight. However all-good is often a qualifier of God.
• Your final point is one of the critics of the of the argument: Dualism. And should be added to the list.
• Your responce seems a little too directed at me. The argument is the argument is the argument. That's the formal presentation of it. I'll either sharpen it up personally or look for a public domain source for the formal but probably just the former for the write up. Tatarize 03:05, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I dare say it is you who fails to comprehend the ramifications of the laws of thermodynamics, and I never suggested that they are magical or prove God exists, but thats off topic. Lets just simplify to state that your argument presupposes that things can be created or destroyed, which is by no means a given.

As to me speaking directly to you, it is your particular presentation of the argument which I am speaking to. As far as Dualism, I wasn't refering to dualism at all, quite to the contrary I was invoking Summum bonum, but a mention of dualism would of course be helpful in the article as well. [[User:Sam Spade|Sam Spade Arb Com election]] 12:15, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I don't know where you guys are going off on this...I think you can also assume that God -could- have created the world with no evil. And suddenly thermodynamics can represent an abstract and intangible object like "evil"? I doubt it applies...but off the topic.

You've entirely forgotten to directly mention the convention of "Free will". God chose to give us free will (according to believers, of which I am one), so therefore he cannot interfere with that.

Even Taoists believe that "all can know good as good only because there is evil." I wish I could credit that quote - it's in the Tao te ching somewhere. 206.114.20.121

bunch of articles

apart from this article, we have

• Logical and evidential arguments from evil
• Epicurean paradox
• Theodicy
• Maltheism, Theophilia
• Eutheism and dystheism

I know this was already discussed above. But it seems to have gotten worse instead of better. These articles are all about the same topic, and there shouldn't be so many of them...

Also, into which of them would I include the observation that mention of the problem is probably first attested (and not resolved) in Psalm 14,1

The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doeth good.

dab (ᛏ) 17:34, 20 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Yes, now that I have an id, I'll point out that I'm the anon who made this point at the beginning of the Talk page, way back in summer 2003. I also tried in August 2003 to rewrite this page and merge Theodicy, although some time after I wandered off, this seems to have been undone. It seems to have only gotten worse since then, and someone has then merged stuff the other way into Theodicy. Or maybe it was already worse only I didn't realize it. Why don't we plan how to merge all these articles? Does anyone think there is a good reason for them to be separate? --BM 20:39, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

This afternoon, I made a start on merging. Logical and evidential arguments from evil was redirected to theodicy, and its content appended to the theodicy article. This is not ideal, but I didn't want to lose the content. I shortened this article (that is, The problem of evil) somewhat to make it an overview, and appended the content of Epicurean paradox here, after redirecting that article. Also, I renamed Eutheism and dystheism to Eutheism, dystheism, and maltheism, and merged the Maltheism in as a (too long) final section. For the moment, it is a separate article, but my feeling is that it should also eventually be discussed in the one article on this general topic, and that the eutheism, dystheism, and maltheism material should be much reduced.

So, we are down to a three articles at present. Now, does anyone have any thoughts on which article should be the final target of merges, theodicy or The problem of evil. I lean somewhat towards theodicy, with the the problem of evil becoming a redirect. --BM 23:17, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Passage on hell

Franc28: the passage, originally placed in the article by an anon, that you've replaced is original research, with no citations or reference, and is both poorly written and poorly argued. Why do you think that it should remain? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:11, 6 May 2005 (UTC)

After further consideration, I agree that the paragraph in question is disjointed. But an extended reference to the Problem of Hell should still be maintained on the page. Franc28 23:18, May 6, 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps that could be a separate article? As a topic, it's rarely found in philosophy of religion, though theologians talk about it. That's because it involves a problem internal to certain religious beliefs (a discrepancy between claims about the existence and nature of god and the existence and nature of hell); the problem of evil, on the other hand, involves a problem external to religious belief (the existence and nature of god and facts about the world independent of religious belief). Do you have any citations? A look through my books, including monographs and collections specifically on the problem of evil, failed to produce any (except for mediæval philosopher/theologians like Julian of Norwich). Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 10:04, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

Whoa, wait up a second here, I thought that God created *everything*. How can any problem be external to religious concerns ? Franc28 17:41, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

But that's not the point — there's a difference between a contradiction internal to religious belief and a contradiction between religious belief and the independent, objective facts. Philosophy is interested in the latter, but not so much in the former, which is the province of theology. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:51, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

I know what the difference is supposed to be, I'm just saying it makes no sense.If religious belief is correct, then there is no such thing as an independent, objective fact (see the TANG). Franc28 20:20, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

But that's hardly a standard or widespread view among non-believers or believers (the TANG reference doesn't really back it up, either). The fact remains that, whether one is a religious believer or not, one is faced with moral and natural, physical and metaphysical evil; one isn't faced with the reality of hell even if one is a believer — at most one believes that it exists. That is, belief in hell – and thus the problem of hell – is internal to and depends upon religious belief, while belief in evil – and thus the the problem of evil – isn't. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:25, 7 May 2005 (UTC)

Oh dear, Mel, the proposition that the "belief in evil" does not "depend upon religious belief" is just as arguable as your other premises. Many Christians would argue that evil is only coherent from the Christian perspective, and TANG proponents like me would argue the exact opposite. Franc28 23:18, May 7, 2005 (UTC)

Well, first, the interpretation of evil and being faced with are two very different things. Secondly, you're still ignoring the central distinction. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 11:31, 22 May 2005 (UTC)

First off, are you speaking of religious evil such as sin, or of moral evil? I believe Mel Etitis is referring to moral evil, and thus is referencing something which is not bound by religious views. Religious evil would only be comprehensible from a religious perspective, but moral evil is bound in such a manner. Second, religious belief is specific to one religion, and thus belief in hell is specific to one religion - namely, Christianity, as I believe the Judaic concept of hell differs from the Christian (correct me if I am wrong). The concept of evil, however, appears in almost every religion and in non-religious systems and thus is not specific to the Christian religion in the same way that hell is, thus making the problem of hell specific to Christianity and the problem of evil much more general. Anria 11:46, 14 September 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, moral evil is NOT bound in such a manner. Anria 05:48, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

Move

Shouldn't this page be moved?? This has been suggested already for a related page The problem of Hell, and so it would follow that it should be done for this page too if it applies to the other page.

So:

Add *Support or *Oppose followed by an optional one sentence explanation and sign your vote with ~~~~

• Support move - "The" should only be used if it is an unmovable part of the title (so The Beatles, The Guardian; but Netherlands, National Football League etc... ). Mathmo 07:56, 8 May 2005 (UTC)
• Oppose According to the template it's not a question of the definite article, but of the capitalisation of "evil" (for which there's no ground). I went to check at Wikipedia:Requested moves, but couldn't find any mention of this article. Was it ever actually placed there? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 13:53, 22 May 2005 (UTC)

removed essay for consideration

I've just removed this extended personal essay from this article and Theodicy, but copied it to the Talk pages because some of it could be incorporated into the articles:

What do other editors think? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 11:21, 22 May 2005 (UTC)

Revert

I've just reverted a very large-scale edit by LukeH. Some of it might go back, but much is, I think, not really salvageable. For example, he seems to miss the reductio nature of the argument in many of its forms, and so thinks that it fails because it starts with the premise that god is omnipotent, omniscient, etc., and then concludes that there is no such being.

