Talk:Paul Tillich

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[edit] Page archived

page archived if only to provide a moment's peace from the relentless screeds. saul tillich, why not just start a freaking blog somewhere. you aren't interested in writing an encyclopedia, you're interested in promulgating your views. that's just what blogs are for. they're great! even i have one! Anastrophe (talk) 04:00, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

That isn't archiving, it's censorship. Had archiving been your real objective, you might have archived material more than a month old. Instead, you deleted -- that's what you really did -- fresh material with which you disagreed. I posted the commentary you call a "screed" at 2:22 on March 11; you deleted it less that two hours later at 04:00. And your use of the epithet "screed" demonstrates that you knew exactly what you were doing, and why.
You are free to delete ("edit mercilessly") material in the Tillich article. You are not authorized to delete the opinions and arguments of contributors to the Talk page. You yourself complained vigorously when, in quoting you for purposes of refutation, I corrected a typo of yours by capitalizing the first word of a sentence. So please quit censoring.Saul Tillich (talk) 00:27, 13 March 2008 (UTC)
please visit the link to the archives, conveniently located above. your claim that i deleted your comments is utterly meritless. Anastrophe (talk) 01:27, 13 March 2008 (UTC)
That isn't archiving, it's censorhsip.
It's called keeping the crap to a minimum Saul. Jonalexdeval (talk) 01:57, 13 March 2008 (UTC)


[edit] Tillich Article’s Section on Theology

The article’s “Theology” section pretends to explain, but the author (Jonalexdeval) is merely paraphrasing statements he himself doesn’t understand. At the same time, in referring to “the norm,” which is “Jesus as the Christ,” the author misleads his readers in four ways:

  • By failing to say that Tillich, in many ways and in many places, said he did not believe in the divinity of Jesus, the author creates the false impression that Tillich regarded Jesus as a divine savior (Tillich didn’t believe in souls or life after death either).
  • The author also fails to say that Tillich uses the phrase “as the Christ” to differentiate between the supernatural Christ of mythology and the real historical Jesus of Nazareth.
  • The author fails again to say that Tillich created his “norm” in order to create a theology that would not crumble if, some time in the future, evidence emerged that the historical Jesus never existed. The Christ of what Tillich regards as mythology would still exist (as a myth) and would have the crucial characteristic Tillich bases his concept of God on.
  • As the biggest failure of all, the author ignores Tillich’s careful explanation of why “Jesus as the Christ” is the norm. Tillich’s reason is that, according to the Council of Nicaea, the Christ was not half God and half man but “fully God and fully man.” The norm calls for a God that is fully God and fully man.

As the article now stands, it is mostly unintelligible gibberish, meaningless abstraction. Take this pair of sentences: “It is important to remember that, for Tillich, no formulation of the question [a question that the method of correlation answers] can contradict the theological answer. This is because the Christian message claims, a priori, that the logos ‘who became flesh’ is also the universal logos of the Greeks.” Don’t you see the non sequitur? How does either (a) identifying the Greek Logos with God or (b) having God become incarnated as a man make it impossible for a question to contradict a theological answer, assuming contradiction really is impossible? Taken literally, those are two unrelated assertions. The author is claiming, thoughtlessly and without comprehension (just paraphrasing what either McKelway or Tillich said), that if God is not or was not also the Logos, or else was not incarnated, a question COULD contradict the theological answer.

The author pretends to explain but clearly doesn’t understand what Tillich means in the two sentences, taken from another source, that he paraphrases. He is taking the words literally, whereas they have no literal meaning. What does it mean for a question to contradict its answer? How does God’s being the Logos prevent such contradiction? Taken literally, the words are unadulterated nonsense. Tillich is using his private symbolic language. To those who understand this symbolic language, the sentences do make sense. But I challenge the author (and his friends) to explain, by giving a nontheological example of a Q and its A, (1) what it means for a question to “contradict” an answer and (2) how, if “the Logos became flesh” (Jn. 1:14), does it become impossible for a question to contradict an answer. Not even the author can explain either (1) or (2), so what we have is nonsense, gibberish. (Only those who know what “question” and “answer” symbolize, what “contradict” means in this context, and why “Jesus as the Christ” must be “the norm,” can turn nonsense into sense.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Saul Tillich (talk • contribs) 02:22, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

