Talk:Problem of evil

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Problem of evil article.
Article policies
Archives: 1, 2
The introduction of this article is too short.
To comply with Wikipedia's lead section guidelines, it should be expanded to summarize the article.
Archive
Archives
Archive 1 Archive 2


Contents

[edit] Logical Error in Logical problem of evil

The final statement non-existence of God is easily circumvented in the Logical argument for the Problem of Evil. The current statement does not define God as omniscient, and does classify that God must know evil to eradicate it. Since God is defined as existing in the first statement, this argument should be concluded that God is not aware of evil, not that God doesn't exist.

The Problem of Evil is only a 'problem' when you prove that God does not exist. The first statement should therefore be a definition of God, not a statement about his existence.

I'll make these changes after 24 hours if I don't receive a rebuttal.

Fenricwolf 00:48, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

I both agree with that and have a problem of my own with the "argument." Namely object 9, the "premise" that evil has always existed and will always exist, combined with the conclusion that god will immediately and totally eliminate all evil, does not necessarily invalidate premises 1, 2, 3, etc. It seems that 9 is arbitrarily injected to artificially create a contradiction. 9 does not follow from any of the original premises it seeks to disprove, so the only premise it can disprove is itself. It's totally independent of premises 1, 2, 3. I feel like I'm just rambling now, but I think people will get the point.

97.101.61.57 11:16, 12 July 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Fenricwolf that there should be a premise that God is omniscient. I think that it was assumed (incorrectly) that omnipotence implied omniscience. The first statement says that God exists because this is a Reductio ad absurdum. I don't really follow what 97.101.61.57 is saying, 9 is clearly marked as a premise and so does not follow any other. The nature of Reductio ad absurdum is such that the contradiction shows that not all premises can be true. If you assume that 9 is false then other premises could be true. Thus Julian of Norwich and followers of Advaita Vedanta for example do not have a problem of evil. -- Q Chris 11:55, 12 July 2007 (UTC)

"he nature of Reductio ad absurdum is such that the contradiction shows that not all premises can be true. If you assume that 9 is false then other premises could be true." That's exactly what I was getting at, except stated in a better manner. The argument on the page says that because premise 9 creates a contradiction, premises 1, 2, or 3 must be false, and that is an error in logic. As Q Chris said, "...9 is clearly marked as a premise and so does not follow any other," therefore, one cannot use 9 to disprove 1, 2, or 3, since they have no logical inter-dependence. The fact that premise 9 creates a contradiction only proves that the argument, assuming premise 9, is invalid. It would be perfectly valid, though incomplete, assuming only 1, 2, 3. Again, Reductio ad Absurdum arguments show that "not all premises can be true," not that "all premises are not true". 97.101.61.57 03:13, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

I think we are agreeing here, the only thing the argument proves is that not all premises cannot be correct. Id does not say that the premise "God exists" is false or that the premise "evil exists" is false and so on for all the other premises. Despite its limited scope, I still think this is a useful argument as many people do claim that they believe all the premises to be true, it shows them that there must be some error in their beliefs. -- Q Chris 19:29, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] The Free Will argument

Where does the cited formulation come from? It is very bad, so is it really from an authoritative source? To wit (I have added line numbers for reference):

1. Good and evil are products of free will (premise)

2. Thus, there can be no good nor evil without free will

3. Thus, to remove evil would be to remove free will, which would also remove all good

4. Thus, to remove all evil is to remove all good, which is evil, so therefore, free will is necessary and is a divine manifestation of God.

Criticism: Either 1 or 2 is redundant; they say the same thing, that free will is a necessary condition for good and evil. 3 does not follow from 1 and/or 2. They say that free will is necessary for good and evil, not that good and evil are necessary for free will. 3 also contains an implication of its own: "To remove evil would be to remove good." The first part of 4 follows from this implication, but only because A implies A (since it is a verbatim repetition). 4 is moreover self-contradictory; it says that to remove all evil is evil. The final part of 4, "Free will is a divine manifestation of God" doesn't follow from anything previously said. (It wouldn't even if what was previously said had made sense.) Suggestion: find an argument that is valid, or rewrite this so it doesn't look like something that tries to be a logical argument. Kronocide 03:06, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

Yes, 2 is an implication from 1. Well you could say all logical proving process is redundant (except the assumptions)...

2 is an implication from 1 as A implies A. All logical proofs are tautologies, but they are not all formally redundant. Kronocide 20:28, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

3 is correct: 1 says that free will "spawns" both good and evil (just as unawareness spawns both options; or 50% probability makes both options equally popular). If there is only good, we cannot say it is choosen freely. So if you remove evil, free will is no longer possible.

Whether 3 is correct or not is not the question. It doesn't follow. Your explanation is interesting, but irrelevant for the logical validity of the argument. Kronocide 20:28, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

4 is also correct: nothing self-contradictory! It says that a quest for power which attempts to remove all evil and leavy only good cannot be considered good. It is like saying that universalism is evil. (But then what other options for good people? Ascethism?)

Again you are reading things into the text that aren't there. 4 does not say that attempting to remove evil is evil, it says that removing evil is evil. That is as self-contradictory as f___ing for virginity, or it is at the very least highly confusing.
I'm not sure why you spend time defending this text instead of improving it, since you understand it. Trust me, it makes no logical sense. It may still make sense, but it's not an argument of sentence logic or any other proper kind, so should not be formulated and structured as if it was. Kronocide 20:28, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

However, the free will then opens another problem: if God is omnibenevolent, how can he create hell? If he made the world so that all paths are realized, how can he condemn people for following the "wrong" ones? And finally, if he wants all paths to be realized, then he doesn't want all people to be saints. Indeed, free will means 'we give the Earth to the people and let them rule themselves however they like, basing on whatever morals they like'. By the moment God gives free will to people, he can no longer have any wishes or longings (especially because he already knows the future). Actually it is a curiosum to say God's will is not fulfilled... Nothing could ever happen without former omniscient God's will. So assuming free will is more like a vision of dead God - deism... 83.31.15.129 00:14, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

I find it interesting that one of the most well-written books ever to be issued on this topic has not once been mentioned in the entire article. I am referring to C.S. Lewis' "The Problem of Pain". This work addresses each objection raised in this topic, and the wonder is that no one, apparently, has gone to look at it. Why? (Centurion13 20:42, 31 December 2006 (UTC))

One common thread runs through many of these exhaustive discourses on God's goodness, the question of free will, etc., and that is the curious idea that God somehow knows what we will do before we do it. But as C. S. Lewis pointed out in "Mere Christianity", many theologians believe that "some things are not in Time at all", and that Christian theologians believe God is not, either. As Lewis points out:

"Another difficulty we get if we believe God to be in time is this. Everyone who believes in God at all believes that he know what you and I are going to do tomorrow. But if he knows I am going to do so-and-so, how can I be free to do otherwise?"