It wasn't just a matter of adding a chunk of text — if it had been, I'd have brought it here instead of revrting it, but editors can find it in the history easily enough. Any comments? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:15, 29 May 2005 (UTC)

Comment on previous revert

LukeH 05:21, 30 May 2005 (UTC):

Either I misrepresented the point I was trying to make, or what I wrote was somehow misread by Mel Etitis. My comments did not "conclude that there is no such being". All my changes were intended to put the rebuttals under one heading (separating the argument from the rebuttal, which is why I moved one of the original paragraphs up), and I then added several further points. It is possible there were inconsistencies between what I added and the original points of the arguments -- but this is the point of a rebuttal. I did not conclude anything about the existence of God, I merely showed that the current arguments in this article are incomplete to prove the inexistence of God. This is an important point, and I feel the article is not complete without it.

The main points I added were that:

1. There are inconsistencies in the arguments in several of the statements made at earlier points in the article (this is merely an illustration of logical inconsistency or incompleteness of the previous arguments, without actually making an attempt to remove the arguments (because they are commonly used), and without even approaching the question as to whether "the problem of evil" actually is a problem or not);
2. The logical incompleteness of extant arguments into the problem of evil leave this as an open problem (this point is made without drawing the conclusion that "the problem of evil" does not exist, simply that current arguments are logically incomplete); and
3. It may be that evil must exist for good to exist, and vice versa, otherwise good itself may not be definable relative to something else (I think this point really needs to be made).

I feel that both sides of the argument need to be fully represented. Suggestions describing reasonable changes to these arguments are welcome. Rebuttals existed in the article before, but were not explained in great depth. Any rational argument ought to stand up to scrutiny, and I simply added an analysis of the logical structure of the arguments that were previously presented, and attempted to illustrate internal inconsistencies in the arguments. The argument and rebuttal were clearly separated so that the two viewpoints would not be confused within the article.

I would like to respectfully un-revert the changes. Please add comments here as to suggested content changes. Thanks!

Further comments from LukeH 05:34, 30 May 2005 (UTC):

In order to be reasonable about the un-revert, I wanted to be sure I understood where you were coming from. I believe you read the phrase "If evil did not exist, would there be such a thing as good?" as "If evil did not exist, would there be such a thing as God?". That is not what I wrote and is not the intent. Undoing the revert.

No, I'm afraid that you've misunderstood both my own comments (I didn't, for example, say that you'd concluded that there's no god) and my reason for reverting. There is indeed room for more material in the article, and for more on responses to the problem (and responses to those responses, etc.) — it's just that what you added wasn't really up to scratch. Aside from the fact that you've not grasped the logical structure of the problem (as I explained in my first comment above), it reads like original research, and it fails to represent the main responses to the problems very clearly. I'd be happy to work with you on improvements to the article; I've held off partly because I've published on the topic, and am perhaps a bit too close to the material, but perhaps that's being too punctilious.

Perhaps I should add that much of what you feel is missing is covered in Theodicy. Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 10:44, 30 May 2005 (UTC)

You're right, I misread your comments. Sorry for the confusion, and thanks for taking the time to clarify further.

I'd be happy with the article if it made one thing clear, which is the primary thing I take issue with, as it appears logically incomplete to me.

There is a gap in the line of reasoning that is presented in the argument that starts with God's perfection and concludes that there is no god. It shouldn't be "filled in" if the gap exists in the standing argument; it just needs to be addressed in the "Responses to the problem" section. It is simply that the unjustified assumption is made that if a perfect God exists and evil exists, and God could destroy evil, then "obviously" He would destroy evil, so therefore there can be no God. You cannot imply that God would destroy evil if He could -- there may be a higher purpose in the existence of evil, which is beyond our mortal capability to comprehend. Agency and justice factor into this. This is a point I tried to make in my commits.

Hardly original research, since it is commonly acknowledged (and almost certainly does not need sourcing) that mankind recognizes his non-omniscience, and that most beliefs of God attribute God with omniscience. If God is omniscient, how can we really know why He does anything that doesn't seem logical to us? (There are an awful lot of things attributed to God, even by prophets that claim to worship that God and communicate with Him, that simply don't make sense to the mortal mind.) The fact we do not fully comprehend God does not necessarily mean He does not exist; simply that we don't understand how or why He (or anything else that He created or apparently allowed to come into existence) exists.

One other comment -- at least according to various Christian (and some non-Christian) beliefs, God has said that He will destroy evil, just not yet :-) --LukeH 17:37, 30 May 2005 (UTC).

First, the relationship between goodness and being prepared to destroy evil is largely irrelevant to most versions of the argument, which asks why god would create an evil world, not why he wouldn't do anything about evil that he found. In so far as it is relevant, though, it's by no means clearly a gap, and the literature on it is reasonably extensive. It's not enough to claim that it's a problem as though that's simply a metter of fact.

Secondly, it's not original research to say that we're not omniscient and that many notions of god hold that he is — the problem comes when you infer that this creates a problem for the argument. One doesn't have to be omniscient to know that someone who does or permits evil isn't perfectly good. Of course, we can get it wrong with regard to other human beings, because other human beings are limited by causality, and sometimes have to choose between two evils (a surgeon cutting up a patient to save her life, etc.) — but as god is also supposed to be omnipotent, he isn't limited by causality, so the same doesn't apply. (see also Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov for a famous response to that sort of claim). Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 19:19, 30 May 2005 (UTC)

"With the further premise that if a god exists, it must be perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent, one can conclude from the existence of evil that no god exists." I've never understood why this premise is made when trying to refute the existence of a deity. Why couldn't "God" be omniscient, omnipotent, but ammoral or immoral when "judged" against common human systems of morality? A hypothetical God could be downright perverse and wicked, while still being omniscient and omnipotent. Any thoughts? --Neural 23:18, 12 July 2005 (UTC)

It's an argument made under those assumptions, it doesn't apply to less stringent requirements of what constitutes a deity. It's only a worthwhile argument since some big name religions share that description of their god. It refutes only that very wistful belief system and wasn't meant to be used on the "more" intellectual kinds of theists. Since the former are much more numerous "the problem of evil" has become perhaps the most common argument despite its many faults. --TheBigD 23:38, 12 July 2005 (UTC)

Hi, BigD. When it comes to refuting these deities, I find it simpler and more effective to bring up "the problem of suffering" rather than the problem of "evil" per se. Especially when it comes to diseases like cancer. IE "Why would an omnibenevolent god allow those who worship him to be afflicted with hideous random diseases?". For "evil" they turn to the unscientific but commonly-accepted Free Will model of human behaviour (or even moral relativism in some bizarre arguments). I haven't yet met a Christian or Muslim who has been able to convincingly address the problem of random suffering when believing in a perfectly compassionate god. They usually address this by not addressing it, and continue on with the belief system regardless. Thanks for input.--Neural 15:15, 13 July 2005 (UTC)

Links

I've removed a couple of links (one repeated with two different descriptions) placed by an inveterate link-adding Christo-Creationist apologist. If there's anything important in the documents linked to, it should be placed in the article. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:21, 28 July 2005 (UTC)

Recent changes to summary

I've just reverted a transformation of the summary into this:

In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent god.

