Talk:Plyler v. Doe

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Contents

[edit] "Illegal" vs. "undocumented"

Please note that the Supreme Court's opinion in Plyler v. Doe used both "illegal" and "undocumented" when referring to the children in question. It seems pointless to me to have a revert war over the use of one term or the other. I edited the text of the article to use both terms; hopefully that will be acceptable to everyone. Richwales 07:24, 26 June 2006 (UTC)

TheKaplan has edited Plyler v. Doe to use the term "illegal" throughout — citing the AP Stylebook to support the assertion that this should be the preferred usage. Not sure what others may think. I would again note that the text of the Supreme Court's opinion in this case used both "illegal" and "undocumented" when referring to the children whose eligibility for public education was in dispute. Richwales 15:11, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Is the distinction between "illegal" and "undocumented" necessary to the meaning of the article? Or just aesthetics? --Tim4christ17 15:24, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
No real distinction in meaning between the two terms — but, to many people, there are political connotations. As I said, there was a revert war going on over this issue a few weeks ago. Inspired in part by the Supreme Court's opinion in Plyler v. Doe using both terms more or less interchangeably, I edited the article to use both terms as well. I'm still worried that upsetting that balance may set off another revert war, but if that happens, I'll probably leave it to someone else to fight it next time. Richwales 06:02, 4 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "Undocumented (illegal) children" vs. "children of the undocumented (illegal)"

The children involved in Plyler v. Doe were born outside the United States and immigrated illegally to the U.S. along with their parents. I added a comment clarifying that this case had nothing to do with the "anchor baby" issue (alien parents having a child in the U.S. in hopes of themselves obtaining legal immigration or citizenship status). Richwales 07:24, 26 June 2006 (UTC)


[edit] United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez

This case says, and this is a direct quote,

Respondent's reliance on Reid, supra, is misplaced, since that case stands only for the proposition that United States citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Similarly, those cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional rights establish only that aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country. See, e. g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 . Respondent, however, is an alien with no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, and his legal but involuntary presence here does not indicate any substantial connection with this country. The Court of Appeals' reliance on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, is also misplaced, since that case assumed that, but did not expressly address the question whether, the Fourth Amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United States. Even assuming such aliens - who are in this country voluntarily and presumably have accepted some societal obligations - would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation differs from that of respondent, who had no voluntary connection with this country that might place him among "the people." This Court's decisions expressly according differing protection to aliens than to citizens also undermine respondent's claim that treating aliens differently under the Fourth Amendment violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 269-273.

I have highlighted the part relevant to this article.

Are any of the following in dispute?

  • It is a clarification by the Supreme Court of Plyler v Doe.
  • It states, "cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional rights establish only that aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country"
  • the point just stated has a direct relevance (given that it is directly referencing Plyler v Doe) as to when aliens receive constitutional rights/protections
  • that one does not gain citizenship before gaining constitutional protections, but rather that those constitutional protections that depend on citizenship are gained simultaneously with citizenship.

Because if none of these points are in dispute, than this reference certainly belongs in this article.-198.97.67.57 (talk) 20:11, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