I was trying to be concise when I wrote the section, so some important aspects I only briefly touched on which would actually require much more explanation. The statement "no formulation of the question can contradict the answer" has to do with Tillich's view (explicitly stated somewhere in the intro to ST) that the theological answer can and must be reformulated in light of new formulations of the existential questions. This is his philosophical honesty at work, and he can claim to be constantly true the Christian message throughout this modification of the theological answer because, as he claims, the logos of Christianity is identical with the Greek logos. Why does this latter claim support the former? Because if the two logos are the same then any reformulation of the philosophical logos will, a priori, be compatible with the Christian logos (so long as it remains true to the norm). And they are the same in the first place because Christianity uses the Greek terminology from the get-go. The reasoning does involve this basic assumption, that on a deeper structural level the the question and answer involve the same principle or truth, one universal and the other concrete. Jonalexdeval (talk) 20:19, 11 March 2008 (UTC)
Your answers are nonresponsive. My first question was: what does it mean for a question to contradict an answer? And I asked for an example. Instead, as you have done several times the past, you falsely assert that Tillich gives the answer somewhere (“somewhere in the intro to ST”). But the answer isn’t in ST or anywhere else. You don’t know the answer; and the first of the two consecutive sentences from your article that I quoted remain, as I said, nonsense. You don’t understand your own writing, and your readers won’t understand either.
I next asked you to explain the non sequitur in your second bold face sentence, which says that a PHILOSOPHICAL question can’t contradict its THEOLOGICAL answer “BECAUSE . . .the logos who became flesh is also the universal logos of the Greeks.” Where is the causal relationship – the “because” connection? You again give a nonresponsive answer by observing that the Christian logos is also the Greek logos. I didn’t ask if logos A = logos B. The logos of John (the God/Logos who became flesh) is indeed the Greek logos – that is the premise of my question – but this fact has nothing to do with why a philosophical question can’t contradict its answer IF logos A = logos B. The Christian logos is a religious concept, not an answer; the Greek logos is a philosophical (metaphysical actually) concept, not a question.
Your reply includes a statement purporting to explain why Tillich “can claim to be constantly true the Christian message.” Nonresponsive again. I didn’t ask how or whether Tillich can claim to be true to the Christian message. I asked how what you say about the logos makes it impossible for a question to contradict its answer. As things stand, you don’t understand your own writing, which makes no sense at all. Saul Tillich (talk) 01:14, 16 March 2008 (UTC)


[edit] Turning Nonsense into Sense

The reason your paraphrased summary of what Tillich wrote is nonsensical is that it misrepresents what Tillich wrote. You claim Tillich said this: “It is important to remember that, for Tillich, no formulation of the question can contradict the theological answer. This is because the Christian message claims, a priori, that the logos ‘who became flesh’ is also the universal logos of the Greeks.” But Tillich actually said that no philosophy (not “no question”) based on the Greek logos can contradict the logos of John 1:14 (meaning a philosophy–not an “answer”-- based on John 1:14). The words “question” and “answer” do not appear in the quotation that follows; neither does “because” or its equivalent.

Here, from page 28 of ST, vol. 1, is what Tillich actually wrote: “The Christian claim that the logos who has become concrete in Jesus as the Christ [John 1:14] is at the same time the universal [Greek] logos includes the claim that wherever the logos is at work it agrees with the Christian message. No philosophy which is obedient to the universal [Greek] logos can contradict [a philosophy based on] the concrete logos [John 1:14], the Logos ‘who became flesh’.” The implicit reason the two philosophies can’t conflict is that the Greek logos and the Christian logos (God) are the same.

Had you understood what Tillich means by an “apologetic” theology you might have avoided turning Tillich’s thought into nonsense. An apologetic theology is a proselytizing theology. More specifically, it is a theology in which the proselytizer says to the person being recruited, “Our God is your God under another name.” Example: “Our God is Allah under a different name, so you can become a Christian.” When Paul and the author of the gospel of John proselytized in the Hellenistic (culturally Greek) world, they told the Hellenists that they could become Christians because their “God”–not really a god but the metaphysical Logos–was God under another name. “John” claimed that the Greek logos became Jesus. To my knowledge, nobody has ever questioned the obvious fact that, in applying the name “Logos” to God and Jesus, John’s author was not entertaining the idea that there is more than one logos.