Lewis goes on to explain that this difficulty arises if we think of God as progressing along the Time-line as we do, the only difference being that He can see ahead and we can't. But suppose God were outside, above the Time-line? Then tomorrow, yesterday and today would be visible to Him in exactly the same way - all the days are 'Now" for Him. He doesn't remember you doing things yesterday, or forsee you doing them a year from now. He simply sees you doing them. In a way, He does not know what you are going to do until you do it, but then, the moment at which you finally do it is already 'Now' for Him. (Centurion13 21:28, 31 December 2006 (UTC))

Kronocide is perfectly correct - the validity of each statement is completely irrelevent - they do not follow logically from each other, and thus do not represent a coherent argument. Since this argument was flagged up a while ago has still not been acted on, I am going to attempt to formulate a more logically-sound version myself. How about the following:

  • Free will requires the potential to so anything one chooses. (premise, or by definition)
  • Thus, free will requires the potential to do evil.
  • Thus, removing the potential to do evil would remove free will.


Note that I have not changed any of the other content in the section, as I am not at all well-versed in Theology. I am simply replacing the bad logical deduction. My conclusion is not exactly the same as the original conclusion, but I think that it is actually closer to the intended result as originally described above the deduction. Branfish 21:07, 12 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Cinema

Should this be removed as original research, or is it just that there is inappropriate use of the first person? Also archived some of the older messages on this page (older than 20th August, roughly) Angus Lepper 20:12, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Defining the Evil of God

First let's start by defining Evil, then defining it in the biblical terms. Evil that which results in pain, sorrow, or distress. Okay that was easy, now on to the biblical terminology. The Hebrew word "ra'" is variouly translated as "bad," "gloomy," "ugly," "evil," "calamitous," "malignant," "ungenerous," and "envious," depending on the context. The Greek word "ka•kos'" may be defined as that which is morally evil and/or destructive; the translations are as follows: "bad," "evil," "hurtful," "injurious," and "wrong."

The bible first uses (ra') as the polar opposite of "good." This is shown with God's command to Adam not to eat from the tree of "Good" and "Bad." Further God warned Adam of the concequences for disobedience. (Genesis 2:16, 17) Therefore, it is evident that God sets the standard as to "what is good" and "what is bad or evil." Further, this account shows that is is not within humankind's perogative to set the standard for themselves apart from God.

It is interesting to note that in the bible, God is referred as being the creator of evil or calamity. (Isaiah 45:7) God's enforcing of the penalty for sin, that being death, has proved to be an evil, or calamity for humankind. This reveals that evil is not always synonymous with wrongdoing. Simply put when the administrators of justice must enforce a law they do so by penalty. The penalty is in itself an evil against to one breaking the law. For example if no penalty was given against those who break the laws and practice lawlessness there would be no justice. Sex offenders, Murderers, thiefs of everykind would constantly be free to do as they will, if it were not for Police, judges, court officials, and jailers. Do we as a society see these as evil doers or as those who enforce the law thereby protecting our own civil liberties? If we look at the situation from the vantage point of the law breaker everything these law enforcer do to them is evil and wrong. However, from the vantage point of justice what these law enforcer do is legal and right. Is it wrong to put a person into a small room, limit their freedom to the public or punish them for the crimes thay have committed by whatever means the government of this world have approved? Ofcourse I am aware, as are you that many governments and their laws and law enforcers are in fact cruel and unjust. Does this mean God is cruel and unjust? It sould be taken into account that God always gave warning, well in advance as to what He was going to do if they people continued practicing evil. This was done to give them time to change their ways,and could extend mercy. To do this was in fact undue kindness on God's part. So it is interesting that God in the postition of Law giver, Judge, and Law enforcer, must inflict "evil" against practicing evil doers, in fact seeks to extend mercy where ever possible. See the examples of the flood and also the plagues of Egypt. In both cases God allowed time for people to take advantage of the situation, to escape the intended "evil" against them.

Evil can then be thus put into two different catagories. That of unjustified evil and that of justified evil. For something to be justified it must be within the limits of the law; be that legislative law of governments or divine law or both (being only if the legislative law of the land does not contradict divine law.) Therefore, the arguement is brought into the realm of justice, that of law and order. For that we need to define Justice. Then, both kinds of Evil can be defined. I can only give to a start. Justice is the maintenance, or administration of what is right, in a fair and impartial way and according to a standard.

There are of course questions, such as why does God allow unjustified evil to exist? If God is Almighty, Benevolent, and All-knowing why does He not just remove such obviously unbenificial evil from this world? These questions are not addressed here, see Theodicy discussion: The Biblical Explaination of the problem of evil. This was just to give some perspective on the definition of Evil. As it is so very clearly distorted and blurred. Here is a question for you as a reader of this: Can we honesty attribute our own cruel and unjust works of evil to God? I hope this in some way improves the article of Wikipedia and add some useful insight. As always I invite all to examine and critique what I have written here. Truth-Seeker 24.150.46.62 22:34, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

You say 'These questions are not addressed here' - yes they are. Have you read the article? 84.70.185.115 23:19, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Move part into Theodecy?

I suggest at least some of this article, e.g. the responses to the arguments against God, be moved to Theodecy - and preferably improved, as a lot of it reads like unsourced 'original research'. 84.70.185.115 23:17, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Removed pov simplistic "solution" from introduction

Removed this:

However, the problem can be solved by looking at it this way: - Is there such thing as cold or darkness? The answer is no. Cold and darkness are the absence of heat and light. Using this example, we can say that evil and suffering is the lack or absence of good.

This is obviously very simplistic. Example:

"The fact that a cellar is dark would disprove the existence of a man with an all-powerful torch who wanted light at all costs."
"But dark is just the absence of light" (has no bearing on the above argument)

If a citation were provided the removed sentence could be an illustration of some of the less than satisfactory arguments, but it certainly has no place in the introduction. -- Chris Q 13:07, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

But the question isn't "Why isn't good everywhere?", it's "Why is there any evil at all?" (added anonymously by 66.167.147.167)

[edit] god or God?