The problem of evil can be summed up by the apparent contradiction among the following four propositions: 1) God exists 2) God is all good 3) God is all powerful 4) Evil exists.

-Atheism solves the problem by denying proposition one, that God exists.

-Pantheism, the belief that God is everything and that everything is God, denies proposition two and allows that God could be both good and evil.

-Polytheism, the belief in many gods, denies proposition three, and reduces God to just one of many gods.

-Idealism, the belief that reality is a product of the mind, rejects proposition four and states that evil is just an illusion.

Epicurus is credited with first expounding this problem, and it is sometimes called the Epicurean paradox or the riddle of Epicurus — although the argument is not really a paradox or a riddle, but rather a reductio ad absurdum of the premises. Epicurus drew the conclusion that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of the gods.

Some of the new material points to additions that certainly could be made to the article (though the summary isn't the right place), but there are two big problems. First, the format: text should be preferred to numbered or bulletted lists (even if formatted correctly). Secondly, the content: it's oversimplified, to say the least.

Any comments? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:33, 4 August 2005 (UTC)

There are still problems with the format - points referred to as a, b and c are now numbered 1, 2 and 3. Is it possible to have lists with 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 or similar? TheMadBaron 04:48, 10 September 2005 (UTC)

RfC

Comments are solicited on the attempts by an anon editor to make substantial changes to the article:

Anonymous is irrelevant. You're suppose to be bold. The point is to improve the article, not to get famous writers to write it. Also, you are blanking out a lot of my edits. Do you even have a specific complaint? Infinity0 17:15, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Explain the reason behind your reversion. I think my edits make it much more clearer. Infinity0 23:32, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

I referred to an anon editor because I thought that it was an anon editor; in fact it was you. I've asked for comments from other editors (that's what an RfC – Request for Comments – is). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:54, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

It looks like many of the editors are providing various descriptions of the problem of evil as they understand it. This kind of personal digest can be helpful for starting an article on a subject which one is familiar with. However, for improving an article on a complicated topic with widely divergent views it is likely to lead to edit and revert wars. The best that all interested parties could do would probably be to look to extant philisophical work: then to refer to the concepts and theories by famous philosophers and the terms they have coined which have gained currency. Hopefully this will depersonalize the content you add. -- Alan McBeth 21:44, 21 October 2005 (UTC)

Recent edit

Though an individual can infer acts which please and displease their own particular god, to assert the existence of an absolute evil is to try and infer the purpose of that god, which transcends pleasing/displeasing that god. For Judeo-Christian religions, the purpose of God is unknowable, thus "evil" can only be defined in terms of humanity. Therefore, the Problem of Evil as it applies to a Judeo-Christian God could be seen as irrelevant.

That misses the point. Evil makes HUMANS suffer, so god would destroy evil to relieve the suffering. God wouldn't be destroying evil for himself. The above point is more part of Transcendental argument for the existence of God, not the problem of evil. Infinity0 19:49, 28 October 2005 (UTC)

Not to belabor the dispute, since I will accede to the will of someone who knows better (the above text is mine), but the Problem of Evil not only presupposes an evil that acts upon humans, but also that God is omnibenevolent as that term applies to humans]. To assert that evil exists is de facto to assert that God is not omnibenevolent towards humans only insofar as the purpose of God is to be omnibenevolent towards humans. Since the purpose of God cannot be known, the Problem of Evil could be seen as irrelevant because in its precepts is a spurious conclusion. This is what I was trying to say. If God wanted to stop suffering, He could have said so somewhere. He didn't. In fact, He says just the opposite. This is an extension of St. Augustine's statement about suffering, that we don't really know if suffering is a part of his purpose, but since it happens, it must be. Therefore, "evil" can only be defined in human terms -- we do not know if this evil is the same for us as it is for God (presumably not), but assuming that God has a purpose is not the same as assuming the knowledge of what that purpose is. My feeling was that this was a valid response to the Problem of Evil, so I put it here. Still 15:27, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

The problem of evil tries to argue that humans suffer needlessly, (since God is omnipotent and can do anything). I don't think it's relevant what *his* purpose is or might be, since whatever that purpose is, any end result of suffering could be accomplished by other means. Infinity0 17:45, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

God created humans in his own image: so surely what we consider evil is included within what God is?

Would people prefer to live in a world/universe whose aspects can be deduced from logical principles, where bad things happen or one in which nothing bad is allowed to happen, however illogical the the consequences?

And, quoting from memory, "We are free to do as we wish, but we have to choose to do rightly" - God allows evil etc to occur so that we can choose not to be evil?

Um, the second paragraph sounds for-god, but the other paragraphs sound anti-god... Anyways, here are my thoughts.

I don't think who thinks what is evil is really relevant in this argument - i don't like the name "problem of evil", but more of "problem of suffering". All suffering is unnecessary if God is omnipotent, because whatever end results, he can bring about by suffer-less ways. If God is omnipotent, then he can make a world where nothing bad happens, AND the consequences are logical.

How can a meta-physical being have an image??

God allows people to be evil so people can choose not to be evil? Why doesn't god just make people not evil in the first place - we are still choosing aren't we? We just have a different spectrum of choices, most of which weigh towards good rather than evil.

Infinity0 20:03, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

What's so bad about suffering? If a child suffers emotional pain because they can't have an ice cream, most adults don't seem too worried about it. To any god, our suffering must seem pretty minor. We're wimps! Even the worst forms of torture, to God, can't seem all that bad. He probably rolls His Most Holy Eyes at this question. Besides, if we're all going to heaven, then one day we'll all look back and laugh at it: "remember the time when I was tarred and feathered, and then drawn and quartered? And I was so worried. Seems so insignificant now, hahahahaha."24.64.223.203 01:56, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

But to us, they seem major. And that's the point. Also, physical suffering cannot be self-averted - but God can avert them. Infinity0 21:20, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

Augustine vs Epicurus: Nonsensical passage?

In the section describing Augustine's response to Epicurus' version of the Problem, there appears this sentence:

Augustine also argued that Epicurus had ignored the potential benefits of suffering in the world. An omnipotent God could give the world any benefits derived from suffering without those in the world having to suffer.

Is sentence number two ("an omnipotent God...") not a counterargument to sentence number one ("Augustine also argued")? If so, the wording needs to be made clearer. SpectrumDT 00:13, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

Yeah, i'll go clarify it. Infinity0 00:31, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

Origonal research in responses

Someone placed what Infinity and I considered origonal research in the responses section. It was taken out, with the following comments added into the text:

The above paragraph is pointless waffle. Somebody please condense it down and add the counter-response that it's not a problem of evil (whose definition is disputed) but of *physical suffering* which is an objective concept. I'd do it, but I'm busy right now. Infinity0 20:13, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

I say that without some outside refferences or sources it be cut out.... it sounds more like someone's opinion Sethie 18:23, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

I have moved them here for discussion.