In calling his own theology apologetic, Tillich is doing essentially the same thing as Paul and “John.” He is offering a “theology” of humanism to the Christians he would recruit to humanism by giving the name “God” to his metaphorical god, humanity. Christianity’s God becomes the counterpart of the Hellenists’ logos. Tillich is saying, in effect, “you can become humanists because your God of theism and my ‘God above the God of theism’ are both named God.” —Preceding unsigned comment added by 141.156.51.132 (talk) 00:05, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

Let's put it this way. The theological response (responding to the existential issues of philosophy) is based on revelation and hence based on "the logos become flesh". So the FORM of this theological response can be modified and changed in order that it may ACTUALLY BE a response to the existential issues. When Tillich says that you cannot just throw the Christian message like a stone into a crowd he means that the theologian must mold the theology to the audience, times, and culture. This molding means changing the FORM but not the CONTENT of the Christian message.
The reason why no formulation of the existential issues can contradict the theological response is because this FORM of the theological response is DETERMINED BY the existential issues (philosophy) AND BECAUSE the CONTENT of the response is NOT essentially altered or modified by the existential formulation. So the form is modified while the content is changed, hence the existential analysis can be formulated and re-formulated through various historical epochs along with the FORM of the response without doing "damage" to the CONTENT of the message. The other part (about the logos) explains why the content is not altered).
Now if you want to know PRECISELY in all the gory details EXACTLY why and how the logos issues connects up with this, well, I think we are safe to say that the issue is beyond the scope of this article. We can be content here to say that, in any case, these are Tillich's words. Delirium (talk) 10:38, 30 March 2008 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jonalexdeval (talk • contribs) 23:54, 29 March 2008 (UTC)
Your reply is again nonresponsive – and nonsensical. It fails to address either (1) the nonsensical nature of your article’s false paraphrase that claims Tillich said no QUESTION can contradict its ANSWER and (2) my accurate quotation of what Tillich actually said, specifically, that no PHILOSOPHY based on the Greek logos can (philosophy A) contradict a PHILOSOPHY based on the Bible’s Johannine logos (philosophy B). Your reply (above) asserts that philosophy A can be made consistent with philosophy B by changing the form of philosophy A without changing its substance.
What you say is again nonresponsive because it deals with a Tillich quotation that exists only in your imagination. Tillich said nothing about form; he was talking about a conflict in substance. Your reply is also nonsensical. If the substance of philosophy A conflicts with the substance of philosophy B, changing the form of philosophy A without changing its substance can’t eliminate the conflict. Suppose philosophy A, theism, says in spoken language (form = oral) that a supernatural being is God but philosophy B, pantheism, says in an written language (form = written) that a metaphysical “essence” within everything that exists is God. Changing the form of philosophy A from oral to written, or for that matter from poetry to prose, cannot eliminate the substantive conflict. You still have two different definitions of God (a substantive difference). Your answer is therefore nonsensical.
The real answer reflects what Tillich means by “apologetic theology,” a concept your article fails to grasp. In calling his theology apologetic, Tillich is analogically doing what Paul and John did. He is proselytizing by telling people who worship the God of theism that both their God and his have the same name, “God” (even though the substance of the proselytizer’s God is vastly different). Tillich is offering a “theology” of humanism to the Christians he would recruit to humanism by giving the name “God” to his metaphorical god, humanity. Christianity’s God becomes the counterpart of the Hellenists’ logos. Just as Paul told the Hellenists (falsely) that Christianity’s God was the logos – the two concepts are really entirely different – Tillich is saying, in effect, “you can become humanists because your God of theism and my ‘God above the God of theism’ are both named God.”
I should have commented on what Tillich means in his Systematic Theology’s page 28 quotation when he implies that the “concrete” (Jesus) and the “universal” are identical. He is alluding to a characteristic of Hegel’s metaphysical Spirit, which is also a characteristic of Tillich’s “God above the God of theism.” The Spirit is essentially “one” entity, the invisible essence of everything in the universe, but it is composed of many things – everything specific thing in the universe. Spirit is one composed of many. Both Hegel and Tillich use many variations of the “one composed of many” (or one = many) theme. These variations include (1) one and many, (2) universal (general) and particular, (3) infinite and finite, (4) abstract and concrete, and (5) world and self. Like Hegel’s Spirit, Tillich’s “God above the God of theism” is both one and many, both universal and particular, both infinite and finite, both abstract and concrete, and both world and self – all of which amount to the same thing.
Were there no other information to go on, Tillich’s God could be interpreted as either (1) the God of pantheism or (2) humanity. Both potential gods are one and many, universal and particular. Humanity is the universal, infinite, abstract, or world – one (general). Individual humans constitute the particular, finite, concrete, or self category – many. Tillich therefore asks, “How is it possible that the many are diverse, but nevertheless form the unity [one] of a cosmos, of a world, of a universe?” He answers: “There must be an original unity of the one and the many.” (Tillich, 1967b, p. 144).
But is Tillich’s “God above God” the metaphysical God of pantheism or the figurative God of humanism? Most interpreters call Tillich a pantheist, an interpretation the article unconscionably hides. But Tillich has specifically repudiated pantheism (e.g., ST, v. 1, pp. 276-77; ST, v.2, pp. 6-7) and, in more general language, he has said that supernaturalism (which pantheism is a form of) is alien to “all” of his thinking. So we know Tillich’s one-composed-of-many God isn’t the literal “universal” of Hegel’s pantheism. Then what is the God above God? Tillich’s “norm,” “Jesus as the Christ,” says God must conform to the ruling of the Council of Nicaea. Nicaea held that the Christ was “fully God and fully man,” not half-God and half-man. When humanity is defined as God, God is “fully God and fully man,” because God is man. Tillich’s Hegelian dialectic progresses from God (thesis) to man (antithesis, the opposite of the thesis) to God = man (synthesis).
Why haven’t you at least revised the article to eliminate the false, nonsensical paraphrase that says a question can contradict its answer? Tillich never said what you say he said, namely, that “no formulation of the question can contradict the theological answer.” He said, “No philosophy which is obedient to the universal [Greek] logos can contradict [a philosophy based on] the concrete logos [John 1:14], the Logos ‘who became flesh’.” Saul Tillich (talk) 02:10, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