Should the spelling by god or God? In some sections it's god and in some it's God. - jlao04 08:44, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

It was God and Gods until [this edit] where someone decided they were both not proper nouns. His edit only affected the introduction, which seemed to bug him for some reason. I don't mind whether its "god" and "gods" or "God" and "Gods", but would object to any POV differentiation. -- Chris Q 11:04, 8 November 2006 (UTC)
I think it should be "a god" and "gods" generally and "God" for the Judeo-Christian god specifically. It is both a common noun and a proper noun. Kronocide 16:14, 20 January 2007 (UTC)
I agree, except "God" should be used when referring to any god, not just the Abrahamic ("Judeo-Christian") one. It depends on the context. It's similar to the words "mom" and "dad," for example. One might say, "Hi Mom," or, "I believe in God." One might also say, "I have a mom," or, "I believe in a god." --Alexc3 (talk) 19:57, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] RE paragraph at "Challenge cannot be proved false"

(newbie alert)

It seems to me that this rebutal to a challenge to the POE (Problem of Evil) is not logical for this reason: It is not necessary for a challenge to a proof (here, the POE proof) to be falsifiable. What is under test here is the POE: does it, in fact, prove its conclusion. The challenge points out a potential problem with the proof. If the proof cannot prove its conclusion without merely assuming things that are in doubt (e.g., that humans are capable of judging God), then its proof fails.

Moreover, it could be argued that if the challenge cannot be falsified, as paragraph suggests, that must mean that the assumption (that man can judge God) cannot be proved to be true. (Since one way to prove the challenge is false, would be to prove the assumption is true. But since the challenge is not falsifiable, then there must be no way to prove the assumption is correct.) If that is so, we know that POE cannot succeed in its proof.

What is the correct way to handle, what seems to me, something that needs to be corrected?

-- Davrids Tuesday, 2006-12-12 T 23:44 UTC


Well I tried what I though was a well cited edit, but got reverted.

Did I do something wrong with my edit?

Here is what I added:

vvv

But this conclusion (the Ignorance of Man Challenge is unfalsifiable) leads directly to the total debunking of the problem of evil. Since the Challenge cannot be proved false, there must be no way to prove the assumption, that man is capable of judging God. (Because the assumption, if proved, would falsify the challenge, which, as we just saw, cannot be falsified.) Since that unprovable assumption is essential to the problem of evil, the problem of evil is also unprovable.

Immanuel Kant was thinking of this result when wrote in "Failure of All Theodicies,"

"We can understand the necessary limits of our reflections on the subjects which are beyond our reach. This can easily be demonstrated and will put an end once and for all to the trial [that is, the trial of God before the tribunal of reason]."

(As quoted in [http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.04.CTNS_theodicy.pdf Making the Task of Theodicy Impossible?)

^^^

I can add another citation if that's the problem.

Or maybe "total debunking" should be less assertive??

Please advise.

(I have moved this discussion to this talk page as I believe it is of general interest) -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

Did I do something wrong with my edit? -- Davrids Saturday, 2006-12-16 T 14:34 UTC

Basically firstly it was original research. Secondly, showing that an argument is not falsifiable obviously shows that it gives us no scientific understanding of whether a problem is right or wrong. -- Chris Q 07:36, 18 December 2006 (UTC)
Thanks for your response. Leaving your first point alone for now, it is true that the challenge cannot be shown to be false. But, since that is true, doesn't showing that an assumption in the problem of evil (POE) cannot be shown to be true, also mean we have no scientific understanding of whether the conclusion of the POE proof is correct?
I see that this is a sort of circular argument. You might say
"Nobody lives next door because we never hear or see anything"
a counter argument might be
"We don't fully understand what hearing and seeing is. Maybe someone lives there and makes ultrasonic sounds and is visible in ultraviolet."
Someone might point out that:
"That is not falsifiable, and goes against our assumptions of physical existence".
I don't think you would gain much by saying. "It is impossible to prove that there are not people living there who can not be seen or heard by humans. It means your argument that nobody lives next door is unfalsifiable and therefore cannot be proved and may be false!"
Basically this type of argument could be applied to any theory; the idea that gravity is caused by invisible imps is not falsifiable! -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)


All of that is true, but misses my point: If we take the time to show that a challenge (it is not a theory) to a proof cannot be proved false, is it not more important that a premise necessary to the proof cannot (or has not) been proved?
The unproved premise here in question is that humans are smart enough to criticise the actions of any god which could have created them. Without proving that, the POE is fatally flawed. -- Davrids 16:27, 20 December 2006 (UTC)
It depends whether it is considered to be a reasonable challenge. You could have a proof:
All cats are animals
Ginger is a cat
Therefore Ginger is an animal.
You could use the same argument against a premise here, that you cannot prove that Ginger is not something that appears in every way to be a cat to humans, but is really something else. This is not falsifiable (in that every test can be claimed that any test is unable to differentiate Ginger from a cat), but would not be considered a reasonable challenge. -- 88.105.122.128 14:26, 21 December 2006 (UTC)


The atheistic POV present in the preceding paragraph ignores the problem that an unfalsifiable challenge presents to the POE. The problem (as seen by a theist) is this: if the challenge cannot be shown to be false, that means that the thesis it challenges also cannot be shown to be true. To a theist, this would seem to be a fatal flaw in the POE.


There is atheistic POV in, "Another problem with the argument from human ignorance," because it lables the unfalsifiable _attribute_ as a "problem" (in a "host of difficulties").
That atheistic POV also asks a challenge to meet the qualifications of an argument of a proof when it is _not_ an argument of a proof. The challenge merely asks that a weakness in the POE proof be corrected before its conclusion is accepted.
For the theist, it doesn't matter whether we have any scientific understanding of whether the challenge is right or wrong. He is not trying to prove that his challenge is correct, he is only asking that the POE proof use no unproven or unprovable assumptions. What matters here to the theist is, whether the correctness of the proof contained in POE can be shown. That's what the article is about, after all.
Wouldn't it be more NPOV to show both the atheist and the theistic viewpoint of what an unfalsifiable challenge means?