The paragraph in question has no sources and just sounds like someones's ideas to me. Any comments?

SAT! Sethie 19:27, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

The problem of defining evil is already covered in the article. This is just repeating stuff. The paragraph needs to be heavily rewritten and shortened and moved to the "Types of Evil" section (near the top). Infinity0 20:13, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

No further discussion or edits have come of it, I am going to remove it. Sethie 23:38, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

Requested addition

Christians that don't accept the concept of "free will", such as Greg Bahnsen, argue that the existence of evil does not contradict the nature of God because God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists. Morally sufficient, in this context, meaning one which satisfies God's omnibenevolence. God has not made this reason known to us yet, but this doesn't mean that such a reason doesn't exist. The existence of this reason, Bahnsen says, is to be taken by faith. He gives the examples of Abraham and Job who were faced with obvious "evils", but had to trust God that He had a morally sufficient reason for them, which turned out to be true in both occasions, according to the Bible. Critics of Bahnsen say that God could have tested Abraham and Job without causing them such evil. Proponents of Bahnsen's logic respond that what happened to Abraham and Job didn't compromise God's omnibenevolence, as the state in which Abraham and Job are now is not any worse than it would have been without the evil (i.e. the evil has been undone in a sense). In the same way it can be speculated that God will undo the evil present in the Earth.

First of all, stop being so christian-centric.

"God has a morally sufficient reason" is irrelevant. It is people, humans, who suffer. They hurt. Also, god cannot have a "morally sufficient reason" to allow evil, since he is omnipotent. That point is already in the article, at the start: an.. omnipotent god should be able to arrange the world according to his intentions - so god intends evil to exist. Infinity0 ^talk 21:53, 11 January 2006 (UTC)

Presuppositional Response

The current paragraph about "inferring a moral standard" doesn't address the logic of the paradox. It is some handwavy composition of words, which tries to prove something out of nothing and fails miserably, without even talking about the paradox itself.

This is an intentional attempt to draw a grotesque picture of the Presuppositionalist response.

I've talked to Presuppositionalists regarding this issue and the conversation goes like that:

• How could the almightly, infitinely good God create a world in which evil exists?
• What do you mean by evil?
• Well, suffering, rape, murder, you know.
• How do you know this is evil?
• Well, don't you agree it's evil?
• In what sense of the word evil? What's the definition of evil? I can't agree that something's evil without a definition.
• Well, evil is what's commonly understood as evil. Let's say murder is defined to be evil.
• God didn't claim to be good (i.e., omnibenevolent) by the "commonly understood" evil. He doesn't subject Himself to our definitions of good and evil.
• Well, isn't "murder is evil" his own definition?
• This is His definition regarding us. Regarding Himself He has different criteria. He is the creator of the universe. He does as he pleases. He defines good and evil. What he pleases is good, so He is good.
• But then "God is good" means nothing, doesn't it?
• Out of the context, yes. In the context of the Bible it means that God sent his only begotten son to die for our sins and that we'll be with Him till eternity.
• Wait, wait, do you claim that evil doesn't actually exist in the world?
• By what standard of evil?
• Well, murder is evil.
• By what standard?
• By God's standard! See, if he's really good he would eradicate evil, he wouldn't create a world with evil at all!
• There are two standards here. God is good by one standard. Somebody dying by murder is evil by another standard. You have to pick one standard only.
• OK, murder is evil. That's my standard.
• Then God isn't good by this standard. He never claimed being good by your standards.
• So by his standard evil doesn't actually exist? Suffering is no evil?
• Exactly. He is good. The definition of good isn't "without any suffering". At least not His definition.

and so on...

I've tried to capture this in logical terms. The thing is that the paradox builds on two premises: that God claimed being good and that evil exists. However the paradox assumes these words "good" and "evil" are mutually exclusive. They aren't. God is good by His standard. Evil is evil by our standard. The premise that "an omnibenevolent God by his own standard will eradicate every evil by our standard" is simply wrong.

If you take one and only one standard and apply the whole paradox to this one standard you would either have "God is benevolent by our standard", or "Evil exists by his standard". These are both false.

That's it. Your description of the Presuppositionalist position ("when talking about evil you're inferring a moral standard") doesn't capture the above logic AT ALL. It needs to be replaced with a better explanation of their position. A logical explanation, not a handwavy one.

The "inferring moral standard" position which you call "presuppositionist" (never heard this word before, if it means something else then oh well, i'm using it the same way you are) is just a broad version of your own viewpoint that "God has his own standards". I cannot see the difference between these two versions:

Another response, based on the definition of evil, claims that the whole logic of the paradox is flawed as it assumes equivalent criteria for the omnibenevolence of God and the evil that exists. According to this response, God is omnibenevolent by His own standards, while the evil that exists is evil by our standards. God doesn't claim to be omnibenevolent on our standards and the existence of what we see as evil is not evil by His standards. If we actually fix one standard for good and evil we would either get that God is not omnibenevolent by this one standard, or that evil doesn't actually exist by this one standard. We would not get that God doesn't exist.

Another response to this paradox argues that by asserting "evil exists", that person is inferring a moral standard against which to define good and evil (see Argument from morality). Therefore, by using this argument one implies the existence of a moral law, which requires a law-maker. Most theists would assert that this law-maker is God, whilst many atheists would argue that morality can just as easily be subjective and/or consensual – that this law is in fact a social contract agreed to by all humans; and/or that this problem is more accurately described as a problem of physical suffering, which can be objectively defined against a standard (of zero physical suffering).

Except that that the first one (your version) is informal and uses POV words like capitalisation of "he".

You say "God doesn't claim to be omnibenevolent by our own standards"; the previous version said "inferring a standard against which to define good and evil". Surely, your point is just a subset of the prev version, since you are inferring that God's standard is the one that counts which is NOT THE POINT of the argument. The argument's point is that HUMANS suffer, and so it is humans' standards that count. Infinity0 ^talk 18:44, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

The sentence "humans' standards count" is the greatest POV in the whole article. Why? This is exactly what "presuppositionalism" means. You are pre-supposing that humans' standards count and from that you derive that there's no God. Sure. A baby could derive that. From Christian perspective humans' standards are irrelevant. God's strandards matter. Capitalizing He is as much POV as stating that humans' standards are the one that matter. In fact, the presuppositional apologetics claims exactly that: there could not be objective proof of God's existence or non-existence. It always comes down to someone's assumptions (presuppositions), such as the one that it's humans' standards that matter.

Also, you are completely missing the point of the article. The article is called "The problem of evil". The point is not that humans suffer. Evil and human suffering are NOT equivalent. Your point is that they are, but this is just a POV.

If you want to be objective and unbiased, you have to include both points of view. One that builds on atheists' definition of "evil" (human suffering, I guess) and one that builds on the Christian definition of "evil" (whatever God defined as evil).

The meat of the article is the logic. Premises, consequences, conclusion. My version of the response is the only one that actually contains any logic. It says that by having one standard for good and evil, one of your two basic premises becomes false and so does the conclusion.