While this is all very interesting, Wikipedia isn't really the place to debate Tillich's theology. The article should have a simple summary of the various opinions scholars have put forth in the literature, and not take sides. --Delirium (talk) 10:37, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

I agree that the article should summarize "the various opinions scholars have put forth in the literature, and not take sides." I am criticizing the article for (1) taking sides and (2) presenting only one of the several interpretations. Roughly 3/4 of the scholars take Tillich at his word when he says the God of theism doesn't exist and when he calls for allegiance to "the God above the God of theism." All but one of the 3/4 who offer nontheistic interpretations of Tillich regard him as an atheist; one regards him as a panENtheist, which combines pantheism with theism. Most of the other interpreters consider Tillich a pantheist (pantheism is a form of atheism), but one -- the only one that is consistent with Tillich's repeated disavowals of supernaturalism -- holds that the "God above God" is humanity. Jonalexdeval's article ignores, indeed hides, these other interpretations, pretending that all but a "tiny minority" of interpreters regard Tillich as a theist. Saul Tillich (talk) 02:10, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
Pardon a nitpick, but "is a form of atheism" seems notably absent from the Pantheism article. 86.133.141.52 (talk) 03:28, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
Your nitpick is reasonable but it depends on how you define atheism. Atheism has both a narrow, or literal, meaning and a broad meaning. The narrow meaning, which I use, is disbelief in monotheism's Supreme Being -- the personal, caring, intervening, concerned-about-man God of theism. The broad meaning is disbelief in any supernatural entity (this includes impersonal metaphysical entities like pantheism's impersonal "essence" of nature) that is "God" to the believer. An intermediate definition would exclude polytheism, with its many personal gods, from the definition of atheism.
Those pantheists who have weighed in on the linguistic issue typically regard themselves as atheists, because pantheism is a form of rebellion against belief in the personal, self-conscious God of theism. A pantheism website, www.pantheism.net, has this to say: "Atheism simply makes the statement that there is no creator God, no personal God, no judging God. Beyond that atheists can be nature-lovers or nature-haters, they can see life and the Universe as joyful - or absurd. . . . World Pantheism [the website organization] has many members who would also describe themselves as atheists and/or humanists, but to these they add an emotional and aesthetic dimension in their connection with nature, the universe, and their fellow humans."Saul Tillich (talk) 23:03, 20 April 2008 (UTC)