The problem of evil argument can only be shown not to be true by saying that one of the premises is wrong. In this case the challenge is to the idea that evil exists, i.e. in affect saying that there is no evil and everything is perfect, but we see "evil" because of our lack of understanding. I know that this is the belief of some mystics, but if introduced should be phrased as such rather than in a round about way.
Our Lord God . . . is at the center of everything, and he does everything. And I was certain that he does no sin; and here I was certain that sin is no deed, for in all this sin was not shown to me . . . . For a man regards some deeds as well done and some as evil, and our Lord does not regard them so, for everything which exists in nature is of God's creation, so that everything which is done has the property of being God's doing. -- Julean of Norwich [1].
Of course if you argue that there is no evil this goes against the teachings of many religions, and this should be mentioned too. -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)



This seems to be a straw man. Whether evil exists or not is moot in this challenge.
No, it is not a straw man. Consider the possibilities. The argument that people cannot judge good is not falsifiable, but never the less must be true or false. If it is false, then the proof stands anyway.
If true, then there are these logical possibilities:
God is Good and acts accordingly so that there is no evil, but we perceive it though ignorance.
We are wrong in judging God to be good, and there is evil.
We are completely wrong, and God is not good, but for some other reason there is no such thing as evil.
Most people arguing that we cannot judge good and evil would assert the first possibility.
Basically the argument stands that if God is good (whether or not we can determine it) and all powerful then there would be no evil (whether or not we can determine it


In my rush to respond before going out of town, I neglected to ask whether you meant to say what this seems to say.
“Whether or not we can determine [evil],” seems to allow the possibility that humans cannot correctly judge evil. This is very close to saying that we do not know that the premise is true, that humans can correctly judge the actions of God. And since this unproven premise is necessary to POE, it seems that we must acknowledge that the conclusion of POE remains unproven.
It seems unlikely that you meant that. Did I misunderstand? -- Davrids 23:44, 28 December 2006 (UTC)


The premise challenged here is the one that states that humans are capable of judging the actions of a god capable of creating them. It doesn't matter that most presentations of POE fail to state this premise. It is still there and still needs to be proved before POE can be scientifically considered valid. -- Davrids 16:27, 20 December 2006 (UTC)


Thanks for considering my long reply. -- Davrids 06:12, 20 December 2006 (UTC)
No problem -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)


I still think that the NPOV can be improved by _neutrally_ stating the challenge is not falsifiable and then stating what that means to the atheist and also to the theist. -- Davrids 16:27, 20 December 2006 (UTC)
I disagree, because the falsifiability is itself a response to the challenge. In any case, the logic of the argument stands, so the only way to counter it is to show that a premise is wrong. There is no advantage to saying that a premise is falsifiable but then continue to assume that it is true. -- 88.105.122.128 14:26, 21 December 2006 (UTC) (Chris Q)


No, there is another way to successfully challenge a proof.
One can insist that an included premise _must_ be proved.
We have seen no proof for the premise that humans have the capability of judging the actions of any god capable of creating them.
Indeed, the very arguments that show that the challenge is not falsifiable, also show that the challenged premise _cannot_ be proved.
Even if this were not so, the POE proof is still unproven theory because it does not have the necessary proof of its challenged premise.


The question of whether evil exists is moot. It doesn't matter whether it exists, or if it doesn't exist, or, as you argue, "if God is good (whether or not we can determine it) and all powerful then there would be no evil (whether or not we can determine it)."
What matters in this challenge, is whether or not the challenged implicit premise in the POE proof has been proved. To argue against some other position, is to argue against a straw man.


_This_ is the challenge's position: The proof is, and will remain, unproven until the challenged premise has been proved. A NPOV requires that the challenged premise be proved.
Merely assuming as correct, a premise that requires God to not exist, is circular.
For instance: "I assume that I can correctly judge God. God, if he does exist, cannot be wrong, and he says that he cannot be correctly judged by man. But I can correctly judge God. Therefore, God is wrong and, thus, does not exist."
Every presentation of POE assumes the premise that humans can correctly judge God, and so, merely assumes that God does not exist. Every proof that assumes its conclusion, is invalid. Therefore, the POE proof is invalid.
If the atheist really wants to test the proposition that the God of the Bible exists, he may not just assume, as true, things that contradict that proposition.
Those are the reasons the theist would not agree that his challenge to the POE premise is comparable to your example challenge to, "Ginger is a cat."


The atheistic POV of the paragraph in the article exists. It assumes that this challenge can be dismissed for being a non-falsifiable theory.
A balancing theistic POV is that the challenge is not even a _theory_ and, so, doesn't need to be falsifiable. In fact, the theist is _glad_ his challenge cannot be proved false, because it shows the challenged premise cannot be proved to be true. Thus, POE is just unproven theory.


The article's paragraph needs NPOV. -- Davrids 17:36, 22 December 2006 (UTC)
I am beginning to think that the section "Challenge cannot be proved false" is rather pointless. The point of the argument of the problem of evil is that the following cannot all be true.
  • God exists
  • God is completely good.
  • God is all powerful.
  • God is all knowing (at least with regard to the consequences of His/Her actions).
  • Evil exists.
The falsifiability of an objection to a premise is not a big deal, as the argument ONLY shows that there is a contradiction if all are true. In this way it is particularly aimed at certain religions that claim all of the above as pert of their beliefs. If you look at the premises it is hard to see how any of them can be proved falsifiable, so why is that one singled out. Add to this the fact that that section has no citations and I think there are grounds to delete it.
Note that if any of the above are false then the argument falls and the other points cannot be determined. For example:
  • God does not exist. Points 2, 3 and 4 are meaningless and point 5 may or may not be true.
  • God is not completely good. All the other points could be true or false as God would not necessarily avoid evil.
  • God is not all powerful. Some other cause may or may not cause evil.
  • God is not all knowing. He/She might have had good intentions but messed up creation so that evil was an unforeseen consequence.
  • Evil does not exist. This may or may not be because of a good God, who may or may not be all powerful, all knowing, etc.
-- Chris Q 07:56, 2 January 2007 (UTC)


As you say, in any _reductio ad absurdum_ argument, if an impossibility is produced from a set of premises, one or more of those premises must be false. If we can prove as true, all the premises except one, then we know the unproven premise must be false.
Unfortunately for the validity of POE, this has not been achieved.
In POE, there are at least two unproven premises, as was shown above. One unproven premise is stated. This is, "God exists."
The second one is unstated and, thus, often ignored. But still must be examined.
That premise supposes that non-omniscient humans are as smart as an omniscient god. This is _absurdum_ on its face.
So here is one more possibility to add to your list:
  • God exists, is all knowing, is all powerful, is all good, and his actions cannot be correctly judged by any being that is not all knowing.