The other version talks about standards too, but it doesn't address the paradox and doesn't conclude through logic that the paradox is flawed. It tries to make up a stupid argument that "proves" God's existence. It's clear from the paragraph itself that their argument is flawed. Presenting a flawed argument as a response is a crappy response. The logical response that derives the flawness of the paradox is the good version of the response.

The old version contains no conclustion (except "what you just read is clearly crap"). The new version contains a clear, logical conclusion. If you still don't see the difference, please let those more intelligent than you to put the logical response instead of the flawed one. I have nothing against you editing the response and removing POVs. But you have to keep the logic there, otherwise you make the article biased. I'll leave it as is for now, as I have to travel out of town for two days. I hope that you'll have put a better (read: logical) version of the response on the webpage by then. If not, I'll have to put it myself. Talk to you on Saturday.

No, actually "humans standards count" is the ARGUMENT. Evil and human suffering are NOT equivalent. - what tree are you smoking? The argument wouldn't even exist if there was no such thing as suffering. Fine, let's pretend evil is not suffering. Why is the problem of evil a paradox then? Oh yeah, because evil causes suffering.

Including "Christian definitions of evil" misses the point of the argument. This is an atheistic argument and BY DEFINITION uses atheistic definitions. BTW, it's nice to know that you think "christian" equates to "theist". You're narrow minded. Infinity0 ^talk 19:23, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

You still don't get it. If you are starting with atheistic definitions (assumptions) it is obvious that you will end up "proving" God doesn't exist. You don't even need to use the pseudo-logic in this argument. By atheist definition God is something non-existent. That's a one line "proof" equivalent to this whole article.

If you start with atheist assumptions and atheist definitions, then this article is biased. If you want to be objective, you have to allow other definitions of "evil". The definition "whatever God defines as evil" is one of the most popular definitions in the world. However, you insist on ignoring this definition in this article. Thus you're making it biased and you're also demonstrating your single-mindedness to all of us.

Grow up, kid. Stop thinking that your definitions are the only true ones. It's childish.

You don't understand the point of the argument, do you... God's motives or reasons are irrelevant to the argument. Infinity0 ^talk 12:52, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

You've totally lost your mind, kid. I totally understand it's not about God's motives. I'm not saying that it's about God's reasons or motives. I'm saying that the article is biased because it uses atheist definitions of evil. This is not an objective article. I am also saying that it is pointless because if you start with atheist definitions it is totally obvious that God doesn't exist. He doesn't exist by definition. Think about what "atheist" actually means.

Which of the two do you disagree with? The fact that the article is biased, or the fact that it's pointless? You said the definitions are atheistic, so I believe you don't disagree with that (i.e., you don't disagree with yourself).

What "atheist" definition of evil? And how does that make the argument biased? It's only set of concepts, and we apply a word, "evil" to describe those concepts. That doesn't mean those concepts don't apply or are invalid. Stop talking crap about how it's "POV". Infinity0 ^talk 14:02, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

If you use another set of concepts such as the "christian" definition of evil, then of course the argument won't work, since the argument is designed TO work with the "atheist" set of definitions. Infinity0 ^talk 14:03, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

Saying that the existence of evil is implied by the existence of suffering is an atheist definition of evil.

The article never says that it uses atheist definitions of evil. It claims to be an objective article based on logic alone. At the end it concludes "God does not exist" as if logic just proved that God does not exist. No. The truth is that atheist definitions + logic just proved that God doesn't exist.

I am claiming two things:

1. If you are having atheist definitions, then you don't need the logic at all. God does not exist by definition.
2. The fact that the article is made to appear as if logic proved no God, while in fact atheist assumptions "proved" there's no God, is confusing to readers.

Now first you have to explain why the whole article isn't pointless, given the fact that God doesn't exist by definition (atheist definition).

Then you have to fix the article and make it so that it doesn't pretend to be what it isn't. Either you have to state explicitly that it uses atheist definitions, or you have to keep something like my paragraph in the responses section, which objects to these definitions.

What do you mean by "atheist definitions"? You're not making sense. Why should an "atheist definition" mean the argument is pointless? The logic is non sequitur. Infinity0 ^talk 16:30, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

This argument (the problem of evil) would be complete nonsense if the words "evil" and "omnibenevolent" are not defined. Agree? Now, what definitions of these words do we use? The atheist ones (implying that the existence of suffering implies evil, which contradicts benevolence)? Or do we allow for other definitions, such as the Christian definition of "evil is what God defines as evil"?

The article is written as if evil and omnibenevolent have clear definitions and everyone agrees on these definitions. That is not the case. The article is written as if logic implies the non-existence of an omnibenevolent (and the other omnis) God. That is not the case. It implies that only with atheist definitions of "evil" and "omnibenevolent".

Thus, I conclude, the article is confusing to readers and should be improved (so that it's clear to non-experts that the logic assumes atheist definitions of the terms used). Also, I say, article which concludes "God does not exist" based on atheist definitons and logic is pointless, as you could as easily prove "God does not exist" based on atheist definitions alone. Which of the above paragraphs is not making sense now?

There is a link to omnibenevolence and also there is a paragraph about the definition of evil. Yes, I agree it could be expanded. But your first point makes no sense. All you are saying is that "the argument works if we take "evil" to mean this, but not if we take it to mean that". Well, that doesn't show anything about the validity nor the correctness of the argument, since you still admit the argument works with "this". "This" is a real concept, ie. suffering. So, the problem of evil is still a valid argument and I'd appreciate it if you stop spewing the crap about "but it's not valid if you take the Christian definition of evil"

"implying that the existence of suffering implies evil, which contradicts benevolence" IS NOT an "atheist" definition, so stop trying to twisted this using propanganda words. It is a premise which follows from the logic. Infinity0 ^talk 19:12, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

This is not "problem of suffering", this is "problem of evil". From now on please stick to the word "evil". The fact that you see suffering as evil is your personal opinion and you're not entitled to imposing that opinion on all of us. The word "suffering" is present on 11 places in the article. The word "definition" is nowhere to be found (except in the paragraph, which I wrote and you erased).

In the paragraph about types of evil "suffering" even comes with the adjective "pointless" which is very, very subjective. If you don't see the point it doesn't mean that there isn't any.

Anyway. You didn't answer my main point: In order for the logic to be valid, you need one and only one definition of evil. That definition has to be clear to everyone. Otherwise the article is confusing to readers.

It is clear from all the comments/edits/objections/"propaganda" you get, that people see this article as proving the non-existence of the Christian God. Why? Because the Christian God clearly states he is omnibenevolent and clearly calls some things, present in this world, evil.

Nevertheless, the Christian God never claimed applying the same standard to himself and to the people. Namely, the context of "omnibenevolent" uses one definition (criterion, standard) of evil, while the context of "the evil in this world" uses another definition.

That is why, I claim, many people get confused by this article, thinking that the logic applies to the Christian God, while it doesn't. In order to clear that confusion, you need to clarify that the argument is only valid if "omnibenevolent" and "existing evil" use the very same standard for good and evil and not different ones.