First, I would dispute your linking citizenship with constitutional protections. The Plyler case certainly does not suggest that one must be a citizen in order to have rights under the Constitution. Neither does Verdugo-Urquidez.
Second, given the point at issue in Verdugo-Urquidez, I believe the only thing that case says about when aliens receive rights and protections under the Constitution is that these rights and protections do not apply to an alien who is outside the US. Lest you become overly worked up over the "substantial connections" wording in Verdugo-Urquidez, please read the opinion carefully and I think you'll agree with me that the point the court was making was that the fact that Verdugo-Urquidez had been extradited to the US was not enough to let him invoke the Fourth Amendment against search-and-seizure activity performed in Mexico before his extradition.
Third, I don't see any evidence at all that the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion constitutes "a clarification by the Supreme Court of Plyler v. Doe," if by that you mean that you think Verdugo-Urquidez alters, modifies, or overrules the holdings of Plyler in any way.
Fourth, even if the Supreme Court (in Verdugo-Urquidez) did in fact mean to say that aliens in the US aren't entitled to constitutional rights until/unless they "have developed substantial connections with" the US (whatever that might mean), any such comment would be at best obiter dicta and not a holding, since the Verdugo-Urquidez case had nothing at all to do with the constitutional rights of aliens outside the US. [Sorry, I must have been distracted when I wrote this "point"; let's just forget it. — Richwales (talk) 05:34, 18 March 2008 (UTC)]
So, no, I don't currently see any valid reason to cite Verdugo-Urquidez in this article. Richwales (talk) 21:58, 17 March 2008 (UTC)
I'm surprised at the degree of misunderstanding on this issue because Verdugo-Urquidez is available for everyone to read. Nevertheless, I'll clarify. I did not add the "see e.g., Plyer v Doe" in the court's findings, the court did. The court is the body who said that the only thing Plyer v Doe establishes is that "aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country". The court did not alter, modify, or overrule the holdings of Plyler, rather it clarified what those findings were. Some degree of the confusion which is occuring here, I think, is a basic misunderstanding on your part about Plyler. The part of Plyler which appears to contradict Verdugo-Urquidez is dicta (it is, afterall, in a footnote). Dicta has no legal weight. Once you seperate the dicta from the rest of Plyler, the statement Verdugo-Urquidez made about Plyler is self-evident.-75.179.153.110 (talk) 23:04, 17 March 2008 (UTC)
Sorry, I still don't see the relevance. Perhaps you (or some other editor) could explain it more explicitly. Also check what I just wrote on the birthright citizenship talk page. Richwales (talk) 04:53, 18 March 2008 (UTC)
You don't see the relevance? The relevance is obvious, so it must be a failure to communicate between you and I. I'll try again.
The court in Verdugo-Urquidez said that the only thing Plyer v Doe establishes is that "aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country". Given that the court clarified what they did, any statement that Plyler v Doe establishes that aliens receive such protections whether or not they have both come within the territory of and developed substantial connections with this country directly contradicts what the court found in Verdugo-Urquidez. Do you, at least, understand that?
I'll add that a holding by the Court does not have precedential effect unless it is backed by a majority of the membership. In Verdugo-Urquidez the main opinion was signed by only four out of nine justices: the concurrence did not mention Plyler at all. Grover cleveland (talk) 05:37, 18 March 2008 (UTC)
The court in Verdugo-Urquidez did not overrule Plyler. It clarified Plyler. The precedent was set by Plyler, not Verdugo-Urquidez-75.179.153.110 (talk) 10:47, 18 March 2008 (UTC)
The court did not clarify Plyler: the four-member plurality did. Big difference. Grover cleveland (talk) 15:45, 18 March 2008 (UTC)
Actually, as best I can tell, the main opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez was signed by five of the justices — Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. So it is a "majority" opinion. I would still say, though, that the significance of the "substantial connections" phrase is unclear in relation to Plyler. The court in Verdugo-Urquidez invoked this concept only in order to counter Mr. Verdugo's claim that, solely by virtue of his having been brought onto US soil as an extradited prisoner, he had acquired the same degree of Fourth Amendment protection already afforded to US citizens living abroad. If (and I still think this is a big "if") the phrase is to be included in the Plyler v. Doe article, it needs to be accompanied by a note acknowledging that the impact, if any, of Verdugo-Urquidez on future cases relating to the rights of illegal aliens in the US remains unresolved. Richwales (talk) 16:27, 18 March 2008 (UTC)
I have been pointing out that, in Verdugo-Urquidez, the court said that the only thing Plyer v Doe establishes is that "aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country". You seem to conceed that fact but make the additional argument that what the court said about Plyler in Verdugo-Urquidez is of no merit because Plyler wasn't about extradited prisoners.

You've provided no sources, however, to support your additional argument (that what the Court said about Plyler is of no merit because Plyler wasn't about extradited prisoners) and, therefore, your claim, at least for now, is original research. To maintain the dispute, reliable sources which support your additional arguement are needed.

The court in Verdugo-Urquidez invoked this concept only in order to counter Mr. Verdugo's claim that, solely by virtue of his having been brought onto US soil as an extradited prisoner Again, another irrelevant point - even if it were true. The Supreme Court does not set law on a case by case basis - that's what precedent is about. I would still say, though, that the significance of the "substantial connections" phrase is unclear in relation to Plyler. Again, the court specifically referenced Plyler. By doing so it made it as clear as humanly possible that its comments were significant about Plyler. This is what I don't understand. If I say "ball A is red" and you reply "but what significance does that have to the color of ball A?" what alternative interpretation of your statement is possible other than that you aren't listening? The court said "Plyler v Doe establishes only that X, Y, and Z" and you are replying "But what significance does that have to whether Plyler v Doe established A, B, and C?" What alternative interpretation of your statement is possible other than that you aren't listening? I'm looking for the key that will help me understand your perspective. -198.97.67.58 (talk) 17:52, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Entire section on US-born children of illegal immigrants should be removed

