Principal Officials Accountability System

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Principal Officials Accountability System (traditional Chinese: 主要官員問責制, often abbreviated to POAS, commonly known as 高官問責制 or 問責制) was introduced by Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in July 2002, the beginning of his second term, as part of his government reform programme. The main purpose for the creation of this system was to ward off public complaints that he leads a disunited and weak government.

Contents 1 Overview 1.1 Background 1.2 Operations 1.3 Implications 2 Flaws 2.1 Unable to hold principal officials accountable 2.2 Unable to hold permanent secretaries accountable 3 Future 4 Structure of political appointment system and its further development 5 References

[edit] Overview

[edit] Background

Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty had inherited the colonial system that all positions in the government are filled by civil servants. This was largely because the system had the merit of efficiency, and had contributed to the success and prosperity of Hong Kong. It was also seen as a symbol of continuity and stability.

Since the reversion to China, there has been an erosion of the running principles of the Executive Council (Execo) - some Execo members have violated the "collective responsibility" principles, namely being unsupportive to the decisions made by Execo. See this as the cause of many of his policy failures such as the "85,000 Housing Reform", Tung introduced POAS in 2002 to remedy the weaknesses as he perceived of the Hong Kong government.

The introduction of the system was seen as an opportunity for him to appoint his subordinates, who will no longer necessary be from the civil services, according to his wishes.

[edit] Operations

The POAS is similar to the cabinet of the United States Federal Government in that the Chief Executive is responsible for nominating and replacing the officials. This is a radical departure from the previous system, where secretaries, who are heads of policy bureaux came from the civil service. The POAS officials serve at the Chief's Executive's pleasure, and they are, in theory, held accountable for policy errors and mishaps (as in resigning when major policy flops or scandals occur).

In the past only the Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Secretary for Justice are ex-officio members of the Executive Council. Unofficial members were majority in the council. After the introduction of the POAS, all secretaries are appointed to the council, and leaders of the larger parties in the Legislative Council are appointed to the council, effectively transforming the council into a cabinet, with the unofficial members like ministers-without-portfolio.

[edit] Implications

Since the introduction of POAS, the government has shown a tendency to ally with certain political parties in Hong Kong such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), resulting in a clear division of the political spectrum - the pro-government camp led by the DAB and the anti-government camp led by the Democratic Party (DP).

[edit] Flaws

However, accountability did not increase in practice, for former Chief Executive Tung often ignored the policy errors and scandals made by his POAS officials, and asked them to stay. Good examples would be Antony Leung (see Lexusgate scandal for more details), Frederick Ma with his responsibility in a stock crisis that evaporated billions of dollars worth of stock value, former Secretary of Health, Welfare and Food Yeoh Eng-kiong, Rosanna Wong and Tony Miller in the "short pile scandal", and Regina Ip with her controversial promotion of the Basic Law Article 23.

[edit] Unable to hold principal officials accountable

Firstly, the former CE ordered the former Secretary of Health, Welfare and Food Yeoh Eng-kiong to “investigate himself” after SARS, as a way to hold the secretary accountable, yet, absurdly, the government’s later report declared that no officials should step down for the outbreak of SARS. He resigned solely because of public pressure. However, beforehand the former Chief Executive was trying to disapprove the resignation and to protect the Secretary.

Secondly, in July 2002, there is the “penny stocks fiasco”. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd., a government-appointed panel of inquiry, making a proposal to cancel listings of companies trading below HK$0.50 for 30 straight days caused a loss of HK$10 billion in the local stock market on that day. Public urged the two principal officials, the former FS Anthony Leung and the Secretary for the Financial Services and Treasury Frederick Ma, to bear responsibility. However, they claimed that they did not have prior knowledge of the regulation and did not engage in this kind of regulatory activity; Frederick did apologize, but only under public pressure but not the demand of CE who is suppose to hold PO accountable.

Thirdly, in July 2000, a motion for non-confidence was introduced against the Chair of Housing Authority Rosanna Wong (a non-civil servant) and the Director Tony Miller for the “short pile” scandal in the public housing construction; the motion passed but Rosanna Wong resigned beforehand and with Tong Miller staying in the Government. These cases denote there has no clear legal statement or conventions on whether a PO has to bear vicarious responsibility of misbehavior, misconduct or fault made by them or their subordinate bodies within their policy portfolio, as being on the top of hierarchy, officials are obliged to oversee operations and policy implementation within the department.

It is the belief of many Hong Kong people that under the POAS system, accountability actually decreased. Faith in the system, not high in the beginning already, fell to new lows in 2003, leading many people to dub the system AAS (Accountability Avoidance System). The protection Tung offered to his beleaguered officials was one of the factors that led to the 1 July protest in which hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong people participated. Only after the protest did Tung reluctantly accepted the resignation of Ip and Leung. Ma remains unscathed.

[edit] Unable to hold permanent secretaries accountable

The case of the “short pile” scandal shows noth the government and the Chief Executive fail hold top civil servants, namely permanent secretary, accountable. Being the top of bureaucracy, permanent secretary no longer maintain political neutrality as they are bridging public and lower civil servants’ suggestion and giving advices to directors and executives; practically they are holding power for policy-making. Political neutrality is seen as an unwritten convention to promote impartiality within government and it is “the fundamental value for good governance ^[1]” as bureaucrats are not elected, they are not meant to represent popular interest and do not capture the mandate to exert any kind of power. Yet, power is exercised and no mechanisms of accountability can hold them fully accountable as, firstly, the Legislative Council can hold answerability by inviting them into enquiry sessions,passing a motion for non-confidence does not entails dismissal nor disciplinary action as it is not stated in the Basic Law or any statute; secondly, they are not members of the Executive Council and not administratively accountable to the Chief Executive.

[edit] Future

The future of the POAS remains unclear. The current Chief Executive, Donald Tsang (himself a former POAS official) has vowed not to replace any of the POAS officials who were in office before his inauguration. However, it is not known if Tsang would scrap or extensively reform the system after he wins an election in his own right in 2007. However, many Hong Kong people believe that Tsang would hold his POAS officials more accountable for everything they do, and dismiss them when they need to.

[edit] Structure of political appointment system and its further development

Under this system, the Chief Executive is able to appoint the Secretaries of Department and the Directors of Bureau directly and they are withdrawn from the civil service. The Chief Executive can appoint the Secretaries or directors from inside and outside the civil service. They will not be civil servants and will be employed on contract. The term of their contract will not exceed the term of the Chief Executive, who nominates them for appointment. Under the new system, there are 3 Secretaries of Department and 11 Directors of Bureau. The system is aimed at raising the accountability of the civil service, so the political appointees are responsible for all their job aspects and will step down if they make any failure.

On July 31, 2006 the government released the Consultation Document on the Further Development of the Political Appointment System. Two new posts, Deputy Directors of Bureaus (DAB) and Assistants to Directors (AD)) will be added to the political appointment layer. Each Director of Bureau will be assisted by the two new appointees and constitute the political team while the civil servants carry out the administrative and executive tasks of the Government. These 2 new posts can also be drawn from within or outside the civil service and with or without political background can also be considered.

[edit] References