Apart from that, I do agree that the argument holds, no matter what definition you use (as long as it is consistent). What I am saying is that if you are consistent in your definitions the "paradox" is not applicable to almost anything. There isn't any popular religion whose God claimed being omnibenevolent in the sense that he never causes suffering or any of that humanistic crap.

You have to understand that an omnipotent God doesn't allow human beings to define "good" and "evil" for him. He defines them himself. Thus you can never judge him as being good or evil, since you don't know what he means by "omnibenevolent", except for what he tells you, but you clearly aren't interested in this. Anyway. Never mind this paragraph if you don't understand what it means.

OK, so you suggest that we should make the definition clear. Well, then, there's no point inserting a "response" to a version of the argument that is NOT strong, see Straw man. We could mention it, but still, what you wrote implied that all instances of this argument was wrong. Infinity0 ^talk 01:13, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree that maybe the response section is not the most appropriate place for the edit and I agree that not all instances of the argument are wrong (e.g. if some religion's god claims to be the omnis in terms of humanistic views such as suffering, I agree this god is non-sense).

What I don't agree with is the edition that you made. It's not a question of morality. Morality is the criterion for good/evil that applies to humans. It's not moral to kill (at least by most moral systems). However, we say this in the context of humans (as applied to humans). Applying the same moral standard to God is wrong. He is not subject to the same moral law we are subject to. He can kill whomever he pleases and that's not immoral (read: that's not evil).

Morality (right and wrong for humans) is one thing; evil and omnibenevolence (right and wrong for God) is another.

The thing is that when you take the logic of the problem of evil and try to apply it to a real world problem (such as the existence or non-existence of the Christian God, or maybe even any other God) you hit this wall: you cannot assert the premise "evil exists" in the same terms (same standard for good/evil, right/wrong) as in the premise "God is omnibenevolent". God (at least the Christian God) is omnibenevolent in his own standards. We can assert that evil exists by our standards (the standards that apply to us). We cannot do the logic of the problem of evil with two different standards. There has to be only one for the logic to be valid.

That is why, I claim, the logic doesn't prove the non-existence of the Christian God (and maybe a number of other religions' Gods). Most readers, however, are left with the impression that it does. We need to correct this and make it clear that it doesn't (and explain why it doesn't). Otherwise we're making a reader-confusing Wikipedia article and Wikipedia articles are not meant to confuse readers, nor to leave them with the wrong conclusions.

In summary:

1. The logic of the "paradox" cannot be applied in practice to almost any religion (e.g. it doesn't work with Christianity).
2. This is unclear to the readers at this point.
3. We need to make it clear.

If you still don't agree, let me know which of the three points above is problematic.

The problem of evil only shows that if an omnipotent being exists, he doesn't want to stop human suffering. There are various ways to explain why, but "he actually does care, he's doing this for <insert reason>" fails since he is omnipotent. I don't think this article, nor the argument, claims anything about god's own "moral" standards, since it's irrelevant to the point. If you want, you might add a sentence stating "omnibenevolence normally means that god wants to prevent suffering." Infinity0 ^talk 13:43, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

Do you even read what I say?

• No one is talking about reasons here. I'm talking about definitions of evil. I don't assign reasons to God.
• I told you this is not the problem of suffering! Omnibenevolence does not normally mean that God wants to prevent suffering. This is only in your own, subjective, humanistic mind!

Please, answer my questions. Which of the three points (in my last post) you don't agree with? Are you saying that the paradox disproves the Christian God? Are you saying that it's evident to readers that it doesn't? Or are you saying that we shouldn't make that evident to readers?

1. I have told you time and time again that evil is normally taken to be suffering. What's your problem? Of course the argument doesn't work if you take "evil" to not mean "suffering", because then you are twisting definitions. That's like saying "2+3 != 5", because I choose to say that 2 actually means 4.
2. The logic of the argument is applied to whatever it says it applies to: in normal cases, suffering and pain. It is clear to readers.
3. The problem of evil only shows that if an omnipotent being exists, he doesn't want to stop human suffering. This may or may not be whatever god, depending on what characteristics that god has.
4. "Omnibenevolence" is defined as all-good. Now if christian god doesn't want to prevent suffering, he's not omnibenevolent. Again here, you are twisting definitions.

Infinity0 ^talk 17:13, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

What's my problem? My problem is this:

Who defines good and evil? Humans or God? You claim that "evil is normally taken to be suffering". Are you saying that I am not normal and you are? Or that humans "normally" define good and evil and God "abnormally" defines good and evil?

Claiming that humanistic definitions of good and evil are "normal" is very subjective and biased. It claims atheistic is "normal" and (mostly) theistic is not "normal".

Since you seem incable of understanding my point, I'll make an edition myself. I'll do my best to make it as non-intrusive, "objective" and tolerant as possible.

You seem to not be understanding my counter-argument that you are putting up a straw man. Do you at least agree that if (evil==suffering), the problem of evil shows that if an omnipotent being exists, he doesn't want to stop human suffering? Here, the objective definition of evil (whenever somebody is in pain or not) makes the argument work. Infinity0 ^talk 17:57, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree with the statement in bold. I don't agree that you can call your definition "objective". There exist objective definitions for which evil doesn't exist (e.g. if we define evil to be a purple giraffe).

Well, what I meant was "suffering" is an objective concept. I agree that evil is a subjective concept. Infinity0 ^talk 18:42, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

I think the issue is resolved now.

By the way, if you really want to know where suffering comes from, the Biblical theory says that it came about because humans wanted to define good and evil themselves. That's actually the whole thing about Adam, Eve and the Garden of Eden. They wanted to "be like God, knowing good and evil" and so they ate the fruit of that tree and God gave them suffering. Now it's easy for humans to define evil (they even call it a "normal" definition). Suffering is not evil, actually. It's just what God gave them, so that they can play defining good and evil, as they wanted to.

The curious thing is that in this article you (or Epicurus rather) ask "why is there suffering in the world?", while giving the answer as well - because you want to define good and evil. Now, with suffering present in the world, it's made easy for you to define it. :)

Yes, I know you don't give a damn about that. :)

Actually, I always thought of this argument as the "problem of suffering", since I never liked subjective concepts such as evil. The argument basically is that humans don't like suffering, and so any all-powerful being can't be good. Infinity0 ^talk 19:55, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Oops! You used the term "good". That's subjective. ;)

All-powerful beings can't be "good" in humanistic terms. I think it's pretty normal that all-powerful beings don't like to think of themselves in the terms of their creatures. They like to keep the right for defining things like good/evil, right/wrong, just/unjust for themselves. After all, they are all-powerful, so they can afford to do whatever they please and then call it good, right and just. Whether you like it or not is up to you of course. :)

I suppose. I just think a god that doesn't try to prevent suffering isn't really benevolent, and not worthy of worship. Infinity0 ^talk 23:04, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Okay, what I've taken (possibly erroneously) from this discussion then is "It is logically consistent that God is both omnibenevolent and omnipotent, if we define omnibenevolence not in terms of what we consider to be evil (for example, suffering)".