Unless we can find some reliable secondary sources for it. Grover cleveland (talk) 15:44, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

US Case Law is about as reliable as you can get and we've got that available already.-198.97.67.56 (talk) 17:02, 18 March 2008 (UTC)
The text of a judgment is a primary not a secondary source. We need a secondary source here. Please see WP:PSTS (excerpted below):
To the extent that part of an article relies on a primary source, it should:
  • only make descriptive claims about the information found in the primary source, the accuracy and applicability of which is easily verifiable by any reasonable, educated person without specialist knowledge, and
  • make no analytic, synthetic, interpretive, explanatory, or evaluative claims about the information found in the primary source.
Examples of primary sources include archeological artifacts; photographs; historical documents such as diaries, census results, video or transcripts of surveillance, public hearings, trials, ... Grover cleveland (talk) 00:35, 19 March 2008 (UTC)
I think the problem is not that the case law is not a reliable secondary source, but that the section is discussing "implications" of the case law and not what the case law actually says. That feels like OR: improper analysis of an otherwise acceptable source. PubliusFL (talk) 23:45, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
If U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez's statement about "substantial connections" is going to be included here, I really think we need to mention as well that this statement was made in the context of someone who was trying to argue that his presence in the US had given him Fourth Amendment protection against foreign searches and seizures, even though the only reason he was present in the US was because he had been extradited to the US from Mexico. That's at least as relevant, in my view, as the statement downplaying (as obiter dicta) the "no plausible distinction" statement from Plyler v. Doe.
In my opinion, the relevant context is that the case was about an alien who had legally entered the U.S. and was claiming Constitutional rights. Everything you mentioned isn't relevant context in my opinion. Fortunately, though, we don't have to argue over our divergent opinions about what is and what is not relevant context - because our opinions aren't relevant (it's original research). If you can find a reliable source which states that the relevant context is what you stated, than I'll happily conceed to quoting the source you provide.-75.179.153.110 (talk) 19:27, 21 March 2008 (UTC)
Will the following quote from the opening summary of the opinion suffice as a reliable source? "[Verdugo-Urquidez], however, is an alien with no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, and his legal but involuntary presence here does not indicate any substantial connection with this country." (U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260.)
Or the following from the majority opinion itself? "Justice Stevens' concurrence in the judgment takes the view that even though the search took place in Mexico, it is nonetheless governed by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because respondent was 'lawfully present in the United States . . . even though he was brought and held here against his will.' . . . But this sort of presence - lawful but involuntary - is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country. . . . When the search of his house in Mexico took place, he had been present in the United States for only a matter of days. We do not think the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him to the United States at the time the search was made." (Verdugo-Urquidez, at 271.)
As best I can tell, the question of whether Verdugo-Urquidez could claim Fourth Amendment protections by virtue of being in the US, when the only reason he was in the US was because he had been extradited, is the only context in which the majority opinion discussed the "substantial connection" concept. If someone can find an additional context for this idea in the court's opinion, I hope they will cite it for our benefit. Richwales (talk) 23:29, 21 March 2008 (UTC)
This isn't about "as best as [you] can tell" (because 'as best as you can tell' is original research). Nowhere in the case does it say "the fact that Verdugo-Urquidez was being extradited is the relevant part of the context". It is part of the context, sure, but is it anymore relevant than the guy's name or what month the trial occurred or whether the guy came from Mexico or any of countless other details? There's a big difference between -relevant- and -context-. I don't think it is relevant, but this case isn't about 'as best as you/I can tell'.-75.179.153.110 (talk) 00:16, 22 March 2008 (UTC)
Please re-read the introduction to the case, which says: "After the Government obtained an arrest warrant for respondent - a Mexican citizen and resident believed to be a leader of an organization that smuggles narcotics into this country - he was apprehended by Mexican police and transported here, where he was arrested." It is clear, from any fair reading for comprehension of the case, that the subsequent references in the majority opinion to Verdugo's presence in the U.S. (e.g., "legal but involuntary presence here", "brought and held here against his will") are referring to his having been extradited from Mexico, as opposed to entering the US by some other voluntary or involuntary means. One doesn't need to engage in original research to come to that conclusion. Indeed, if anything would constitute original research here, it would be insisting that the fact of Verdugo's extradition was not relevant, or that some other factor (not mentioned) is relevant to understanding what the court's majority meant when they brought up the "substantial connection" concept. Richwales (talk) 01:52, 22 March 2008 (UTC)
Again, determining what is and what is not a 'fair reading' is original research.