Actually this statement disproves itself. If a being cannot correctly judge God or God's actions then they cannot even determine if God is All Good, All Powerful or All Knowing. It's all assumptions. -- [MDH] 19 January 2007

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 152.216.7.5 (talk) 21:29, 19 January 2007 (UTC).


This is true, if you mean the statement does not prove itself to be a truth. If the statement were presented as a truth, it would then be necessary to provide proof of its correctness.
But it is not presented as a truth. Instead, the statement is presented as a _possibility_.
This possibility has not been successfully excluded from reality by the Supposed Problem of Evil. That is the result of this discussion.
I predict (if I have not here proved) that POE will never be able to correctly exclude this possibility.
(Possibly, someone will challenge me to produce proof that this possibility is more than just possibility. Such a discussion is not relevant to whether the POE proof is valid.)


The Problem of Evil is a major liability to atheism. -- Davrids 20:24, 28 January 2007 (UTC)


Fortunately, there are religions which do conform to this possibility.


I support your removal of the paragraph because it was citation-less and POV. -- Davrids 03:24, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Improper redirect

Searching for the problem of pain (in all lowercase) redirects to Problem of Evil. Instead it should redirect to The Problem of Pain (the C.S. Lewis book). I tried to change it, but it doesn't seem to be working. Perhaps someone more savvy can fix it. --kidbritish 23:46, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

This redirect has already been fixed, seeing nobody mentioned it here in the past. --54x 12:40, 4 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Suggestion: argument from world creation

This is against teologies saying "there is no God in THIS world, because he wants to preserve your free will".

Assume people have free will (and I'm actually not gonna agree with this, but let's assume it anyway).

World could be constructed in another way and people would still have free will. Example: if you play dice, you could have got a 6 instead of 1, as a one-time exception being a part of world laws. This still wouldn't make you unfree.

Having another world order affects your will, but it is still free. As in the above example: you could be more willing to keep playing if your results were better.

Note, the overall probabilities of your life actions shifted a bit (and multiplying this experiment, they could be shifted a lot). You are more towards one direction, even more: your character could change - whilst still being free.

Now, a better example: God knew how world would look like when he created it. He knew what would be the effect of human free will. But was him tied by a destiny? Of course, not. He could have created completely another world, so that human free decisions in it would be other; and would be in better proportions. So that less people would be surprised by hell.

Then why there is so little God in this world? Why doesn't he help us a little, for example in the XXth century?

And well, if you keep saying it's because he wants to hide and wants to keep the number of believers lower... because he wants to keep a fair amount of evil... then I'm going to fulfill this desire of him. ;) I don't think anything could happen against God's will; so whatever I finally do must be already a subject of his plans and the result of some earlier will of him.

Actually, I believe God's precepts should be treated like the ancient virtue, like some kind of a tip, a guide-post how to live well and what to do to succeed in life. But I can't agree they are so strict and absolute that breaking them means your condemnation and eternal hell: is man only a mistake of God? does he not love us enough, also those who follow other ways?

83.31.15.129 00:35, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Theodicy vs Defense (or maybe a Challenge)

The introduction to this article is incomplete. It says that a "proposed solution" to the problem of evil constitutes a "theodicy." This is not correct, and the distinction is important. Alvin Plantinga ("God, Freedom, and Evil," 1977) distinguishes between a "defense" and a "theodicy." A defense merely seeks to show that the claims of any argument from evil are not sufficiently substantiated, such as the idea that a 3-0 God (Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Omnibenevolent) is inconsistent with the existence of evil. With a defense, the goal is merely to show that these three attributes of God, combined with the existence of evil and premises asserting that an all-good God would prevent all evil, are not logically inconsistent, such that they generate a logical contradiction. The way to do this is to show that the premises of such "logical" or a priori arguments from evil are not necessarily true. If this is the case, then they cannot show that the mere concept of God is inconsistent with the existence of evil. This is different from a theodicy, which comes from the Greek words "theos" and "dikaes" and means "to justify God," where one is concerned to offer an actual reason for why God allows evil. Thus a defense merely seeks to show that certain premises in the a priori argument from evil are not necessarily true, whereas a theodicy attempts to explain the existence of evil. Timm001 03:16, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

I understand what you are saying and the distinction you make is real. If this defense shows that the POE argument is not complete, then it is not necessary to justify why God might allow evil.
Still, I would have called this action a "challenge" since it challenges the correctness of the argument. "Defense," instead, suggests that something is being defended (at least to me).
I'm quibbling, though.
You might consider this substitution for the sentence:
"Some question the logical validity of this dilemma. Others suggest a theodicy (a reason why such a god would allow evil)." Davrids 04:47, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] evil in heaven - removed sentence.

I have removed the following sentence:

Critics of this argument note that there is evidence in these religious traditions that free will and evil might both indeed exist in heaven.

This sentence does not add anything, the text already says: What about those in heaven - they are free, yet some claim that no evil would ever happen in heaven.

The heaven example is in any case a weaker example, the strong one being why couldn't God create beings that were like Himself. One could argue that if there were evil in Heaven it would be an even stronger indication that God was either not all good or not all powerful. -- Chris Q 07:31, 11 January 2007 (UTC)


[edit] Strange assumption..

From where comes the assumption that a god must be "all-good"? It doesn't come from the basis of the Abrahamic religions (ie scripture) So is that really an idea we could argue that a god MUST be? Its' not, and many religious people don't believe god is only good, but rather that he is in and behind everything due to his supposed omnipotence.


I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things. Isaiah 45:7

Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid? Shall there be evil in a city, and the LORD hath not done it? Amos 3:6

Doesn't sound like scriptures support this modern idea (it hasn't been around for very long.) of a god who is "all-good"... The base of the Abrahamic religons (the O.T) doesn't support it at all, it contradicts it. And I can't find anything supporting it in the Qur'an or the N.T either.


And what is this:

"Actually this statement disproves itself. If a being cannot correctly judge God or God's actions then they cannot even determine if God is All Good, All Powerful or All Knowing."

I agree that no being could determine such but not that is disproves itself. Or does something always have to be proven to be true? (I'm not saying that particular statement you referred to is true, however, but lets assume so for sake of argument.) Wasn't (for example) the theory of gravity true before it was written? Or did gravity work differently before the theory was written? No, it did not, it worked exactly the same way, and when we humans are all gone: It will continue to work the same way it always has, without us. (This is of course, assuming that the theory of gravity is correct, which I'm pretty sure we all do, as evidence suggests so.)