This leads me to draw one of two conclusions, given that I don't know Christian scripture that well. I shall start with the weaker, either:

1) "God is ominbenevolent, but that benevolence has no meaning to us". In which case even saying this is pointless (though not nonsensical), as I could equally well say "God is a purple giraffe, but purple giraffe has no meaning to us". My question is, under this alternative, why even say it? God is not all loving by our standards, so that could mean anything. That is, unless you imply...

2) "God is omnibenevolent, because He finds himself to be omnibenevolent". This particular phrasing is awkward I know, but conveys my main point. Does this not mean that the Christian church believes it knows how God feels about himself? Is He not written to be unfathomable? If the Christian church then believes we cannot understand Gods ways, then this particular defense of a Christian God within this paradox, is moot.

This does not get around the question "does evil exist", but frankly we are trying to argue this within a view of (atleast) Christianity; this religion give a particular moral yard stick and declares acts good or evil (c.f. Ten Commandments), and in doing so has declared acts that have occured to be evil. Incidentally, I believe "Free Will Theodicy" is the only defense, though weak [in my opinion], and hinges largely on whether or not you consider natural disasters to be an evil of the world, which if a Pope ever said "x is evil" about a disaster would, atleast, kill papal infallibility. mr_happyhour 30 April 2006

Interestingly enough, anyone who claims that there can be no God because there is evil in the world is making two claims they may not realize. Claim #1: From saying that there is evil, then there must be such a thing as evil. Then there must also be something known as good. There must also then be something that determines what is evil and what is good. It is obviously not humans, as even though we know what is 'good' and what is 'evil', we choose to do evil nonetheless. If there were no God, this raises an interesting conundrum. How can there be a system which determines good and evil (i.e. a moral system) and humans disobey this system, then where did this system come from if there is no God? Claim #2: By suggesting that the presence of evil disproves the presence of God is the same as saying that the evil is God's fault. Christian belief states that man sinned and that brought death and suffering into the world. This puts the blame on man not on God. Why doesn't God get rid of all the evil, then? He will and most likely soon. Evil is not a permanent condition. Why doesn't God just wipe all evil out now? God is giving everyone the opportunity to join his side willingly. When he comes back, that opportunity will not exist and then evil will be wiped out. This is what Christians believe and I think it adequately takes care of the question of evil. I can not speak for other religions, though. My information came from C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity. Alisyd 16:44, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

At the risk of flaming please read this talk page. 1) The paradox works on the assumption, within Christianity, that evil exists; Christians define a moral yardstick (above, ten commandments etc) implying evil does exist by these (and their God's) standards. Of this, Free Will Theodicy is in my opinion a completely valid defense - on the condition that, as a Christian, you do not consider natural disasters an evil, and all evil is committed by man. The point is that given the Christian God, the paradox occurs. If you start with the premise God doesn't exist, then you would not consider this paradox, that is why it is a paradox!

2) is largely answered in the text, and in brief an answer could be "God could bring about the same result by any means", omnipotence implying he could give us the opportunity without the presence of evil being necessary, and omnibenevolence implying he would do just that; I do not see how this is a valid defense. Your argument of "When He comes back..." is answered by this same omnipotence problem, He doesn't need to leave it there. I'm pretty sure most people who take this argument seriously aren't as glib as you have been. I believe though in this you are circling around the Free Will Theodicy - evil exists because giving us the choice is the greater good (though being glib myself) - in your second argument, and of this there is more interesting discussion. mr_happyhour 2 May 2006

Some extra content?

Probably the earliest theodicy still used today is that offered by Hinduism. At first it seems no different from the early Christian beliefs, that all pain and suffering are the results of past sins. But the difference is reincarnation. When Hinduism says ‘past sins,’ it is talking of sins which could have been committed in a past life. Although with many lives lived peacefully and well, one can break the chain and transcend physical life, it is not uncommon for a Hindu mother to scold her children and warn them that evils committed in this life could be returned in the next, perhaps being reincarnated as an animal! Life seems very pitiless. We are punished for sins that we cannot possibly remember doing, and possibly would not do if faced with the same circumstances. To be born a beggar, a king, an athlete or a helpless cripple is simply the composite consequence of the deeds of other lives. It is no use inventing a devil to explain evil. Life is purely what we’ve made of it. Looked at from this standpoint, despair lurks close, but many seers have had different ideas. From their perspective, life is no longer an unpitying court of justice, but instead a gym, where obstacles in life seem more like the ropes and parallel bars and vaulting boxes which make us strong.

Saint Irenaeus was born in the early 3rd century in Asia Minor. He was born into a Christian family, surprising as Christians were still prosecuted for another 50 years. He became the 2nd Bishop of Lyon in his later life, by then well known for his book, of which only one copy remains, a Latin translation. He believed that Mankind had been created immature and needed to overcome evil and brave suffering before it can be pure and be, in every sense of the word, good. He said that Adam and Eve’s argument with God had been not a fully fledged rebellion, but instead a childish tantrum, portraying man’s desire to have everything, now. He believed that God is keeping Eden safe and untainted, waiting for when man grows up. He likened death and suffering to the whale which ate Jonah: it was only in the depths of the whale’s stomach that he could turn to God. Saint Augustine was born in a Roman city in northern Africa, son of Saint Monica. He was raised in Carthage and grew up to teach rhetoric and philosophy but moved to Rome, often considered the centre of the civilised world. He became known later on for his privation boni theory which is very popular today. He believed that Evil was not created by God, but was just an absence of Goodness. For example, God did not create darkness, he created light. He created life and justice, but did not create injustice and loss of life. This is often known as the Constant Theodicy.

Karl Barth thought that current theodicies relied too much on the a priori notion of God’s omnipotence. He agreed with the Constant Theodicy, calling the opposite of good ‘das nichte’, which always threatens to reduce God’s creations to nothing. He talked much about Hope. He said that was what God had given to help man against das nichte, so that man would be helped through pain and suffering by the hope that God’s eventual triumph over evil would soon come. The most recent and probably the most popular theodicy is that concerning Free Will. This believes that God created man with the potential in him for both good and evil and the ability to choose, for obedience and goodness is pointless if it is forced and there is no alternative. God then set limits on his own powers, so that he could not interfere with man’s thoughts and actions.

This was put in the "See Also" section. I think it's useful information, but atm there is too much of it. Someone please condense it down. Infinity0 ^talk 23:29, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

"Moral argument"

I have no idea what the "moral argument" (as listed in the "formalised arguments" section) is trying to argue, what it's about, and how the premises listed form the conclusion. Therefore, I assume most readers won't understand it either. If someone DOES know what it's about, then could they re-write it so it's easier to understand? Thanks. -- infinity0 16:31, 9 March 2006 (UTC)

I tend to agree; there shouldn't be any need to divide people into the subjective "most rational theist" in a structured argument. I think the point is if all evil is objectively justified, a (rational) theist is justified in letting it exist, because he knows it is justified, and also not justified because he has justified God and God's definition of evil. I could easily be wrong though as some of the latter points a failed to understand. If it isn't cleared up then I'm not sure what to do with it... mr_happyhour 3 Apr 2006

Something to consider

'Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid? shall there be evil in a city, and the LORD hath not done it?' Amos 3:6

What is the claim that a god must be 'all-good' based upon? I'd reckon its probably not from a religous book, but rather some idea pushed by modern priests.