You seem to be arguing that, because something is found in the first sentence, it is relevant context. If that were true, then the case would not apply to a.) gang members who weren't gang leaders b.) people who came from countries other than Mexico c.) gang leaders involved in international sex slavery instead of the international drug trade. just to name a few. I would contend that 'gang leader', 'drug trade', and 'Mexico' aren't relevant context either and they occur in the same breath with 'transported here'. But, again, what you and I believe isn't relevant. What is relevant is reliable sources. You will note that I have not argued for adding to the article any statement saying what is and what is not relevant context - because statements either way require sources.-75.179.153.110 (talk) 03:00, 22 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Request for comments

We have a disagreement over whether a comment about Plyler v. Doe in another case (U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez) does, or does not, belong in this article. This disagreement is also spilling over into the article on birthright citizenship in the United States of America; see that article's talk page as well as this one. I'm posting this RfC in an effort to get additional input from editors with a background in the law, who can clarify for us the criteria for determining the significance and relevance of a case and how far we can go in deciding if a case is or is not relevant without violating WP:OR or WP:SYNTH. Richwales (talk) 18:31, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Outside RfC comment: Court cases can speak for themselves. That is, when the majority explicitly says they're modifying, extending, or overruling a holding, it's fine for us to use it. Legal opinions are one of the exceptions to PSTS framework because they're reliably published, and the best source for material when the holding is clear. That said, the majority is doing no such thing here, and indeed there is no majority, only a plurality. Cases get cited all of the time, and Wikipedians are not in a position to judge what a court means if the court does not make itself clear. Therefore, this does seem to be SYN without secondary analysis.
I decided to look for secondary analysis—law journal articles are not rare. There are over 900 secondary articles in Lexisnexis citing Verdugo-Urquidez. Of these, only 4 even mention Pyler, and of these four, none talk about Pyler's influence on the holding of Verdugo-Urquidez. In fact, just one article mentions them in the same breath. In a footnote to the comment "Verdugo in Cyberspace" the author writes "Verdugo-Urquidez tried to rely upon alien's rights cases in arguing that foreign nationals are able to claim Fourth Amendment protections. [footnote: Verdugo-Urquidez cited such cases as Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (according illegal aliens Equal Protection Clause rights) ...]"
Note that even this solitary reference is about Verdugo-Urquidez's argument, not the holding. A mention here simply fails WP:WEIGHT and appears to be original synthesis. Cool Hand Luke 01:55, 19 March 2008 (UTC)
Outside RfC comment: I would like to "affirm" (ah, there's a legal term) the general comments by editor Cool Hand Luke in his first paragraph above, regarding Wikipedia's use of court cases. As far as the specifics regarding the Plyler case and the Verdugo case, I am of no help right now, as I have not yet studied the decisions and I don't follow these two Wikipedia articles closely. Just happened across this. I'll try to put my two cents in soon. Yours, Famspear (talk) 03:26, 19 March 2008 (UTC)


Outside RfC comment: I would also like to "affirm" (!) the comments of Cool Hand Luke. Looking at the judgement, Plyler v Doe is simply used as an authority/precedent. Very common in common law legal systems. If we allowed this small comment into the article, we will open the floodgates to hundreds or thousands of similar examples contained in judgements. I agree this fails WP:WEIGHT. Smith190 (talk) 15:03, 22 March 2008 (UTC)


Outside RfC comment: Having read both Plyler and Verdugo it seems clear to me that the reference to Plyler in Verdugo is merely meant to distinguish the presence of the appellant's presence in the U.S. in Verdugo from those in Plyler, i.e. non-citizens within the U.S. are entitled to certain Constitutional protections (Equal Protection in Plyler) but the Court isn't going to extend the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the appellant in Verdugo based solely on the fact that he was brought into the U.S. to be prosecuted. That's the meaning of the quoted text at issue here. To make a rule out of the Court's reference to significant connections in its reference to Plyler would be misplaced in my view. redwater —Preceding comment was added at 02:06, 8 April 2008 (UTC)