[edit] The problem of evil is not God, it is man...

All powerful; The confusion comes by the wrong definition of all powerful. There are logical limits to all powerful. Example. Can God make something that He cannot lift? Can God make something that He cannot control? Can God make rules that limit Himself?

By saying this, it does not diminish the power of an all powerful God, it merely defines the power.

If you were to equate it to something else. You can equate it to the speed of light. For your average person, the speed of light is infinite. No time passes between turning a light on and the light coming on. But if you want to get technical about it, the speed of light is not infinite, just VERY VERY fast. For most practical purposes, there is no speed of light, practically instantanious. The only time that the speed of light becomes an issue, is if you push it to extremes. Measuring distances to stars, or comparing the differences between different light colours. etc...

In the same way, for all practical purposes, God is all powerful. God made man with the intention to not control him. Does this limit His power? yes. Does that make Him any less God? no.

Man has the potential to be whatever they choose to be, and their is no evil in this world that has not been brought about by man.

The problem of evil is not God, the problem of evil is man.

      • As a side note, I received the following comment on the above thought.

"God is supposed to have made man with a certain nature, liking this, disliking that etc. Our free-will chooses in accordance with our nature. Instead of an omnipotent God giving us a nature which is aligned with his --so that we choose with our free-will what also delights him as well-- we are supposed to have been given a nature that is in rebellion with his own, i.e desiring at times and choosing with our free will that which offends him- see original sin. God then is supposed to punish man for His own workmanship. GoldenMeadows 11:48, 23 April 2007 (UTC)"

Yes, God did make man with a certain nature, and if you read the whole "Garden of Eden" story, then you see that man was made with a pure nature to start with. Until the turned their backs on God and corrupted themselves. And by saying that "our free will chooses in accordance with our natures". Well that is not true. You might be prone to certain decisions, and prone to certain quirks, but you maintain the ability to either choose for it or against it.

--Mootieman 14:55, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

A practical example rooted in Christian teaching illustrates the problem. Nobody suggests that the saints in heaven sin. Aquinas argued that this is so because a soul immersed in the beatific vision is incapable of sinning. Now presumably the saints in heaven have free-will and this being so it suggests that God is quite capable of ordering our nature such we are not inclined to sin whilst still retaining free will, i.e why does God not simply "mend" the fallen nature we are supposed to have been born with rather than punish a soul for a damaged nature not of his own making? GoldenMeadows 15:07, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

That is a very, very good question, You had me stumped there for a bit ... Allow me to break down your statement. 1. There will be no sin in heaven. (Premise) 2. God can "fix" us without taking away free will. (Conclusion from 1) 3. Why does He not just fix us, instead of punishing us. (Question from 2)

I am not going to try and answer the first two statements, because in essence, we can debate it, but there is not a lot of information about it, so at best, it will only be a guess.

Why does God not just fix us? God will not force himself on us, (have His way with us against our will). On the contrary, He has gone to great lengths in order for Him to reunite man with Himself. In order for Him to "fix" us, we need to submit ourselves to his authority, and for the most part, humanity likes their indipendance.

--Mootieman 07:38, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

The above answer still does not answer the problem about sin in heaven. If there is no sin in heaven then either only perfect people will go to heaven (which contradicts the Christian belief that Jesus died so that sinners could go to heaven) or god will interfere or "fix" us at the time we go to heaven. If he will do it then, why not now? -- Q Chris 12:27, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

In order for me to ensure that we are all on the same wavelength, allow me to break down your questions.

Your questions:
1. Will there be sin in heaven? No

2. Either (Only perfect people go to heaven) or (God can fix us)?
Firstly, There are no perfect people, so then that would mean that God will have to "fix us" in heaven.

3. If God can "fix us", why not now?
I will not presume to guess his reasons or motives.

Which leaves the question:
4. How would it be possible to ensure that there is no sin in heaven without taking away free will?
This one is going to be very difficult to answer as there is not a lot of information about it. Which means I will have to specultate.

I see in one of your previous posts, you ask why God didn't create us as good and pure and godlike... Well, he did... the original man/woman was made in the likeness of God. Until they were deceived by the devil and rebelled against God. You see, if God was to restore our innocence and remove the temptator, then you can have heaven without sin and retain our free will.

--Mootieman 15:39, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

I agree with your summary of the argument. I actually agree that God created us as good, pure and godlike, though I think your assertion that they were deceived by the devil has its own pitfalls. God also created the devil, so why was the devil not good and pure? I think that this, combined with point 3 (why doesn't God fix us now), makes me believe that God intended things to be as they are. This being the case how could God subject people to hell for acting in a way that was intended? I am finding better answers to these questions in the Bhagavad Gitathan I did in the Bible. -- Q Chris 06:29, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Your question as to why God made the devil bad? Well, the Devil was made good and pure. He grew arrogant because of his beauty and rebelled against God.
We seem to have gotten side tracked a little bit ... But here is the point ... It is quite clear that Evil comes from a rebellion against God
The existance of evil proves that we are rejecting God, not that God doesn't exist...

--Mootieman 07:18, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Yes, it only disproves one view of God. It disproves the existence of a God who is all powerful, all knowing, all good and would not have wanted what we see as evil emerge. -- Q Chris 09:08, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

I do not understand how your previous comment fits in with the rest of this argument. You say yes, as if you agree, then you say the opposite of what I am saying. Explain pls.

--Mootieman 09:35, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

OK go back to your summary
1. Will there be sin in heaven?
No
(OK)
2. Either (Only perfect people go to heaven) or (God can fix us)?
Firstly, There are no perfect people, so then that would mean that God will have to "fix us" in heaven.
(OK)
3. If God can "fix us", why not now?
I will not presume to guess his reasons or motives.
(what you are saying is that God has some reason not to fix us now. I just extended this back to say why did he not fix us yesterday and so on until I got to the point where evil first emerged. Why God let evil emerge is really the same question as why God won't fix us now, except way back in the past and there must have been some reason)
Which leaves the question:
4. How would it be possible to ensure that there is no sin in heaven without taking away free will?

...