Added 10/03/06

There are quotes from the bible in omnibenevolence. But thanks for pointing out that contradiction; I'll add it to my list so I can show it to the next Jehovah's Witnesses that come knocking on my door ;) -- infinity0 21:48, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

'Perfect' equals 'Benevolent'?

Ah I see them now, but just a question.. Since when does things like 'the way of the lord is perfect', mean that he would have to be all good?

What is 'perfect' would be quite relative wouldn't it.. Couldn't even total evil be perfect? (For example, if someone would be so evil that nobody or nothing could be more evil than him.)

Or this; "As for God, his way is perfect: the word of the LORD is tried: he is a buckler to all those that trust in him." Psalms 18:30

Who knows who he would regard as 'those who trust in him'?

For instance read Matthew 7:21-23:

"Not everyone who says to me, 'Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me on that day, 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and in your name drive out demons and perform many miracles?' Then I will tell them plainly, 'I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!'"

Maybe he feels that nobody truly trusts in him anymore? Oh well, this isn't a theological debate anyways.. :)

But yeah, I still don't think there is anything (in the bible atleast) that supports omnibenevolence.. Atleast nothing I know about.

And those jehovas witnesses are a real pest aren't they? Tell them to prove their faith by drinking poison.. ;)

"And these signs will accompany those who believe: In my name they will drive out demons; they will speak in new tongues; they will pick up snakes with their hands; and when they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at all; they will place their hands on sick people, and they will get well." Mark 16:17-18

Added 18/03/06

Well, being evil is generally considered a fault, so that would make god not perfect. But I suppose you could argue it your way. Meh. -- infinity0 20:51, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, but 'generally considered' is simply an opinon held by a majority, is it not? Cause I try to not deal in opinons.. :P

What Im saying is that almost everything could be perfect. When it cannot be surpassed, then it is perfect.

Anyways, I think evil is an overused concept.. That which is evil to someone may not be evil to someone else. It's all opinons and belief, cause most of our precepts of right and wrong comes from our culture or/and religion.

Though lets consider this; If one buys the idea that this being (usually referred to as 'god') has created all life (which I don't buy), then who has the right to deny him to take life, or let life suffer? After all, if this was the case, then without him there would be no life at all.. Life would be his to create, to play with, and to destroy, since he would own it.

Have a good one. :)

Significant changes to the article in March, 2006

Infinity0 and anonymous contributor: Nice work on the reformatting and clarifications-- the article suddently starts to make some better sense. I will need some time to fill in the history, maybe a week. No doubt Augustine of Hippo, who really defined the problem in ways that affect views even today, and perhaps Anselm at the end of the first millenium CE, and who else I don't know at the moment. Later...Kenosis 06:37, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

I spent maybe two hours reading everything in this article and its talk. I like the formal arguments but it gets muddled afterwards. My favorite explanation was eloquently sung by Satan himself: "...without evil there could be no good, so it must be good to be evil sometimes..." NorrYtt 07:49, 9 April 2006 (UTC)

God and Satan

If you believe in God you usually believe in Satan/the devil. This means that good and evil balance out because God is good and Satan is evil—Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.210.184.32 (talk • contribs)

Unless your religion states that your God is all powerful and all knowing, and that Satan isn't -- Chris Q 06:19, 13 June 2006 (UTC)

As I've mentioned before, I find the problem of "suffering" in general to be a bigger stumbling block for monotheistic religion than the problem of "evil". Christians and Muslims can put evil down to "mankind's free-will" and say that it's our fault that murder, for instance, exists. But when an innocent child gets bowel cancer or a peaceful village of pios people is brutally wiped out in an earthquake, not even the religious can really say this is man's evil. This is supposed to be God's territory.

At this point, somebody willing to face the question logically will conclude that (1) there is no God after all, (2) God has no power to prevent terrible random natural atrocities (meaning he's not God), or (3) God CHOOSES to sit back and watch these kind of horrors unfold (God is a cruel pervert).

The problem with religion is that believers refuse to face these issues in any meaningful or logical way - because none of the possible answers is acceptable to them.-Neural 23:18, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

It's been a while since I read up on theodicy, but can't we agree that the world must be left in a neutral state, with possibility of torment and joy. Why? Because if the physical world was made in a way which would limit human free will (ie we couldn't grab rocks and smash our brother upside the head because we were jealous), then we could not choose to sin in certain ways. I'm trying not to be needlessly verbose, so I hope what I said is sufficient to state my counter. Piepants 16:57, 18 August 2006 (UTC)Piepants.

Buddhism and Islam

The article does not discuss the problem of evil as understood by Buddhism or Islam, which makes the article incomplete. Anyone interested in providing such a discussion? Coolmoon 04:57, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

I lack the knowledge to write such an entry, but my understanding is that Islam has the same "Problem of Evil" as Christianity. Buddhism does not have a problem of evil, viewing what we call evil as suffering caused by unnecessary attachment. -- Chris Q 06:30, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for that. Some info in the article about the Islamic view would be good, though. Regarding Buddhism, may be an addition to the article mentioning how Buddhism deals with evil/suffering, then? Coolmoon 10:44, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

In Mormon Theology

When I say Mormon, I mean pertaining to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in this context.

First, we believe that God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient. We also believe that there is evil in this world, but that it is not His evil--it is Satan's. We believe that before this life, both Satan and Jesus formulated plans for the salvation of mankind. Jesus' plan was to give men free will and judge them for it accordingly in the end. Satan's plan was to force mankind to be perfect. When God the father chose Jesus' plan, Satan rebelled and took a third of the hosts of heaven, who agreed with him, down to hell. These spirits who followed Satan are evil, and tempt men to do evil today.

Now, it seems like a paradox to most people that a perfect God can allow any sort of evil to exist, but: being perfect does not entail this. The omniscient God knows that men must have temptation in order to give them choice. Free will would mean nothing if there was no temptation to do wrong. God tolerates Satan because He knows this temptation is necessary for men to be able to choose their own way. If there was no temptation, men would never sin, and there would thus be no opportunity for good, as it were. The Book of Mormon states in 2 Nephi 2: 11, 13:

"[11] For it must needs be, that there is an opposition in all things. If not so, my first-born in the wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility."

"[13] And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness there be no happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness there be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not there is no God. And if there is no God we are not, neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to be acted upon; wherefore, all things must have vanished away."

In essence, God wants his children to be happy, and the plan he has for us is one of agency, or free will. We must choose to become what we become, or else life would mean nothing. And Satan must exist to tempt us to do evil, as Christ teaches us to do good. Satan is not an omnipotent being and God could destroy him immediately, but He knows that Satan is necessary for the greater good and eventual happiness and eternal life of mankind, no matter how much it pains Him. This scripture from Moses 1:39 illustrates God's greatest glory:

"[39] For behold, this is my work and my glory—-to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man."

I am wondering whether I should put this or a shorter summary in the main article, but I thought I'd post it here first. Tom Stringham 17:16, 20 August 2006 (UTC)