So the argument just as I could have said: It disproves the existence of a God who is all powerful, all knowing, all good and who wants to "fix us" now. The statement I made is the same but projects back into the past to the point where evil emerged. -- Q Chris 12:49, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

It is not his existence that is at stake, but our understanding of His character. --Mootieman 07:34, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

I think that is a good summary. The argument makes so many assumptions about our understanding of God that it is not really a proof of the non-existence of God. Take the analogy that the absence of light in a dark cellar proves that there is not a man in the cellar with a functioning lamp, who is awake and knows how to use it and who really does not want the cellar to be dark. Some uses of this argument are just like saying "absence of light in the cellar proves that there is nobody in the cellar. -- Q Chris 08:56, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
Well, since sin/=evil (destructive) acts, but is instead the "seperation from God of man", it makes perfect sense for sin to be impossible in heaven, where you are in perfect unity with God. Furthermore, the saints are not made by God to be sinless and worthy, they choose to be that way - so it seems God can/will not subvert free will to make people sinless.KrytenKoro 14:19, 28 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] The problem of Evil in Islam

I have added the following tags. {{off-topic}} {{expert-subject}}

This section needs attention from someone knowledgeable in this subject. The current entry appears to be a good faith edit describing Islam's attitudes to good and evil rather than addressing the topic of the article. The small amount that I have read about Islam's ideas on predestination and evil make me think that Islamic philosophy has much more to say on this topic. -- Q Chris 09:32, 11 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Moral argument from evil

Am I not understanding something, or is the argument "Moral argument from evil" in the Formalised arguments just a rambling and less robust expression of the argument given in "Logical problem of evil"? If so I think it adds little value and should be removed. -- Q Chris 06:38, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

The whole argument is pretty flaky. Specifically, I have a problem with: 11. No theist knows that a god exists; 12. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified; 13. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists; and 15. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. The concept of "justification" is used ambiguously here to conclude in faulty logic. If 11 begets 12, then it is implied that actual nonexistence of a god would make the theist's belief "false" instead of "unjustified", while "unjustification" lies in his lack of proof (factual knowledge) of a god's existence. Thus, because the existence of a god doesn't require or necessarily create "proof" of itself, and in the absence of proof the theist remains unjustified in his belief whether a god exists or not, 13 and 15 are invalid (and by extension the whole conclusion.) Just my two cents. Succubus MacAstaroth 15:16, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Theory of Evil

Many have claimed what evil is and that god is evil. but consider this if there is a god and what he has created he classes as good,then if what we consider evil, in his eyes may be good as he is the judge of good and evil.

For example we may consider mass homicide wrong and evil but if god considers it good then it is good thus asking how can we judge good and evil. The only thing that gives us an idea of god sintentions is religion. Altough osme religion promotes thing that other religions say is wrong so we cannot know what good and evil truly is.

sorry for the spelling mistakes on the previous theory

^unsigned post^


Whether God's concept of evil differs from our own is irrelevant; you can replace every incidence of the word "good" (or "evil") in the article with "good (or evil) as defined by the speaker" (in this case, humanity). If God considers our concept of evil to actually be good, and vice versa, it makes no difference, because he is still doing/being what we call evil. It's mere semantics. The clear implication in Christianity is that God is benevolent as we perceive benevolence. See, we invented the word to describe the concept, and if God doesn't fit the concept, then the word doesn't apply - get it? I hope (but doubt) this made some sense. This is what happens when you get a right-brain trying to put thoughts into coherent language. It makes perfect sense in my head, I swear. Succubus MacAstaroth 08:07, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
It makes sense to me. If someone argues that their God is "good" in some way beyond our understanding for subjecting good people of other religions to eternal torture I have no problem in saying "your God's good is my evil". -- Q Chris 12:16, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Merge

These articles seem to be the exact same concept (with Euthyphro having more), though I do notice that this article is prejudiced towards assuming that Elohim cannot be. Thus, it seems prudent to merge the two.KrytenKoro 14:24, 28 July 2007 (UTC)

I strongly oppose a merge. The two problems have nothing to do with each other. The problem of evil has to do with why is there evil if a good omnipotent god exists, while the Euthyphro dilemma is about whether god is the source of morality or not. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 141.154.243.77 (talk • contribs) 20:57, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

I agree with the last user. These are two very distinct issues in philosophy of religion that require an article each. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.243.251.69 (talk • contribs) 16:15, 13 September 2007 UTC

Presently the merge notice indicates that the two articles to be merged are 'problem of evil' and theodicy.
The underlying problem is that the 'theodicy' article is entirely and exclusively about the 'problem of evil,' and not about 'theodicy', which is -- as the name indicates -- really about [justifications for] [the existence of] god, to include all problems stemming from those "proofs". The 'problem of evil', to include death, sickness etc, is only one of those problems.
A related problem is that there is already also an article that deals with the for/against the existence for God. Obviously, 'theodicy' needs to redirect there.
So, what ought to be done with all the 'problem of evil' stuff presently in the 'theodicy' article? Obviously, it needs to come here. -- Fullstop (talk) 23:03, 28 April 2008 (UTC)
I agree the two should not be merged. Although they do overlap; there are parts that should be in one and not the other. A theodicy is any attempt to justify the ways of God to man, I think I've even seen a Oxford University press volume strictly about "Hell Theodicy". In any case, these articles both need a lot of work. And ideally the problem of evil would even be split to the logical and the evidential, but we are very very far from that. Merzul (talk) 20:59, 1 May 2008 (UTC)
  • NO MERGE - Very poor idea. The two subjects are inadequately correlative. Tucu (talk) 20:46, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

Merge!!! The two topics are clearly related. The theodicies are an attempt to justify God in the light of evil, so because of this join the make a merge pledge today!! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.11.95.59 (talk) 13:12, 28 May 2008 (UTC)

  • These articles should not be merged. The Problem of Evil is a philosophical problem in the Philosophy of Religion, a Theodicy is strictly a theological enterprise which attempts to explain God's moral plan in the Christian religion. The two are related, Theodicy is a way of attempting to solve the Problem of Evil, but it is by no means the only way. The Free Will Defence is a means of opposing the argument from evil which is not (strictly) a Theodicy. Thomaschina03 (talk) 13:07, 2 June 2008 (UTC)

Let's have a look at the definition: "Theodicy (IPA: /θiːˈɒdɪsi/) (adjectival form theodicean) is a specific branch of theology and philosophy that attempts to reconcile the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent God, i.e., the problem of evil."

Either this definition is wrong and needs to be completely rewritten, or the articles should be merged. Richard001 (talk) 11:12, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Christian Ditheism

The problem of evil is no problem for christians who believe in the devil but then why is Christianity (or parts of it) not listed under "Ditheism"? --Mudd1 10:18, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

Etymologically, Ditheism suggests two gods, as does this section of the article. None of the Abrahamic faiths affirm that the devil is deity, lesser or not. Thus, the problem of evil persists regardless of Satan, since God remains passively responsible for all evil acts. Satan has no autonomous power.

[edit] Problem of evil, I have one explination read the bottom

  1. God exists. (premise)
  2. God is omnipotent and omniscient. (premise — or true by definition of the word "God")
  3. God is all-benevolent. (premise — or true by definition)
  4. All-benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise — or true by definition)
  5. All-benevolent beings who can eliminate evil will do so immediately when they become aware of it.(premise)
  6. God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 3 and 4)
  7. God can eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 2)
    1. Whatever the end result of suffering is, God can bring it about by ways that do not include suffering. (conclusion from 2)
    2. God has no reason not to eliminate evil. (conclusion from 7.1)
    3. God has no reason not to act immediately. (conclusion from 5)
  8. God will eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 6, 7.2 and 7.3)
  9. Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
  1. Items 8 and 9 are contradictory, but there are explinations. For example God eliminates the evil

but the evil comes back as a result of our own actions and the devil's effect on us. God let us on the other hand choose between good or evil because it is the part of free will. That is also why evil continusly comes back and thats why we can draw parallells to the sentence that life is also in our own hands. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.217.177.87 (talk)

I removed these edits from this article and from Talk:God. This is original research and not allowed on wikipedia. The logical argument as stated in the article is of importance philosophically and historically; please do not modify it with your own ideas. bikeable (talk) 15:37, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] It should be pointed out... that what is considered evil is subjective

I mean, some consider masturbation do be evil.--Steven X (talk) 13:24, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Oh wait, this was pointed out in the archives, but still, the word subjective should make it's way into the article somehow.--Steven X (talk) 13:27, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] does evil actually exist?

the presumption of this article is that there is a problem in the first place and what is overlooked by many is that evil is a mental invention not found in reality. reality is made of atoms, molecules and cells that move according to laws of physics and are not good nor evil, just real. Evil has no existance until you impose an idealized fantasy world upon the real world as a standard of measure and in doing so you create things which support or lead to the ideal and things that lead away or harm the ideal. remove the ideal and you remove good and evil, thus problem solved, no problem ever existed in the first place but by rejection of reality.Jiohdi (talk) 15:37, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

See above.--Steven X (talk) 04:08, 2 February 2008 (UTC)
"things that lead away or harm the ideal" - you really care to discuss the things humans do that "lead away or harm" the assumed idea behind evolution?! While the subjectivity of good/evil should most certainly be mentioned you should really consider why your position is more philosophical then scientific within our current understanding of the universe. 193.226.105.89 (talk) 10:42, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
"you really care to discuss the things humans do that "lead away or harm" the assumed idea behind evolution?!". ...what? Ilkali (talk) 10:52, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Section 1.3.2. Title. That's pretty sick guys

Really, The Final Jewish "Solution" Am I the only one seeing the problem with that?

-Lauris —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.15.39.223 (talk) 18:14, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Even theologians

Theodicy relies on a metaphysical view of morality that few people, even theologians, agree with[citation needed] (that good and evil are not moral judgments).

HAHA, this is unfair to theologians. Someone should fix that eventually. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.67.198.141 (talk) 21:56, 24 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Poor Argument

I removed the following from the main page: Moral argument from evil

  1. The most rational theists believe (i.e. roughly speaking, have a belief) that God exists.
  2. If a god exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil (even if no-one intervenes to prevent that evil).
    1. For any possible world W, if a god exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
    2. If a god exists, then there is an objective justification for every actual instance of evil, (including those evils where there is a witness).
  3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as defined above) are theists who believe(2).
  4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
  5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
  6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur. (from 4 and 5)
  7. If the most rational theists know that a god exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur. (from 1 to 6)
  8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know 2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
  9. Even the most rational theists do not know that a god exists. (from 7 and 8)
  10. If the most rational theists do not know that a god exists, then no theist knows that a god exists.
  11. No theist knows that a god exists. (from 9 and 10)
  12. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified.
  13. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists.
  14. If a god exists, then no theist has a false belief that a god exists.
  15. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. (from 13 and 14)
  16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that a god exists. (from 12)
  17. No god exists. (from 15 and 16)

I did so because it's an excessively poor argument with which I doubt many atheists agree. It makes all sorts of premises with no support and even begs the question. I'm all for arguments, but let's put some good examples on the page. --Liempt (talk) 07:05, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Suffering in non-human animals

Besides the quote from Hume's Dialogues, there is no mention of the unnecessary suffering endured by non-human animals from things like disease. I note that once the silly free will and original sin/testing you out arguments are exhausted, there seems to be little explanation for this strange cruelty in nature (though I'm sure the theologicians have conjured up something for this too). Richard001 (talk) 11:24, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

You mean Bambi? :) Also see the nice exposition by Nick Trakakis on the IEP. But to answer your immediate question, the simplest approach is to lift the free-will defence from human agents to super-human agents. Very trivialized, you get tsunamis because of Satanic activity, whose free will is essential in the same way that human free will is needed. Theologians, I'm sure, have a lot more things to say.
There is terribly much to do on these articles, but the specialized encyclopaedias IEP and SEP already cover these topics very well, so I find it hard to motivate myself to do something about this topic. I'm very interested in evil though, so I might come here and help at some point. Cheers, Merzul (talk) 21:18, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] suggested item to include as link or put in see also

Trinitarian Universalism ... --Emesee (talk) 04:36, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Worldwide view

Of all the stuff in this article I find the diversity of views perhaps the material to capitalize on. The philosophical expositions are in a bad shape and as I said, it is not worth duplicating the freely available high quality material on IEP and SEP. What can be done here is to reorganize material to give the history section more prominence and including the Islamic and Buddhist views. Then a simple overview of the philosophy, and I don't know, maybe go for the very very recent stuff on the problem of evil.

Any ideas on what to do with this article? Merzul (talk) 13:48, 22 May 2008 (UTC)


Let me ask again, are there any objections, if I were to start making some changes to this article? Is anyone watching this, who would like to help? Merzul (talk) 18:17, 2 June 2008 (UTC)